Implementation of the Vienna Nuclear Agreement and Concerns of Critics

On the day of announcing the implementation of the Vienna agreement, politicians from the 5+1 group and the Islamic Republic emphasized the concessions they received from the other side or its impacts (a safer world). Supporters of this agreement will also point out its positive aspects. However, what do Iranian and non-Iranian critics say about various aspects of it, and what concerns do they have? Where are Iran-West relations headed after the agreement? Contrary to the views of Zarif and Rouhani, who considered the Vienna agreement a new chapter for Iran's relations with the international community, no transformation will occur in Iran's relations with other countries based on this agreement. According to the perspective of the Supreme Leader and the ruling elite (mainly military and security forces) regarding the world, Iran, and its political system, the enmity of the Islamic Republic with the United States and the West will continue, the regime's military intervention in the region will persist, the destruction of Israel will continue to be a declared goal, Iranian-American citizens will be taken hostage to be used as tools in international negotiations, and friendly relations with countries that oppose democracy and freedom will be strengthened. The Islamic Republic sees itself as a crucial part of the resistance axis against democracy, freedom, and human rights (the anti-West axis) and acts accordingly. Khamenei has repeatedly emphasized that negotiations will be limited to nuclear issues. This agreement, even after implementation, is merely a minor footnote in the ideological booklet of the Islamic Republic for preserving the regime and cannot be seen as a sign of a change in the behavior of the Islamic Republic. While major powers want the Islamic Republic to be a stabilizing anchor in the region, this does not mean that the government will be prepared for such behavior. Due to its security and ideological perspective rather than a scientific and economic view of the nuclear program, the Islamic Republic may repeat its past mistakes. Why did the ruling elite accept this agreement? The question is why the ruling elite of the Islamic Republic accepted these limitations, and ultimately some critics praised the negotiating team? The answer lies solely in the threats that sanctions posed to the regime's survival. Officials close to the leadership have pointed to the disrepute of Western governments in case of non-implementation of the agreement after wasting tens of billions of dollars of the country's assets in advancing this program (and the over $100 billion losses due to sanctions), but from their perspective, Western governments are disreputable, and the consequences of this agreement do not affect their views. With the lifting of sanctions, officials will return to the same reasons that led them to initiate the nuclear program, albeit with more concealment. As the logicians say, the cause of existence is also the cause of persistence. What is the dispute about? Before and after the approval of the resolution related to the nuclear agreement in the Security Council (July 20, 2015), the commanders of the Revolutionary Guard raised their voices. The commander of the Revolutionary Guard announced that he would not accept this resolution, even though this 14-page resolution was prepared in Vienna with the cooperation of the parties. All the measures that commanders and security forces close to the leadership (Shari'atmadari and Mehdi Mohammadi in the notes of Kayhan and Vatan-e-Emruz) have spoken about, namely the 8-year limitation on the missile program and the implicit acceptance of previous resolutions, had already been agreed upon. According to this resolution, avoiding the automatic return of sanctions (and not the approval of their return) requires a council vote, which any country, including the United States, can veto. Why, despite the acceptance of the agreement by the Supreme Leader, did military and security forces and even some members of parliament oppose this agreement to the extent that some expressed hope that the U.S. Congress would reject the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action? Media close to the Revolutionary Guard and security forces followed the same propaganda line. Why? It is clear that the current discussions are no longer about the terms of the agreement; they are about managing the results of the agreement in domestic politics. Two issues are raised in the internal dispute over the agreement. The first issue relates to the political capital of Rouhani's government. Opponents of the agreement say that the government and the negotiating team have crossed red lines to strip the political capital from Rouhani's government. The second issue concerns the economic outcome of the agreement. For the Revolutionary Guard, it is unclear how much of the blocked assets will benefit its headquarters, and for this reason, media close to it are expressing contradictions in this regard. In the week following the agreement, media opposing Rouhani's government published daily articles about the amount of blocked assets. When the Kayhan newspaper reports on the visit of German officials with the headline 'The Government's Red Carpet Under the Feet of the Nation's Enemies' (July 21, 2015), it is clear that it aims to delegitimize the government team by accusing them of colluding with the enemy. What will be the reflection of the implementation of the agreement in domestic politics? Rouhani's government fundamentally lacks a social base to strengthen that base after the implementation of the agreement. This government came to power relying on the social base of reformists. Rouhani's government is a broker of power and balance, and after completing this project, it will fade away, just as previous governments were quickly overshadowed by Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard. Reformists will not benefit much from this situation because they have never been the promoters of the nuclear program or the designers and advocates of these negotiations. They have mostly remained silent regarding the nuclear program. Opponents of the agreement (some close to the leadership, the Stability Front, and Ahmadinejad's associates) will continue to emphasize its failure and the government's crossing of red lines to portray Rouhani's government as ineffective and to benefit from the regime's tension-inducing behaviors in the region and anti-Western rhetoric and actions. Khamenei does not want any faction in Iran to benefit from this agreement and will prevent this from happening. What will be the consequences of the implementation of the agreement in society? The announcement of the implementation of the agreement has not generated much enthusiasm in society and will not do so because, firstly, the process of lifting sanctions has been slow, and its effects will last for years; secondly, the likelihood of its impact on people's livelihoods is very low due to corruption, waste, the bloated government, and its foreign interventions; and thirdly, people have gradually realized that neither the nuclear program nor the nuclear agreement is fundamentally related to them and their needs. The immediate rise in the dollar price after the implementation of the agreement explains this situation well. The pulse of the Iranian market can be measured by the dollar price, and the market reflects public concerns and tendencies more than opinion polls. The government is also negotiating to borrow for paying employees' salaries in the 2016 budget. There is no budget for development projects, and the increase in Iran's oil exports will only lead to a further drop in oil prices. Public opinion sees no reason for joy and enthusiasm.