Initiative in Design, Helplessness in Execution

In the first part, we comprehensively and concisely addressed the structural problems of political power in Iran, the struggle for change, and the theory of reform from within. In this section, we continue the discussion by providing examples that practically demonstrate that Rouhani's government has been unable to confront existing internal challenges. Due to the limitless interference of domestic policies in Iran's foreign policy, what we have witnessed in the past two years indicates that the executors of Rouhani's foreign policy have been shackled by debilitating constraints that, despite optimistic signs, have led to inconsequential and even negative outcomes. In addition to the nuclear issue and relations with the West, Iran's involvement in several important regional scenes is among the problematic aspects of its foreign policy, which will be referred to below: Saudi Arabia In Bahman 1393 (February 2015), following the death of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson immediately expressed condolences and announced that the Foreign Minister would attend the official ceremony on behalf of the government. Such opportunities are diplomatically perceived as seemingly neutral, yet an experienced diplomat could turn them into a golden opportunity for their country. At that time, Zarif was engaged in nuclear negotiations in Switzerland. His initial reaction indicated that the Foreign Ministry's announcement would be implemented. However, shortly thereafter, the Foreign Ministry's position changed, and ultimately, citing a scheduling conflict, Zarif's trip was canceled, and instead, one of the Foreign Ministry's diplomats headed to Riyadh. Remarks made in the margins of this event by conservative circles summarized that even a second-tier diplomat was too much for such a ceremony! Thus, an opportunity that could have been a suitable start for dialogue regarding Iran-Saudi relations was lost. Subsequently, events in Yemen brought the two countries to the brink of direct war. It reached a point where even the Saudis echoed the threats of the U.S. and Israel, at a time when the latter two countries were repeating them less frequently, and the Saudi ambassador in London stated that if Iran does not reach an unconditional agreement on the nuclear issue, 'all options are on the table' for Saudi Arabia! (It seems the ambassador had forgotten that not long ago, Saudi Arabia was fundamentally opposed to the agreement itself). In any case, whatever Saudi Arabia's stance towards Iran may be, it reflects the failure of Iran's foreign policy regarding an important neighbor. Iraq and Syria At first glance, due to the brutal invasion and the presence of the group known as the Islamic State (ISIS) as a common enemy of Syria, Iraq, and Iran, it seems that Iran's foreign policy towards Iraq and Syria should be similar. However, this is not the case. Iran's support for Syria has strategic aspects, and Syria is important for Tehran as a bridge to Lebanon and long-term support for Hezbollah. Bashar al-Assad's Alawite background has little to do with the theocratic regime of the Islamic Republic, just as Iran's relations with Syria began during Hafez al-Assad's time, due to his enmity with Saddam Hussein, not friendship with Shia Iran – Hafez al-Assad was personally anti-religious. Currently, Syria receives financial aid, goods, and weapons from Iran, and outside the closed family circle of the Assads, Iran does not have a major base or support within Bashar al-Assad's system. Should Bashar's regime fall, or if a broad and coalition government removes the Assad family's power, Iran's influence in Syria would be limited and face significant danger. Iran's presence in Syria is mostly at the level of security experts and military advisors, and the Islamic Republic's religiosity in its relations with Syria does not have a clear color and can even become very pragmatic at times. Meanwhile, Iran's relations with Iraq follow different conditions. Iran's historical and religious interests in Iraq are deep-rooted, and there are historical and profound relations between the clergy of Iran and Iraq. During the eight-year war with Iraq, many of Iraq's current rulers were refugees in Iran and supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran. After the U.S. military invasion of Iraq in 2003, with the return of these refugees to Iraq, Iran's political influence in Iraq increased and deepened despite the occupation of Iraqi soil by U.S. forces. Today, Mr. Rouhani's foreign policy essentially has no initiative regarding Iraq and merely follows the lines drawn by the central decision-making circle in collaboration with military leaders and the Revolutionary Guard. In this regard, even if Iran's military intervention and participation in the fight against ISIS inherently expands the possibilities for convergence between Iran and the West, Rouhani is unable to convert it into credibility for his foreign policy, and therefore, the possibility of convergence with the West in the fight against the Islamic State on Iraqi soil does not exist. European Union The European Union, in its current form, was established in 1993 and has achieved greater cohesion and unity in its decision-making every day. In contrast to this internal and external cohesion in Europe, the Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to attempt to influence the whole by approaching one of the European powers. In this context, it has at times approached France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany. Recently, especially during the eighteen months of negotiations with the 1+5, Iran's effort has been to influence U.S. decisions by getting closer to European members. This policy has two major flaws: - First, due to structural problems, Iran fundamentally cannot cooperate even on equal terms with open and democratic structures or go beyond certain limits. For this reason, Iran's policy of rapprochement with Europe is cautious, and whenever it feels that the Islamic political system cannot absorb and accommodate mutual demands, it halts the entire adopted approach. Conversely, Europe, which somewhat shows flexibility towards Iran, finds itself forced to retreat when it encounters issues related to democracy and human rights and is pressured through European-Iranian citizens. As a result, due to such issues, Iran and Europe's convergence work is left halfway without any tangible outcome. Visits by European representatives to Iran are usually rich in promises but weak or fruitless in terms of execution. For example, the sidelines of the last European Parliament group visit to Tehran attracted global attention. On one hand, this visit was controversial due to the coverage by Ms. Marietje Schaake, a representative from the Netherlands in the European Parliament, and on the other hand, due to the disruption of the press conference by the delegation at the end of the visit. Did this visit yield any results in terms of noticeable changes in domestic policy, human rights, or foreign policy (mainly the 1+5 negotiations)? Did this visit have a direct impact on the human rights demands of the people? As Ms. Schaake later mentioned in an interview with Radio Farda, can there be hope for changes in judicial policies and limiting the death penalty in Iran? What brings the foreign policy apparatus into this matter is the undisclosed content of the negotiations. What negotiations took place that discussing them with media representatives was deemed inappropriate and led to security forces' intervention? The prohibition of the press conference in Tehran cannot prevent discussions about its content outside the country. So what was there that required a security response? Was it just Ms. Schaake's coverage, whose image in completely Western attire with the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly filled the virtual space? Similar trips by European representatives in the past have also led to controversies and ultimately criticism of Rouhani's foreign policy. For example, in Azar 1393 (December 2014), a European parliamentary delegation met with Nasrin Sotoudeh and Jafar Panahi inside the Greek embassy and presented the special human rights award of the European Parliament, which had been awarded to them a year earlier, to these two symbols of the domestic opposition. At that time, both the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Foreign Ministry accused each other and expressed ignorance about how the meeting with Iranian citizens in a foreign embassy was planned and executed by members of the European Parliament. It is clear that the Foreign Ministry issues entry permits to the country, but other institutions can apply for such permits. Ultimately, the executive apparatus, namely Mr. Rouhani's government, was accused of negligence in the area of unofficial meetings. It is evident that the designers of Iran's foreign policy undertook this action to demonstrate individual freedoms in Iran but failed to effectively defend what had been done, and in practice, it counted as a negative point for Iran's foreign policy. The European Parliament was also able to conclude, by obtaining firsthand information and speaking directly with the opposition, that despite Mr. Rouhani's pragmatic inclination, he is unable to step beyond the spider web of domestic politics and open the political space of the country. Such signs are sufficient for the European Parliament and foreign observers not to count on establishing relations with Iran, while also strengthening the positions of the external opposition and Iranian expatriates opposing the Islamic regime. The final negotiation deadline for reaching a comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and the 1+5 is July 1. If Iran can reach an acceptable executive framework, this date, which is one month before the end of the first two years of Hassan Rouhani's presidency (August 6), could be the greatest achievement of his presidency, just as it could be considered an important achievement for the U.S. President. The fundamental question here is whether the anti-change conservative network will again be able to prevent structural changes and the taking of constructive steps forward? The existing signs do not confirm the possibility of such changes, and even if an agreement is in place, it will be in a state of unfavorable conditions. In the next section, we will evaluate Rouhani's two-year record, mainly focusing on Iran's relations with the U.S. and other regional issues that are a function of these relations. (To be continued)..................................................................................................... The author's opinion does not necessarily reflect the views of Radio Farda. Jalil Roshandel, Professor of Political Science at East Carolina University.