Idlib: The Intersection of Conflicting International Views and Interests

For several weeks now, the Syrian crisis has focused on whether or not the Syrian army, Russia, and Iran will attack Idlib. With an agreement reached on Monday (September 18) in Sochi between the presidents of Russia and Turkey (without the presence of representatives from the Syrian government and Iran), this attack will be postponed until further notice. It seems that certain geopolitical and economic considerations in relations with Turkey, particularly keeping the rift in its relations with the US and the West active, have led the Kremlin to be cautious and considerate of Turkey's interests and views, including on the Idlib issue, an approach that may not necessarily be pleasing to the Damascus government and the Islamic Republic. Thus, the fate of Idlib is likely to become, like other areas in northern and eastern Syria where the Assad regime's control has not yet been restored, a function of the larger political equations regarding the future of the Syrian political system and the military presence of Iran in the country. Idlib is the last point still held by opposition rebels against the Assad regime, and at least some of them will not easily surrender to other areas, as on one hand, it would mean the definitive end of their existence and confrontation with the Syrian regime, and on the other hand, especially if Turkey does not open its borders, they have almost no other place to retreat and escape. Of the nearly three million people residing in Idlib, one and a half million have come from other places, either fleeing the war and conflicts between the parties or following the surrender of extremist and non-extremist armed groups in Homs, Daraa, and Eastern Ghouta, which allowed them to go to Idlib with their families. The number of these rebels is estimated to be around one hundred thousand. Some of them, including extremists and non-extremists, have been persuaded by Turkey to gather under the umbrella of the 'National Liberation Front.' The part that includes only the extremists, centered around Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra and close to al-Qaeda), is not practically under Turkish influence, and at the same time, a strong geographical and theoretical border does not completely separate these two fronts (despite Turkey's wishes and efforts). One of the reasons Turkey provides for delaying the attack by Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime is the opportunity to separate the ranks of these two fronts against each other. In a data representation published by a research center close to the Turkish government, the status and capabilities of four active rebel forces in Idlib can be observed, although many more independent sources estimate the number of rebels affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to be higher than this graphic suggests, meaning that the figure this Turkish institution mentions for the National Liberation Front's forces aligns more with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's strength and vice versa. Regarding the record of some of these rebels, The Washington Post has published a report focusing on their treatment of non-affiliated rebel forces and those unwilling to cooperate with them. There are mentions of execution sites and that over the past years, a total of ten thousand people have been arrested by these forces in Aleppo, with no information on the fate of some of them. Turkey's motivations for preventing an attack by Assad's forces on Idlib are important for several reasons. Turkey has been responsible for Idlib as one of the four de-escalation zones in Syria under the Astana agreements and has established 12 military checkpoints there. Turkey's exit from this area would effectively mean a reduction in its maneuverability regarding Syria's future and its claims in the power equations in Damascus. An attack on Idlib would also incapacitate the rebel forces close to Turkey, forces that were supposed to serve as a means for Turkey's maneuvering in the power equations in Syria and possibly be relied upon in conflicts with the Kurds in northern Syria to weaken their position and claims. It is likely that the Syrian regime, after gaining control over Idlib, would seek to exert military and political pressure for Turkey's exit from northern Syria, which would naturally not be pleasing to Ankara. An attack on Idlib could also unleash a flood of refugees towards Turkey, adding to the burden of the current three and a half million displaced people on the Turkish government. The influx of both affiliated and non-affiliated, extremist and non-extremist rebels into Turkey could become a security issue for this country. The US and Europe do not share Turkey's motivations in opposing the attack on Idlib and have their own problems with this attack. Regardless of the potential humanitarian disaster resulting from the attack (which may not differ much from the attacks on Mosul and Raqqa and their humanitarian consequences), the Assad regime's control over Idlib could place it in an even stronger position and further diminish its (and also Russia and Iran's) readiness to participate in political processes for power-sharing in Damascus and to shape a political structure that breaks the monopoly of this regime (and Russia and Iran) and allows other regional and international powers to have a share in the power equations in Damascus. Obtaining more serious commitments from Russia and the Assad regime to end or limit Iran's presence in Syria is also of little importance in the current struggle over Idlib. The threats and media posturing from both sides regarding the nature and potential consequences of using chemical weapons are partly a part of the pressure exerted in this political struggle. Whether it is the US's exit from the JCPOA, the missile and aerial attacks by Israel on Iranian military bases and facilities in Syrian territory, or the intense negotiations with Russia and the political pressure in the equations related to the recapture of Idlib, all of these are platforms that the US and Israel are using to limit the power of the Islamic Republic in the region in general and to cut off this government’s use of Syria as a channel for supplying weapons and munitions to Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is of utmost importance for Israel that Iran, with its approach towards the existence of this country, has no military or advisory presence in Syria and along Israel's borders. The West also has other levers; however, the West has other tools at its disposal to achieve its two main demands in Syria, namely to compel the Assad government to seriously participate in processes related to creating a new political structure and to prevent the restoration of conditions prior to the outbreak of the crisis in 2011, as well as to cut Iran's military presence in Syria. Part of Syrian territory, which is the main center of oil and gas production in the country and its agricultural production, remains in the hands of the US and the Kurds allied with it. The withdrawal from these areas and the restoration of Damascus's control over them, as well as the lifting of Western economic sanctions against Syria and active participation in the reconstruction of this country, which Russia and Iran cannot handle alone, are also levers and platforms for the West to achieve the aforementioned demands. Overall, despite the military victories of the Assad regime with the help of Russia and Iran in the past three years, the situation has now reached a new turning point, and the restoration of the Assad government's control over other parts of Syria has become more a matter of political interactions and exchanges among regional and international powers than a military issue, with the exchanges primarily focusing on the future political structure of Syria and the continuation of Iran's military presence in this country. Although there is greater consensus among regional and international powers regarding limiting Iran's presence in Syria, the issue of Syria's future political structure is more complex, and Western countries, Arab states, and Turkey have differing views on the Arab nature of Syria, the rights of the Kurds, and so on, which are not necessarily reconcilable.