Iran-U.S. Nuclear Agreement and Conspiracy Theory

Millions were waiting for the nuclear deal between Iran and the 1+5 to be finalized before 6 AM on July 10 (19 Tir) and submitted by the President of the United States to Congress for a one-month review period agreed upon between the President and Congress. The deal did not conclude as expected. Hundreds of experts and international observers, along with major news agencies and networks, had prepared their teams and journalists in various languages to interpret and inform their audiences about such an agreement; however, this did not happen. No agreement was announced; unlike previous occasions, there was no extension; yet the sky did not fall. John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, stated, "We have gathered here to reach a comprehensive nuclear agreement... We will not rush, but we will not stay here forever... Our goal is to reach a good agreement." Meanwhile, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, tweeted that the Western parties had changed their positions at the last moment. When we combine this statement with comments from Ali Akbar Velayati, former Iranian Foreign Minister and direct advisor to the Supreme Leader on international affairs, we realize that while Zarif's words reflect a reality, these changes in positions are not enough to drive Iran away from the negotiating table. Velayati stated on a television program, quoting the Leader, that "if an agreement is not reached by the deadline, they can extend it... Iran will not leave the negotiating table." Therefore, the conditions for an agreement are not disappointing. From the overall statements of both sides, it can be concluded that there is a draft, but upon re-reading, it contains contentious points that have created hesitation and doubt for at least the U.S. and perhaps one or two other members of the 1+5. However, it does not seem that these points of contention have a direct relationship with Iran's desire to build and produce a nuclear bomb. The Russians, stating that "our Western allies, who did not support a draft resolution that was fully accepted by others, are to blame, not Iran," reveal another aspect of the matter and in fact accuse and blame some members of the 1+5. What can be concluded from all these interactions and reactions is that a draft exists, but upon re-reading, it contains contentious points that have created hesitation and doubt for at least the U.S. and perhaps one or two other members of the 1+5. However, it does not seem that these points of contention have a direct relationship with Iran's desire to build and produce a nuclear bomb and are more related to peripheral issues that cannot be overlooked. If the matter were directly related to the bomb, it would have led to a halt or even a complete cessation of negotiations. A look at the demands of the 1+5 shows what areas Iran has not yet fully agreed upon and what the West's demands are. Some of these issues are major, while others are components of the same items. 1- The issue of arms sanctions and the dimensions of Iran's ballistic missiles; during the years when Iran was under economic sanctions due to accusations of nuclear activities, some sanctions were imposed that appeared to have economic effects but were essentially multi-purpose and limited Iran's defensive capabilities as well as its offensive capabilities or arms exports and political power expansion in the region through arms sanctions (whether for trade or establishing bases of influence). One of these sanctions was the conventional arms embargo (non-nuclear and lacking weapons of mass destruction). This sanction has not had a place in nuclear negotiations so far because Iranian missiles lack nuclear warheads. With Iran's insistence on lifting its arms sanctions, the question arises (and Israel may also feel threatened in this regard) about how much Iran wants to invest in such medium-range missiles if the arms sanctions are lifted or how much it might increase their range and capabilities, thereby enhancing both its defensive and offensive capabilities. This concern has led the West to reconsider lifting this sanction while Iran insists on its removal. However, Iran's insistence on this matter itself indicates another reality: that Iran is in a better bargaining position and can make such a demand at this stage. In this context, the Iranian Foreign Minister tweeted, "You cannot change horses in the middle of the game," indicating that the West is attempting to impose new conditions and introduce a topic that was not part of the nuclear negotiations. The lifting of arms sanctions is not only beneficial for Iran but also advantageous for one of the negotiating parties, namely Russia, which wants to dominate the arms market in the region and Iran. 2- Access to military sites; the issue of access to Iran's military sites has been one of the most sensitive topics in recent negotiations, but it is highly likely that a satisfactory solution was reached just last week. This possibility arose after Yukiya Amano's visit and subsequently a second delegation of his deputies to Tehran. Observers believe that during Amano's visit, Iran provided useful promises and information regarding the chronic issue of "possible military activities in the past" to Amano, and subsequently, the rapid and secondary visit of the second agency group was facilitated, leading to the matter being considered largely resolved. Currently, it is said that Iran's nuclear developments will be under control for 10 years so that Iran cannot increase its level and capabilities. The truth is that one or two years more or less is of no value for a country that does not have political intentions to produce a nuclear bomb. However, restrictions on technological research can deprive a country of achieving non-military scientific advancements in the nuclear field for a long time and could even cause irreparable damage in sciences, especially in medicine. For this reason, it is highly likely that Iran will continue to negotiate in this area since nuclear technology in Iran is largely endogenous and considered a national achievement. During Ahmadinejad's era, manipulating public sentiments and considering nuclear technology and energy as a "legitimate right" raised public expectations, limiting the conditions for negotiation and bargaining in this regard. At the same time, it should be noted that fluctuations in the range of agreement regarding this condition cannot halt the entire negotiation. 3- How long will the control over nuclear technology developments last, and what will be the fate of nuclear research and development in Iran? Both of these issues have been negotiated for a long time, and occasionally snippets of them have leaked outside the negotiation rooms. It does not seem that further bargaining will witness major changes. Currently, it is said that Iran's nuclear developments will be under control for 10 years so that Iran cannot increase its level and capabilities. The truth is that one or two years more or less is of no value for a country that does not have political intentions to produce a nuclear bomb. However, restrictions on technological research can deprive a country of achieving non-military scientific advancements in the nuclear field for a long time and could even cause irreparable damage in sciences, especially in medicine. For this reason, it is highly likely that Iran will continue to negotiate in this area since nuclear technology in Iran is largely endogenous and considered a national achievement. During Ahmadinejad's era, manipulating public sentiments and considering nuclear technology and energy as a "legitimate right" raised public expectations, limiting the conditions for negotiation and bargaining in this regard. At the same time, it should be noted that fluctuations in the range of agreement regarding this condition cannot halt the entire negotiation. 4- Conspiracy Theory; one day after President Obama's conversation with the U.S. State Department negotiation team, on Thursday, John Kerry himself appeared before the news cameras after a busy day, announcing very briefly that there was still no news! This issue has had both positive and negative reactions within the United States and has been interpreted as a tactic to continue negotiations and for electoral exploitation, and even worse, as a conspiracy by the Obama administration to keep Iran in a state of endless negotiations. This interpretation, which is essentially a reading of Josh Earnest's comments, resembles a conspiracy theory. For the following reasons, this interpretation is incorrect because even if the Lausanne agreement leaves the matter in suspense, many sanctions will effectively be lifted by other members of the 1+5, creating conditions that will even render the UN resolution practically invalid. Such a situation would be a significant defeat and loss of credibility for the five permanent members of the UN Security Council in global leadership and would overshadow their signatures in support or non-support of international treaties. There is still an opportunity for a sustainable agreement to be reached, and some observers believe that perhaps even the U.S. President could convince Congress to shorten the review period. Of course, this depends on the content of the agreement. To reach a final point, no further expectations should be held, and fortunately, this time a sweet "cup" awaits all negotiating parties and the "JCPOA" project. Additionally, such a plan has disappointed Iran and many other countries in the world, including friends of the United States, regarding the ability to lead globally and control international conflicts, leading to a breakdown in the fabric of international relations. The U.S. may be able to do this for the short term, but the costs are unimaginable. Such a tactic could have worked for a while before the Lausanne agreement, but now that it seems Iran has made the necessary and sufficient concessions in the areas desired by the 1+5, or at least Iranian negotiators have created such an image of Iran among a significant portion of international observers, suspending negotiations or postponing them would not only be a tactical mistake but also a flawed strategy. In such a case, any reaction from Iran, even withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the commencement of overt and covert activities in the production of materials usable in a bomb, would seem legitimate. Meanwhile, signing a verifiable treaty could give the international community the ability to effectively control nuclear developments in Iran and, if necessary, confront them through UN collective security arrangements. A government in negotiations cannot be declared war upon. There is still an opportunity for a sustainable agreement to be reached. By Sunday, such a conclusion could be reached, and some observers believe that perhaps even the U.S. President could convince Congress to shorten the review period. Of course, this depends on the content of the agreement. To reach a final point, no further expectations should be held, and fortunately, this time a sweet "cup" awaits all negotiating parties and the "JCPOA" project.