Iran, the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Nuclear Negotiations

On Saturday, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, announced that a "technical deadlock in negotiations" had been resolved in recent discussions between him and the U.S. Secretary of Energy. Concurrently, John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, arrived in Paris after returning from Saudi Arabia to explain the nuclear negotiations process between Iran and the P5+1 countries, engaging in discussions with the foreign ministers of Germany, Britain, and France. Throughout the past week, the negotiations and the fate of Iran's nuclear file have been at the center of international media attention, both due to the ongoing talks in Geneva and Benjamin Netanyahu's speech to American Jewish supporters of Israel and subsequently in the U.S. Congress, where he expressed concern about reaching a so-called "bad" agreement. These remarks were met with praise from many members of the U.S. Congress, particularly Republicans, and criticism from President Barack Obama and several Democratic representatives and senators, who stated that Netanyahu's speech did not contain any new solutions. Following this speech, President Obama told Reuters that the U.S. seeks a ten-year halt to Iran's sensitive nuclear activities, which analysts believe refers to activities that could enable Iran to produce nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, stated in an interview with CNN that Iran might accept a proposal to impose ten-year limitations on certain aspects of its nuclear program. This week's guests on the program "Views" will discuss the latest developments in Iran's nuclear file: Hooshang Amir-Ahmadi, president and founder of the Iranian-American Council, which has worked for nearly three decades to improve relations between Tehran and Washington, in Rutgers, New Jersey; Mehdi Nourbakhsh, a professor of international relations at Harrisburg University in Pennsylvania; and Hossein Alizadeh, a former diplomat of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Helsinki. The influence of Israel and Saudi Arabia's positions on nuclear negotiations from the perspective of Hooshang Amir-Ahmadi, Mehdi Nourbakhsh, and Hossein Alizadeh. Mr. Amir-Ahmadi, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, stated in interviews with two American television networks last weekend that there is a possibility that the Islamic Republic of Iran will accept a ten-year halt to sensitive nuclear activities as desired by the U.S. Does this mean we are close to a nuclear agreement by the end of Nowruz or July? Hooshang Amir-Ahmadi: The reality is that a lot has been done in recent months, and some issues have been resolved, but they still have not reached a deal. There are still many issues ahead. Can you summarize these issues in two minutes? Hooshang Amir-Ahmadi: Yes. From the beginning, there were three problems. The first problem is Iran's enrichment capacity, which is not only related to the number of centrifuges but also to the type of centrifuges and how much and at what level they operate. Now, the issue of what level they can enrich is resolved; they cannot exceed five percent. Therefore, one problem is the capacity, which is how much enriched uranium Iran can produce in a given time. The second issue is how much of this enriched uranium they can keep or send out. Iran can enrich ten thousand kilograms of uranium, but it may be able to keep only a thousand kilograms in Iran and send the rest to another country, which in this specific case would be Russia, if possible. This actually relates to the discussion of "breakout" or breakout time, which means how quickly Iran could, if it wanted to, build a bomb, which the Americans insist should be one year. This means that within that year, Iran should not be able to produce more enriched uranium than could lead to a bomb. Finally, the third point is how long Iran must remain in this limited situation. The reality is that the deal that is to be made was previously proposed years ago and was called suspension for suspension. This was practically mentioned for the first time six or seven years ago, meaning Iran would suspend its enrichment, and the U.S. and Europe would also suspend sanctions. Now, Iran's suspension means that it should not exit from its current situation. That is, it should come down and not increase. Now, whatever that situation is, for example, eight thousand or seven thousand or nine thousand centrifuges of type "R1" from the 60s and 70s. Then the amount of enriched uranium, which is currently about seven or eight thousand kilograms a year, is what we are discussing at this point. Therefore, the deal that is to be made is suspension for suspension, which was proposed years ago, and now there may be an agreement on this, but many formulas for "suspension for suspension" have emerged, including the one I mentioned, that most of Iran's enriched uranium should go abroad. Mr. Nourbakhsh, as Mr. Amir-Ahmadi mentioned, the U.S. wants to ensure that Iran does not reach a nuclear breakout point or irreversible point in the next ten years. This means that even if it wants to acquire the ability to produce nuclear weapons, it should be one year away from that goal so that it can be controlled. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran is demanding the lifting of sanctions. Could accepting a ten-year halt to sensitive nuclear activities in exchange for lifting oil sanctions and sanctions on Iran's central bank be a formula for reaching an agreement by a set deadline? Mehdi Nourbakhsh: We have four types of sanctions. Some sanctions were imposed by the Obama administration, some are from the U.S. Congress, some relate to Europe, and some are from the United Nations. This makes the situation very complicated. In this sense, if Obama does his part and the UN or European countries do, a large part of the work still remains; that is, the U.S. Congress. This is why the discussion that Iran has about the rapid lifting of these sanctions is, in my opinion, not feasible at all. I mean, the discussion that Mr. Amir-Ahmadi made. Perhaps if we could have reached a conclusion six or seven years ago, not only would these sanctions not exist, but we are now six or seven years behind in this regard. Therefore, the discussion of sanctions and lifting sanctions that Iran wants is very complicated. It is not possible to lift these sanctions overnight. The Islamic Republic can now exert some pressure to at least lift sanctions at the international level that restrict access to banks and foreign currency or allow Iran to sell oil and other things... If Iran can do something in this regard, at least in the areas that are feasible, without connecting to the U.S. Congress, it would be very successful. But as I said, the conditions are complicated. Mr. Alizadeh, the Kayhan newspaper, which reflects the views of the most distrustful faction in Iran towards the West, has warned that the U.S. is achieving its goal of curbing Iran's nuclear program. However, the sanctions remain in full force. This is what Mr. Nourbakhsh also pointed out, that the situation is very complicated. Is there a scenario where opponents of negotiations in Iran might be convinced that the progress and results of the talks could also meet their demands, or not? Hossein Alizadeh: You referred to Kayhan's remarks. I strongly recommend to your listeners to listen to the audio file recently released by Mr. Mahmoud Nabavian, a hardliner member of parliament from the Stability faction, published on Saham News. It is twenty minutes long. In it, he reveals all the behind-the-scenes negotiations as much as he could. However, he essentially stated that under the current circumstances, the leadership team is cornered. I urge you to listen to it so that our discussions today will have much more meaning and context. But returning to your question, Dr. Nourbakhsh said we had four types of sanctions. From another perspective, we have three other categories of sanctions. Sanctions related to nuclear issues, human rights, and the Syrian issue. You see, all these negotiations only concern the nuclear issue. If any sanctions are lifted, the sanctions imposed for human rights against Iran and those applied regarding Syria will not be included at all. They are not even on the agenda of the negotiations. Therefore, the situation is extremely complicated. Mr. Khamenei has realized that sanctions are not just pieces of paper and that they cannot be circumvented. I refer to his two speeches during Ahmadinejad's presidency when he said sanctions were just pieces of paper and had no effect, and that sanctions pushed us forward and led us to self-sufficiency and independence, and so on. He explicitly stated that we would circumvent the sanctions. Both of these statements have now been practically dismissed according to Kayhan's remarks and Mr. Nabavian's statements. I agree with the two esteemed guests that no sanctions will be lifted. In a limited and conditional manner, perhaps some discussion about the central bank sanctions or oil sales may be lifted, which does not mean that the wheels of the country's economy will be greased and issues will improve. Moreover, after that, there will be discussions about more detailed and precise oversight. In his recent statements, the Secretary-General of the IAEA also said that we still cannot confidently say that Iran's nuclear program is one hundred percent peaceful. Mr. Amir-Ahmadi, last week before Benjamin Netanyahu's speech to the AIPAC pro-Israel American Jewish lobby and then to the U.S. Congress, some observers predicted that as a result of these two speeches, opponents of negotiations in Congress would be strengthened and the Obama administration would face new challenges in continuing negotiations. Others, conversely, said that the outcome of these two speeches, partly due to the Obama administration's dissatisfaction with this presence, would backfire on Benjamin Netanyahu. Which of these two predictions is closer to reality? I believe it has made President Obama's problem worse. Unless we assume that President Obama is a stubborn person who has come to give more concessions to Iran out of stubbornness against Netanyahu or to proceed more cautiously. The reality is that the President of the United States cannot be stubborn. He will not. The system does not work that way. That is one side. Therefore, we can say that Obama's position has not changed. If it has not become tougher, the opponents, who say it has become tougher, are correct in a sense. Because Mr. Netanyahu found an opportunity to speak to 500 of the most influential people in this country. He addressed these issues to them. Now, let’s assume that half of those sitting there believed him; that is very important. Most of them already knew all this. As Nancy Pelosi said, we know this. They knew this. But just the fact that this issue was raised and this discussion was created, some of the issues that Obama and Kerry did not mention in America and did not clarify to Americans were articulated more clearly by him. Therefore, it has definitely hardened the U.S. side's position. Especially since President Obama has a historical responsibility on his shoulders. That is, if one day, hypothetically, President Obama and his administration make a mistake regarding these negotiations, then Mr. Netanyahu and others will say for years and decades, "Look, we told you. You didn’t listen." Therefore, I believe Obama has become more cautious. In my opinion, the U.S. government's position will become tougher. For this reason, Mr. Kerry immediately left Geneva and went to Saudi Arabia because he fears that Netanyahu might have turned the Arabs against him. He certainly has changed the Arabs. Therefore, Mr. Kerry wants to mitigate the blow by going to Saudi Arabia and telling them, for example, not to listen to Netanyahu; we are watching. The very fact of this means that Kerry and Obama have problems. Mr. Nourbakhsh, do you agree with Mr. Amir-Ahmadi that the reactions in Iran to Netanyahu's speech in Congress have made the weight of President Rouhani's government efforts and the continuation of negotiations heavier or the weight of the opponents of negotiations? I completely agree with part of Mr. Amir-Ahmadi's remarks that Obama, whatever he wants to do, must show that he is standing up to Iran. I completely agree with this part of the discussion. However, one analysis is that now the Democrats are much more united behind Obama for what he wants to do. This is also an analysis, and I believe it is a sustainable analysis. The remarks that Pelosi made and the sixty representatives made were very strong against Israel. Therefore, many are discussing that the Democrats will stand more firmly behind Obama. In Iran, I believe this has completely benefited Rouhani. To the extent that Mr. Rafsanjani recently stated that those who oppose resolving this issue are in harmony with Israel and other countries that oppose resolving this issue. I think Netanyahu's speech, in a sense, helped the Rouhani government internally by providing them with a better weapon to argue that those who oppose resolving this issue are more aligned with the Israeli government. This is very significant for Iran internally, and it could be said that those who discuss this and wish to support Rouhani have become much louder than the Kayhanis and others. Therefore, internally, I think this was beneficial for Hassan Rouhani. Mr. Alizadeh, what do you think about this? The fact that the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and about a quarter of the Democratic Party representatives did not attend Netanyahu's speech in Congress, did it change the perspective of those leaders in the Iranian government who...