Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council; Possibility of Confrontation, Military Balance

Part One - The aim of this series of writings is an attempt to compare the military capabilities of Iran and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council in a context where the intensification of geopolitical conflicts between Tehran and Riyadh could provide a backdrop for military confrontation. In the first part, the reactions of the commanders of the Revolutionary Guard and their condescending view of Saudi Arabia, the possibility of confrontation, and the quantitative comparison of military capabilities between Iran and the aforementioned countries are examined. Following the attack of demonstrators on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Mashhad, and Riyadh's decision to sever diplomatic relations with Tehran, tensions and verbal warfare between the two countries have escalated. Bahrain, Sudan, and Djibouti, supporting Saudi positions, have severed their political relations with Iran. Djibouti's action was the subject of mockery in some Islamic Republic media, and Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, said that Saudi Arabia, by cutting relations, sought to cover up its 'crime of beheading a religious leader in its own country.' Despite this, the reactions and criticisms of other Iranian officials regarding Saudi Arabia's decision to cut political ties and execute Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr were generally mild and expressed in diplomatic language. The reactions of the Revolutionary Guard commanders, however, had a different tone, downplaying Saudi Arabia. Hours after Bahrain severed diplomatic relations with Tehran, the Fars news agency, known for its affiliation with the Revolutionary Guards, reported that 'the entire region from Syria to Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen has become chaotic,' stating: 'In such circumstances, regional frogs have become gunslingers.' Brigadier General Hossein Salami, the deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards, at a memorial for Sheikh Nimr at the Motahari Higher School, said: 'If the Al Saud do not correct their course, they will soon face complete decline.' In this context, Admiral Ali Fadavi, commander of the Revolutionary Guards Navy, on Friday, January 8, explained Saudi Arabia's policy towards Iran, emphasizing that the U.S. is the source of all actions in the region, stating: 'We are now witnessing that the U.S. has taken a new course for direct confrontation with us, indicating their withdrawal and the emergence of fools as puppets in their shadow puppetry.' Ali Fadavi stated: 'The Saudi kingdom is nothing in the face of Iran's military power and is only considered a fifth-rate threat because the Islamic Republic has prepared itself for battle against the likes of America, not Saudi Arabia.' Last January, Saudi Arabia criticized the Islamic Republic's regional policies, warning that it would take 'countermeasures' against Tehran. Brigadier General Mohsen Kazemini, commander of the Mohammad Rasoul Allah Corps in Greater Tehran, recently referred to the statements of Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi Foreign Minister, regarding his country's confrontation with Iran, asserting: 'The Islamic Republic does not consider the Al Saud regime a threat to itself.' Brigadier General Rasoul Sanaei Rad, the political deputy of the Revolutionary Guards, on Monday, January 4, in similar remarks, said: 'If it were not for brotherly and ideological considerations in the Islamic world, the country of Saudi Arabia, which is now mired in acute security, political, and economic issues, would not be considered significant for the Islamic Republic of Iran... and the claim of confrontation with Iran is a bluff to exaggerate the declining power of Saudi Arabia.' Brigadier General Vahidi, the former Minister of Defense, also predicted that Saudi Arabia would once again 'beg' to reconnect with Iran following its decision to sever ties. The increase in tensions and the diplomatic crisis arising from the severance of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran and its consequences merely reflect and manifest part of the deep and longstanding geopolitical disputes between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia in the region, one of the components of which has manifested in proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen. Both countries are fanning the flames of sectarian differences in their power struggle by exploiting sectarianism and insist on pursuing their goals. Ayatollah Khamenei promised Saudi politicians after the execution of Sheikh Nimr that 'divine revenge' would seize them, and in response, Saudi Arabia warned by placing its allies against Iran: 'Interventions must stop; otherwise, we are ready to take more serious measures.' The possibility of confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not clearly defined, but the verbal attacks between the two countries and each side's efforts to dominate the other, whether alone or by forming alliances, are likely to increase instability in the Middle East by fueling their proxy wars. It is unlikely that Iran and Saudi Arabia will back down from their positions, at least in the short term, but what is certain is that the new round of political tension between the two countries will worsen the current situation in Syria and Iraq, where Tehran and Riyadh have significant influence over some of their political and military actors. Recently, Saudi Arabia has expressed a willingness to send ground units to fight ISIS in Syria. Saudi sources have stated that they are preparing a force of 150,000 troops for Syria, most of whom will come from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Egypt, and Jordan, and other Arab countries such as Morocco, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar will also send troops to this force. The U.S. has welcomed this idea, but Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, says: 'I don't think [Saudi Arabia] has the courage to do this, because their forces are a classic army, and history has proven they cannot cope, and if they do this, they will have shot themselves in the foot.' Rahim Safavi, a military advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei, also made similar remarks on the occasion of February 11, stating: 'The fact that the Al Saud regime wants to send a legion to Syria is a foolish publicity stunt; if they could, they would have intervened in Yemen.' If this deployment occurs, a direct confrontation between Saudi forces and Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards in the Syrian battlefield would not be unexpected. Currently, Saudi Arabia considers a direct conflict with Iran unlikely. Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince and defense minister of Saudi Arabia, called any war between his country and Iran a catastrophe and stated that such an event should not be allowed to happen. In an interview with The Economist, he stated: 'This is something we do not foresee at all, and anyone who takes steps in this direction [to start a war between Iran and Saudi Arabia] is not of sound mind.' Nevertheless, without resolving the existing issues between the two countries and reaching a 'grand bargain' between Riyadh and Tehran, whether through bilateral dialogue or mediation by regional or extra-regional countries, the possibility of military confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia cannot be ruled out. The ongoing political confrontation between these two countries in various fields in the highly volatile Middle East could heat up the current cold war and lead to direct military conflict between the two countries or, on a broader scale, conflict between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. In other words, the deep-rooted disputes between the two countries over power provide the necessary material and structure for a direct military confrontation. If such an event occurs, how will the military balance in the Persian Gulf be affected? Quantitative Comparison of Military Capabilities Considering the sensitive and fragile situation in Iraq in recent years, the balance of power in the Persian Gulf is tied to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, as well as the display of power by foreign forces present in the region, especially the U.S. 1. The total military forces of Iran and its three branches in the above table include the army and the Revolutionary Guards. The Basij and police forces are not included in the above table. 2. Ground units, the National Guard, and the missile forces of Saudi Arabia are considered part of the country's ground forces. Paramilitary units such as border guards, coast guard, and police affiliated with the Ministry of Interior are not included in this table. 3. The ground units of the United Arab Emirates and the presidential guard are part of the country's ground forces. The coast guard of the emirate is not added to the navy of this country. 4. The ground units and royal guard of Oman constitute the country's ground forces. Nearly 2,000 foreigners are employed in the army of this country, and the police, coast guard, and tribal guard of this country, with a total strength of 4,400, are considered paramilitary units. 5. The National Guard and coast guard of Kuwait, numbering nearly 7,100, are considered paramilitary forces. 6. The police, National Guard, and coast guard of Bahrain, with a strength of over 10,000, constitute the paramilitary forces of this country and are not included in the above table. Despite the Iranian military commanders, especially the Revolutionary Guards commanders, downplaying the military capabilities of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and even ridiculing these countries, leading to the dissemination of incorrect perceptions in society that the Arab countries across the Persian Gulf are militarily fragile and cannot withstand even minimal resistance against Iran, the above table shows that these countries in some cases have quantitative superiority over Iran. The defense budget of these countries, which have a population just over half that of Iran, is reported to be more than seven times that of Iran. In other words, Iran's defense budget is about 18 percent of Saudi Arabia's budget and nearly 13 percent of the total budget of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.