If Trump Does Not Certify the JCPOA...

A short time remains until October 12, when Donald Trump, the President of the United States, is set to announce his administration's final opinion on Iran's compliance with the nuclear agreement (JCPOA). While providing 90-day reports is an internal matter and the responsibility of the U.S. President to Congress, there is also a global dimension since representatives of the 5+1 countries signed this agreement and the UN Security Council approved it. Therefore, China and Russia, who have veto power in the Security Council, have interests in this agreement alongside the U.S. and Europe. For two years, Donald Trump has opposed the JCPOA and promised to nullify it during his election campaign, but since January 2017, he has confirmed Iran's compliance twice in the 90-day reports to Congress. Now, the deadline for the third report is approaching, and Trump wants to fulfill another campaign promise. Trump's latest action regarding the public health insurance program instead of the so-called 'Obamacare' has not succeeded and has not yet been implemented. When considering Trump's opposition to the JCPOA alongside other programs that his administration has suspended, one can clearly see the 'Obama removal' plan. Although the element of surprise should not be overlooked, if the decision to cancel the JCPOA is part of a broader 'Obama removal' strategy, the likelihood of it occurring increases due to Trump's insistence. Since the recommendations of the President's advisory team to prove Iran's non-compliance with the nuclear agreement have not been officially, substantively, and documentedly published, and the President has only hinted a few times that 'you will see' and 'I have decided,' the market for speculation is hot, and correspondingly, there are many opposing and supporting reactions. With this introduction, alongside presenting the facts, some possible scenarios are examined, and it is noted that as of the moment of writing this article, there is no certainty regarding President Trump's decision: What will Trump do? It is likely that Trump's report to Congress will address a series of Iranian activities known as destabilizing regional policies without announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. Based on this report, Trump will call for the imposition of the most severe economic sanctions against Iran, with sanctions on the Revolutionary Guard being the most prominent part. He will justify Iran's non-compliance with the 'spirit' of the JCPOA by citing a list of non-nuclear allegations, alongside interpretations of the JCPOA text as potential and future violations, as well as actions such as the development and testing of ballistic missiles, cyberattacks, and human rights violations. The main issue is that some major powers, even those defending the JCPOA, will not only not defend Iran against these allegations but will also call for increased pressure on Iran. The focus of these allegations is on ballistic missile production and military threats alongside 'support for terrorism.' Trump's argument is that if the JCPOA were a well-written and negotiated agreement, Iran would not engage in such activities. On the other hand, critics of the JCPOA argue that according to the text of the agreement, Iran will be able to return to the starting point after a period of seven to ten years and produce materials usable for nuclear bombs with access to more advanced technologies. Therefore, the JCPOA is not a good agreement and should be renegotiated to determine long-term limitations. However, it is likely that President Trump will not declare the JCPOA void because in that case, he would have less leverage and would shorten Iran's path back to the starting point. Even if Trump asks Congress to legislate regarding America's remaining in this multinational agreement, this would practically mean the approval or disapproval of the JCPOA by Congress two and a half years after its acceptance by the Obama administration. Trump would likely prefer the JCPOA to remain suspended to keep the leverage intact for now. However, if the Trump administration does not confirm Iran's compliance in its report, Congress will have 60 days to reinstate the sanctions that have currently been suspended. The reinstatement of sanctions would turn the issue into a global economic crisis and negatively impact many industries and banks worldwide. Opposition testimonies from General Dunford, the senior security advisor to the White House, and General Mattis, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, explicitly distinguish Iran's commitments to the JCPOA from what is referred to as destabilizing and security-threatening activities in the region, and like Secretary of State Tillerson, they do not deny Iran's compliance in the nuclear context. Moreover, General Mattis and General Dunford have called for the Trump administration to cooperate with the JCPOA, considering it within the framework of U.S. national interests and security. However, President Trump has shown that he can formulate policies without regard to advisors, and the Constitution allows him to do so in many cases. The political landscape in the U.S. is not solely influenced by the opinions of these two generals or the Secretary of State. Many senators and representatives in Congress view Iran as a threat to the region and U.S. allies in the Middle East, and the political weight of this perspective can influence lawmakers and ultimately turn the President's opinion into law. Although, unlike the case of 'Obamacare,' lawmakers are not at risk of losing voter support, and there are many opponents of Iran; however, there are also numerous international positive and negative factors. As a result, achieving consensus for the repeal of the JCPOA seems more difficult. Some of these factors include: Europe - Several EU member countries helped draft the JCPOA text, which Iran signed. Following that, many EU countries, despite the non-supportive stance of the U.S., entered into significant trade agreements with Iran. It is true that the share of European trade with Iran is negligible compared to trade with the U.S., but conversely, the U.S. is also dependent on trade with Europe and cannot easily impose sanctions against Iran on its European partners as it did before the JCPOA without calculating the impact on its trade relations with Europe. Before the JCPOA, sanctions were gradually imposed, but now they could quickly return, which would harm the European economic system and simultaneously destroy Iran's emerging economy. Erin Cunningham, in her article in the Washington Post, states, 'European political-diplomatic officials, along with executives and business leaders, are already organizing their counter-offensive against the Trump administration's policy and urging the U.S. Congress to push back against Trump's pressure to prevent the collapse of the nuclear deal.' Helga Schmid, Secretary-General of the European External Action Service, believes that 'the nuclear deal has been effective and is working; the world will be less secure without this agreement.' European diplomats and business leaders hope that the 60-day window for the U.S. Congress will provide them a 'buffer zone' to convince Congress to save this agreement. One senior executive of a multinational institution based in Europe believes that there is no alternative to this agreement and that 'it is an illusion to think that the case [of the agreement] can be reopened and renegotiated.' If Washington seeks to implement its decision to renegotiate or terminate the nuclear deal, it would effectively block the trade exchanges of other nations with the U.S., but if it tightens the pressure on Iran, it may be more effective. Internal situation in Iran - If Trump's actions lead to the nullification of the nuclear agreement with Iran, the resulting crisis may not be manageable in Europe and could lead to a more significant crisis of unrest and instability within Iran. The regime is divided internally into two factions: those opposed to negotiations with the U.S. and those in favor. Opponents label supporters as 'U.S. lackeys,' while supporters will call opponents 'monopolists' and 'enemies' of the people. Naturally, analyzing the sociological aspects of such a situation is beyond the scope of this article. Israel's perspective - Israel's view of Iran has always been from the perspective of the security and survival of the Israeli state. This perspective has been repeatedly attacked verbally by Iran, so that despite the absence of animosity between the peoples of the two countries, leaders on both sides view each other with hostility. Iran supports armed opponents of Israel by any means possible; Israel views Iran's technological achievements - especially in the nuclear field - as fundamentally anti-Israeli developments. With this perspective, Israel seeks to influence any government it can. Israel has repeatedly asked Russia, European countries, and the U.S. to contain Iran's power. Many Europeans have acted in this direction, and the U.S., which considers Israel a strategic partner in the Middle East, always prioritizes its policies for Israel's security. Ballistic missiles - One of the most important motivations and causes of the current situation is Iran's ballistic missile tests, which have occasionally been accompanied by slogans (including calls for the destruction of Israel) and are viewed by many observers, including European partners and U.S. allies, as a threat to global security. The impact of North Korea's experience fuels this perception that these missiles will ultimately be used to carry nuclear warheads and therefore contradict UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and are against the text and spirit of the JCPOA. Hostile reactions from Iran - In recent days, a new strategy has gained strength in the U.S. that considers a specific approach towards the Revolutionary Guard and the potential classification of it among terrorist groups. Based on this approach, all activities of the Revolutionary Guard may be fully sanctioned. Until now, specific elements of the Revolutionary Guard have been sanctioned, but its entirety, which has very extensive military, economic-commercial, and even political activities, has not been targeted for sanctions. The clarification of the dimensions of this new U.S. approach has provoked reactions from commanders of the Revolutionary Guard and the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, threatened that under such circumstances, all U.S. bases in the region would be targeted by Iranian missiles. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, also threatened the U.S. with reciprocal actions, stating that the U.S. would make itself 'more despised' and 'more isolated' among the Iranian people with such actions. Other sources have also claimed Iran's 'hard, decisive, and crushing response.' These reactions can be seen as a slope towards military friction. On both sides, there is a possibility of resorting to force to resolve the political issue, and this is calculated, but part of this capability on both sides has a propaganda aspect. The possibility that a small friction in the region could rapidly escalate and ignite the flames of war is very high. A war where the loser and winner are not clear in the short term. It should not be forgotten that great powers may also resort to war to maintain their superiority and prestige. Iran's choices - Iranian officials, including the Foreign Minister, have referred to Iran's 'multiple nuclear choices'; one of these choices is to use European leverage against the U.S., which is currently active in various ways. Another leverage is to use the internal system of the JCPOA and the commission addressing related issues, which includes various levels of technical expertise to diplomatic negotiations. There is also the possibility of using the systems and mechanisms provided within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN itself, which have been utilized in the best possible way by garnering support from the Agency. The UN's support is conditional and within the framework of the JCPOA as a non-proliferation treaty; otherwise, this organization does not unconditionally support Iran regarding human rights, missile activities, destabilizing actions, and support for certain groups. Under certain conditions, Russia could negotiate with the U.S. on behalf of Iran and incur costs for preserving the nuclear deal from other issues like Syria and the fight against ISIS. However, Russia's relationship with the U.S. is severely vulnerable and under scrutiny from Trump's opponents, and currently, the maximum Russia may do is to protect its relationship with the U.S. and prevent further damage to it. China's interests in Iran have significantly expanded economically with the implementation of the JCPOA, but there is no clear agreement between China and the U.S. on how to deal with North Korea. For this reason, the only role China can play in saving Iran's nuclear deal is to neutralize acute actions in the Security Council. In fact, China and Russia would potentially side with Iran in the Security Council in the event of a severe crisis, but their votes are unpredictable and may fluctuate between abstention and negative depending on the case. The possibility of resorting to Oman - A point that should not be completely overlooked under any circumstances is the possibility of quiet diplomatic movement behind the scenes by Iran to preserve the nuclear agreement. Just a few days ago, Western diplomats residing in Tehran (who are not American, of course) stated that negotiations had begun between European and Iranian officials regarding Iran's ballistic missile program and Iran's support for proxy groups fighting in Syria and Iraq. Although the Iranian Foreign Ministry immediately denied this news, the subsequent visit of Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, to Muscat, the capital of Oman, cannot be separated from this rumor that the Iranian delegation may be discussing the situation at the margins of the summit.