Iran in the Year 1393

Another year has passed for Iran and Iranians. A year filled with suspension and affected by it. A year where many areas related to the nuclear energy issue were caught in 'waiting.' The Rouhani government prioritized resolving the nuclear crisis and achieving reconciliation, while also focusing on reviving the stagnant economy. Thus, the area of political development remained silent and marginalized. A significant part of the reformist political forces, affected by this situation, tried not to cause any disturbance to the government's main programs and dismissed many of their demands. This does not mean that the ruling authoritarian forces ceased their repression of civil society and the pursuit of their independent projects. They created disturbances against cultural development and changes in the political and media atmosphere of the country as much as they could. However, resistance and active engagement in civil society were simultaneously noticeable. Protests by women in several cities against acid attacks, meaningful ceremonies on December 7 (Student Day) at several universities, protests by teachers, workers, and nurses for the denial of their civil rights, and the human rights stand of citizens (from Nasrin Sotoudeh to Gohar Eshghi, mother of Sattar Beheshti) are some of the evidences of the aforementioned claim. Aside from these, the emergence of ISIS in the region and the increase in insecurity around Iran proliferated 'security-seeking' as a new priority within society. This situation led to the emergence of a name in the political-social space of Iran: Qassem Soleimani. The senior commander who, alongside Zarif and Motahari, was one of the important figures of the year 1393. Soleimani was a commander who, alongside Jafari and Ghalibaf and several other senior commanders of the IRGC, had written to Khatami, the reformist president, following the attack on Tehran University dormitory (1999): 'Our patience has run out, and we do not consider it permissible to endure more if our demands are not met.' Beyond Iran's borders, another name also emerged prominently: Mohammad Javad Zarif. The mature movement and active engagement of the Foreign Minister and the diplomatic apparatus increased hopes for an agreement with the West on the nuclear issue. In addition to Zarif and Soleimani, Ali Motahari, a principlist member of parliament, was influenced by his critical actions in 1393. He became a prominent figure in the country by boldly criticizing the pillars of the government and defending the fundamental rights of Iranians—especially Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard. However, independent of all this, some events had particular significance and prominence in 1393. The year began with the fervor surrounding the border guards taken hostage in Sistan and Baluchestan. Of the five soldiers abducted by the 'Jaish al-Adl' group, four were released with the effective role of Molavi Abdolhamid and returned to the country. The role of the Sunni Friday prayer leader of Zahedan and the foremost figure of Sunnis in Iran in the release of the border guards was undeniable. This event once again highlighted the importance of the 'bridges' between civil society and the government in Iran, a topic that continued to face indifference from the ruling authoritarian forces. However, Molavi Abdolhamid, as befitting his status, was not appreciated by the core of power. Even his exit from Iran was still prevented in 1393. Civil society, however, widely honored and celebrated the famous Sunni cleric. The year of continued estrangement and restriction was marked by the prohibition of publishing news and images of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, the foremost figure of reformism in Iran, which was a prominent manifestation of the mismanagement and disregard of the hardliners towards these effective 'bridges.' Despite Khatami signing and sending a significant letter from the Combatant Clergy Association to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, he continued to experience the animosity and estrangement of the system's top figure and his security-military companions. Thus, 1393 was not only the year of the continued house arrest of the leaders of the Green Movement but also a year of increased restrictions against trusted and popular political figures in civil society due to illegal limitations against Khatami. The issuance of heavy judicial sentences against political activists and strictness in granting them leave was another aspect of the continued estrangement and restriction in the past year. The continuation of repression and violence against dervishes and Baha'is or the execution of bizarre sentences (for example, 11 years in prison for Nasir Hashemi, an economist, and 10 years for Rouyin Atoufat, a civil activist) were clear evidence of this estrangement. The arrests of Atena Farghadani and Mohsen Rahmani and several other civil activists had no meaning other than the application of violence and illegal domination and threats. In reviewing the year 1393, one cannot ignore a significant social event. After the death of Morteza Pashaei, a young pop singer, in November, tens of thousands of people took to the streets in Tehran and several other major cities to mourn in a different manner. This event was so strange and unexpected that it faced various reactions and was evaluated from different angles. Youssef Abadari, a sociology professor at Tehran University, was another name that, like Pashaei, became increasingly prominent. He made headlines with his frank and unreserved criticism of part of society. Abadari criticized the prevalence of 'banality' in politics and society and addressed the 'identification of society with the government in a mutual fear' following the 2009 elections. He also explicitly criticized the 'quasi-fascist' situation in society and the 'politicization' and 'destruction of everything for which the revolution was made.' Regardless of the content of Abadari's words and without judging his viewpoint, his critical opinions sparked a wave of serious discussions about 'the political matter' and the current state of Iranian society. The year of executions and important trials was marked by the first year of the second five-year term of Sadegh Larijani as head of the judiciary, filled with executions. The statistics of executions of minors under 18 years reached its highest annual rate since the 1970s. This year also saw the number of executions during the second leadership of the Islamic Republic set a new record. Some of these executions (such as the execution of Mohsen Pouraslani, a political prisoner, and six Kurdish and Sunni security prisoners) were accompanied by various protests and numerous controversies. In a year when news of economic corruption and astronomical embezzlements continued in Iran, the trial and imprisonment of Ahmadinejad's first vice president was not a small matter. Mohammad Reza Rahimi was one of the few senior government officials in the Islamic Republic to be prosecuted. He was tried in connection with the embezzlement case from Iran Insurance. His final sentence was five years in prison, restitution, and a monetary fine. The son of the head of the Expediency Discernment Council was also another famous defendant of 1393. His 15-year imprisonment, monetary fine, and dismissal from public service were the main highlights of the announced penalties against Mehdi Hashemi Rafsanjani. A sentence that has not yet been finalized and is significantly meaningful. The year of acid attacks in Mehr 1393 affected the social atmosphere in Iran due to the acid attacks in Isfahan. The occurrence of these bitter and unfortunate events coincided with the peak of news related to the 'Support for the Commanders of Good and Prohibition of Evil' plan, which was shocking and significant during the time of the establishment of the moderate government. No individual or legal entity took responsibility for the acid attacks on women. Civil and group protests in Isfahan, Tehran, and Mashhad did not lead to any results, except that several female activists (such as Mahdieh Golroo) were once again targeted for threats and arrests. The security and law enforcement forces have so far shown incapacity in arresting the perpetrators and instigators. The unusual intensification of protests against women's dress by hardliners and opponents of the government strengthened the suspicion of the political-security and ideological nature of the acid attacks. Although some senior judicial and law enforcement officials of the Islamic Republic criticized linking the acid attacks to the issue of 'commanding good and forbidding evil.' Ahmad Reza Radan, the former deputy chief of police in Iran and head of the Strategic Studies Center of the Law Enforcement Force, described the 'over-exaggeration' of the incident as worse than the 'issue' itself and stated that this event was 'exploited by enemies.' The innocent victims of the acid attacks became the major victims of Iran's politicized and ideological society. The year of the sick leader and the Assembly of Experts was intertwined with the news of the illness and prostate surgery of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. When all paths in the authoritarian system reliant on a person lead to the absolute rule of the jurist and the leader's office, it is natural that news of his cancer would be sensitive and controversial. Rumors and 'hearsays' that arise in political and media circles in such situations focus on the condition of the head of the political system and are raised with greater intensity. Direct and indirect comments about 'the next leader of the Islamic Republic' also increased in this context. Statements that sometimes, like Hashemi Rafsanjani's hints about the possibility of a council leadership, faced predictable reactions from the far-right. In this context, Hashemi Rafsanjani's defeat by Mohammad Yazdi, his long-time critic and hardliner rival in the Assembly of Experts, was an important and thought-provoking event. The former head of the judiciary received twice as many votes from the Assembly of Experts as the head of the Expediency Discernment Council and took the presidency. The return of the former chief justice to a high position in the government occurs while Hashemi Rafsanjani had threatened to expose him and said: 'I will point out in writing about his issues during the time of Imam Khomeini and in the session of selecting the leader after Imam's passing and in the judiciary.' The year of diplomacy and economy, however, despite all the aforementioned events and the sensitivities expressed about various cultural and artistic fields by the layers of hardline conservatives, especially their sensitivity towards music and cinema, was a year influenced by the two concepts of economy and diplomacy. In 1393, the Rouhani government had a noticeable success in controlling the economic crisis and repairing the ruins left from Ahmadinejad's era. Some of the government's programs (especially and specifically: the Health Transformation Plan and the insurance of Iranians) were very important and prominent. However, the moderate government faced time-consuming and energy-draining challenges from parliamentary opponents and the propaganda-media arms of authoritarianism. In addition to these, the government's economic limitations forced Rouhani to think of new sources of income. Taxing entities that are immune from auditing and evasion was one of these sources. This led Rouhani to express several important comments and criticize the economic activities of the security apparatus dominating the IRGC and tax-evading institutions. This statement by Rouhani may be considered his most important remark in 1393: 'If capital, site, newspaper, news agency, cannon, military capabilities, and other manifestations of power are concentrated in one institution, even if it is Abu Dharr and Salman, it will become corrupt.' A statement that, although lacking a specific and clear 'address,' adequately introduced and criticized its 'reference.' Rouhani's challenge with the security forces dominating the IRGC and the far-right is unlikely to end soon. The year 1393 was also, as mentioned at the beginning, entirely intertwined with the issue of nuclear energy (and specifically negotiations with the United States). An important topic that connects the political-social and economic events of Iran to the fate of diplomacy in 1394 and places it in a state of suspension and waiting.