Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council: Possibility of Confrontation, Military Balance (3)

In previous sections (1 and 2), the military capabilities of Saudi Arabia were downplayed by IRGC commanders, a quantitative comparison of the military strength of Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries was made, and the main strengths and weaknesses of these countries in various military fields were examined. In this section, we continue the discussion with the possibility of unifying the military capabilities of the GCC countries, the extensive military presence of the US in the region, and the potential consequences of a possible confrontation in the Persian Gulf. One of the shortcomings of the GCC countries is their weak military cohesion. Thirty-four years ago, when the GCC was established, its founders hoped that this council would pave the way for the unification of member countries in various fields, including military. However, evidence shows that this goal has not yet been achieved, although the council has taken effective steps in this regard with US encouragement. While Washington has kept the door open for the sale of advanced American weapons to GCC countries, it has repeatedly urged them to consolidate their arms purchases instead of making individual orders and to move towards a military union with their human and non-human resources. Two years and a bit ago, in December 2013, six members of this council agreed to form a 'Joint Military Command' in Riyadh and a strategic and security studies college. The main goal of this joint military command, which some experts have dubbed 'Arab NATO,' is to counter potential threats from Iran. This Arab NATO will not have a permanent army; instead, special units from the military of each GCC member will be put on standby and ready to serve in the 'Joint Military Command' to be deployed as needed. In fact, such units will have two duties: defending their respective countries while also responding to the call of the mentioned command to defend the collective interests of the GCC. Although the GCC countries have cooperated with each other in a limited capacity under the 'Peninsula Shield Forces' since 1982, establishing an Arab NATO will not be without obstacles. One of the obstacles is the long-standing political differences among some ruling families in the GCC countries, largely rooted in Saudi Arabia's dominance over the council. Some smaller countries are reluctant to have some of their military units under Saudi command, and Oman, which has close ties with Iran, has officially opposed the idea of military unification with other countries. Some experts believe that given the deep-rooted differences among the leaders of the GCC countries, US pressure for military unification may backfire and fracture the council. However, recent developments in the region, including Iran's nuclear agreement with the P5+1 countries and the beginning of the sanctions relief process, as well as Iran's potential to expand what is perceived as the Islamic Republic's 'political ambitions' in the region, have further strengthened the necessity of military unity among the council countries, and the consensus among the ruling families of these countries cannot be ruled out. The extensive presence of the US in the region, as previously mentioned, will see confrontations between Saudi Arabia and Iran and other GCC countries in the air and sea, primarily in the Persian Gulf, which is the site of the most concentration and activity of Iranian and Arab military forces alongside non-regional forces. Therefore, an abstract view of the military capabilities of the countries south of the Persian Gulf and comparing it with Iran without considering the extent of the military presence and capabilities of the US and other Western powers in the region, which are considered allies of the GCC countries to varying degrees, does not do justice to the matter. After withdrawing from Iraq, the US reduced its troop numbers in the region, but it is estimated that around 35,000 of its military personnel remain in the Middle East, particularly in the GCC countries. Nearly 15,000 of these troops are stationed in Kuwait at Camp Arifjan and the Al-Jaber and Ali Al-Salem air bases. The number of US troops in Oman has decreased following the major withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, but nearly 200 US Air Force personnel remain in the country, and the US, according to credible reports, can use airports in Muscat, Thumrait, and Masirah Island if needed and with prior notice. The US has about 7,000 troops, mostly from the Navy, in Bahrain, and the center of the Fifth Fleet (the naval branch of Central Command or CENTCOM) is located in this country. Additionally, some US military personnel have been stationed at Sheikh Isa Air Base to support US air operations in the region. Nearly 5,000 US troops are stationed at Al Dhafra Air Base in southern Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, primarily tasked with providing services and support for fighter jets, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. The number of US troops in Saudi Arabia has decreased since 2003, but delegations and advisors remain to advance training and modernization plans for the Saudi National Guard and security forces in the country. Several thousand US forces, mostly air personnel, are present in Qatar. The US Joint Air Operations Center is located at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which is one of the most important overseas operational centers of the US military. In addition, Al Udeid serves as a storage facility for significant amounts of US weapons and equipment kept for emergencies. Besides the US, France has a military base in Abu Dhabi with 500 personnel, and the UK has decided to establish a new naval base in Bahrain after 40 years of dismantling its base there and leaving the East of Suez, with the construction having begun last year. Given the extensive US presence in the southern Gulf countries, in the event of military conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries, the US military, followed by the UK and France as supporters and allies of these countries, will enter the field to protect their strategic interests and keep the lines of communication open in the Persian Gulf and continue the free flow of oil to industrial countries, thus completely tipping the balance of power in favor of the Arab countries, as witnessed during the Iran-Iraq War and the flare-up of tanker wars in the Persian Gulf. Misjudgments and false confidence of IRGC commanders The concept and interpretation of a country's military capability and its comparison with other countries, apart from material and weapons and equipment and generally quantitative factors, also relate to other important qualitative factors such as command, morale, ethical commitment, faith and sacrifice, knowledge, and professional skills of personnel. The exercise of power and proper direction by commanders of an army to their forces, in other words, command and control, is one of the vital components in the field of war that requires real-time information and correct and rapid decision-making. The history of human warfare is filled with foolish slips and blunders by military commanders that have caused many disasters for various reasons, including the incompetence of commanders, incorrect operational plans and assessments, and the false confidence of senior officers. Nevertheless, a brief look at the numerous statements of high-ranking Iranian military officials, especially IRGC commanders, in recent years, which some have been previously mentioned, shows that these commanders, due to incorrect processing of information or for political reasons, while exaggerating the capabilities of their forces, have a simplistic and incorrect analysis of the capabilities of the GCC countries, especially the US. Neither the wisdom of Saadi's advice that says 'do not underestimate your enemy' has reached the ears of these commanders, nor are they familiar with the English proverb that says: 'Though thy enemy seems a mouse, yet watch him like a lion.' In this regard, Admiral Ali Fadavi, commander of the IRGC Navy, has stated: 'In the IRGC, no one believes that the power and capability of the US Navy is greater than that of Iran.' He has repeatedly promised the destruction of the US Navy in the event of a confrontation with the IRGC and even claimed the ability to sink US ships in the Persian Gulf within 50 seconds, believing that US aircraft carriers, due to their ammunition storage, are like powder kegs and can be destroyed with a single missile. In similar statements, Hossein Salami, the deputy commander of the IRGC, described US aircraft carriers as 'scrap metal,' and Mohammad Reza Naqdi, head of the Basij Organization, also emphasized that 'the enemy's [US] aircraft carriers are worth no more than a can of food in the battlefield.' While Saudi Arabia and the UAE have a relative capability for mine-sweeping with five mine-sweepers, one of Iran's greatest naval weaknesses is its negligible capability in this area, and if the US lays mines in Iran's strategic ports and islands, the Islamic Republic will be unable to sweep or neutralize them. Nevertheless, Mahmoud Fahimi, the deputy operations commander of the IRGC Navy, said in 2012: 'The IRGC Navy is proficient in mining, laying mines, and mine-sweeping, and the United States cannot cope with this.' The Navy's capabilities are also minimal in this regard, limited to two or three 'RH-53' helicopters with limited mine-sweeping capabilities—helicopters that date back to the Shah's time and are nearly 40 years old. Eight years before the revolution, in 1971, based on an assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Iranian Air Force was stronger than the combined air forces of the southern Gulf countries, but currently, despite efforts to optimize its aircraft, the Air Force poses more of a threat to its existence than to the GCC countries, and in recent years, many of its aircraft have crashed due to technical and mechanical defects and generally obsolescence. The obvious weakness of the Iranian Air Force in military engagements at sea will have a negative and clear impact on the Navy of both the Army and the IRGC, significantly increasing their vulnerability against the GCC countries, whose air forces have quantitative and qualitative superiority over Iran and receive technical, logistical, and intelligence support from the US and several other Western countries. The impossible victory for Iran Some domestic experts consider Iran's experiences gained during the eight-year war with Iraq as one of its advantages compared to the GCC countries, but these experiences have faded over time. Most of the Iranian military personnel who were present at the front during that war have retired, and the majority of the country's population under 25 years old has no direct knowledge of the revolution, the war, and its events. In the maritime domain, Iran has a relative superiority over the GCC countries in terms of operational experience and possession of underwater units (Kilo and Ghadir-class submarines) and can pose threats to the GCC countries. However, in the air domain, Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries, which have total superiority, with the support of the US, will have the upper hand in a potential battle with Iran and can diminish or even erase Iran's superiority in naval, missile, and asymmetric operations. Any confrontation in the Persian Gulf between Iran and the Arab countries will ultimately bring the US and several European countries into the battlefield. Contrary to the claims of Iranian military commanders, especially the IRGC, who deem the capabilities of these countries and even the US as negligible, a military victory for Iran over the GCC countries is impossible. Unlike the Arab countries in the region, which, despite their clear differences with the US, still enjoy support from this country and several other Western nations, Iran has no friend or ally that can turn the tide. The hopes of some Iranian politicians for Russia and the close relations between the two countries, which have their specific reasons at this time, cannot be reassuring, and it is not expected that this country, while grappling with two wars in Syria and Ukraine, will come to Iran's aid in the event of military conflict with the southern Gulf countries and further entangle itself with the US. In a potential conflict with the Arab countries, Iran will be alone, and the results will not be dissimilar to the outcomes of the final years of the Iran-Iraq War, where with the internationalization of the war in the Persian Gulf and the direct and overt intervention of Western countries, especially the US, neither Saddam Hussein was defeated nor could Iran achieve victory. While the option of a full-scale war should not be taken lightly, the war of the Islamic Republic with the GCC countries and consequently with the US in the Persian Gulf will be long, costly, and catastrophic for the Middle East and beyond.