Independence Referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey's Approach

One day before the independence referendum in the "Kurdistan Region" of Iraq, Turkish media excitedly reported that the Turkish army had deployed military units and tanks from many areas in southern and eastern Turkey to the border province of "Silopi" between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. The official aim of these movements is a military exercise and not a real military operation against Iraqi Kurdistan. However, Ankara wants to show through this "gesture of threat" that if Iraqi Kurdistan declares independence with its referendum on Monday, it is prepared for any reaction, including military operations. How seriously should the Kurds of Iraq take Turkey's threats? These threats were first announced by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan before his brief trip to New York and his annual speech at the United Nations General Assembly, stating that his government would consider all "response options" in a meeting of the "National Security Council" and the cabinet. This meeting, which was supposed to be held earlier, was postponed due to the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan so that if Masoud Barzani's government did not delay the referendum at the last moment, the necessary "decisions" could be made in this council. Both Ankara and Tehran have stated that the issue of the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan is not merely an ethnic consultation within a neighboring country and is not limited to the internal situation in Iraq; rather, this action has serious and dangerous regional consequences for all Middle Eastern countries. The leaders of Turkey and Iran do not hide their serious concerns about the spread of the Kurdish separatist wave to their own countries. Just hours before the start of the Iraqi Kurdistan referendum, it was reported in Ankara that the "general lines" of Ankara's policy regarding "northern Iraq" had been determined in the meeting of the National Security Council and the cabinet in four areas: political, diplomatic, economic, and military, and that it would be implemented "soon, step by step, and in coordination with neighboring countries." It is said that during Erdoğan's upcoming visit to Tehran and his subsequent negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, this issue and the necessary reactions to the declaration of independence of Iraqi Kurdistan will also be discussed. Although the Turkish government has not provided details about these "response actions," media close to the Ankara government discuss the following possibilities: • "Zeroing" political relations between Ankara and the Kurdistan Regional Government, which had gradually developed since 2013 alongside the cooling of relations between Ankara and Baghdad. Closing the Turkish consulate in Erbil and cutting all initial political relations that had been established with the Erbil government. In contrast, returning to political relations only with Baghdad, alongside political coordination with Baghdad and Tehran. • The possibility of reintroducing border discussion topics stemming from the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) between the newly established Republic of Turkey and the victorious countries of World War I, which includes the border between Turkey and Iraq and the status of cities and provinces like Kirkuk. • Closing or limiting the activities of the "Habur" border point, which plays an important role in trade between Turkey and the Kurdistan Region. Cutting or limiting the transfer of oil from Iraqi Kurdistan through the Ceyhan pipeline. • The possibility of resuming military operations by Turkey against the "Kurdistan Workers' Party" (PKK) rebels in the "Sinjar" region (Shingal) west of Mosul, somewhat similar to Turkey's military operations in northern Syria (the "Euphrates Shield" operation in the "Manbij" province of Syria), which Turkey claims is aimed at cutting the presence of PKK militants between Iraq and Syria. Pro-government newspapers (including "Sabah") even reported that the name of this operation, according to Turkish official sources, is "Dicle Shield." Naturally, Turkey can cut its border with Iraqi Kurdistan and trade with the Kurds of the "region." Undoubtedly, such actions can coordinate with similar actions from Baghdad and Tehran to deliver very dangerous and potentially fatal blows to a nascent independent government like Iraqi Kurdistan, which none of its immediate neighbors agree with its declaration of independence. However, in practice, it seems unlikely that Turkey will undertake similar operations in northern Iraq as it did in northern Syria, which included not only air and ground bombardments but also the intervention of ground forces along with Turkish tanks and armored vehicles, executed with the participation of some Syrian opposition groups and implicit support from Russia. In northern Iraq, these conditions do not exist. Unlike Syria, the Russian element does not play a significant role in Iraq, and Turkey has few local allies. On Sunday, it was reported that Iran had closed its air border with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. At the same time, it was announced that flights from Iran to Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, as well as all transit flights from Iranian airspace originating from the Kurdistan Region, had been halted. On the same Sunday, sources from the "Patriotic Union of Kurdistan" reported artillery shelling of central Iraqi villages by Iran. In the past, Iranian forces had shelled border points in Iraqi Kurdistan, claiming that they had become centers of activity for "terrorist groups" against Iran. A Turkish proverb says, "Water will not be clear until it is muddied"; apparently, to clear the waters of the Middle East, which have been muddied for ten to twenty years, a longer waiting period is necessary.