Iran, 'Islamic Government' and the US Approach; Interview with Senior American Diplomat

Ryan Crocker is considered one of the most seasoned American diplomats in the Middle East. Over the past few decades, he has served as the United States Ambassador in countries such as Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Lebanon, closely monitoring the situation and developments in the region, including Iran. Just before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, he was tasked by then Secretary of State Colin Powell, alongside Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, William Burns, to assess the potential consequences of the US overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime. The result of that research was a six-page memo titled 'Perfect Storm.' According to Colin Powell's biography, this memo warned that the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of its government could lead to severe sectarian and ethnic tensions, open the door for neighboring countries including Iran and Saudi Arabia to intervene in Iraq, completely disrupt Iraq's political and economic structure, and also open a new front in the power struggle among the Sunni minority in the country. Now, much of Mr. Crocker's predictions have become a reality. Ryan Crocker believes that in the context of Iran's nuclear program developments, diplomacy should be given as much room for success as possible. A few days before the end of the last round of sensitive nuclear talks between Iran and world powers in Vienna, Radio Farda sat down with Mr. Crocker to discuss Iran's nuclear program, the regional situation in light of the violence of the group known as the 'Islamic Government,' and the US approach in the region. Mr. Crocker stated that we are going through very sensitive days, both for Iran and for the countries negotiating with Tehran over the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. All parties have expressed optimism that a potential agreement could be within reach, and for this reason, they have extended the talks. How likely do you think this round of talks will become a turning point to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue once and for all? There is still time to answer this question; at present, speculation will yield little result, but there are a few points that are completely clear: First, the negotiations have been very serious, and in recent weeks, no information has leaked from the negotiation rooms. I think this itself is a good sign. We all know what the main issues are; there are several issues, two of which are clearly of utmost importance to Iran: sanctions and their lifting, and for the US and its allies, inspections and their conditions. These two issues have apparently been the most challenging for negotiators, which is why they have asked for another week, and we must wait and see what they do. Do you think if a nuclear agreement is reached, how realistic is the idea of normalizing diplomatic relations between Iran and the US in the near future? I believe if we reach a satisfactory nuclear agreement, a range of possibilities will open up before us. Although I do not think there will be a rapid transformation in the diplomatic sector, there are several major problems that we all need to address. However, a nuclear agreement will create a different atmosphere in which dialogues and diplomatic relations – which we previously could not even imagine – will at least become possible, but it will take time. You speak positively about developments that will relate to Iran and the US. On the other hand, however, in the region, some Arab countries – most of which are also US allies – are not particularly pleased with what is happening between Iran and the United States. Specifically, Saudi Arabia has been more explicit than others, and there is also Israel, which has always fundamentally opposed negotiations between Iran and the US – as they are currently taking place. Therefore, do you think a potential agreement between Iran and the US will affect the United States' relations with its allies in the region? Do you think the US will have to reconsider its policies in the region at some point? I do not think so. I believe our policies in the region have been consistent; our friendly relations and alliances in the region have been continuous and important for all of us. In the aftermath of an agreement with Iran, it is very important for the US to clarify the terms and consequences of the agreement for its allies, first and foremost Saudi Arabia. A good agreement – which the US will only sign such an agreement – will benefit all countries in the region and beyond. At the same time, it is important to remember that Israel and Iran once had very close relations, and Israel had an office in Tehran. In the current pattern of alliances and hostilities, there is no significant point; Iran and Saudi Arabia had very close relations in the late 1960s and 1970s. There is no reason that with changing policies we cannot return to that era. So first we must reach an agreement, then ensure that everyone understands why the agreement is beneficial for all, and after that, we will see what options may arise. However, at the same time as we are discussing this and amidst the negotiations, Benjamin Netanyahu is harshly attacking these talks and has already described it as a 'bad agreement.' With that said, do you think the US can persuade the current Israeli government or the Saudis that this agreement is actually in their interest as well? I repeat, we will find out in a week. If we reach an agreement, it will naturally mean from Washington's perspective that it will be a good agreement. The next step will be to clarify to everyone in the region what the agreement is and why ensuring stability and security in the region with a non-nuclear Iran will benefit everyone, and then we will continue down that path. Speaking of the regional situation, it is no secret that the situation in the Middle East is very chaotic, and the Islamic Government group has displayed a new level of shocking violence. In your opinion, what were the main factors that led to the situation in Syria and Iraq reaching this point? As you said, the regional situation is chaotic and very complex. In Syria – where I served as ambassador for a while – we must go back to 1982 to find the origin of the current crisis. It was February 1982 when the Assad regime besieged the Muslim Brotherhood in the city of Hama and used artillery fire and armored equipment to crush them. They succeeded, but during this operation, more than fifteen thousand civilian citizens – most of whom were Sunni – were killed. This event had two consequences: first, a regime that anticipated a day would come when it would have to account for its actions and spent three decades ensuring it was prepared to face the consequences of the Hama massacre. Therefore, Syria in March 2011 was not like Egypt, Libya, or Tunisia; the regime was prepared. The other point is that as a result of the Hama incident, the radicalization of Sunni Muslims in Syria occurred, which led to the subsequent massacres. For this reason, it was not surprising for many of us to see that the government opponents quickly turned towards Islamic extremism, Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda, and then – as you mentioned – the Islamic Government group. Therefore, this process began decades ago in Syria, and it is particularly important for Americans to understand this matter, as they may not have a grasp of history and should remember that history plays a role in such cases, and resolving it is very, very difficult. In Iraq, the legacy of Saddam Hussein's era and the shock of 2003 and thereafter created a very unstable political landscape. Unfortunately, what we have witnessed in recent years is the Iraqi tendency towards primary identity components: tribe, sect, or in the case of the Kurds, ethnicity. The Islamic Government group has been able to exploit this situation to its advantage and establish a stronghold in Iraq, while sectarian militia groups supported by Iran stand against this group, making the situation very, very dangerous. Although we are currently witnessing very unfavorable conditions, the situation in Iraq could become even worse than this. Given the situation you describe, how likely do you see the defeat of the Islamic Government group? First, we must understand that this situation is fundamentally political and not inherently military. ISIS has gained ground due to the government's incapacity and the disintegration of the political system. Therefore, in Iraq, I believe what is necessary is for the Iraqis, with the help of the international community, to mend these political rifts in their country, which currently prominently separate Sunnis from Shiites and Kurds. These fractures must be repaired because if they succeed in doing so, they will take the opportunity away from ISIS. This group will be defeated through a functional and comprehensive government. I think this is what Mr. Abadi, the Prime Minister of Iraq, is pursuing. However, to achieve that, he needs help from both inside and outside the country. How do you assess the role of the United States in this regard? If we compare the dimensions of US attacks against the Islamic Government group with what we witnessed, for example, in Iraq and Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, we conclude that US attacks against the Islamic Government group have been relatively limited. What do you think is the reason for that? I emphasize again that I believe the US should take on a more prominent political role; I would like the US to collaborate continuously at higher political levels with the Iraqi government, as well as with political figures in Iraq who are not in government, so that ultimately they can reach a solution to their political problems and tensions. I think such an approach is much more important for the ultimate defeat of ISIS than a series of airstrikes against this group. Because – based on what we have witnessed over the past year during ISIS's dominance over Iraq – they may have suffered some damage in certain respects, but they have not been defeated. To be clear, I am not at all sure that their defeat will be military; this group must be defeated politically, and I think the United States can play a very important role in this regard by collaborating with the Iraqis, and we must do just that. What about Iran? Both politically and militarily, what role can Iran play in the current situation in Iraq? Specifically, what role is the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps currently playing in the political and military landscape of Iraq? At the beginning of our conversation, I mentioned the significant problems between Iran and the US that have created a rift between our countries, and Iraq is one of them. I believe that Iran's policy in Iraq is currently very destructive, especially the role of the Quds Force, whether directly – when we saw the Quds Force commander in Tikrit in front of television cameras – which is considered the heart of Sunni territory, and the commander of the Quds Force stood there for the world to see. [And indirectly] we see Shiite militias that, with the support of the Quds Force, have now reached near Ramadi, the center of Anbar province – which is a Sunni province. In my opinion, at least the Quds Force is pursuing a policy of permanent division in Iraq so that the country is divided into three sections: Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish. Why should it pursue such a policy? I think for some, like the commander of the Quds Force and veterans of the Iran-Iraq war – who in 1988 felt they were deceived and forced to accept a ceasefire instead of a decisive victory – that war is still ongoing for them, and this is an opportunity to achieve the victory they lost in 1988. A lasting victory [for them] is the permanent division of Iraq. A divided Iraq will never be able to threaten Tehran again and will not be able to attack Iran like in 1980. This interpretation seems to be the only one for what the Quds Force is doing – both directly and indirectly through Shiite militias in Sunni areas – in Iraq. Of course, I believe that this policy will not be in Iran's favor in the long run, as a divided Iraq based on ethnic and sectarian lines will ultimately pose a danger to Tehran's internal security. Just as it has been for Turkey, an independent Kurdish government in Iraq will have implications for Iran and Turkey concerning their Kurdish populations. Therefore, what I see is a policy that the Quds Force is pursuing, which has severely destructive effects on the Iraqi government and the region, a policy that will ultimately be detrimental to Iran as well. There is a general perception that since the Quds Force is fighting the Islamic Government in Iraq and the United States is also fighting against this group, this parallel struggle could lead to the elimination of the rift between Iran and the US. How realistic do you think this is? My opinion is completely contrary to this perception. The saying 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend' is not necessarily always true. I believe that the Iranian government and the Quds Force are using ISIS to pursue the policy of dividing Iraq – which I have explained. I do not think the Iranian government feels particularly threatened by the Islamic Government group; this group has never stated that it intends to occupy Tehran; such a thing is not in their plans. But the Islamic Government is extremely anti-Shiite, and on the other hand, Iran is considered the main Shiite power in the region.