Iran After Possible Failure of Nuclear Negotiations

In apparent response to pressures from the U.S. Congress to solidify ongoing nuclear negotiations with the Islamic Republic and threats from lawmakers to impose further sanctions on Iran in the event of diplomatic failures, Mohammad Javad Zarif, in an interview with Fars - a news agency affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards - has indicated that negotiations will not be extended if the current talks do not yield results. Although the Iranian Foreign Minister cautiously remains hopeful for a nuclear agreement before the deadline, his awareness of the dimensions of the disagreements and the significant gap between the expectations of the negotiating parties makes him more familiar with the difficulties in reaching a potential agreement than anyone else. The choice of Fars news agency to emphasize the recent statements of the Islamic Republic's Foreign Minister may reflect the current state of negotiations, where hope for a successful outcome is gradually fading over time. Concurrently with Fars's report, another media outlet affiliated with the military and known for opposing the nuclear negotiations, Tasnim, reported on the collection of signatures by Ebrahim Karkhani, head of the Parliament's Nuclear Committee, to prepare a proposal that, if approved, would obligate the government to what is termed 'preserving nuclear achievements and defending the rights of the Iranian people.' Based on the mentioned evidence and in the absence of any positive signs of progress in the negotiations, it can be concluded that the talks continue to revolve around endless bargaining. The continuation of this situation will make breaking the nuclear deadlock seem out of reach and declaring its failure inevitable. If the nuclear negotiations do not reach a conclusion by the specified deadline, the U.S. government will avoid directly accusing Tehran of non-cooperation and threatening the Islamic Republic with retaliation in order to prevent the onset of another major political-military tension in the region, while still appearing hopeful for a political solution to end the disputes, even as Congress prepares to pass new sanctions against Iran. For Iran, in the current very difficult economic conditions, increased sanctions are merely an attempt to find a color brighter than black and not a noticeable change in the internal situation. The reduced oil prices in global markets have now significantly diminished the hypothetical but calculable differences in Iran's economy between the two scenarios of 'lifting sanctions' and 'increasing sanctions.' If sanctions are lifted, the country's currency will not strengthen overnight, the inflation rate (albeit at a slower pace) will continue, the rate of domestic production will not accelerate, and the trend of rising unemployment will not stop. The domestic market and the national economy of Iran have long lost their excessive sensitivity to the outcome of nuclear negotiations and are waiting for another miraculous opening. Even if the negotiations yield no results, the rial will not experience an overnight collapse. Perhaps with a bit more acceleration, if the negotiations fail, the rial will continue its downward trend in value to maintain government revenue levels and the ability to meet payments. In practice, the simple concept of reaching or not reaching a conclusion in negotiations does not change the critical status of Iran's economy; it is about the decrease or increase in the speed of the decline of determining graphs and indicators such as inflation, unemployment, and reduced domestic production. The ruling Islamic Republic will have two paths to take in response to the failure of negotiations: either choose a government model and encourage patience until a new opportunity arises in an uncertain future, or revert to the model favored by the military and their conservative supporters and engage in retaliatory actions. Announcing an increase in uranium enrichment - even by more than 20 percent, reducing the level of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and canceling commitments related to accepting additional inspections by agency inspectors (part of the commitments related to the Additional Protocol) will be among the immediate actions of the regime. However, the Tehran government will avoid announcing a complete withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which would immediately make Iran fully military, and will defer this option to the retaliatory reactions of the international community. The goal of Iran's nuclear development has never been to acquire a nuclear bomb but to possess the power to achieve it and gather the necessary tools. Over the past two decades, with the end of the previous bipolar system governing the balance of global power and regional security, the nuclear bomb has largely lost its deterrent properties. The potential capacity to 'achieve a nuclear bomb' is now relatively much less valuable than actually having a nuclear bomb. North Korea and Pakistan have not had better security conditions since acquiring nuclear bombs. Countries like Japan, South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina, with all the necessary capabilities for immediate nuclear bomb construction, have shown minimal interest in taking action in this direction over the past two decades. In modern security equations, the nuclear bomb is a spent card and a dead option. The reason for the current U.S. government's insistence on removing this capability from the Islamic Republic's control through diplomacy is to achieve a low-cost political victory and help change America's past image in the world, distancing itself from the symbols of militarism associated with it, and to keep the unpredictable, unstable, and unconventional Islamic Republic regime away from this capability. The Islamic Republic has long lost its way in nuclear negotiations and has become trapped in a larger, smarter game aimed at gradually diminishing its capacities and capabilities. The current nuclear negotiations with Tehran are merely part of this larger game, and the operators of the Islamic Republic have placed themselves in this path, willingly or unwillingly.