Iran After the Elections of March 7

Finally, the elections of March 7 concluded, according to the announcement of the Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the participation of 33 million out of nearly 55 million eligible voters. The deadline for participation in the elections was widely extended until 11 PM, and in Tehran, Mashhad, Nishapur, and Khorramabad even beyond that. A surprise of the election on Friday was the request of Mehdi Karroubi and then Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard, leaders under house arrest since the 2009 elections, to transfer the ballot box to their home. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard voted, but Mehdi Karroubi was unable to cast his vote. According to his wife, Fatemeh Karroubi, as reported by the website Saham News, the ballot box was brought to their home at 1:30 AM on Saturday, and Mehdi Karroubi stated that since the deadline for voting had passed, he did not want to cast an illegal vote. I am here with three guests on this week's viewpoints program who have gathered to discuss the potential consequences of the elections on Friday. Qassem Shole Saadi, a representative from the third and fourth terms of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and Kourosh Zaim, a member of the central council of the National Front of Iran, both in Tehran, and Taghi Rahmani, an activist and analyst from the national-religious spectrum in Paris. Let's start with the electoral atmosphere, Mr. Shole Saadi, in your opinion, as a representative of the third and fourth terms of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, what characteristics did this election have in terms of integrity, competition, and citizens' willingness to participate compared to previous parliamentary elections? Qassem Shole Saadi: In my opinion, since Mr. Khatami was elected in 1997, the public atmosphere of society and public opinion has been shaped against the conservatives. In various ways. Since the appointed institutions are under their control and sometimes the elected institutions have also been placed under the management of appointed institutions, like the ninth, fifth, seventh, and eighth parliaments and two terms of Ahmadinejad, the management of appointed institutions was decisive for their success. But public opinion is pursuing something else. That is, the smallest opening and escape route that public opinion seeks will do its work. For example, in the 2013 presidential election, despite the fact that those who were elected had passed through the Guardian Council, they ultimately voted for someone who had the most divergence from the appointed institutions. Now, in the current elections for the parliament and the Assembly of Experts, we saw that the Guardian Council disqualified almost all reformists and independents, but the few that managed to pass through the sieve, the preliminary results announced so far show that a serious defeat has befallen the conservatives. This indicates that public opinion is following its own path, and the people are going their own way, while the appointed institutions have created obstacles in opposition to this public inclination until now. But eventually, one day they will be forced to comply with this power of public opinion and the people's demands and submit to it. Mr. Zaim, we witnessed the voting of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard, two leaders of the 2009 protests on Friday from house arrest, and the request of Mehdi Karroubi, the third leader of these protests, for this action that was unsuccessful. What did you observe that aligned with your predictions and what events did you witness that you did not expect? Kourosh Zaim: Firstly, I had predicted that in this election, the hardliners and radical conservatives who opposed the JCPOA and Rouhani's government would suffer a severe defeat. However, the significance of this election, aside from the fact that we did not have the conditions to participate in national and old organizations, is very impactful for lifting sanctions and the success of the JCPOA. For this reason, Mr. Rouhani arranged the reformist candidates in such a way that those reformists who were well-known and had a negative background were not included. Most of the reformists on the list were individuals who were not well-known. Therefore, they no longer carried that negative burden, and in my opinion, they are successful or will be. What is important is that I saw that no party or individual that participated in the elections had a program, platform, or stated what they would do or what services they would provide for the country. Everyone just came. In my opinion, the arrangement was only for their votes in parliament, not for them to express their existence. Because Rouhani needs to achieve some of the promises he made with a supportive parliament, and I think this was arranged accordingly, and I believe they will be successful. But many of the people who went to vote, who would not have voted in the past, did so not to vote for these candidates but to prevent certain figures who had been nominated from going to this parliament or the Assembly of Experts. In other words, a negative vote? Mr. Rahmani, with nearly 60% participation, what do you think? This is the first parliamentary election in the post-revolution period that you have been following from outside. Your observations? Taghi Rahmani: My observation was that this election was a period of urgency. It resembled no previous parliament. It had no program and no prominent figures. A group came. The same young hardliners who are now engineers and doctors have come to manage in society and have organized a movement in social networks with these middle-class segments, which have various factions in large cities, to create a participation that increased from 45% to 60%, so that in this participation, in some large cities, figures would come to parliament who would at least not raise a red card against the government and would not lead Iranian society towards a tense relationship. In my opinion, this was a characteristic. But the important issue was that a kind of sensitivity and political rationality is returning to Iranian society. This parliamentary and political sensitivity does not mean that we consider Mr. Hashemi desirable. All those who voted for Hashemi also paid attention to Hashemi's weaknesses. In my opinion, if this process leads to institutionalized behavior, gradually our society will learn the parliamentary voting behavior, that parliamentary struggle is a league struggle, not an exclusionary one. Exclusionary struggle is the methods that the leaders of the Islamic Republic have always pursued. Eliminating the opponent. This was the most important thing that I observed from the outside... The event that occurred yesterday after 2009, in my opinion, was significant. This was a challenge and a breaking of the concept of house arrest by Karroubi, who later voted, and it was very interesting. The teacher died in absolute exile. Even his wife divorced him. Mossadegh was buried in absolute exile. But both Montazeri, Mousavi, and Karroubi broke the house arrest. And this was only due to the characteristics of these aware classes and the bitter experience of the reformist era. Because reformism failed in the sense of a process. But reformism has not failed. This is an important issue that I see. There is still hope and fear, and right now there is a dispute in the Ministry of Interior about how to announce the Assembly of Experts. Mr. Shole Saadi, what can be said about the composition of the future parliament? Will it differ from the ninth parliament? Qassem Shole Saadi: In my opinion, it will be somewhat different. Although the majority may still belong to the conservatives, the reformists who are now on Mr. Khatami's list as the Hope List, even if they are a minority, will be a strong minority in parliament. It has already been announced that so far about one-third of the seats have been allocated to them. One-third can be a very strong minority in parliament. Secondly, controversial figures like Rasayi and Koochakzadeh who were there were either not approved at all or did not win votes. In my opinion, the parliament will be devoid of these figures. Everyone knows that the current problems of the country are mostly economic; we are going through the post-JCPOA period. This expectation can be had that a relatively aligned parliament with the government will form and can take steps to solve economic problems. Although the appointed institutions are not interested in the Rouhani government having successes that would pave the way for his re-election next year. Therefore, not necessarily through the election of parliament, but from other places, there may also be obstacles in the way of the government, and thus the government is in a state of hope and fear and must wait for the announcement of the final results. Regarding the Assembly of Experts... let’s discuss the Assembly of Experts in the next question. Mr. Zaim, will this tenth parliament again be one that will confront the government and impeach ministers, or will it turn on a different axis? Kourosh Zaim: With the results that have been temporarily announced and with some even conservative candidates in small towns realizing they have been elected and will enter parliament, my view is that although the reformists may not gain the majority to support the government, some conservatives or those who have called themselves conservatives and have been elected, and we see these few who have been elected in small towns, they will not oppose. They will agree with the plans that seem logical to them with the government. In general, those who are semi-independent and those conservatives who are not hardliners and the reformists who enter, most of whom are unknown figures, will give Mr. Rouhani a parliament that can work with. That is, it will not be a parliament that can stand against the government like the ninth parliament, and Mr. Rouhani also needs a parliament that can carry out the tasks that have been planned, especially his commitments to the international community. I am optimistic that this will happen. Mr. Rahmani, what do you think? Will the tenth parliament be pro-government, anti-government, or, according to the wishes and desires of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic in his statements a few days ago, will it be neither pro-government nor anti-government? Taghi Rahmani: It will not be according to the wishes of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. He desires a parliament that, as they say, will break the back of Hashemi and Rouhani. However, it will be in accordance with the leader's destinies. Mr. Khamenei has two faces. One is his real face, the radical one that says the term hardliner means those who go too far are deviants. No, the Daesh are deviants. We hardliners are better people. But Mr. Khamenei also has a face influenced by the historical characteristics of the clergy. He believes that sometimes those doubts... The movement has also relied on those doubts. Mr. Hashemi also relied on those doubts. In my opinion, at worst, we will have a parliament that, as Mr. Zaim and Mr. Shole Saadi said, will not confront Rouhani too much. But 80% of the current parliament's composition is in disarray. The results are still unknown. In my opinion, there will be complexities regarding the parliament's policy, the faction that forms, the role that Aref will play, and most importantly, the role that Mr. Khatami will play from outside and the civil society. And the political figures. That is, the type of relationship established with the future parliament is important. It is enough to have twenty Ali Motahari's who will go to parliament to receive it. It is enough that a few radical people are not in parliament so that they do not dominate the atmosphere of parliament and intimidate others. We know that Mr. Khalghali with Hadi Ghaffari in the first parliament intimidated many representatives who were inclined towards the Freedom Movement. Now, this parliament will not be like that. So it is a step forward. The next step, in my opinion, is to clarify a final composition, at that time this parliament will be one that is aligned with Mr. Rouhani. In my opinion, the desired parliament is one that is a step ahead of Mr. Rouhani and when Mr. Rouhani goes to give concessions to the real reformists, he should also give concessions to them. Let me, Mr. Rahmani, continue the rest of this discussion in the conclusion. Mr. Shole Saadi, to what extent does the support for Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Hassan Rouhani in the Assembly of Experts elections make this institution special from now on? Qassem Shole Saadi: The Assembly of Experts is believed to have special importance this term because it is predicted that due to Mr. Khamenei's old age and illness and the eight-year term of the Assembly of Experts, which is twice the length of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, this Assembly will ultimately have to determine the future leader. Mr. Rafsanjani recently said that a group had been assigned to investigate the possibility of determining the future leader and that the Assembly should also supervise the leader's performance, which of course has also provoked reactions. There will be discussions, and the rifts within the ruling system have also become clearer. For example, Mr. Rafsanjani, who seemed to be one of the examples of Mr. Khamenei's remarks about the ignorant elites, has now gained a new credibility due to his positions in the last Friday prayer and the letter he wrote to Khamenei three days before the 2009 elections, and the arrest of his children. Likewise, the government support of Mr. Rouhani and the support of Mr. Khatami can be said to have created a kind of second Khordad in the Assembly of Experts. In such a way that today the discussion was not about who would enter the Assembly of Experts but rather about preventing certain individuals from entering. Now, the preliminary results also apparently indicate this. Mr. Rafsanjani's list seems to be winning. However, the composition of the Assembly of Experts is such that they will not be able to do anything significant. Just as the Islamic Consultative Assembly cannot either. Because the structure of power in Iran is such that it is not like in, for example, European countries or democratic countries. Here, the power institution is the institution of the Supreme Leader. And that too in its absolute form. The judiciary and the Guardian Council, etc., perform their duties under the supervision of the Supreme Leader. Therefore, it would be overly optimistic to think that the Islamic Consultative Assembly or the Assembly of Experts could accomplish anything significant.