Internal Political Conflicts in the Shadow of Nuclear Negotiations

In the political movements of groups and factions in Iran surrounding the nuclear issue, two trends intertwine: 1) using the nuclear negotiations to display unity and loyalty to the leader, paying attention to the 'red lines' of the 'system' (Khamenei, the office, and the IRGC), ultimately ensuring the survival of the regime; and 2) political competition to gain more power and weaken the opposing faction by leveraging these negotiations. When Mesbah states, 'The issue of the negotiators' betrayal is not on the table' (Nasim, June 9, 2015) or Mohammad Reza Bahonar says, 'It is not right that some become increasingly anxious to the point that their trust in the negotiating team gradually disappears, as distrust towards the negotiating team should not be created, and this team needs support and unity from within' (ISNA, June 11, 2015), both are sounding the horn of unity and cooperation with the negotiating team that operates under the leader's supervision. The spokesperson for the Front of Followers of the Imam and Leadership expresses the traditional conservatives' party position: 'Members of the negotiating team need morale and support, and it is unfair for anyone to treat them with vulgar, harsh, and rude language' (ISNA, June 11, 2015). However, when the negotiating team is implicitly or explicitly accused of selling dignity (Mohammad Ali Ramin at a gathering in Palestine Square, Khabar Online, June 3, 2015), yielding to foreigners (Hamid Rasai, Mashregh, April 24, 2014), opening their hearts to foreigners (Alireza Zakani, Jahan News, October 12, 2015), betrayal (Mehdi Koochakzadeh in Parliament, June 3, 2015), being intimidated by the enemy, and ignoring the system's red lines (on the websites of religious committees and Hezbollah elements), rival groups are solidifying their position in domestic politics and attacking their opponents. The publication of the news about 'managed inspections of accepted military centers' attributed to Araqchi in a closed session of Parliament by Fars News Agency (June 3, 2015) is precisely in this direction, and for this reason, Araqchi denies it. Gatherings, despite lacking permits, are held by those acting on the second side of these two trends and opposing the government, regardless of government officials' statements about the prohibition of gatherings without government permission. These gatherings occur similarly to the unauthorized gatherings of the past 37 years in mosques, Friday prayers, and state ceremonies (such as the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini) to avoid problems with the Ministry of Interior. Two such gatherings took place on June 8, 2015, on the sidelines of Friday prayers in Tehran and Mashhad. Another gathering occurred in Shiraz at the university mosque under the title of a sit-in (June 12, 2015), and some of these gatherings led to marches after Friday prayers, named 'Protests Against the Agreement at Any Cost.' During the anniversary ceremony of Ayatollah Khomeini, a group shouted 'Death to the hypocrite' at Rouhani. Hours after the Interior Minister emphasized that to prevent a bipolar atmosphere, no gatherings for or against the nuclear negotiations would be allowed (Entekhab, June 9, 2015), the group 'Popular Front for Defending National Dignity' announced the holding of a gathering of opponents of the negotiations under the shadow of threats on Sunday, titled 'Which Independence? Which Victory?' at the Emtiyaz Mosque in Shiraz, featuring speeches by Saeed Zibakalam and Bagheri Lankarani, both representing the positions of the Steadfast Front. The day before, a gathering occurred in Feyziyeh with the presence of Ghadad Adel, and Mohammad Sadegh Salehi-Manesh, the governor of Qom, announced to maintain respect for the Interior Minister that the gathering 'We Will Not Allow' would be held inside Feyziyeh, arguing that seminaries, like universities, do not require permission for gatherings within their internal premises (Tabnak, June 9, 2015). The function of these gatherings for participants is political competition with the opposing faction, but for the government, it is an expression of opposition to what it is doing. The main goal of these gatherings, coordinated with the office and military and paramilitary forces, is to distance the regime from something (the nuclear agreement) that it is compelled to do; to shift responsibility from a group that is carrying out the work. The government's position is to continuously assure the 'worriers' that 'the burden of negotiations is on the shoulders of the system' (Hassan Rouhani, Tabnak, June 9, 2015). At the same time, to prevent the negotiations from slipping out of the government's control, Rouhani seeks to deflect attacks from Zarif. For this reason, he introduces him as the commander of the diplomacy front (same source). What is the dispute about? In the ongoing negotiations in June 2015, it is clear that the discussion is about the Islamic Republic's accession to the Additional Protocol of the NPT. The government and the opposing faction have two opposing positions on this matter. The government believes in joining this protocol for several justifications: 1) that 124 countries have joined this protocol (Ali Khorram, former representative of the government at the UN, Quds Online, June 5, 2015); 2) that not joining the protocol was not among Khamenei's red lines (Araqchi, state television channel 2, June 5, 2015); and 3) that inspections can be managed (Zarif, June 3, 2015). The government's opponents see this as allowing enemies access to military centers and exposing the country's military secrets and discussions with nuclear scientists. Khamenei has also aligned with them. The content of the statements issued at gatherings against the current negotiation process in June 2015 mainly revolves around this issue. IRGC commanders have also resorted to threats: 'Not only will we not allow foreigners to visit Iran's military centers, but we will not even allow them to think about this issue. Even in their dreams, they will not have permission to visit our most ordinary military locations... Anyone who speaks of such matters will receive a response with hot lead' (Hosein Salami, deputy commander of the IRGC, state television news agency, April 30, 2015); 'If agency personnel enter Iran to inspect these centers, the IRGC will detain them as 'spies' and pour hot lead down their throats' (IRGC commander of Fars province, Fajr IRGC website, June 6, 2015). Opponents know well that they cannot selectively deal with the protocol. Mohammad Javad Zarif has informed them of this: 'Selecting certain parts of the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is not possible at all' (Etemad, June 16, 2015). Therefore, it is clear that this dispute is not about Iran's positions in the nuclear negotiations but about power in domestic politics. However, the political dispute reflected in these statements is not limited to joining or not joining. The political dispute is over the credibility or lack thereof of Rouhani's government in pursuing negotiations. Rouhani's government came to power with the slogan of turning the wheels of people's lives alongside the spinning of centrifuges, and this indirectly showcases the inefficacy of the previous government. In contrast, those who carry the policies of the previous government, if they sought negotiations with great powers during that period, today deny the essence of negotiations. They claim that today neither the wheels of people's lives nor the centrifuges are spinning. The opponents' goal in this confrontation is to undermine the credibility of reaching an agreement by Rouhani's government, while the government's goal is to discredit the criticisms of the opponents. Nuclear negotiations: opportunity or threat? Political factions view the nuclear negotiations as an important event in the political landscape of the country, and all parties consider it an opportunity. Since all attention is focused on these negotiations and their outcomes, political factions want to ride the wave of these negotiations to promote and disseminate their views. No group is harmed by the negotiations because the success or failure of the negotiations has its own political and economic interests for the involved parties. The success of the negotiations means ensuring the continuity of Rouhani's government for another four years, while failure means the upper hand for opponents in the 2016 elections. Note that about 70% of provincial and district managers are still from Ahmadinejad's government (Abdollah Naseri, member of the Baran Foundation, Bahar News, June 4, 2015) and can play a serious role in the emergence of a government with that inclination.