Iran and Saudi Arabia: Diplomacy of Intimidation or Movement Towards Military Confrontation?

War in international relations is usually the last stage of a political dispute that could not be resolved in any other way. By choosing war and employing military power as the only solution to political disagreements, usually two countries or two coalitions involved in the dispute hope to intimidate the opponent with their military tactics and strategies and force them to surrender to their political will. Thus, the goal of resorting to military force is usually to bring the hostile country to its knees so that it finds itself in a position where it has no military defense and consequently submits to the demands of the invading country. In other words, the aim of military conflict or 'war' is to create conditions under which the opposing party accepts political demands to end military hostilities. All wars eventually reach a stage where one side can no longer defend itself militarily or through paramilitary means and is compelled to yield to the enemy's conditions and sit at the negotiation table. However, war, both in terms of mobilizing specialized human resources and military hardware, is a very costly choice. Maintaining military superiority after war, rebuilding a nation that incurs costs to participate in war (even if it wins), providing healthcare costs for war veterans for the remainder of their lives, and many other expenses require billions of dollars. Moreover, the psychological toll on society cannot be quantified. For this reason, choosing war as the last stage of challenges must be done with careful scrutiny. At the same time, before resorting to military forces and officially starting a war, there is another stage known as the diplomacy of intimidation. The lifespan of intimidation diplomacy can be very short or very long, but whatever it is, it is a very sensitive stage before the onset of war. Despite the use of the term 'intimidation,' as described by Jacobsen in the book Security Studies edited by Alan Collins, intimidation diplomacy is defined as: 'a combination of military threats and limited use of military forces (as a stick) alongside incentives and assurances (as a carrot) aimed at influencing the enemy to change its behavior in a noticeable way.' Intimidation diplomacy does not necessarily resort to full military operations and tries to guide the opposing government towards a desirable political solution through coercion and intimidation. Successful use of intimidation diplomacy can lead the opposing country, which lacks full military capability or does not want to bear all the costs of a war along with the loss of human resources, to adapt to its available resources while also bringing the dispute to an end. The following article examines this concept in the context of the risk of war between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other regional actors. The crisis in relations and escalation of conflict - The current conditions and mutual relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states, Israel, and the United States best illustrate the application of intimidation diplomacy. Each country maximizes the use of every tool at its disposal to deter the other from resorting to military conflict and to guide it towards political solutions and agreements. Every day, new friction alters the relationships among regional countries, changing previous calculations regarding the possibility of war. On Wednesday, October 25 of this year, Iran and Saudi Arabia concluded that they could not interact politically with each other and chose a third party (Switzerland) as the protecting power, thereby halting their diplomatic relations. The crisis in relations with Saudi Arabia intensified after the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the 1+5 and quickly took on broader dimensions. With changes occurring within the Saudi system, the incompatibility between the two countries deepened day by day, and amid Donald Trump's victory in the U.S. presidential election and following his first trip to Saudi Arabia, both countries became more resolute in their stance against Iran. In fact, the existence of a common enemy named Iran helped them set aside the disagreements that existed at the end of President Obama's term and repair their relations through arms agreements. However, as much as Saudi Arabia feels closer to the U.S., its sense of distance from Iran intensifies. Following the attack on the Saudi embassy and consulate in Tehran and Mashhad, the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia suffered serious damage. Iran's regional actions and presence have become intolerable for Saudi Arabia, and young Saudi Arabians have increasingly made bolder statements against Iran. Gradually, most political options have lost their credibility, leaving no capacity for relationship-building. In the competition with Iran over Syrian issues, Saudi Arabia has lost the opportunity to win, and in addition, in the costly war in Yemen, it sees Iran's foothold becoming more pronounced. The missile that disrupted the balance - On Saturday, November 4, the Yemeni Houthis launched a ballistic missile towards King Khalid International Airport in the outskirts of Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. The missile did not reach its target and was intercepted in the sky by Saudi Arabia's U.S.-made missile defense system. Immediately, attention turned to Iran, and it was said that Iran had provided the ballistic missile to the Houthis. The Iranian Minister of Defense denied Iran's involvement in the Houthi missile attack, and one of the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps stated that 'there is no possibility of transferring missiles to Yemen.' This IRGC commander claims that the missile belongs to the Ansar Allah group (the Houthis), and indeed, the Houthi militants have made similar statements, identifying the launched missile as 'Volcano 1' and made in Yemen. It is not unlikely that with advisory assistance from Iran, which could include technological support, the Houthis have managed to reconstruct one of their missiles and launch it towards Saudi Arabia. Both the United States and Saudi Arabia have attributed the missile launch towards Riyadh to Iran, with some sources related to the Saudi coalition in the Yemen war stating that the missile launch vehicles were made in Iran. Typically, in military provocations, especially in critical situations, attacking major cities or the capital of a country is among the red lines that cannot be easily overlooked. For example, if six missiles hit six Saudi villages and even cause casualties and financial losses, it is not as significant as a missile that is intercepted in the sky over the capital. An attack on the capital is considered provocative and, in a way, a declaration of war. The problem here is that Saudi Arabia has been at war with Yemen since March 2015, and despite the existence of a coalition and U.S. support, it has been unable to end it. The missile attack on Riyadh was carried out by the Houthis, not by Iran, and therefore there is no compelling justification to label it as 'Iranian military aggression.' Of course, this interpretation does not justify Iran's interventionist actions in the region, especially when the Kayhan newspaper, which is published under the supervision of the representative of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, features a bold headline referring to the 'Houthi missile launch at Riyadh,' predicting that 'the next target will be Dubai' in the United Arab Emirates or perhaps Jeddah, Taif, or Aramco headquarters. Similarly, from the Saudi side, the ballistic missile launch by the Houthis from Yemen has been interpreted with similar phrases, labeling it as 'military aggression' or 'direct military aggression' from Iran. Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi Foreign Minister, has considered the Houthi missile attack as 'a declaration of war from Iran' and has threatened that 'we will respond appropriately at the right time.' In the latest reaction, as reported by Agence France-Presse, Saudi Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Salman also used the phrase 'direct military aggression' by Iran and considered the Houthi missile attack as 'Iran's military action.' Apparently, Agence France-Presse quoted this interpretation from a conversation between the Saudi Crown Prince and Boris Johnson, the British Foreign Secretary. The impact of political events in Lebanon - On the same day that the Houthis launched their ballistic missile towards Riyadh, Saad Hariri, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, was in Saudi Arabia. Twenty-four hours earlier in Beirut, Saad Hariri and other Lebanese politicians had negotiations with Ali Akbar Velayati, the representative of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, the content and messages exchanged in which are not precisely known. However, twenty-four hours later, in an unprecedented move, Saad Hariri announced his resignation on Al Arabiya television in Saudi Arabia, citing hostile actions and 'Iran's interference' and its supported group, Hezbollah, in Arab affairs, claiming that his life was 'in danger.' Hariri's statements, referring to the depth of Iran's influence in Lebanon, claim that Iran has 'taken Lebanon hostage' and that 'the smoke of Iran's malice in the region will ultimately come back to haunt it.' The fact that the Prime Minister of a country voluntarily resigns in another country and holds institutions of his own country's sovereignty alongside a foreign power responsible for it is unprecedented. Questions arise as to why, for instance, Saad Hariri did not use existing tools within the sovereignty to resolve the problem and why he resorted to Saudi television to announce his resignation. For example, could Saad Hariri not have submitted his resignation to the President first and recorded a similar message to be handed to the media after leaving Lebanon? Some sources familiar with the Arabic language and literature have even identified the text of the message read as unfamiliar in the common Arabic language in Lebanon, likening it to the language commonly used in Saudi Arabia. In other words, the voluntariness of the resignation is called into question, and it has been suggested that Saad Hariri, despite his wishes, read such a text. Following these developments, we see Thamer al-Sabhan, the Saudi Minister of State, introducing Hezbollah as the agent of 'hostile' actions against Saudi Arabia and considering these actions as a 'declaration of war by the Lebanese government' and the Hezbollah group 'against Saudi Arabia.' In any case, Saad Hariri's resignation indicates how much the Hezbollah group, which ostensibly is only part of the Lebanese government, has gained power and how influential Iran's role has been in these developments. Of course, the refrain heard from Iran is the denial and rejection of interference in the affairs of other countries in the region. Nevertheless, Saad Hariri's resignation shows how much the Hezbollah group, which ostensibly is only part of the Lebanese government, has gained power and how influential Iran's role has been in these developments. Although none of these provocations hold significant strategic and military value and are not at a level that cannot be countered militarily, they nonetheless indicate that the capacity and diplomatic initiative of the two countries to resolve their issues through conventional political methods have reached a deadlock, and the relations between the two countries have entered the level of 'intimidation diplomacy.' Echoes of war - Currently, neither the United States, Iran, nor Saudi Arabia individually benefit from entering into a full-scale military war. However, Saudi Arabia, which has not succeeded in the Yemen war, hopes to leverage the dissatisfaction of the U.S. and Israel regarding Iran to initiate a limited war in the region with their support, which would help Saudi Arabia's objectives and cover its lack of victory in Yemen. Although Saudi Arabia may have suitable financial resources to spend on a limited war, it lacks sufficient human and military resources to engage in a war with the Islamic Republic of Iran alone. On the other hand, Iran, which has been engaged in two proxy wars in Iraq and Syria for years, is likely to seek to avoid direct involvement in another war in the region or to direct it to a third point where another proxy group (albeit with Iranian support) would be involved, resulting in more costs for Arab countries than for Iran. For various reasons, this point could be Lebanon. The most important argument for this preference is to bring the battlefield closer to Israel's borders. However, Israel, neighboring Lebanon, would not be pleased about the occurrence of a new war on the other side of its borders, as it cannot prevent the overflow of its consequences and destruction into Israel. Until now, Israel has resorted to every means to prevent armed groups supported by Iran in the Syrian war from approaching its borders with Syria. For this purpose, Israel has repeatedly targeted suspicious locations within Syrian territory with airstrikes. However, a war that starts from Lebanon would certainly have disastrous consequences for Israel and the region. After the unsuccessful missile attack by the Houthis on Riyadh, between President Trump and the King of Saudi Arabia...