Interview with Ilan Berman; The Trump Administration Ignores Iran's Signals for Negotiation

No one knows yet what Donald Trump wants to do with the Islamic Republic. In his election campaign, he has both supported an agreement with Iran and encouraged Israel to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. On one hand, he has appointed a team of individuals in his cabinet who oppose any negotiations with Tehran, while on the other hand, he has stated that his only demand is for Iran not to acquire a nuclear bomb. These questions become more pronounced as the President-elect of the United States has not mentioned his plans regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran since the election results were announced, even as he has drawn lines for China, Mexico, and even Canada, promising to impose multiple tariffs. To find answers to these questions, we approached Ilan Berman, the Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC), a think tank based in Washington, D.C., that focuses on U.S. foreign policy issues and national security challenges. Berman, who supports the continuation and even updating of the maximum pressure strategy against Iran, believes the new Trump administration should pay special attention to supporting the Iranian people who are fighting against the Islamic Republic. Berman, who is well-acquainted with the opposition groups of the Islamic Republic, believes that U.S. national security interests require the United States not to support groups seeking to disintegrate Iran. Are there signs that Iran is sending signals to Trump? What do you think the foreign policy of Donald Trump's second term will be towards Iran? Will we witness a second season of maximum pressure strategy or is a second JCPOA on the way? I think this is a very good question, but there is no clear answer to it. What is completely clear is that U.S. policy towards Iran has entered a phase that will have a more skeptical and confrontational approach. However, in my opinion, the main question is whether the maximum pressure policy from Trump's first term will be updated or not. Because a lot has happened in the region over the past five years, and it has become clear that although economic pressure on the Iranian regime is necessary, it is not sufficient to stimulate and energize the streets of Iran, nor is it sufficient to meet U.S. foreign policy interests on a broader scale. My hope is that we will see a new version of maximum pressure that strengthens the positive aspects of the previous policy, including reducing the regime's financial resources for its nuclear program and support for proxy forces like Hamas and Hezbollah. At the same time, this new version must pay more attention to the streets of Iran and have a deeper understanding of the need for regime change. However, the President-elect of the United States has sent different signals during this time. On one hand, he has said he wants to negotiate with Iran, while on the other hand, he has appointed individuals who oppose any dialogue with the Islamic Republic. That is correct. The important point is that the endpoint of the maximum pressure policy has always been directed towards new negotiations. In Trump's first term, the clear goal was to pressure Iran to create various levers against this country, and ultimately force Iran back to the negotiating table. The goal of these negotiations was to reach an agreement that, according to the Trump administration, would be more favorable for the U.S. than the JCPOA. However, conditions have changed significantly. It seems that there is still a desire for an agreement with Iran in Trump, but it is clear that this is increasingly inconsistent with the sentiments of the Iranian people. What we observed last year was a fundamental change in the attitudes of the Iranian people, and we are witnessing slogans like 'Death to the Dictator' and 'Death to the Islamic Republic' more than ever in the streets of Iran. For U.S. policy to be effective, this policy must also change. We must accept that perhaps the desired outcome is no longer reaching an agreement with Iran, and it may be better to seek a more fundamental change in Tehran. Are you suggesting regime change? Regime change, especially in U.S. policy, is a controversial and sensitive phrase. However, regarding Iran's future path, it is clear that the current regime is not aligned with the Iranian people and poses a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, in my opinion, it is reasonable for the United States and its allies to seek alternatives to this regime. But are these alternatives capable? Do they have the right position to create a new vision and take control? This discussion fundamentally concerns Iranian opponents, which includes a wide spectrum. Some of these opponents operate within the country, while others are present in the diaspora. The commonality among them is that so far, the United States and European capitals have not significantly engaged with them. At least if the discussion of regime change is not directly raised, it would be very beneficial for Washington to think more seriously about these alternative options. A hundred days with the government of Pezeshkian; a bitter experience in foreign policy. It seems that the end of this path you are outlining leads to regime change; however, Mr. Trump stated in his pre-election speeches that the United States has neither the ability nor the interest to pursue regime change. That is correct. It is reasonable for the United States to have a cautious approach regarding what it can achieve inside Iran. This has several reasons: first, our information about what is happening in Iran is not complete and flawless. Second, our historical record in supporting political changes in foreign countries has not been very successful. We have recently seen this well in Iraq. Therefore, we should be humble about what we can achieve. In my opinion, the era of supporting regime change in a complete and widespread manner has long since ended. However, at the same time, it is very wise for American policymakers, especially in the new administration which will have a more confrontational approach towards the Islamic Republic, to start thinking about what principles the Iranian opposition groups represent, what goals they pursue, and what values they defend. This is a discussion that has not yet been seriously raised, but in my opinion, it should be raised. Because the more we realize that the Iranian regime is on the verge of a kind of political transformation due to economic, demographic, and internal conditions, the better it is for the U.S. to begin its planning before these transformations occur. However, Donald Trump has emphasized several times that his only issue with Iran is the Islamic Republic's nuclear program and that he only wants Tehran not to reach a bomb. That is absolutely correct. There is an obvious tension here, but I would like to look at this issue in two pathways; one is the pathway of nuclear development that turns Iran into a nuclear power, and the other is a pathway for meaningful political changes in Iran. If the current regime reaches the destination of the first pathway, the second pathway will never be realized because the nuclear program will be used as a tool to stabilize the regime and strengthen domestic support for it. Moreover, since the international community generally does not intervene in the internal affairs of nuclear powers, the regime will have greater freedom to suppress political opponents within the country. Therefore, these two issues are not separate but are deeply interconnected. Slowing down Iran's nuclear program is a necessary prerequisite for achieving meaningful political changes within the country. This slowing down, as you say, which will likely be accompanied by military attacks from Israel, will not lead us towards an all-out war? Of course, my answer now is different from the answer I gave a few weeks ago. What is completely clear is that even until this summer, the situation in the Middle East was favorable for the Islamic Republic. Now we are witnessing a completely different situation. Hezbollah has been significantly weakened, and the missile threat from this group against Israel has largely dissipated. On the other hand, Israel has been able to neutralize Iran's air defense structure. As a result, the Iranian regime currently has no effective protection for its nuclear programs. This could push the regime towards a strategic decision to move more quickly towards a nuclear position, as it knows that the nuclear status will provide it with the necessary protection. This means that Israel and the United States, or a combination of the two, have very limited time to take meaningful action against Iran's nuclear program. However, this issue is now more understood in the region than ever before. If Israel or the United States act against Iran's nuclear program, my impression is that this action will lead to heightened tensions but will not result in an all-out regional conflict. Given the set of conditions that have prevailed in the region over the past year, do you think we will be one step closer to an Israeli military attack on Iran's nuclear facilities under the new U.S. administration? Considering all the conditions, it seems that Israel will likely take action because there are two important factors. First, Israeli politics and society have become polarized on many issues, but there is a strong consensus across the political spectrum from left to right that a nuclear Iran is an existential threat to Israel. The conditions are now such that the threat from Hezbollah has been removed, and Iran's air defense systems, at least for now, have been eliminated. This gives Israel an opportunity to take action. Israeli officials acknowledge that they cannot completely destroy Iran's nuclear program because it is dispersed and highly advanced. However, they seek to delay it for several years. They hope that with this delay, Iran will be dissuaded from returning to nuclear activities. This delaying strategy is not perfect, but there are historical examples such as Iraq in the 1980s and Syria in 2007 where Israel employed the same method. The result of this approach was that neither of these countries was able to resume their nuclear programs because they became embroiled in other issues. Israel is very hopeful that by applying the same strategy to Iran's nuclear program, a similar outcome will be achieved. And do you think that if Israel goes this route, the new U.S. administration will also support and participate in it? In Washington and even in some parts of Europe, there is a broad and common belief that Iran's nuclear program under the control of the current radical revolutionary regime is an existential threat to global peace and security. This threat is particularly not due to the nuclear program itself, but because of the finger that may be on the trigger. For this reason, if Israel decides to actively act against Iran's nuclear program, you will likely not see active participation from the United States or European governments. However, at least one can expect that they will quietly support it. Has Iran, since Donald Trump's victory, sent numerous signals for negotiation with the new U.S. government, the latest being Mohammad Javad Zarif's article in Foreign Affairs? How do you analyze these efforts? It is clear that this action by the Iranian regime is entirely logical, as this diplomatic strategy has been very successful for them in the past. Whenever the regional conditions change against Tehran, the Iranian regime shows hope for an agreement to Western politicians. This tactic mitigates international pressure and initiates a negotiation process that always has the same goal: 'buying time to advance the regime's strategic objectives.' It seems that the same scenario is currently in play. During the Biden administration, Washington was eager to engage with Tehran, but at that time, the regional conditions were favorable for Iran, and the regime did not show much interest in engagement. But now the situation is different. A tougher administration in Washington will soon take power, and the regional conditions are no longer favorable for the Islamic Republic. Therefore, the Iranian regime is trying to reduce the pressures that Washington and its European allies are likely to impose, and it is doing this by attempting to enter negotiations. This is an old tactic, but it does not seem that it will yield meaningful results. So, do you think the new administration in Washington will ignore these negotiation signals from Iran? In my opinion, these signals will be ignored until sufficient levers are created. The main problem that the Trump team faces upon entering the presidency is that all the levers created during Trump's first term with the maximum pressure policy have disappeared. The reduction of the Islamic Republic's foreign currency reserves, the decrease in oil exports, and consequently the reduction of the regime's income no longer exist. Today, the regime is in a much more stable and better economic condition than five years ago. The first and foremost task of the new Trump administration is to rebuild these levers. This means re-imposing sanctions, limiting Iran's activities, reducing Iran's trade, and restricting the Islamic Republic's freedom of action in the region and beyond. After that, dialogue may be possible, but currently, it seems that the incoming administration understands that it does not have sufficient leverage for this. You have conducted extensive studies on the opposition groups of the Islamic Republic and have stated that the U.S. should support groups whose goals align with U.S. national security, and for example, you explained that the disintegration of Iran is not in the interest of the U.S. Why do you think that?