In the first part, the reactions of the commanders of the IRGC and the underestimation by Saudi Arabia regarding the possibility of confrontation and the quantitative comparison of Iran's military capabilities with those of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries were examined. Here, we continue the discussion by evaluating the most important military strengths and weaknesses of these countries in the air, sea, missile, and air defense domains. The Gulf Cooperation Council countries do not share a land border with Iran, but their number of tanks and armored vehicles is significantly higher than that of Iran. Any potential military confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and consequently with other mentioned countries, will occur at sea and in the air, turning the waters of the Persian Gulf into the frontline of battle. In this regard, the naval and air forces of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have superiority over Iran. The aging of the Iranian Air Force is notable; it has 256 bombers and fighters, consisting of a collection of old American aircraft remaining from the Shah's era and outdated Russian, Chinese, and French planes, which despite continuous efforts to optimize and equip them with indigenous or reverse-engineered weapons, have limited operational capabilities. Some of these aircraft, such as the F-5, F-4 (Phantom), and F-14 (Tomcat), are over 40 years old. The aircraft received from China, known as Chengdu J-7 (or F-7), is comparable to the Russian MiG-21 and, along with eight units of the Saeqeh aircraft produced through reverse engineering, are among the newest aircraft in Iran. Additionally, a large number of the 137 Iraqi Air Force aircraft transferred to Iran by defecting pilots (including MiG-23, 25, and 29, Mirage F-1, and Sukhoi-20, 22, 25, and 25, and Ilyushin 76) are old and worn out. The Islamic Republic has dangerously neglected the modernization of its air force, turning it into a museum of outdated aircraft. Iran's transport aircraft and attack and transport helicopters also have a similar situation. Despite this, Brigadier General Reza Nasirzadeh, the deputy coordinator of the Air Force, made surprising statements saying, "I can confidently say that our air force is very high in various dimensions, including operational combat capability, and besides one or two industrial countries, it is on par with other countries in the world. In other words, our air force is among the top five or six countries in the world." The air superiority of Arab countries is evident as the number of fighters and bombers in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries is three times that of Iran. Similarly, these countries have over four times the number of transport aircraft and transport and attack helicopters compared to Iran. Apart from quantitative superiority, the average age of these aircraft is about one-third that of Iran's aircraft and their technical capabilities and efficiency are also better. The Saudi Air Force alone has a quantitative advantage over Iran, and its fighters and bombers, such as the F-15, Tornado, and Eurofighter Typhoon, are considered among the most advanced aircraft in the world, well-prepared for operations with the support of the countries that manufacture these aircraft and their close cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman collectively have 112 F-16 aircraft, and Kuwait has 27 F-18 aircraft ready for operations. Qatar is also set to receive 24 Dassault Rafale aircraft from France, and Oman 12 Eurofighter Typhoons from Europe. Moreover, the experiences gained by Saudi and Emirati pilots in Yemen and in ongoing air operations against ISIS within the framework of the US-led coalition cannot be overlooked. In the naval arena, Iran, with its two forces, the Navy of the IRGC and the Navy of the Army, has a manpower advantage over the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. In contrast, the Arab countries lack underwater units, but the number of their ships, corvettes, and boats exceeds that of Iran. Furthermore, the naval forces of these countries conduct joint exercises annually to gain experience and improve coordination, and they have participated in the US and its allies' mine-clearing exercises in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman under the title of "International Anti-Mine Exercise." The Saudi Navy, which is the largest force among the southern Gulf countries, has two fleets: the Eastern Fleet in the Persian Gulf centered in Jubail and the Western Fleet in the Red Sea centered in Jeddah. Currently, the Eastern Fleet of this country has 4 corvettes and 9 missile boats. In a persistent effort to counter potential threats from the IRGC Navy, including swarm attacks, it has undertaken the modernization of its Eastern Fleet with advanced American units and equipment at a cost of over $11 billion. The list of requested units from the US includes 10 frigates (2500 to 3500 tons), at least 20 corvettes, 10 MH-60 helicopters (known as Seahawk) for anti-submarine and surface operations, three special maritime patrol aircraft, and at least 30 drones capable of being launched from shore and sea. The IRGC Navy, with its asymmetric warfare capability, focuses on using corvettes and fast boats for swarm attacks, shore-to-sea missiles, mine-laying, and special commando operations. This force possesses ballistic anti-ship missiles in the Persian Gulf (the marine version of the Fateh 110 missile), and some of its vessels are equipped with torpedoes and surface-to-surface missiles, including Nour, Kowsar, and Nasr-1. This force has a presence in its five regions in Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Bandar Mahshahr, Assaluyeh, and Bandar Lengeh, and on Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf, and aims to replace its old fast boats and low-capacity missile boats made in China and North Korea with more powerful domestically produced models. The strategic navy, with its mission mismatch, is present in the Sea of Oman and, at the directive of Ayatollah Khamenei, is supposed to be a strategic navy and establish its regional and extra-regional presence. The strategic navy, also referred to as the blue-water navy, must be capable of operating in waters at least 1500 nautical miles (about 2800 kilometers) from its shores. Such naval forces generally have aircraft carriers. The Army's Navy has three Russian-made Kilo-class diesel submarines and several semi-heavy and light submarines of the Ghadir type. In terms of surface units, the core of this force's offensive capabilities consists of missile corvettes made in France, China, and Iran, and six ships. Of these, except for the Jamaran destroyer (Mowj class), which joined this force about six years ago, most of the Navy's vessels, despite being optimized and equipped with new missiles, do not have immediate readiness for combat missions and long-term operations. Three British-made Alvand-class frigates are 38 years old, and two American-made corvettes were operational 43 years ago. This force is constructing another Mowj-class destroyer, and the process of modernization and increasing the surface capabilities of this force is significantly slower compared to what is happening in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Currently, this force, as a green-water navy (coastal waters), does not have high operational capability to confront regional naval forces, let alone limit the operational power of extra-regional naval forces and assume the role of a strategic navy. Nevertheless, some Iranian military commanders, ignoring the necessary structures for a strategic navy, consider this goal to be achieved. The Army's Navy and the IRGC Navy, as two coastal forces, depend on ground bases and the Air Force for their air cover, which itself suffers from chronic weaknesses. The Army's Navy has a support unit consisting of anti-submarine and transport helicopters and patrol aircraft that were purchased during the Shah's era. The hovercraft of this force also have similar records. These units, which are nearly forty years old, despite optimization and major repairs, have limited capacities and cannot be used regularly and continuously. Nevertheless, Admiral Beigham, the deputy commander of the Navy, recently stated on January 16 that this force "has the most powerful support unit in the region." Iran's reliance on missile capabilities is evident in the Islamic Republic's approach and performance regarding the Air Force, especially after the Iran-Iraq War, which shows that equipping and rebuilding this force has not been prioritized for several reasons, including the very high cost of replacing old aircraft. The imposition of international sanctions against Iran has also exacerbated this issue. Therefore, the Islamic Republic has based its strategy on strengthening its missile capabilities, which have relatively lower costs and accessible technology, while Iran can largely handle this with its military industry capacity. Some Iranian military officials have linked this approach to the armed forces' reliance on the principles of asymmetric warfare, believing that ultimately achieving victory in a classic war, especially in an air confrontation with the US, is impossible due to the advanced weapons and technology of this country. Given this assessment, the Islamic Republic, which relies on an anti-American axis and does not actually consider the Gulf Cooperation Council countries as its competitors, has made Iran vulnerable to air attacks from these countries while also depriving the Army and IRGC naval forces of effective air support by strengthening its missile capabilities. The missile program of Iran is one of the major concerns for the Arab countries of the southern Gulf. Therefore, these countries have added advanced and efficient air defense systems to their arsenals to counter this potential threat from Iran. Except for Oman, the other five Gulf Cooperation Council countries have received the Patriot air defense system (of the "PAC-2" or "PAC-3" type), which is a mobile missile system from the US, and they are also using this system in the Yemen war. Last August, the US Department of Defense agreed to sell another 600 missiles of the "PAC-3" type worth $5.4 billion to Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the US is set to provide the high-altitude air defense system known as "THAAD," which has a missile range of over 200 kilometers, to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. Furthermore, in recent years, Saudi Arabia has established a missile force for deploying ballistic missiles and possesses the Dong Feng-3 ballistic missile. According to military experts, Saudi Arabia received more than 30 units of this optimized missile, which is lighter than its original model and has a maximum range of 4000 kilometers, from China in 1981. While the Gulf Cooperation Council countries are spending billions (113 billion dollars in 2015) to prepare their capabilities to counter Iran's ballistic and cruise missiles and are also increasing their air capabilities, the Islamic Republic has put all its eggs in its missile basket by neglecting its air force, and its most effective air defense system is the short-range "Tor-M1" system made in Russia. If Russia ends its delays, it will soon deliver the S-300 system to Iran.
Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council; Possibility of Confrontation, Military Balance (2)
The article discusses the military capabilities of Iran compared to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, highlighting the significant quantitative and qualitative advantages of the latter in air and naval forces. It emphasizes the strategic implications of Iran's reliance on missile capabilities over air power, particularly in the context of potential military confrontations in the Persian Gulf.
👥 Key Players
⚡ Actions
📰 What Happened
Iran's military capabilities compared unfavorably to Gulf Cooperation Council countries amid potential confrontation.
- Brigadier General Reza Nasirzadeh announce Iranian Air Force
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
Iran's military inadequacies pose significant risks in potential confrontations with GCC countries.
📝 Key Evidence
🏷️ Entities Mentioned
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%