Implementing the Citizen's Charter Requires System Change

After Rouhani took office as President, there was supposed to be a text titled 'Citizen's Rights' prepared by the government and sent to the parliament for approval. This was one of Hassan Rouhani's promises: 'I will draft the third chapter of the Constitution, which concerns the rights of the people, and present it to the parliament to be legally submitted to the nation. In citizen's rights, men and women are equal; in citizen's rights, Kurds, Turks, Arabs, and Persians are equal.' (Election rally at Shiroodi Stadium, Tehran, June 8, 2013) After Rouhani's election, government officials initially kept this topic silent. Later, they considered the realization of citizen's rights possible within the framework of existing laws: 'We have many laws, but people are not aware of them. The President beautifully stated that in the Citizen's Rights document, we should include freedom of expression, women's rights, rights of elites, the disabled, and similar rights as footnotes. This way, people will know which law grants them this right... The Citizen's Rights Charter is more of a strategy than a legal document; it is a management document, meaning the government wants to manage the new era with this document. There are existing laws, yes, but they have not been implemented, and the government brings it to the forefront.' (Elham Aminzadeh, Legal Deputy of the President, Iran Newspaper, July 9, 2014) Thus, the Citizen's Rights Charter was reduced from a legal framework to an educational pamphlet or political statement to satisfy audiences. However, nothing was done in this regard until 2016, on the eve of the 2017 elections, when the final text was prepared and signed by Rouhani. (December 20, 2017) Beyond claims and promises, what is the final text in terms of concept and form, and what function does it serve? The rights of the people are conditional on the will of the rulers. The 120 articles of the Citizen's Rights Charter are a combination of the principles of the Islamic Republic's Constitution, existing laws, governmental decrees of the Supreme Leader, and resolutions of appointed institutions (such as the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council). These articles are options from unimplemented laws and regulations that should have been executed if the government had the will to implement them. Just like the laws and regulations of the Islamic Republic, this charter also conditions any citizen's rights that seem to conflict with Sharia and the ideology of Islamism on compliance with Islam, similar to how the rights of the people in the Constitution are conditioned on conformity with Islamic principles (according to the interpretation of the ruling clerics). In this regard, Rouhani's government has followed the usual Islamist pattern in the realm of citizens' rights, which is to condition them on the will of the rulers. When there is neither the will to implement nor a movement in society to pressure the government to execute laws, drafting this text seems futile. Avoiding the Guardian Council's scrutiny. The government's decision to refrain from presenting a charter beyond existing laws (if it were identical to existing laws, there would be no need to draft and approve it) as a legal bill to the parliament was made because government officials knew that this charter would not pass the ninth parliament nor the Guardian Council. Even if the tenth parliament accepted it, this charter would not pass the Guardian Council's scrutiny. For this reason, the government decided to issue it as an administrative directive or statement, while its promised content and substance go beyond an administrative bill or political statement. Implementing such a charter is not solely the government's responsibility, so the President's signature cannot guarantee its implementation. Only in the area of 'facilitating people's work in government offices' can the charter have enforceable guarantees, where relevant laws exist but have not always been implemented. Accordingly, the idea of circumventing the Guardian Council and not presenting the charter as a bill, then providing a selection of existing unimplemented laws, has rendered it ineffective and turned it into a political statement for propaganda purposes on the eve of the eleventh government's elections. The contradiction of the charter with other laws and processes. This charter, which conditions its articles to Islamic principles (namely the interpretation and demands of the ruling clerics and guardians), and combines parts of existing laws, is fundamentally contradictory to the ongoing processes and other sections of the Islamic Republic's laws over the past four decades. I will mention just a few examples. For instance, Article 37 of this charter states: 'The inspection, collection, processing, utilization, and disclosure of letters, whether electronic or non-electronic, personal information and data, and other postal correspondence and communications via remote means such as telephone, fax, wireless, and private internet communications are prohibited unless by law.' The clause 'unless by law' is a death knell to this principle because censorship, filtering, and the collection of satellite reception equipment are considered in existing laws, and in some cases, the current process involves inspecting citizens' postal correspondence and internet communications. This is not an exception but the rule. According to Article 77, 'It is the right of citizens to freely choose and engage in the occupation they desire without discrimination and in accordance with the law. No one can deprive citizens of this right for ethnic, religious, gender-based reasons, or due to differences in political or social opinions.' This article does not even contain the clause 'unless by law.' Non-Muslim citizens and those who do not believe in the Velayat-e Faqih are officially and legally barred from holding many government positions (such as membership in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps). Even Shia citizens can only be employed in certain government positions by declaring loyalty to the Constitution and the Velayat-e Faqih and proving their commitment. Article 82 states: 'The employment, promotion, and granting of privileges to employees must be based on expertise, competence, and capabilities relevant to the job, and arbitrary, factional, and discriminatory approaches and the use of methods that violate privacy in the selection process are prohibited.' All relevant laws regarding employment and selection in the country, which condition belief and commitment to the Velayat-e Faqih as a requirement for employment (almost all of them), violate this article. Over the past four decades, everything that has been done has violated this article. Rights such as the right to assemble, gather, and protest (Articles 43 to 48) have been repeatedly conditioned on government permission in press, party, and assembly laws prior to the drafting of this charter, and the government has avoided issuing permits for non-affiliated individuals. Affiliated individuals also conduct their activities without needing to obtain permits. The section regarding the right to fair trial is one of the most ironic parts of this charter. All the existing regulations and processes in the security, military, paramilitary, and judicial institutions of the Islamic Republic violate Articles 56 to 66 of this charter. Implementing this charter in some cases necessitates a change in the system because the identity of the Islamic Republic is defined by existing laws, processes, and procedures, and if these are to change, the Islamic Republic as we know it will no longer exist. Some of the laws of the Islamic Republic were drafted by groups and currents that are now considered subversive to the regime. Thus, if Rouhani's charter (or parts of the existing laws of the Islamic Republic) is to be implemented, all existing laws and regulations must be reviewed and changed, which is impractical. The repression machine is more active than ever. This text can be put in parentheses, and we can address the government's claim of 'bringing law to the forefront' in the realm of citizens' rights. During Rouhani's four years in office, the status of realizing the rights of the people not only did not improve but worsened in some areas. The number of executions (both official and unofficial) during Rouhani's term increased significantly (from an average of about 600 per year to about 1000 per year). Arrests, forced confessions on television, trials, and prison sentences for journalists, internet site writers, political activists, religious and ethnic activists, and student activists have continued. Thousands of young people at parties, hundreds of internet activists in the fields of makeup and clothing, and dozens of dual citizens can be added to this list. The regime's repression machine has not paused for a moment and has continuously evolved. Just like during Ahmadinejad's administration, censorship, filtering, jamming, and even the collection of licensed books, confiscation of licensed shows and films, and cancellation of licensed concerts have continued. The Rouhani government has taken no action in this regard. Domestic policy and social and cultural issues have not been among the government's priorities.