Iran After the Syrian War

The civil war in Syria is coming to an end, although the power struggle is not over. Nevertheless, the parties involved have become so exhausted after seven years of conflict that even if their political demands are not met, it seems unlikely they could engage in full-scale war again. It can be said, or at least hoped, that the war has concluded and has shifted from military operations to conference tables. Conferences that will take place from now on, whether in Sochi and Astana, or in Geneva and Riyadh, will be scenes of significant political struggles. But will the end of the Syrian war also mean the end of regional conflicts? The situation is changing; ISIS's military ship is stuck in the mud; armed opposition groups have branched out; a fresh coat of paint has been applied to the battered political machinery of Syria by Russia and Iran, but its half-burnt engine awaits a skilled mechanic to somehow remedy the seven years of destruction. Meanwhile, the desperate driver of the vehicle is trying every avenue to keep the worn-out engine running and moving. It is said that Bashar al-Assad, during his recent trip to Moscow, sent a message to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu through Vladimir Putin, suggesting he is willing to make a conditional deal with Israel regarding border areas between the two countries. Unconfirmed sources have stated that Assad's message is clear: a demilitarized zone up to 40 kilometers from the Golan Heights, Bashar al-Assad's gift to Israel to alleviate its security concerns regarding Iran's military presence in Syria. The only condition of this generous offer is that Netanyahu does nothing to topple Bashar al-Assad's regime. This proposal, if true, aligns perfectly with the historical approach of the Assad family. It is worth recalling that after the extensive occupation of the Golan Heights by Israel in 1967, Hafez al-Assad (Bashar's father) and later Bashar al-Assad himself, realizing that military confrontation with a stronger neighbor is futile, have not shown any military reaction and have not resorted to violence to reclaim the occupied territories. Now, on the verge of the end of the seven-year civil war in Syria, Bashar al-Assad, who sees his position at risk, is seeking to use the strong neighbor to stabilize his situation through a tactical leap. In fact, Bashar, with the same cunning inherited from his father, aims to hit multiple targets with one shot: • Bashar al-Assad, dreaming of continuing his presidency after the end of the civil war, calculates that the support of a powerful and influential neighbor like Israel will be very effective in achieving such a goal at this stage. • Secondly, Bashar al-Assad calculates that after the war, both Iran and Russia will present him with multi-billion dollar war bills that he can pay in two ways. He can grant concessions to Iran, such as a road transit privilege to Lebanon to reach Hezbollah or access to the shrine of Sayyida Zainab, which can become a 'golden pilgrimage piggy bank' to pay off Iran's debts. Who knows, perhaps during the war, other shrines have been found that can be built into domes and mausoleums, making it easier to settle the war bills. For Russia, however, a more tempting morsel is available. Russia pursues a longer-term program in the region and the world, and for this reason, Syria is a new launch pad that can assist Russia's long-range strategies. Russia's access through the Black Sea and Turkish straits to the Mediterranean is very limited, placing it in a Turkish trap. But now Russia can utilize Iran's air bases to reach its various bases in Syria in Tartus and Latakia, or Khmeimim and Sha'irat. Additionally, in the post-war period, Russia will be able to sell its war machines to Syria. As the military savior of Syria (at least as long as Bashar al-Assad is in power or if another government supported by Russia comes to power), Russia will be respected by Syria. Ultimately, Syria, like Iran, needs to be a power with a 'veto right' in the United Nations Security Council. While Syria feels indebted to Iran, it is unlikely to be able to pay off Iran's multi-billion dollar war bill. At the same time, it does not see it in its interest for this debt to keep the IRGC commanders in Syria in such a way that they could jeopardize its future. Thus, creating a buffer zone not only limits Iran's activities and distances them from Israel's borders but also brings Syria closer to Israel. In other words, now is the time for Bashar al-Assad to free part of Syrian territory from Iranian influence and receive a reward from Israel for this action. Although the establishment of a demilitarized zone up to 40 kilometers deep will prevent Iran's creeping expansion towards the Golan borders, it is likely that Iran will still have a transit route to Lebanon via the International Highway No. 1. The distance from Damascus to the Lebanese border is less than 40 kilometers, while the distance from Damascus to the official Israeli border is about 200 kilometers. What Iran has gained due to seven years of war in Syria is not limited to these communication routes. Iran's influence in Lebanon deepened since 2008, especially when Hezbollah managed to control parts of the west and surrounding Beirut. The gradual geographical expansion of Hezbollah coincided with a decrease in Saudi influence in the region and an increase in Iran's political influence, such that at the height of the Syrian conflict, in October 2016, with the election of Michel Aoun (through parliamentary votes) as the President of Lebanon, Iran's position was significantly strengthened. Saudi Arabia's actions at that time, cutting financial support for Hezbollah and recently applying pressure for Saad Hariri's resignation, confirm the development of Iran's power in the region and the inability of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to change the course of these developments. Iran's performance in Syria and Iraq In the past seven years, Iran has financed, provided human resources, technical knowledge, and what has been called 'advisory support' to sustain the Syrian war and prevent the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime. Iran mobilized proxy forces in the form of numerous battalions and divisions, part of which were recruited from Afghanistan and Pakistan, to provide the necessary manpower for Bashar al-Assad's army. In contrast, Sunni support for the armed opposition against Bashar led to chaos and fragmentation and ultimately the emergence of Salafi jihadists. In Iraq, the IRGC's foreign unit officially organized military forces into a 120,000-strong unit known as Hashd al-Shaabi. In a recent letter, Qassem Soleimani referred to Hashd al-Shaabi as 'sacred' and described Hezbollah's role and presence as 'powerful and central.' Although not all members of Hashd al-Shaabi support Iran and are supported by it, three Shiite groups named Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Badr Organization have direct ties to the IRGC. The Islamic Dawa Party in Iraq and the Badr Organization, which controls the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, are considered Iran's political arms in Iraq and are factors that have contributed to Iran's superiority in the region. Mr. Soleimani's letter declares the 'lowering of the flag' of ISIS as the 'end of ISIS's dominance' and describes it as a 'very great and decisive victory.' Iran's long-term goals and strategy If we consider Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari's remarks on December 2 as part of the realities of Iran's foreign policy, Iran has engaged in 'popular organization and mobilization' in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria and has created a similar type of organization among the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Thus, Iran's future plans, utilizing the results and experiences of the Syrian war in the region, are more or less clear, although there is no guarantee of their success. This multi-dimensional program is, in fact, an effort to control the Middle East using unconventional tools in international relations. These tools are religious-ideological and inherently conflict-inducing, and they can institutionalize the differences arising from ethnicity, language, and religion in the highly tactile and emotional societies of the Middle East, keeping the flames of conflicts burning forever. Supporting Shiites and Shiite-leaning groups against Sunnis is at the forefront of these programs. Implementing Iran's long-term plans requires creating proxy groups with an invisible and secret structure in critical points and strengthening them in specific geographical areas. Such groups will be created dormant and ready to react in future situations. In the external domain, exerting psychological pressure on Israel through Hezbollah and direct and indirect support for Palestinians and groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas is included. In the internal domain, controlling Iraq, controlling Yemen, controlling some Gulf countries, and even Afghanistan are part of these plans. In fact, the environment surrounding the Tehran-Mediterranean communication corridor will define the geographical scope of this strategy. On a macro level, exacerbating irreconcilable hostility with the United States while attempting to make concessions to Europe, so that it can be used as leverage against the United States, will be the main arm of this strategy. Naturally, the financial backing of this strategy comes from oil revenues, which increase more and more with the expansion of global crises, but due to these very crises, instead of being spent on improving people's lives and economic development, it will be used for regional role-playing and competition. The natural outcome of this strategy will align and unite the United States with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against Iran and continue international pressures, intimidation, and the option of military action against Iran.