Iran and Changes in Trump's Administration; Has the Risk of War Increased?

Mike Pompeo, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who was appointed as Secretary of State by the President, has a very successful background in his field. After graduating from the United States Military Academy at West Point, he served as a tank officer in Europe. He then studied law at Harvard University and subsequently established a successful law firm specializing in aerospace business. In 2010, he was elected as a Republican candidate from Kansas to the U.S. Congress. Pompeo, who is 54 years old, began his last role with the presidency of Donald Trump over a year ago and has since been the head of the CIA. He is considered the second Secretary of State in President Trump’s administration after Rex Tillerson. The way in which the Secretary of State was changed is unprecedented in the United States. The CIA and part of its duties have similarities to the State Department, although the methods of the two organizations are practically different. However, Pompeo's appointment as Secretary of State was not solely due to the theoretical similarities between the two organizations. There are more similarities between the thoughts of President Trump and Mike Pompeo, as well as their temperaments, compared to Rex Tillerson, and perhaps one of the reasons for Pompeo's selection was these similarities. Currently, there are four main issues in U.S. foreign policy that are more significant than others: The first two are managing relations with China and Russia, which are critical to national security and defense policy at a global level. Following that is the issue of arms control and preventing North Korea from becoming nuclear, which relates to a very important part of Asia and U.S. influence in those areas; and the fourth issue is Iran. Washington does not view Iran solely from the perspective of the nuclear agreement but also considers Iran's role in oil and Gulf security on one hand, and Iran's activities in a broader area beyond the Gulf, namely the Middle East, on the other. In the Middle East, in addition to Israel's security, issues such as Iran's influence in Lebanon and its relationship with Hezbollah, influence in Islamic countries in the region including Syria and Iraq, and its impact on the Yemen war and competition with Saudi Arabia are major topics that both the CIA and the U.S. State Department focus on. Thus, the nuclear agreement is not presented as an independent issue, or rather, it is no longer considered an independent issue. The nuclear agreement plays a regulatory role in Iran's functionality in all the above matters, and the U.S. view of the nuclear agreement is as a determining factor in Iran's regional and trans-regional role. Iran's relations with Europe have elevated Iran's role beyond the regional aspect and have made it more complex, just as Iran's relations with the two veto-holding members of the United Nations, namely China and Russia, have also expanded and intertwined the equation in other dimensions. Mike Pompeo, based on what he has articulated so far regarding the four main issues of U.S. foreign policy, is much closer to Donald Trump, while Rex Tillerson was distanced from the President's thoughts within the same four issues and, at the same time, distanced himself in practice from the rhythm of the President's desired work, even causing delays in the implementation or non-implementation of some of the President's requests. It cannot be simply judged which of the two ministers' working methods aligns more with U.S. national interests and security, and perhaps it requires more time and separate analysis. If we accept that the process of pursuing the issue takes precedence over the issue itself, we must acknowledge that Trump's disagreement with Tillerson was primarily over the processes of pursuing and implementing foreign policy, not the foreign policy issues themselves. Therefore, what led to Tillerson's dismissal was the difference in behavior and action that caused multiple frictions between the Secretary of State and the President, ultimately leading to Tillerson's dismissal, which was not entirely unexpected, and Mike Pompeo was appointed in his place. Pompeo has a hard and uncompromising stance on national security issues. Most people working on national security issues in the U.S. agree on Pompeo's sharpness and intelligence, but some believe that to create a balance between security and national interests, a balance in thought and behavior is also necessary, and fiery and harsh behavior can jeopardize national security. For example, what Pompeo stated just a few days ago about North Korea is one of the instances that reflects his toughness. He said on Fox News: 'Make no mistake, no concessions will be made to North Korea during negotiations.' He had previously supported 'regime change in North Korea.' At the same time, these statements were made by him as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, not as Secretary of State, which has different duties. Pompeo has been a staunch critic of the nuclear deal with Iran since his time in Congress. He refers to Iran's regional role and activities labeled as 'destabilizing' as a destructive role that must be countered. When the nuclear agreement with Iran was concluded, he opposed it as a member of Congress, believing that this agreement was tantamount to 'rewarding Iran for its depraved behavior.' In 2016, he called for a move towards 'regime change' in Iran. His reaction and writing a letter to Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, also indicate his hardline positions. Although this letter was merely a reaction to Soleimani's threatening remarks towards the U.S., it nonetheless shows that Pompeo is someone who pays attention to details and studies them before reacting. The existence of a President who does not believe in classical leadership methods and often wants to resolve issues abruptly, or the selection of Mike Pompeo as Secretary of State, who is more vigilant about Iran's movements than his predecessor, does not necessarily bring the Trump administration closer to a military solution but increases the sensitivity of the U.S. government towards Iran. In October of last year, Mike Pompeo stated regarding the Iranian nuclear deal: 'The security community and the U.S. Treasury can tighten the noose on Tehran and pressure all economic institutions in Iran that are connected to security forces and the Revolutionary Guard.' When we place this perspective alongside the recent statements of the U.S. President, and if we seek to find a single reason for this change, we must say that the most significant point of contention between Trump and Tillerson has been the issue of Iran. The President stated outside the White House on Tuesday: 'If you look at the deal with Iran, in my opinion, it is a very bad deal, and I guess he (Tillerson) thinks it is not. We really did not think alike. Our relationship is good, but our thoughts are different.' Shortly after Pompeo was introduced as the new Secretary of State, President Trump directed his first renewed attack towards Iran, calling it 'the source of most problems in the Middle East.' These statements somewhat indicate the future trajectory of relations between the two countries. Tillerson will officially leave the State Department at the end of March, but all matters have already been entrusted to his deputy. Pompeo needs congressional approval to begin work, but it does not seem difficult to gain congressional support (given that Pompeo has previously secured it for his CIA leadership). The main challenge in implementing President Trump's desire to exit or fundamentally amend the JCPOA is to do so without entangling the U.S. with European partners while also addressing President Trump's dissatisfaction with this agreement as effectively as possible. Holding a joint commission meeting on the JCPOA in Vienna could be a constructive step in resolving this international dilemma. Germany, Britain, and France's proposal to impose new sanctions against Iran's missile programs may largely cover U.S. concerns regarding Iran. However, regarding changes to the text of the nuclear agreement, not all levers are in the hands of the U.S., and the U.S. is well aware of the challenges of exiting the JCPOA and its impact on a potential agreement with North Korea. The leverage of the P5+1 countries and the reactions of Russia and China on one side, and the positive reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency alongside the support of the United Nations for this agreement as a positive achievement in disarmament, and even the positive outlook of the Secretary of Defense and military commanders in the Middle East and Africa in contrast to President Trump, the new Secretary of State, and the U.S. Congress come into play. Analyzing the statements of Mike Pompeo and other officials of Donald Trump's administration cannot necessarily be interpreted as Washington's interest in entering a new war in the Middle East against Iran. Although a country like Saudi Arabia may desire such a war and expect the U.S. to align militarily in support of it, it is clear that Saudi Arabia is more interested in somehow dragging the United States into the war. On the other hand, the motivation for war cannot be the nuclear deal, as at least two years ago, the nuclear agreement was signed as an alternative to war and a formula that could keep the shadow of war away from the region. However, what is referred to as Iran's destabilizing actions in the region, which includes extensive Iranian interventions in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, has the potential to lead to military friction and could result in a localized and temporary conflict. At the same time, it cannot be said that with the arrival of Mike Pompeo, the possibility of such frictions has decreased or increased. However, if a military conflict arises due to existing tensions over Iran's regional behavior, the issue of the JCPOA will be overshadowed, and without the U.S. being forced to exit the JCPOA, the conditions of war will change the fate of the JCPOA. In such circumstances, it is unclear whether Iran will remain committed to the JCPOA or whether the P5+1 countries will uphold their trade agreements with Iran. The stronger likelihood is that they will side with the U.S. in its war against Iran. In the remaining years of President Trump's presidency, factors such as the U.S. intent and commitment to support Israel, the increasing concerns of both countries and some Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia regarding Iran's regional role will continuously overshadow U.S. foreign policy decisions regarding Iran. When we place these concerns alongside the U.S. demands from Iran in the context of amending the nuclear agreement (JCPOA), especially the sunset clause in this agreement, we realize that the pressure to negotiate over Iran's ballistic missiles is a byproduct of a series of concerns that have been highlighted above. In addition to all these factors, Israel's pressure regarding feelings of insecurity from Iran and Iran's presence and provocations through the Syrian borders must be viewed as a very determining factor. Certainly, Iran also has reciprocal concerns. However, the point that is often overlooked is that despite the military nature of the issues in dispute with Iran, the processes chosen so far to resolve the disputes are of an economic (sanctions) or political (international pressure) nature. In other words, the issues between Iran and the U.S. can and should be resolved through diplomatic channels. However, this solution requires calmness and a policy free of provocation and controversy. Yet such an atmosphere is currently variable, and the language used by Iran towards Israel and the U.S. increases the likelihood of rapid ignition. This analysis does not intend to ignore the risk of war or emphasize the likelihood of its occurrence. Underestimating the risk of war is a significant mistake, but at the same time, the art of diplomacy should be to navigate around it and resolve bilateral and multilateral issues. There is always a temporal gap between military solutions—whether considered a last resort or not—and political, economic, or diplomatic solutions, as small as pulling the trigger of a gun. The existence of a President who does not believe in classical leadership methods and often wants to resolve issues abruptly, or the selection of Mike Pompeo as Secretary of State, who is more vigilant about Iran's movements than his predecessor, does not necessarily bring the Trump administration closer to a military solution but increases the sensitivity of the U.S. government towards Iran. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that if a decision is made to confront Iran militarily, Mike Pompeo will not be responsible or the executor of it; rather, commanders like General Mattis, the Secretary of Defense, or senior military commanders like General Joseph Votel, the commander of Middle Eastern and African forces, will execute it, and they currently emphasize the positive aspects of the nuclear agreement and consider it implementable. They have even testified in various congressional committees that the nuclear agreement reduces military threats from Iran. However, the finer point is that in the United States, generals do not have the power to declare war and peace; the President does.