Improvement of Iran's Relations with Qatar Instead of Continuing Conflict in Yemen

In competition with Saudi Arabia's regional influence, Iran's most effective lever is the use of internal Arab disagreements to develop bilateral relations with countries along the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, such as the Emirate of Qatar. The economic and security significance of the world's largest gas field, jointly owned by the two countries, makes the continuation of friendly relations and exchanges between Iran and Qatar inevitable, serving as a guarantee for maintaining bilateral ties between Tehran and Doha even in the most difficult conditions. The presence of over 30,000 Iranians in Qatar is another factor that places the development and strengthening of bilateral relations in line with the national interests and welfare of both countries. The potential for political relations and friendship between Iran and Qatar positions this wealthy and sparsely populated country alongside Oman in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, ahead of Kuwait. Another fortunate aspect for Rouhani's government in this regard is that Tehran's relations with Doha remain outside the influence and interests of the Revolutionary Guards; a barrier that the UAE and even Kuwait have not been spared from. As an Arab emirate, Qatar has some unavoidable commonalities with other Arab countries, especially in the Persian Gulf. Regarding the three Iranian islands of Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa, despite adopting more moderate positions than other Arabs, Qatar is bound to sign the annual statements of the Gulf Cooperation Council. As a military ally of the United States, and hosting the largest U.S. airbase in the region, in the event of military conflict against Iran, Qatar's role could be decisive for and against Iran. Qatar can signal a green or red light to the aggressive use of U.S. military equipment stationed on its soil against Iran. Compared to the mass media of other Arab countries, the positions of the Al Jazeera news network towards the Islamic Republic and developments in Iran are friendly and largely independent. Despite the small geographical distance from Iranian territory, trade exchanges between the two countries are limited, and the potential for development is significant. Considering Qatar's need for food imports and cheap labor, Iran could easily multiply its current exports of less than $100 million to that country. Rouhani, in his second term, needs to achieve victories in several domestic and foreign areas. In the current situation where tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia seem higher than ever in the past six years, a policy of de-escalation with Riyadh will not yield results in the short term. Instead, creating balance in relations with smaller Arab countries and leveraging their internal disagreements is a cheaper and more effective policy. After the end of the eight-year war with Iraq, during which Qatar supported Saddam by providing financial aid, Iran had the opportunity to develop bilateral relations with Kuwait and Oman. Saddam's military invasion of Kuwait in 1990 provided another opportunity for the Islamic Republic to get closer to smaller Arab countries in competition with Saudi Arabia. Syria and the Revolutionary Guards' decision to intervene militarily in that country to preserve Assad marked the first significant step backward in Tehran-Doha relations. The occupation of the Saudi embassy in Tehran on January 12, 2016, following the execution of a Shia cleric named Sheikh Nimr, not only created a crisis in Tehran-Riyadh relations but also affected Iran's relations with other member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, including Qatar. Iran's support for the Houthis in Yemen was another factor for aligning Arab countries and preventing the development of relations between Tehran and Riyadh's rivals among the southern Gulf countries. The phone call from Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, the Emir of Qatar, to Hassan Rouhani after his recent electoral victory has created a new opportunity for the development of Iran-Qatar relations, through which Tehran can continue its competition with Riyadh's influence in a safe and low-cost area; an opportunity that will not be available in the poor and war-torn Yemen.