Internal Conflict? Inefficiency? Confusion? What Has Happened to Russian Spies?

When an underground agency is at the top of international news every day, something strange must have happened. The current status of the Russian military intelligence agency, known by its former acronym GRU, is one such case. British security agencies identified two GRU agents as suspects in the poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter with a nerve agent that occurred in March 2018 in Salisbury. Following that, a series of revelations about one of these spies, Anatoly Chepiga, a colonel in the Russian military intelligence agency, raised the possibility of his involvement in military conflicts in eastern Ukraine and the assassination of Abdulwahid Adilgriev, a Chechen rebel commander, in 2015 in Ankara. On October 4, the Dutch government released extensive information about the operations of the Russian military intelligence agency in that country, which aimed at cyber attacks and disrupting the activities of international organizations, including the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Dutch investigations into the Malaysian Airlines passenger plane that was shot down in 2014 over conflict areas in eastern Ukraine. One important clue provided in this evidence was a taxi receipt showing that one of these individuals went directly from the headquarters of the military intelligence agency to Moscow airport. In addition, in recent months, individuals suspected of spying for Russia have been arrested in Norway, Estonia, Greece, and Montenegro. Andrew Roth, a reporter for the British newspaper The Guardian in Moscow, described these incidents as 'shameful' in a report on October 5. He wrote: 'The disclosure of several consecutive operations in European countries raises the question of whether the Russian military intelligence agency has deliberately adopted provocative methods or has gone off the rails?' State media and pro-government Russian media have covered the denial of involvement in these cases, dismissing them all as part of a new wave of 'spy obsession.' The evening news report on the Vesti network on October 5, which is one of the prominent examples of how Russian media handle these issues, claimed that the new accusations are an 'excuse' for imposing further sanctions against Russia and aim to unite the West ahead of Britain's exit from the European Union. However, some experts searching for reasons behind the recent continuous disclosures suspect that the Russian military intelligence agency has been weakened by the activities of other security agencies in the country, including the Foreign Intelligence Service or the Federal Security Service of Russia. They argue that due to the leaders' belief in Moscow's multifaceted confrontation, the Russian military intelligence agency has gained significant financial and credibility advantages, and other Russian security agencies also want a larger share. Roman Dobrokhotov, editor of Insider, a Russian publication that has collaborated with the Bellingcat investigative group in publishing many of the recent disclosures, said in an interview with Current Time TV that 'I have heard many conspiracy theories that believe this situation is the result of competition between the military intelligence agency and the Federal Security Service of Russia. But that is impossible.' He added: 'With these hypotheses, they want to find a rationale for this situation because they believe it cannot be this ridiculous. But there is a general rule that one should never use conspiracy theories to explain inefficiency, and this general rule applies more in Russia than in any other country.' Roman Dobrokhotov also noted that, for example, in his recent investigations, he found that a Russian military intelligence officer sent money to a group in Serbia that was supposed to be used in a military coup in Montenegro via Western Union money transfer, and in the money transfer receipt, he provided the address of the headquarters of this security agency in Moscow. Vladimir Frolov, a political analyst who is said to have guided Robert Hansen, a double agent of the FBI, one of the Russian intelligence officers, expressed similar views on the Russian Republic website. In part of his analysis, he wrote: 'It is clear that Russian security agencies have not weakened the military intelligence agency by leaking information about military spies in the media. This is a myth. Russian security agencies compete intensely with each other, but none commit treason to resolve disputes and expose state secrets.' The mindset of the system Some of the reasons for the mistakes of the Russian military intelligence agency may stem from the nature and structure of this agency. The function of this agency is a wide range of military operations ultimately controlled by Sergei Shoigu, the Minister of Defense, one of Vladimir Putin's closest friends with political ambitions, and Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the public face of Russia's doctrine on 'multifaceted warfare.' Andrei Soldatov, a Russian security analyst, said in an interview with the British newspaper Telegraph in September: 'Since Sergei Shoigu is very ambitious with the aim of turning the Ministry of Defense into a bigger player in Russia's foreign policy, the military intelligence agency's operations abroad have expanded.' Mark Galeotti, an expert on organized crime and Russian security agencies at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, wrote in July that the military intelligence agency is waking up from a long sleep and inactivity during Anatoly Serdyukov's presidency over the Ministry of Defense. He added: 'The military intelligence agency has returned. Its budget is unlimited, its confidence is very high, and its role in overseas operations reflects the military mindset and relatively aggressive stance prevailing in this agency, which prioritizes success in operations over avoiding risk.' Roman Dobrokhotov, a journalist, also believes that one of the reasons for the embarrassing mistakes of the Russian security agency is the rapid expansion of its activities. In an interview with Current Time TV, which is jointly operated by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America, he said: 'I think it relates to the issue of employees and agents and the lack of sufficient budget for their training. They do not have adequate resources and facilities. They send the same agents who have failed in previous operations for new operations. It seems completely chaotic and sheer disorder. The whole world has learned the word Novichok. It is time for foreigners to learn the word Bardak (meaning chaos) as well. This is the best description of the current situation.' It seems that the Russian military intelligence agency, just like the Ministry of Defense, is facing serious problems in controlling accessible information on the internet. In 2014, when the Russian government denied any involvement in the military conflicts in eastern Ukraine, investigative groups like Bellingcat easily found photos of Russian soldiers boasting of their presence in Ukraine on social media. The Bellingcat group used publicly available information to find evidence regarding the downing of flight MH17, which easily calls into question the contradictory hypotheses of the Russian Ministry of Defense regarding this incident. The tip of the iceberg? However, other experts are not sure that the inefficiency hypothesis can fully explain this situation. The Russian government has perfected the use of various hypotheses, evidence, and enticing stories to create confusion in the information arena and divert public attention in recent years. For example, on October 1, the popular newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, probably the most influential newspaper in Russia, published an interview with an anonymous 'university professor' who claims to know one of the spies related to the Sergei Skripal poisoning case, identified as 'Alexander Petrov.' This anonymous source said that Petrov is a businessman connected to the Kremlin who provides 'miraculous products' for senior officials that cannot be found in the Russian market. Other analysts recall the traditional methods used during the KGB era and sending threatening messages to targets. Viktor Davydov, a Russian human rights activist and dissident from the Soviet era, wrote on his Facebook page that he left Moscow four years ago after finding pieces of wire and welding drops on the floor of his home. He added: 'Someone installed listening devices and deliberately did it in a way that I would notice.' From such a perspective, for the Kremlin, the disclosure of some of the country's espionage activities may not be a sign of weakness but rather a sign of multifaceted activities. In other words, it may just be part of a larger whole. Ellen Barry, a reporter for the New York Times in London, wrote on Twitter on October 5 regarding this theory: 'There is a lot of talk about the inefficiency of the Russian military intelligence agency. But at the same time, it is a reality that they have conducted similar operations in an indeterminate period without getting caught.'