We are at the beginning of the fourth week of street protests. Political and military officials of the Islamic Republic speak of the end of clashes and the establishment of calm, but what is happening in the streets, universities, and schools is not a sign of tranquility or a decline in protests. So far, protesters have achieved significant gains, which can already be seen and felt as 'buds'.
If until yesterday there was talk of a generation that was dependent on their parents for 'pocket money', today, according to an economics professor, we are witnessing a generation that 'powerfully creates its own leaders, generates thought, and creates solutions, without needing the guidance of worn-out intellectuals and inactive academics like me'.
Mohsen Renani, in a note titled 'A Hair's Breadth', states, 'It can be said today without hesitation that this regime is failing because it has never had a theory of failure.'
In recent years, whenever the topic of the fall of the Islamic Republic came up, it was said that the 'great chance' of the Iranian government is that it does not have a strong alternative and that opposition groups outside Iran lack the ability to mobilize and lead the masses on a large scale.
What has happened today in the streets of Iran is believed by experts to be a 'great shock' to a government that perhaps did not expect its rivals to be the youth and school students who would shake the foundations of the regime.
However, it does not seem that the government accepts such interpretations from analysts. Last week, Ayatollah Khamenei, at the officer training college, interpreted the presence of teenagers and youth in the streets as a trivial and insignificant level, akin to 'internet programs', 'exciting and emotional'. He said, 'All of this, in total, is a very small number against the Iranian nation and the faithful and proud youth of Islamic Iran.' He stated that the reactions and support of artists and athletes for the protesters are 'worthless' and 'have no significance'.
Despite downplaying the protests, Ayatollah Khamenei's meeting with military personnel at the officer training college amidst street clashes and the suppression of students had a specific meaning. He could have met with political and academic activists but seemed to prefer to support the military as in the past and show their backing to the opposition.
The death of Mahsa Amini sparked a fire of expectations from the government among the people. Now, the power's blade cannot confront the fallen headscarves, and in a way, Iran has entered an era of 'optional hijab'. The number of those who removed their headscarves and threw them into the fire is so large that Ayatollah Khamenei, in his recent speech, passed over this significant event and preferred not to mention it.
In Esfand 1396, in response to the removal of headscarves during the protests of Dey, he said, 'The fact that four girls are deceived and remove their headscarves is a small and insignificant issue.'
Vahid Ishtari, a principlist activist, wrote on Twitter that the era of compulsory hijab is almost over and we are in the 'post-Mahsa' era: 'Do not be fooled by the analyses of petty analysts who announce a great victory and a proud emergence from a new sedition! Women, life, freedom have achieved their goals.'
It seems that what is happening today in the streets is the beginning of the same renaissance that researchers have promised. Mohsen Renani stated in Esfand 1397 that the renaissance occurring in Iran is higher and better than the European Renaissance. He said, 'The European Renaissance was the separation of religion from politics, but in the Iranian Renaissance, the separation of faith from Sharia is happening, which is far ahead of European secularism.'
The talk of a media revolution, the information age, and technology is not new. In Iran, we have practically and noticeably faced only part of its functions. Typically, when talking about the new generation and media, young people and teenagers are depicted as staring at a mobile phone or tablet and computer, busy chatting, playing games, and watching films and series.
Most concerns and criticisms of the teenage generation were that they lack movement and need to be handed a glass of water, and if parents do not provide food for them, they might even risk their lives for the same entertainment conditions.
Now that young people and teenagers have come to the scene, the main analysis of those close to the government and senior officials is still based on the belief that those who came to the streets were influenced by 'action video games' and that the educational system needs to be 'cleansed'.
What has happened in recent days has unveiled one of the functions of media and social networks that have replaced parties and leaders of political groups. This aspect of the functions of new media was evident in the protests in Iran in 88, 96, and 98, but this time it has emerged in a new form and within the framework of the generation of the 80s.
In these years, when figures like Ayatollah Khamenei speak of 'being free' and 'licentiousness' in cyberspace, it is more directed at the reasons for not having the pulse of this movement in terms of hardware and software, and less attention is paid to the fact that despite comprehensive control of cyberspace, filtering WhatsApp and Instagram, social networks can transform a passive and indifferent citizen into an active, 'aware', and responsible individual.
What happened during the death of Mahsa Amini in Iran and the world was of a nature of awareness and taking people out of the circle of 'individuality', and not only Iran but countries around the world were mobilized, resembling a miracle that can be attributed to social networks as its 'prophet'.
The Islamic Republic has not experienced such conditions (if we call it a demand crisis) in its 43 years of existence, and the government is now faced with a nation that, in addition to livelihood issues and bread, has more than ever concerns about social freedoms, especially women's rights, and these new demands are not something the government can ignore if it suppresses protests. Externally, it has also left a significant impact and forced world leaders to align with this protest movement.
It is questioned who the leader is of the teenagers and youth who came to the streets, and protests that supposedly have no 'head' are doomed to failure.
In today's communication system, we are faced with a new form of public mobilization where social networks take on the leadership of protests and social and political movements, such that an idea or thought from an ordinary person or civil activist can receive public support and turn into a movement, creating a massive wave.
In other words, 'communication age' movements do not need formal leadership and a vertical command center to convey orders, and traditional definitions of organization have changed, and what is observed in the protests in Iran is a clear example of such a movement, and the government does not know whom to pressure.
For example, during the recent protests, an individual collected 1200 tweets that contained quotes and anonymous messages in a file named 'For' and asked artists, poets, storytellers, and translators to create a new narrative from these messages for people inside and outside. He stated, 'I kiss the hand of any artist who can create a narrative and impactful artwork from it.'
From such writings, the protest song 'For...' was produced and published, exponentially driving the protests and becoming a symbol of these protests and a lasting historical work.
On the other hand, the same song 'For...' has inspired many other artists and raised the expectations and forgotten demands of the people from the government, and the long list of people's demands continues to grow.
Moreover, social networks, despite internet outages, have facilitated individual and group communications and established direct connections between people and protesters, while government media such as newspapers and television have been removed or diminished from this cycle, and the government cannot censor news or impose its narrative unilaterally on the people.
One of the most important characteristics of this round of protests is the collapse of 'fear' of seeing security forces and special units. In past protests, sometimes a few officers would push a large number of protesters back, but images from social networks and reports from eyewitnesses show that teenagers and young people are not afraid of seeing the officers and stand up against them. In many videos, it has been observed that special unit forces have been forced to retreat in front of the protesters.
The scattered nature of protests in large cities like Tehran did not scare the youth and teenagers but became a trump card for continuing protests and exhausting security forces and special units. Unlike past protests, the scattering of protesters rendered the repression apparatus incapable of ending the protests to the extent that on the third of Mehr, during the visit of the head of the judiciary to the command center of the emergency unit of the police, there was talk of 'insomnia and fatigue' of the forces.
On the other hand, government agents in these years, in addition to shooting at protesters, have instilled fear and terror among the families of the killed and the protesters. In every period, especially mothers have stood up against these pressures. In this round of protests, families, especially mothers, have not succumbed to these threats more than ever.
For example, regarding Nika Shakerimi, the judiciary, along with all government media, tried to give a criminal color to the murder of a seventeen-year-old girl, but despite forced confessions from Nika Shakerimi's aunt and uncle, her mother, by releasing a video, rendered all these efforts 'ineffective'.