Iran and Unarmed Missiles

(Part One) Since the Iran-Iraq war, Iran has developed a particular interest in the production, research, and development of a wide range of ballistic missiles and their launch capabilities into space. This interest, initially stemming from a vulnerability and defensive gap, has gradually taken on various dimensions. Today, this capability poses a major problem for Iran, and despite agreements for nuclear rollback, concerns remain that Iran may seek to enhance its missile capabilities to the level of nuclear warheads. The term ballistic refers to the method of an object's movement in space, similar to a cannonball or bullet that is guided along a predetermined trajectory after initial launch. Accordingly, missiles launched according to this physical principle are termed ballistic. In other words, it is the manner of travel that designates the term ballistic, not the type of material contained in the missile's warhead. The payload carried by a ballistic missile can be of a conventional type (composed of gunpowder and incendiary materials), in which case it is referred to as a conventional ballistic missile. At the same time, the same ballistic missile, with modifications, can carry various types of warheads, including biological, microbial, chemical, and nuclear. However, in this case, a different type of detonator is required for explosion, which fundamentally differs from that of conventional munitions. The fuel of a missile can be solid, which generally shortens the preparation time for launch. Conventional missile weapons are typically not considered effective offensive weapons nor strong defensive weapons. However, if stockpiled for defensive purposes, depending on type and quantity, they can provide effective deterrence. On the other hand, the intent and will of the weapon's owner cannot be determined until the weapon is actually used, and as necessary, a weapon such as a missile can be utilized both defensively and offensively. Another application of ballistic missiles in a different configuration is in missile defense systems, which only activate after the launch of an offensive missile with the intent to neutralize it. During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein used missile systems for offensive purposes, while during the Gulf War (1991), Israel utilized the Patriot missile defense system as a defensive measure. In addition to Israel, countries such as Greece, Germany, the Netherlands, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan are also equipped with this system. This system has the capability to counter ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and some aerial systems. Iranian Ballistic Missiles In the summer of 2008 (1387), during a military drill, Iran tested several of its ballistic missiles with varying ranges. Among the missiles tested at that time was the medium-range Shahab-3 missile. However, conflicting statements have been made regarding the range of Iran's Shahab missiles. Some domestic sources state the range in kilometers, while others mention it in miles, resulting in an unclear specification of the missile ranges, perhaps intentionally. What can be stated is that a range between 800 to 1800 miles has been claimed. 800 miles is approximately equal to 1288 kilometers, while 1800 miles equals 2900 kilometers. The linear distance, or flight path, from Tehran to Tel Aviv (Israel) is 1588 kilometers or 987 miles. Therefore, if the Shahab missile has only an 800-mile range and is launched from Iran's western borders instead of Tehran, it can easily reach Mecca, Israel, and Egypt. However, if the Shahab missile has an 1800-mile range, it could reach beyond Israel to places like Sudan, Egypt, and using mobile bases, even parts of Eastern Europe such as Slovakia, Albania, Poland, and Croatia; or in various directions to areas in Russia, Belarus, Lithuania, or even India and Pakistan; or to Ethiopia, Sanaa in Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea. It is clear that the missile's range can fluctuate depending on the type of fuel used and whether the warhead weight is less or more. More credible military sources have cited the range of the Shahab-3 missile as a maximum of 1000 miles or 1600 kilometers. However, such a range can only be achieved if the explosive warhead weight is reduced to 750 kilograms. After factors such as weight and range, the fuel of the missile is significant. Solid fuel is superior compared to liquid fuel as it considerably shortens the preparation time for launch. A ballistic missile with a conventional warhead The production of medium-range ballistic missiles in countries lacking the capability to produce nuclear warheads is unprecedented, and Iran is the only country that has built, tested, and mass-produced a ballistic missile (in other words, a carrier for a nuclear warhead) before producing a nuclear warhead, equipping it with a conventional (non-nuclear) warhead. This cannot be simply interpreted to mean that because Iran has produced the conventional part of the missile, it will therefore be able to produce a nuclear warhead and then easily replace the conventional warhead with a nuclear one. A ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear payload requires a third but vital component: a detonator that can activate with a nuclear warhead. This means Iran must overcome two technical problems: constructing a detonator that works with a nuclear warhead and producing the nuclear warhead itself. It would be overly optimistic to assume that since the Shahab missile is a modified version of North Korea's Nodong missile, its detonator would also be readily available to Iran through that country. Since the 1980s, Iran has tested various methods for producing ballistic missiles until it reached the Shahab-3 missile. The foundation of these missiles has been acquired. Iran purchased various missiles at different stages and, in parallel with their use during the war with Saddam Hussein and years after the war, reached the Shahab. Shahab-1 is a modified version of the Scud-B missile made by the former Soviet Union. Shahab-2 was built based on the Scud-C model, which was originally produced by the Soviets but never found its place in the Soviet arsenal. The designation Shahab-3 as a modified version of the Nodong missile is unrelated to its previous generations, Shahab-1 and Shahab-2. Nodong (also known as Rodong), although utilizing the Scud-D structure, is an independent missile that was initially constructed with Iranian financial assistance in North Korea, and then a percentage of the missiles produced in North Korea were exported to Iran. After the Nodong/Shahab-3 project, Iran moved towards the Sajil missile project, replacing liquid fuel with solid fuel. Despite international community efforts to impose sanctions and control the export of components, technology, and parts usable in the production of ballistic missiles in general and specifically Shahab and Sajil missiles, Iran has managed to make significant progress in this area and has mass-produced such missiles. The Importance of Ballistic Missiles The goal of producing ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads during the Cold War was strategic deterrence. However, for Iran, this goal has fundamentally changed, evolving from defensive power due to the lack of effective air force into a significant offensive capability. Of course, technically, since these missiles lack nuclear warheads and their explosive payload is a maximum of one thousand kilograms or less, they do not possess a high destructive capability, and beyond that, precise targeting with these missiles is nearly impossible. In conventional warheads, various factors can complicate or render achieving desired targets nearly impossible: - There is a possibility that the detonator may not function at all. - Other possibilities include technical failures in the missile's fuel and computational errors during its launch. - There is a possibility that a conventional missile may be intercepted and destroyed by anti-missile missiles during its trajectory, whereas due to the risk of nuclear explosion, no military would attack a missile with a nuclear warhead. - Missiles must be transported and, so to speak, planted on launchers before being launched. - A multitude of missiles must be targeted at a major military target, but the military target must be small to be effective. If missile capability is expended on scattered targets, a strategic result will not be achieved; however, such attacks can naturally create fear in densely populated civilian centers. The Strategic Dilemma, Examining a Hypothetical Conflict The difficult and so-called dilemma regarding unarmed ballistic missiles is summarized below: In a hypothetical conflict, if a multitude of conventional (non-nuclear) missiles are targeted and launched at population centers—even if dispersed in targeting—they can cause significant casualties and financial losses along with widespread fear and anxiety. If a multitude of conventional missiles are launched at decentralized industrial or military centers, the damages will be entirely incidental and scattered, bearing no proportion to the investment (the value of the weapons used), and naturally, such conditions will not compel the enemy to surrender to the demands of a country. Conversely, the targeted country may express a more severe reaction, escalating the conflict or bringing it to a stage beyond conventional conflict, such as a nuclear threat. In such circumstances, if the country possessing conventional ballistic missiles lacks nuclear options, it will automatically be the loser of the conflict. Or if such a country, due to a miscalculation in its combat capability, loses a significant portion of its conventional missile capability in initial attacks and is severely retaliated against, it will suffer compounded negative damages. If both countries possess strategic (nuclear) capability, these calculations change, and fundamentally, the threat of use or attack with a missile carrying a nuclear warhead enters into considerations such as deterrence, balance of power, and the intervention of major powers and the Security Council. To be continued... The author's opinion does not necessarily reflect the views of Radio Farda. Jalil Roshendela, Professor of Political Science at East Carolina University Membership In this area Ballistic Missiles and Concerns of the IRGC Navy; Types and Applications of Flying Vessels Advisor to Putin: Russia is Modernizing the S-300 System for Iran The Changing Battlefield of 'Proxy Forces'; War Against the People in the Streets of Iran The First Paragraph; The Responsibility of Opponents and the Likelihood of Radicalizing Iranian Society The Death of the Last Mossad Representative in Tehran Amid the Iran Crisis