Iran and the Temptation of Power

Iran's position in the Middle East and its ability to influence power relations in the region has recently become one of the most intriguing topics in international relations literature. In connection with the final stages of Iran's nuclear talks with the group known as the 'P5+1', and the possibility of re-establishing communication bridges between Tehran and the most important Western capitals, there are numerous writings and speeches in European and American media discussing the 'return of the Persian Empire' and the potential for Iran's influence to expand once again along the Mediterranean shores. These writings and speeches emphasize Iran's role as the only major regional power capable of containing the Middle Eastern volcano. The ancient Iran narrative is also taken very seriously within Iran, although there are differing and sometimes sharply contradictory voices regarding the characteristics of this role and its strategic objectives. Interestingly, instead of solely emphasizing the 'Islamic mission' as in the past, there is an increasing focus on pre-Islamic history and its figures and myths. In fact, contrary to the fundamental principles governing the emergence and consolidation of the Islamic Republic, the recall of pre-Islamic history and the emphasis on the connections between present-day Iran and the empires that once existed in this land are becoming more pronounced in the discourse of some figures or media closely aligned with the regime. In this context, boundaries that were previously considered 'red lines' are being broken, and it would not be an exaggeration to speak of 'taboo-breaking'. Historical figures from ancient Iran, which the regime that emerged from the 1979 Revolution insisted on erasing from the historical memory of Iranians, are gradually regaining their ancient status and rank in the writings and meaningful speeches of some media reflecting the ruling ideology, albeit with a new hue. For instance, Cyrus, the founder of the Achaemenid Empire, is included in the list of God's prophets and is said to be the same 'Dhul-Qarnayn' mentioned in Surah Al-Kahf as a unique, just, and righteous figure. The provision of new legitimacy for the greatness of ancient Iran goes hand in hand with current developments in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. About three years ago, Major General Rahim Safavi, military advisor to the Supreme Leader, stated, 'Iran has historically penetrated to the Mediterranean Sea three times: the first by Cyrus the Great, the second by Xerxes, and the third today.' Recently, remarks by Ali Younesi, a special assistant to the President, regarding Iraq's presence in the 'civilizational sphere of Iran's influence' stirred significant controversy. According to him, Iraq 'is our identity, culture, center, and capital, and this is true for both today and the past.' Based on the connection between today and yesterday, Iran's presence in the 'four capitals' of the region (Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sana'a) is introduced as the most important sign of the regime's rising power. It appears that a significant portion of public opinion, especially among the middle class in large cities, is not displeased with the emergence of this discourse, which at least formally resembles post-Constitutional nationalism and especially the historiography of the Pahlavi era. For about two centuries, Iranians, aware of their painful decline, have lamented the lost days. Iranians are not the only nation in the world suffering from their weak position in the network of international relations and desiring to climb the ladder of power. The rise of the power fever among nations has various motivations: emerging from decline and humiliation, taking control of their destiny, living comfortably in prosperity and security, protecting themselves from the encroachments of other power claimants, considering their race, culture, and historical background superior to other nations, imposing their beliefs and values on others, seizing larger territories, and chaining other peoples to plunder their wealth, or a combination of some of these motivations. The role of power and power-seeking as one of the most important driving forces in human history is clearer than the sun. Nevertheless, some nations, for various reasons, and in justified or unjustified ways, are more engaged in the temptation of power and desire to influence their surroundings. In Europe, the English, French, Germans, and Russians have had a history intertwined with power-seeking over the past few centuries, and a significant number of their people still live in the dream of returning to ancient empires. The United States believes in the superiority of its political and economic structures and considers its interests to be the world's interests, employing all levers of power to fulfill what it perceives as its mission. In the Arab world, there are numerous tendencies that are restless for a return to the days of past glory, especially during the magnificent periods of the Baghdad Caliphate. The Turks, despite having gone through over ninety years of a secular republic, have once again turned to the myths left from the Ottoman Empire. Defining power in international relations, Raymond Aron, a prominent theorist of international relations during the Cold War, defines power, in a broad sense, as the ability of an actor to influence the behavior, actions, thoughts, and feelings of other actors. From his perspective, 'power in the international arena is the ability of a political unit to impose its will on other units.' The levers of power are not the same throughout history and are not defined by the same criteria. The irresistible power of the Mongol Empire was based on completely different foundations than the current power of the United States, although the commonality of both, according to Raymond Aron's definition, is the ability to impose their will on others. Today, powerful countries (except in very rare cases) are not interested in conquest. In the contemporary world, the struggle for expanding national territory through encroachment on other lands has largely disappeared in many parts of the world. In the 21st century, powerful countries are those that can influence the definition of the rules of the game at the international level, impose their will on other countries through military or non-military means (including economic sanctions), extend their lifestyle and culture beyond their national borders, dominate the production and dissemination of new goods and services globally through their scientific knowledge and creativity, and play a dominant role in shaping the economic geography of the world. The power of the United States undoubtedly relies on its military and diplomatic capabilities, but as much or more so, it derives from the allure of the dollar, the prestige of Harvard and Stanford, the dynamism of Silicon Valley and 'GAFA' (an acronym for Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple), the magic of Hollywood, and the fame of CNN. Germany, shattered after World War II, became the giant of Europe by relying on the rise of the mark and its industrial myths, even as it left its military power in a not-so-bright state and will soon abandon its nuclear power, even in its non-military form. Japan, South Korea, and especially China have transformed the global order mainly by relying on their industrial and commercial power. Even microstates like Singapore gain the ability to influence vast areas around them by becoming very dynamic economic hubs. Is Iran powerful? Based on what we know about the foundations and characteristics of power in the 21st century, the question arises whether Iran truly possesses the necessary capabilities to influence its surrounding areas, especially the Middle East. To answer this question, it is essential to emphasize several points: First) Iran's main power lies in the solidity of its foundations as a 'nation-state'. Various aspects of this reality become clearer when examined within the confines of what is referred to as the Middle East. In fact, many of the current countries in this region lack historical roots and were created following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, at the behest of British and French officials. Many of the current borders in the region were drawn based on the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. Iraq is a highly artificial political unit that could not have survived even without the military intervention of the United States and its allies in 2003. Syria is also a legacy of European dominance over this region. It can be predicted with concern that the collapse of borders in the Middle East will not be limited to these two countries. Iran, however, is a different reality. Over the past thirty-six years, despite revolution, war, sanctions, and significant political rifts among Iranians, the 'nation-state' of Iran has remained steadfast based on its historical foundations. Of course, one cannot ignore separatist tendencies among ethnic and religious minorities in Iran, especially in border areas. However, such tendencies are seen in many other old and stable countries, from China to England and Spain. In other words, the core of the 'nation-state' in Iran is solid, and this solidity increases Iran's maneuverability in a region composed of mostly artificial and weak states. Second) Another factor that, again in comparison to the Middle East, weighs heavier for Iran is the relative stability of its political system. The form of political power that emerged from the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and how it has evolved over the past thirty-six years has not yet been adequately examined. The Iranian political system has its weaknesses, the most significant of which is the exclusion of a large segment of Iranians from political life as 'non-eligible'. In fact, the right to be elected or to accept political responsibilities in Iran is monopolized by the 'eligible', and from this perspective, the Islamic Republic is not dissimilar to pre-apartheid South Africa. Even within this closed system, a portion of the 'eligible' have been marginalized as 'seditionists'. Despite all these limitations, the mechanisms provided for in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, including elections for the parliament and the presidency (albeit within the framework of 'eligible' individuals, excluding 'seditionists'), continue to operate without interruption. The press in Iran, despite all the constraints weighing on it, is more vibrant and freer compared to many countries in the region, primarily because Iranian civil society, again in comparison to the region, is at a different level. Third) In this context, a third factor must also be considered, which is both a source of power and a source of weakness and danger for Iran. This is the 'Shia Crescent' that has gradually formed under Iran's influence in the region. It can be confidently stated that today in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc., Twelver Shia Muslims have a strong affinity for the Islamic Republic, which is naturally an advantage for Iran. However, this 'Shia Crescent' can also create numerous troubles for Iran. In fact, the Islamic Republic entered the arena with the slogan of 'Islamic unity' and harbored the ambition of leading the 'Islamic Ummah'. The Islamic Republic's strong insistence on defending the 'Palestinian cause' was partly to resonate with the Arab and Sunni world in a highly sensitive public slogan and even to take the lead in it. However, reality has unfolded differently, and instead of being the standard-bearer of 'Islamic unity', Iran increasingly appears as a Shia power that does not hesitate to resort to Iranian nationalism's slogans and myths to bolster its legitimacy. In this situation, the danger of a broad coalition of Sunni powers, from Islamabad and Ankara to Riyadh and Cairo, against the reconstruction of the 'Safavid Empire' increasingly threatens the region. Fourth) However, what calls into question Iran's position as a significant Middle Eastern power under current conditions are its substantial economic weaknesses. A very large part of the Middle East, even despite the glitz seen here and there, suffers from state-run and often oil-dependent economies. Iran is deeply entrenched within this 'Middle Eastern economy', and its macroeconomic indicators, even compared to countries in the region, are in very poor condition. How can one speak of a return to the 'Persian Empire' in the 21st century when Iran's national currency is so weak, the country's inflation rate is among the highest, and its growth rate is among the lowest in the region, oil fields are barely worn out, and despite their vast reserves, gas fields remain unexported to global markets? How can one claim to be powerful when a very large number of the country's graduates are either unemployed or migrating? Can a country whose industries operate at one-third of their capacity speak of power? Is the country's foreign trade structure, which relies on the export of raw materials and very low-value goods, compatible with power? And finally, this question: in a country where water, one of the main sources of Iranian civilization, is becoming so scarce, lakes and rivers are drying up, and the specter of 'water wars' looms over some regions, how can one be optimistic about exercising power in the regional space?