Iran in Syria; New Confessions, Unanswered Questions

The military-security participation of the Islamic Republic in supporting the Assad regime (which began in early January 2011) has been sufficiently revealed; however, despite denials from several years ago and initially, official and new data has been published for months regarding this matter. Comments by Hossein Hamadani, a senior commander of the IRGC in Syria who was later killed in that country (in October 2015), are among the important reports and noteworthy evidence in this area. Recently, Hamadani's statements have been meaningfully confirmed and completed by Mohammad Reza Naqdi, the commander of the Basij. Naqdi reported last week in an interview that Assad's successes against citizen protests began when Iranian military-security forces came to the aid of the autocratic and repressive ruler: "Victories began the day the Basij was established in Syria." The "National Defense Forces" supporting Assad were organized with significant investment and active participation from the Quds Force of Iran in Syria. Naqdi explained: "The same model that was implemented in Iran was also executed there. They gathered young people and trained trusted individuals." Naqdi emphasized that these militia forces were armed despite the initial opposition of the Syrian army; an action based on the experience of the Islamic Republic and relying on the participation of part of the Basij in the bloody suppression of the Green Movement. The commander of the Basij also added that Syrian soldiers, upon witnessing the "victories," aligned with the strategy of the Quds Force; "small units were formed and played roles in several operations in the suburbs of Damascus, and they saw how young people who voluntarily came with ideological motivations acted. They saw that they were more successful than those who came merely for salaries and jobs. They believed it and allowed the number of battalions to increase." The recent statements of the fallen commander Hamadani are not the only new confession from a senior military official of the Islamic Republic regarding the close ties between Tehran and Damascus. Just a few days prior, a new comment from Hamadani, the senior commander of the Quds Force in Syria, was published. This senior military official, who was killed in Syria last autumn, explained why the Islamic Republic intervened in Syria's internal affairs. Hamadani, referring to the recognition of the Islamic Republic by Syria and Hafez Assad after the victory of the revolution, stated: "This has a definition in diplomatic language; a country that recognizes you first has a special status, and in foreign relations with that country and in diplomacy, it must be valued. A separate account must be opened." Hamadani also mentioned Syria's practical companionship and empathy with Iran in the war with Iraq, listing the following points: closing Iraq's oil pipelines to the Mediterranean (as the "economic lifeline" of this country from the perspective of the senior commander of the Quds Force); Damascus's indifference to the significant profits from oil transit and transfer; a positive response to Iran's need for "ammunition and military equipment" and assistance in this area; and equipping Iran with "missiles" in the war with Iraq. He then asks: "Should we not help him now? He needs it; should we not assist?" Hamadani also referred to Syria's cooperation in establishing Hezbollah in Lebanon by the Islamic Republic and helping Tehran strengthen and maintain the presence of this organization. He also emphasized the importance of pursuing the Supreme Leader's view in strengthening the "Resistance Front" and added: "The front is the Resistance Front; it is not just about Syria... Duty, ethics, and humanity tell us we must respond. Every greeting has a response." He quoted the Supreme Leader as saying: "Bashar Assad fights on our behalf, fights for us." Like Naqdi's comments, Hamadani's words also provide significant reports of military-security cooperation and assistance from Tehran to Damascus after the protests began in January 2009. In Hamadani's explanation of the initial motivations for Tehran's cooperation with Damascus, there is no indication of "ISIS"—which has recently justified the military-security presence of the Islamic Republic. Last year, prior to the publication of the aforementioned views, another important interview with Hamadani was published; in that conversation, he referred to organizing those he described as "thugs and rascals" and stated: "We identified 5,000 people who participated in the riots but were not involved in political parties and movements; they were identified as criminals and thugs, and we controlled them at home. On the day they called for protests, they were controlled and not allowed to leave their homes. Later, I made them members of battalions. These three battalions later showed that if we want to train fighters, we must bring such individuals who deal with knives and blades to the front lines." This senior IRGC commander emphasized that during the suppression of the Green Movement, "45,000 Basijis were present in this scene." Later, after Hamadani's death, Aziz Jafari, the commander of the IRGC, confirmed Hamadani's effective role in suppressing the Green Movement and stated that "without the foresight and management of General Hamadani," it would have been "difficult to suppress" the Green Movement. Aziz Jafari added that after suppressing the protesters against the 2009 election coup in Iran, "he was restless and unsettled" and joined the authoritarian regime of Bashar Assad to suppress Syrian protesters: "The burden of General Hamadani's experiences in Syria helped him." Iran in Syria; Numerous Questions This document does not claim that the current crisis in Syria is entirely due to Tehran's cooperation with the Assad regime; the author also does not ignore the interventions of several regional governments and transnational powers in Syria, nor the social and cultural roots of the unprecedented crisis and the continuation of the tragedy in this part of the Middle East. The fundamental questions are as follows: If the Islamic Republic had not stood by the authoritarian regime at the beginning of the Syrian protests against Assad's autocracy, would the material and human costs that have affected Iran over these years have been avoided? Will the historical burden and adverse effects of Tehran's direct intervention in the Syrian crisis haunt Iranians for decades? If a democratic and national regime were in power in Iran, would it have come to the aid of Assad's authoritarian regime in the face of Syrian protests and engaged in suppressing Syrian protesters? Would part of the responsibility for the humanitarian disaster in Syria fall on Iran and Iranians? If the political authority in Iran had not defined a "Resistance Front" and "strategic depth" in which "Hezbollah Lebanon" and "Damascus Assad" were central, would military intervention and security presence in Syria have been deemed a "national necessity"? Do the economic and political benefits derived from Tehran's support for Assad's Damascus outweigh its "costs"? If the rulers in Iran did not prioritize their "ideological" projects and visions over "national interests," would Iran's support for Assad's authoritarian regime have been necessary? Would pursuing human and sustainable development in Iran be preferable to entering a very costly conflict and competition in Syria? The national interests sacrificed for ideology and autocracy. The questions listed are numerous; the previous and recent confessions of senior military and security officials of the Islamic Republic clearly show how the freedom-haters and democracy-opposers in Iran—who brought about the 2009 election coup and endeavored to suppress the Green Movement—have defined and pursued their strategy in the region by standing alongside the authoritarian Damascus. The central power in the Islamic Republic has defined a "strategic depth" for Iran, the cost-benefit of which has not been discussed and debated in any democratic process or safe public discourse among the Iranian people—especially among experts. Neither the press enjoys freedom and security to critique this regional policy, nor do experts within the country, nor political parties and groups; all of these exist under censorship, intimidation, and threats. There is no parliament arising from "free, fair, and just elections" that can critique the regional policy at the core of power. Ayatollah Khamenei and the military-security current aligned with him have pursued their political-ideological priorities regardless of democratic trends in domestic and foreign policy. Thus, unfortunately, the costs associated with the Islamic Republic's insistence on maintaining military-security presence in Syria continue to burden Iranians and national interests and will continue to do so unless effective public inquiry on this matter compels the regime to change its approaches both domestically and internationally.