Iran, Europe, and 'Drug Diplomacy'

Last week, the University of Vienna hosted the biennial Iran Studies Conference, where dozens of scholars, university professors, and enthusiasts exchanged views on the history, culture, politics, and literature related to Iran. In one of the many sessions of this conference, research on drug diplomacy and the relationship between Iran and the European Union in this area was presented. This research was presented by Yana Beer Christensen from the Institute of International Studies in Denmark. Ms. Christensen responded to questions in this regard in an interview with Radio Farda. Yana Beer Christensen is a researcher at the Institute of International Studies in Denmark. She is an anthropologist specializing in issues related to Iran. She was one of the speakers at the biennial Iran Studies Conference in Vienna. What is your assessment of the EU's cooperation policy with Iran regarding drugs? Has this been an effective collaboration? I think preventing the flow of drugs from Afghanistan is a very difficult and monumental task. This reminds me of a statement by one of the staff members of the UNODC, who said that this task is like trying to stop a waterfall with your hands. This means that Iranian officials or the UN can do whatever they want, but they are still engaged in this struggle on a large scale, and from that perspective, it will not be effective. However, as I mentioned in the session, the EU's approach has changed over the years. At one point, we witnessed dialogue between Iran and the EU, and this cooperation was very important and was seen as a way to address a problem for Europe, a common issue that both sides had an interest in, to help prevent the influx of opium from Afghanistan into Iran. Because Iran intercepts about 80% of the world's opium trafficking and is on the route to Europe, it was a partner that needed to be worked with. However, at one point, this effort to prevent drug trafficking became intertwined with human rights criticisms, and this realistic criticism arose regarding the number of executions in Iran, which should be emphasized has not been an effective policy. I conducted my first interview with a UNODC official in 2001 and returned to Iran in 2005 to research the treatment of drug addicts. At that time, working with Iran on combating drug trafficking was a topic that was much less politicized, while programs such as treating addicts, reducing demand, and harm reduction were much more sensitive and political. Can we talk a bit more precisely about this timeframe? Yes, I think the allowance for treating addicts as patients was granted around 1998 and 1999. This means making a distinction between traffickers and addicts; the former are still considered serious criminals, while the latter are treated with a patient approach. As a result, some of the treatment programs that existed before the 1979 revolution were reinstated. But this was a sensitive issue. Many Europeans were interested in working with Iran in this area and started doing so; in 2003, the harm reduction program was initiated, which was very new in 2005 when I was there, and local NGOs had begun to provide methadone and syringes and were expanding. However, at that time, the issue of trafficking was still more important, and everyone knew that something had to be done about the situation at the Iran-Afghanistan border. You refer in your research to this period, which coincided with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency, and the issue of combating trafficking faced challenges during this time. The situation changed. When I went to the UNODC office in 2012 and again in 2014, I realized that the issue of combating trafficking had become very politicized. Part of this was due to human rights criticisms, but sanctions also played a role. Since there are sanctions on dual-use technologies, cooperation with Iran became very difficult for this UN office and EU countries. Even the issue of dogs used for detection operations became entangled with these sanctions. As a result, the status of anti-trafficking programs and, on the other hand, treatment and harm reduction programs changed, and the political nature of treatment programs and so on decreased. It is also interesting that some countries that collaborated with Iran in combating trafficking turned to cooperation in demand reduction and harm reduction, and this was a suggestion I made to the Danish government that this is a way they can still operate in this area in Iran. Can you elaborate on how this cooperation can be effective? The statistics I currently have are not very up-to-date, but these centers provide services to about 700,000 people; there are many centers for addicts to visit, many NGOs, and there are also government programs in this area. I do not exactly know how foreign budgets have entered this cycle. Of course, this area also faced challenges during Ahmadinejad's time, and there were some treatment methods that were not easily carried out, and doctors who were active in this area were arrested and imprisoned. Yes, the Alaei brothers were active in this area and were imprisoned for years. Yes, exactly. Some left the country, and there were problems. When I asked the UN about the success rate of these programs, they said it was clear that they had not been successful because there are still very serious problems. And of course, another important issue is that in Iran, the use of heroin and opium has shifted to methamphetamine, which has changed the level of the problem. For a time, Afghanistan could be blamed for the problems, but now home kitchens in Iran have become producers of methamphetamine. As a result, it has become an internal problem. Also, demographic changes have occurred; for example, the number of women addicted to crystal meth has greatly increased, and the levels of psychological problems and violence have risen, which fundamentally differ from addiction to a substance like opium. Therefore, efforts are currently being made to find new ways to treat these individuals. In this regard, Maziar Ghiabi from Oxford University has conducted extensive field research that is very up-to-date. Returning to the cooperation between Iran and the EU, you mentioned that sanctions and human rights are challenges to this cooperation. Today, after the nuclear agreement, the issue of sanctions has somewhat eased with some problems, but the issue of human rights remains. What is the EU's current approach to this cooperation? I do not know the details behind the scenes, but I have seen indications from European officials that say this is a common challenge and an area where we can cooperate with Iran. I think as long as Iran carries out death sentences for drug-related crimes, it is hard for me to imagine European countries supporting efforts to combat the cycle of drug production and supply. However, it is clear that they can lift sanctions on dual-use technologies and make it easier for Iranians. I think what they can do is cooperate with Iran in the areas of demand reduction, harm reduction, and treatment. There is a great need to share experiences that can be mutual, and Europeans can learn in this area as well. Some countries like Norway and Sweden have directed their budgets toward this. Can you explain how the sanctions on dual-use technologies have impacted this process? The discussions that have been raised relate to night vision goggles or detection equipment that have components that can fall under the category of dual-use technology. However, it seems there is an excessive caution on the part of Europeans that anything that may be slightly related to another issue falls under sanctions. I mentioned the issue of dogs used for sniffing drugs, which I really do not know how it relates to dual-use technology! Of course, in the meantime, banking sanctions, capacity building, and funding issues have also been problematic. You mentioned executions and said it is a challenge for cooperation with Iran. What is your opinion on some Iranian officials' comments regarding reducing the number of executions? This issue regarding reducing the number of executions related to drug offenses began with Mohammad Javad Larijani proposing the abolition of the death penalty for drug-related crimes to the parliament. This has been discussed for a while, and those who previously supported these death sentences, including the Larijanis, seem to have changed their views. As a result, a space has been created for negotiation in this area, which Europeans can discuss with Iranians, and it seems a common ground has been formed. However, I do not know if this can lead to a change in the law or not. Other executions in Iran relate to retribution. A look at Ahmadinejad's era shows that at one point, 60% and at another point, 80% of executions were related to drug offenses. After Rouhani came to power, although the number of executions is still increasing, most of them are related to murder cases. This has led to actions at the community level in this regard, and even the judiciary is participating in this issue to prevent executions by negotiating with the families of victims. Of course, legally, since it originates from Sharia, changing it is difficult. Another challenge is that for murder, either retribution is carried out or the offender is released, and one cannot change execution to life imprisonment, so victims and families are somewhat faced with the option of execution or forgiveness, which complicates matters. Also, discussions about public executions have negative impacts on society. In the case of drug-related sentences, legally, since it is not based on Sharia, changing it could be easier, but conversely, there is no social movement to free these individuals and prevent their executions because many consider them worse than murderers and see the impact of drug use on society. Therefore, there are still two different approaches regarding the abolition of death sentences. I think it is still possible to carry out punitive measures with long prison sentences and reduce the number of executions. Finally, another area where the UN can work is to ask Iran to transparently disclose the identities of executed individuals to clarify what crimes they were executed for, whether they were part of armed groups or committed lesser crimes. In a way, we have also become entangled in the politics of numbers. The figures I used for my research were based on sources from NGOs, which often have discrepancies regarding execution statistics, and official figures are much lower than the numbers I used in my research. No one in the Iranian government is willing to clarify this issue and the crimes of executed individuals. If this were done, and for example, it became clear that these individuals were involved in the murder of others or participated in armed conflicts with security forces, it could make a difference. Therefore, it seems there are various ways to engage in dialogue with Iranians in this area, and the solution is not just to say that Iran must stop executions, or we will cut our budget and assistance.