Iran in the Past Year

The year 1396 was a year of surprises and unique events for Iran in both domestic and international dimensions. This article follows excerpts from these developments. Spring 1396 - Ayatollah Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his Nowruz speech, urged the people to take actions that would remove them from 'vulnerability' against 'the threats of enemies and their hostilities.' The prescription he provided has yet to cure the chronic illness of the country. Khamenei introduced 'resistant economy' as a 'direct and clear road' to solving problems and stated that if there is 'action and effort' for a year, 'the effects and signs of it' will be observed. He also emphasized that 'it is possible to fight unemployment with a resistant economy; it is possible to combat recession; it is possible to control inflation; it is possible to stand against the threats of enemies; it is possible to create many opportunities for the country and utilize them.' Two months later, on 29 Ordibehesht 1396, the people elected Hassan Rouhani for a second term as president with 57% of the votes against his rival Ebrahim Raisi, who was widely supported by fundamentalists. The people's votes were a hope for a political opening domestically and constructive engagement with the outside world, which Rouhani had promised. However, these hopes quickly turned into despair and ultimately led to widespread public protests at the end of the year. Rouhani's significant trips - Throughout the year 1396, despite numerous foreign trips, the Iranian president could not make progress on major foreign policy issues. In the first week of the year, the government delegation and the president's trip to Russia was accompanied by the signing of several economic cooperation documents. Then Rouhani became embroiled in the re-election campaign; and on 17 Khordad, five members of the group known as the Islamic State (ISIS) attacked the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Parliament building. Although ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, it later became clear that the perpetrators of this attack, which left 12 dead, were Iranians affiliated with ISIS. Despite multiple foreign trips throughout the year, the Iranian president could not make progress on major foreign policy issues... Apparently, strict orders from the leadership had blocked any interaction with American officials to prevent any opening in foreign relations with the West. In Shahrivar, Rouhani met with Turkish President Erdogan and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on the sidelines of the Islamic Cooperation Summit in Kazakhstan. However, the level of expectations among the people domestically and the hope that Iran would emerge from the economic and international deadlock peaked in the last week of Shahrivar with the president's trip to New York. Unlike the trip that coincided with the signing of the JCPOA, the speeches of the presidents of Iran and the United States at the UN General Assembly (26 Shahrivar) were planned in such a way that there was no possibility of a face-to-face meeting between the two presidents. Apparently, strict orders from the leadership had blocked any interaction with American officials to prevent any opening in foreign relations with the West. However, on the sidelines of the summit, meetings were held with French President Emmanuel Macron, with promises of reciprocal visits that have yet to be realized. There were also less significant meetings with the President of Austria, the Prime Ministers of Japan, Pakistan, Norway, and Belgium. The Kurdistan Independence Crisis - Following the UN summit, the three countries of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey faced difficult days awaiting the results of the independence referendum for the Kurdistan region of Iraq. This referendum brought the three countries closer together to coordinate on ways to counter Kurdistan's independence. On 10 Mehr, General Hulusi Akar, the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army, visited Tehran and was welcomed by the president and Iranian officials at the Saadabad Palace. Two days later, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Tehran, a decision was made to militarily blockade the borders of Kurdistan to curb the independence movement. On 10 Aban, the second trilateral conference of Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan (North-South) was held, despite existing disagreements between Iran and Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan's proximity to Israel. The meeting of the leaders of Russia and Azerbaijan with Ayatollah Khamenei was a side event of this meeting that showed the leadership's decision-making role in foreign affairs extends beyond the government's power. This meeting could not resolve Iran's disagreements with other neighbors regarding the Caspian Sea. Syria and Israel - Subsequently, the Russian president hosted the presidents of Iran and Turkey in Sochi to prepare for the formation of a 'National Dialogue Congress' between the Syrian opposition and the government. This 'Congress,' which some of Assad's opponents do not attend, has been held several times throughout the year with the presence of Stefan de Mistura, the UN representative, and American diplomats but has yet to resolve the Syrian issue. Following the announcement of American support for recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, an extraordinary meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation was held in Istanbul on 22 Azar. President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif of Iran also attended this meeting, but the next day, the Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that support for the resolution of this meeting and its final declaration should not be interpreted as recognition of Israel, and the Islamic Republic officially declared a 'reservation' on these issues. Saudi Arabia - Saudi Arabia has never supported the 1+5 nuclear agreement with Iran and has always sought its cancellation. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir believe that Iran, by providing arms and ballistic missiles to the Houthis and supporting the Assad regime in Syria, is a source of terrorism and extremism, a destabilizing factor in the Middle East, and the main culprit in the ongoing war in Syria. Iran, in turn, accuses Saudi Arabia of supporting terrorism and extremism and believes that Saudi oil dollars and American support have contributed to the spread of terrorism in the region. This situation did not change throughout the year 1396. Limited actions were taken during the year, but they could not repair relations with Saudi Arabia, and Saudi officials showed no willingness to change the status quo, continuing a verbal war with each other using harsh and sarcastic language or threats and insults. It seems that other bilateral issues cannot be resolved directly between the two countries, and resolving them requires mediation from factors outside the borders of both countries. Iran, Syria, and Israel - Iran's support for Syria and the proxy role of Hezbollah forces and those recruited by Iran from regional countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan) sent to Syria to participate in the war against Bashar Assad's opponents continued in 1396 and was considered a damaging factor in relations between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Iran's argument against foreign criticisms has consistently been that Iran has a legal presence in that country at the request of Syria and is fighting terrorism. This claim is made in a context where Israel usually perceives Iran's presence and intervention in Syria as a vital threat to its existence. Moreover, it believes that the nuclear deal has not blocked Iran's path to a nuclear bomb, and Iran remains determined to build a nuclear bomb. On the other hand, commanders of the Revolutionary Guards and the Quds Force of Iran, by promoting the slogan of destroying Israel, reinforce the perception of threat. For example, in Bahman 96, Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Forces, stated that 'the destruction of Israel' is the best revenge for the killing of Imad Mughniyeh, the commander of Hezbollah's military wing. These statements, despite the friendship and closeness between Iran and Russia, were criticized by Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, who condemned the threat to 'destroy Israel' vehemently. The Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA) - Iran's nuclear agreement with 1+5 has faced problems since the beginning of Donald Trump's presidency. Among other things, the American president considers it a bad deal and has threatened that if its provisions are not amended, the U.S. will withdraw from it. Iran's view of this agreement is inflexible, and it has threatened that if the U.S. withdraws, it will start producing high-enriched uranium. European governments, for their economic interests, want to maintain the JCPOA but are trying to convince Iran to make concessions regarding the peripheral issues of the JCPOA. The fruitless trip of Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French Foreign Minister, to Tehran shows that Iran shows no flexibility in resolving existing disputes, and this has led to a tendency for military options from the other side. The result of a year of Iranian efforts to use various levers to maintain the nuclear agreement has been largely unsuccessful. On the fourteenth of Esfand, 'Jean-Yves Le Drian' visited Tehran. This trip was directly related to European efforts to save the nuclear agreement 'JCPOA' by opening a dialogue channel regarding Iran's missile program, which has been opposed by most Western countries and the U.S. However, Le Drian's trip was fruitless, and Iran showed no flexibility regarding negotiations over the missile program. On Friday, 25 Esfand, the capital of Austria witnessed the last opportunity for negotiations regarding the complaints repeatedly raised by President Trump. In the joint commission meeting of the JCPOA, the issue of revising the details of the nuclear agreement was not agreed upon. However, on the sidelines of this meeting, a bilateral dialogue took place between Iranian and American diplomats regarding prisoners and missing dual nationals and Americans in Iran, the details of which were not announced. Thus, in the last days of the year, the nuclear agreement faced a significant deadlock. Overall, 1396 was an unsuccessful year in maintaining the achievements of the nuclear agreement. A year in which every four months, the risk of canceling the nuclear agreement was raised and then postponed for four months due to factors beyond Iran's control. The four-month deadlines stem from the accountability structure of the U.S. presidential system to Congress, which requires it to report every four months whether Iran has remained faithful to the commitments of the 1+5 agreement. Since the beginning of President Trump's presidency, he has reluctantly issued this confirmation three times, despite his own will, but in the last round, on 22 Dey (12 January), the U.S. president officially announced that if the flaws of the JCPOA are not corrected by the next round, i.e., by 12 May (22 Ordibehesht 1397), the U.S. will withdraw from it. One of the reasons for America's opposition is the regional policies of the Islamic Republic and the ballistic missile program. America's allies try to influence Iran in two ways: direct pressure and efforts to convince Iran that if it does not change its regional behavior and missile program, the nuclear agreement will be jeopardized. Secondly, through alignment with the United States in increasing pressure on Iran in all areas except the nuclear agreement. In fact, Europe does not want the JCPOA to be canceled, and for this reason, it is willing to align with the U.S. on a range of issues in the hope that Iran will concede in one area and be willing to negotiate. The fruitless trip of Jean-Yves Le Drian to Tehran shows that Iran shows no flexibility in resolving existing disputes, and this has led to a tendency for military options from the other side. Le Drian described Iran's role in the Middle East as 'questionable' on 28 Esfand, before the start of the meeting of foreign ministers of EU member countries in Brussels, and stated that the EU cannot ignore Iran's ballistic missile program. It must be said that the result of a year of Iranian efforts to use various levers to maintain the nuclear agreement has been largely unsuccessful, and Iran has not been able to utilize the influence of other members of 1+5 to convince the United States. Conclusion - The year 1396 was not a good year for Iran in both domestic and international arenas. Despite the vote of confidence the people gave to Rouhani, widespread public protests at the end of the year and protests by women against mandatory hijab resulted in dozens of deaths and thousands of arrests, with many still held in unspecified conditions or in unknown detention centers. The government's indifference to protests and the rights of the people has once again turned the idea of regime change into one of the options for the West. With changes occurring in the foreign policy apparatus and White House advisors, once again, as the May deadline (the four-month review period of the JCPOA) approaches, attention is drawn to substantive changes in the U.S. strategy towards Iran, which encompasses a range of options. Options such as the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, attacks on Iranian missile and military bases, the outbreak of war between Israel and Saudi Arabia against Iran, regime change, peaceful regime change from within, support for organized opposition groups residing abroad, or support for the collapse of the regime, all of which are part of the available options.