Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 2, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.

Key Takeaways

The combined force launched several airstrikes on March 2 targeting Iranian internal security sites responsible for maintaining security, suppressing protests, and spreading regime propaganda.

The United States and Israel conducted several attacks targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in Iraq on March 1 and 2 to degrade the militias’ ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against US forces and Israel. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear to be threatening to expand their attacks to regional countries that host US troops, such as Jordan.

The Houthis could target Emirati, Israeli, or US military positions in the Horn of Africa if it joins Iran’s regional retaliatory campaign.

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined US-Israeli force continued to degrade Iranian air defenses to maintain air superiority over western Iran and Tehran. US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Dan Caine announced on March 2 that “local air superiority has been established [over Iran].”[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated on March 2 that it has targeted over 200 Iranian air defense systems since the war started on February 28.[2] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on March 1 that Israeli aircraft have been using “stand-in” munitions in Tehran after Israel established air superiority over the city.[3] Katz’s statement suggests that Iranian air defense systems no longer pose a significant threat to Israeli or US aircraft in Tehran given that Israeli aircraft are able to drop munitions directly on their targets instead of launching munitions from a distance. The combined force’s strikes on Iranian air defense systems also enable Israel and the United States to operate lower-generation aircraft in Iran with less risk. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that US B-1 bombers struck targets in Iran on March 1 to degrade Iranian ballistic missile capabilities.[4] The use of B-1 bombers demonstrates that the combined force is degrading Iranian air defenses to the point that the United States feels comfortable using lower-generation aircraft to conduct attacks in Iran.

The combined force has also continued to degrade Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities in order to disrupt Iran’s ability to coordinate and execute large-scale missile barrages against Israel and US forces. Commercially available satellite imagery shows bunker buster bomb impacts at the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Imam Ali Missile Base in Khorramabad, Lorestan Province. The Imam Ali Missile Base is home to the al Hadid 7th Missile Brigade and al Tawhid 23rd Missile Brigade.[5] The base reportedly stores Shahab-3 ballistic missiles, which have a range of between 800 and 1,300 kilometers.[6] US and Israeli strikes also targeted the Bid Ganeh ballistic missile facility in Tehran Province on March 2.[7] The Bid Ganeh site likely stored medium-range ballistic missiles, according to a missile expert.[8] Israel struck the facility during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[9]

The combined force may have targeted an Iranian drone manufacturing facility in Shahin Shahr, Esfahan Province, on March 2. Anti-regime media published a video of an explosion in Shahin Shahr and an individual in the video claimed that the explosion took place at the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA).[10] HESA operates under the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry and produces Ababil- and Shahed-series drones.[11] The combined force’s reported targeting of HESA comes amid reports that Iranian Shahed drones are “so far the most dangerous threat.”[12] The combined force struck several Iranian drone launch sites and storage facilities, some of which appeared to contain Shahed-136 and Shahed-129 drones, in southeastern Iran on March 1.[13]

The combined force appears to have targeted the Malek Ashtar University Aerospace Complex in Tehran on March 2. The combined force conducted a strike in Pasdaran, Tehran City, which is home to numerous defense industrial and nuclear-related sites.[14] ISW-CTP assesses that the combined force may have struck the Malek Ashtar University Aerospace Complex based on footage of the strike and satellite imagery.[15] The complex is responsible for designing aircraft for the IRGC and has previously cooperated with Russia to develop advanced aircraft designs.[16] An Iranian OSINT account also posted a video of an explosion in Pasdaran and suggested that the targeted site may have been the Defense Industries Organization (DIO).[17] The DIO is a subsidiary of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and is heavily involved in Iran’s missile and nuclear programs.[18] There are numerous other nuclear and military sites located in Pasadaran that may have been targeted, including the Mojdeh site and MODAFL Intelligence Protection Organization. The Mojdeh site is located at Shahid Rajaei University and previously housed the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) headquarters. The SPND played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[19] Shahid Rajaei University is affiliated with Iran’s nuclear program, and some US officials believe that the university has been involved in nuclear warhead design research.[20]

The combined force launched several airstrikes on March 2 targeting Iranian internal security sites responsible for maintaining security and suppressing protests. The IDF announced that it struck regime command centers and bases belonging to security forces responsible for suppressing anti-regime protests. The IDF also announced that it struck 10 Intelligence Ministry command centers and an IRGC Quds Force facility in Tehran City.[21] The combined force also continued to target Law Enforcement Command (LEC) sites and Basij bases across Iran.[22] OSINT accounts have reported airstrikes targeting four Basij bases and three LEC sites in Tehran City since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 8:00 AM ET on March 2.[23] One of the targeted Basij bases in Tehran was the Fifteenth Tehran Municipality Region Basij Resistance Base, which is one of the 23 Basij regional bases in Tehran.[24] The combined force also targeted the Fifth Tehran Municipality Region Basij Resistance Base on March 2, as ISW-CTP reported in its March 2 morning update. OSINT accounts also reported a strike on an LEC site in Sarableh, Ilam Province, and the Kurdistan Province LEC Headquarters in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province, on March 2.[25] Iranian media separately reported that the combined force targeted a local official’s home in Sarableh on March 2, killing five people.[26] The IDF also confirmed that the combined force targeted the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) headquarters in Tehran City on March 2.[27] IRIB is responsible for spreading regime propaganda.

The combined force struck the Natanz Nuclear Facility in Esfahan Province on March 2, which marks the first attack on an Iranian nuclear site since the start of the US-Israeli campaign on February 28. An Israeli analyst, citing March 2 satellite imagery, reported that strikes targeted Natanz and severely damaged at least three buildings.[28] The function of the three damaged buildings is unclear, but the Natanz complex was Iran’s primary uranium enrichment site before the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. Iran’s representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Reza Najafi, told the IAEA Board of Governors on March 2 that the combined force recently attacked Natanz.[29] Israel previously struck Natanz during the Israel-Iran War, destroying the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and damaging electrical substations and support buildings that supplied power to the site.[30] The PFEP housed more than 1,700 centrifuges. The United States also targeted Natanz during the June war and likely destroyed the site or rendered it inoperable.[31] US officials told the Wall Street Journal on February 26 that US negotiators demanded that Iran dismantle key nuclear facilities, including Natanz, as part of a potential nuclear agreement.[32] Iran rejected this demand. The Associated Press, citing an unreleased IAEA report, reported on February 27 that the IAEA had observed activity at Natanz and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant but could not verify the purpose or nature of the activity.[33] The IAEA report also stated that the agency could not confirm whether Iran had suspended all enrichment-related activities. The IDF Farsi-language spokesperson announced on March 1 that the IDF is “systematically dismantling” Iranian nuclear infrastructure.[34]

US CENTCOM denied Iranian claims that it sank a US aircraft carrier and announced that it has sunk 11 Iranian vessels in the Gulf of Oman, including the IRGC Navy’s Shahid Bagheri drone carrier.[35] The combined force has attacked the IRGC Navy Jamaran Moudge-class frigate, Artesh Navy Bayandor corvette, Artesh Navy Naghdi corvette, and Artesh Navy Kurdistan Makran-class forward base ship in Iran’s southern fleet since the start of the war.[36]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military sites and institutions in Lebanon on March 2 to degrade Hezbollah’s ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against Israel. The IDF reported that it struck over 70 Hezbollah weapons depots, launch sites, and launchers in southern Lebanon.[37] The IDF also struck several al Qard al Hassan branches across Lebanon.[38] Al Qard al Hassan is Hezbollah’s main financial institution and operates approximately 30 branches across Lebanon.[39] Hezbollah uses funds transferred via al Qard al Hassan to finance its military operations, pay its fighters, and purchase weapons.[40] The IDF has regularly targeted al Qard al Hassan during and after the Fall 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[41] It is notable that Israel’s airstrikes have largely been concentrated in southern Lebanon thus far given that the IDF previously assessed that Hezbollah had moved the bulk of its weapons and combat forces north of the Litani River.[42] These airstrikes indicate that Hezbollah maintains small units in southern Lebanon that are capable of conducting limited attacks against Israel.

There are varying reports about whether Israeli airstrikes killed certain senior Hezbollah leaders. OSINT accounts reported on March 1 that Israeli strikes killed Hezbollah’s Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc head and Hezbollah’s Shura Council member Mohammad Raad.[43] Israeli media has denied this claim, however.[44] A Hezbollah-affiliated media outlet posted a statement from Raad on March 2, which suggests that he is alive.[45] The IDF confirmed that Israeli airstrikes killed Hussein Mekeld, who served as the head of Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters in Beirut.[46] The IDF stated that Mekeld held several roles in Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters and was responsible for forming intelligence assessments about the IDF.[47]

The IDF has taken steps to enhance security and reduce threats along the Israel-Lebanon border in response to Hezbollah’s attacks. IDF Chief of Staff Major General Eyal Zamir approved on March 1 a plan for continued defensive and offensive preparedness against Hezbollah.[48] The IDF stated on March 1 that it has significantly increased the number of forces along the Israel-Lebanon border and is prepared to deploy additional forces.[49] Israeli media reported on March 2 that the IDF sent reinforcements to the IDF 91st Territorial Division and the 210th Territorial Division, which both operate along the Israel-Lebanon border.[50] The IDF issued evacuation warnings for over 53 southern Lebanese villages, urging Lebanese civilians to evacuate the area immediately.[51] The IDF also issued evacuation warnings for Lebanese residents who live near al Qard al Hassan branches.[52] The IDF issued urgent evacuation warnings for southern Lebanese residents in September and October 2024 ahead of its air and ground campaign against Hezbollah.[53] Israeli officials stated that the IDF will intensify its strikes on Lebanon and may target Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem.[54] IDF Spokesperson Brigadier General Effie Defrin told Israeli media that the IDF could conduct ground operations in Lebanon and noted that “all options are on the table.”[55]

The United States and Israel conducted several attacks targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in Iraq on March 1 and 2 to degrade the militias’ ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against US forces and Israel. The United States and Israel struck an Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) base in Samawah, al Muthanna Province, on March 1.[56] Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias operate under the PMF and answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[57] A security source told Iraqi media that the strikes killed one Kataib Hezbollah member and injured another.[58] The United States and Israel separately struck a PMF headquarters in Jurf al Sakhr, north of Baghdad, which is a Kataib Hezbollah stronghold.[59] The strikes reportedly killed one PMF member and injured another. The United States and Israel have struck PMF headquarters in Jurf al Sakhr multiple times in recent days.[60] The combined force reportedly struck a PMF 50th Brigade checkpoint north of Mosul on March 1.[61] The PMF 50th Brigade is affiliated with Asaib Ahl al Haq.[62] The combined force reportedly also struck a PMF 30th Brigade headquarters in the Ninewa Plains on March 1, wounding two fighters.[63] The PMF 30th Brigade is affiliated with Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[64] The United States has previously conducted pre-emptive airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in Iraq to prevent the militias from launching attacks.[65]

US President Donald Trump told CNN on March 2 that the United States’ “big wave” of strikes on Iran is “coming soon.”[66] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio similarly stated on March 2 that “the hardest hits are yet to come.”[67] An unspecified senior US official told CNN on March 2 that the United States is preparing for a “major uptick” in strikes on Iran over the next 24 hours.[68] The official stated that the United States assesses that its strikes thus far have succeeded in weakening Iran’s air defenses and that the next phase of US strikes will largely focus on Iran’s missile production, drone, and naval capabilities.[69]

Supreme Leader Succession

Unspecified sources told anti-regime media on February 28 that the IRGC wanted a new supreme leader to be selected within hours of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s death on February 28.[70] Iran has not announced a new supreme leader at the time of this writing. The IRGC also reportedly wants to circumvent the supreme leader selection process outlined in the constitution because the Assembly of Experts cannot convene to select a new leader due to ongoing US and Israeli strikes.[71] The Iranian constitution stipulates that the president, the judiciary chief, and a member of the Guardian Council will assume the responsibilities of the Supreme Leader until the Assembly of Experts convenes to select a new leader. The Iranian Expediency Discernment Council appointed Guardian Council member Ali Reza Arafi as the third member of the Leadership Council on March 1.[72] The IRGC is not a monolith, and it is unclear which faction of the IRGC this report was referring to. The combined force killed IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour in airstrikes on February 28.[73] There are unconfirmed reports that IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi has replaced Pakpour.[74]

Iranian Retaliation

Iran continued to launch ballistic missile barrages at Israel at a relatively low rate on March 2. Iran conducted at least four missile barrages targeting Israel on March 1 and at least six missile barrages targeting Israel on March 2, compared to at least 20 missile barrages on February 28.[75] The IDF reported on March 2 that Iran is attempting to conduct larger and more coordinated missile attacks on Israel but is struggling to do so because of IDF strikes on Iranian missile launchers.[76] The combined force had destroyed around half of Iran’s missile launchers as of March 1.[77] US and Israeli strikes on Iranian command-and-control networks may also be limiting Iran’s ability to respond.

Iran continued to conduct drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting Gulf states. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ministry of Defense reported that Iran has launched 174 ballistic missiles and 689 drones at the UAE since the start of the conflict on February 28.[78] The ministry added that the UAE has intercepted 161 missiles and 645 drones, but that 13 missiles and 44 drones have impacted UAE territory. Iran targeted the Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia.[79] The Prince Sultan Airbase is an active US Air Force air expeditionary base that currently hosts several US military support aircraft.[80] Iran also targeted the Ali al Salem Airbase in Kuwait, which hosts US forces.[81] The Iranian Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters spokesperson claimed that Iran launched 12 drones targeting Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, six drones and five ballistic missiles targeting a US “command and control center” in the UAE, and six drones targeting US naval facilities in Bahrain.[82]

Iranian attacks targeting energy infrastructure in the Gulf have disrupted some regional oil and gas industries. Qatar announced that it has ceased production of all liquefied natural gas (LNG) and associated products.[83] Qatar is responsible for approximately 20 percent of the global LNG supply.[84] State-owned QatarEnergy similarly halted its production of LNG due to Iranian drone attacks on its facilities in Ras Laffan Industrial City and Mesaieed Industrial City.[85] Saudi state-owned Saudi Aramco shut down its Ras Tanura refinery as a precautionary measure after Iranian drones attempted to strike the refinery on March 2.[86] The Ras Tanura oil refinery is Saudi Arabia’s largest oil refinery, and the Ras Tanura complex is a vital export terminal for Saudi crude oil.[87] Several oil companies in Iraqi Kurdistan have similarly stopped production at their oil fields as a precaution.[88] Natural gas and oil prices have increased 46 percent and 13 percent, respectively, as of March 2.[89] Oil prices are above $82 USD per barrel, which marks the highest price since January 2025.[90]

Iran is attempting to disrupt international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz as part of a broader effort to impose a cost on the Gulf states. Iran likely seeks to push the Gulf states to pressure the United States and Israel to end their combined strike campaign against Iran. IRGC adviser to former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Brigadier General Ebrahim Jabbari threatened on March 2 to attack any ship that transits through the Strait of Hormuz and stated that not a “single drop of oil will leave the region.”[91] The Iranian Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters spokesperson claimed on March 2 that Iranian forces launched two drones targeting the “US-allied,” Honduras-flagged Athe Nova commercial oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in a fire on the tanker.[92] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on March 1 that an unspecified actor launched two unmanned surface vessels (USV) and an unspecified projectile at an unspecified vessel 50 nautical miles north of Muscat, Oman, which forced the vessel‘s crew to evacuate the vessel.[93] Iran may have used USVs to attack the commercial vessel because USVs can inflict greater damage to vessels than unmanned aerial vehicles. Iran also reportedly launched two unspecified projectiles at the Stena Imperative oil tanker, which was docked in Bahrain, according to maritime security sources speaking to Reuters.[94] The attack caused a fire, which the crew quickly extinguished. The US Navy uses the Stena Imperative as a refueling tanker for US naval vessels in the region.[95] Iran previously attempted to seize the Stena Imperative with two fast-attack craft on February 3.[96] The Iranian Artesh separately claimed on March 2 that its naval and ground forces launched 15 cruise missiles at unspecified vessels in the northern Indian Ocean.[97] ISW-CTP cannot verify the Artesh claim.

Axis of Resistance Response

Hezbollah may have conducted a drone attack targeting a British airbase in Cyprus on March 2.[98] Hezbollah has not commented on or confirmed the attack at the time of this writing. Cypriot and British officials said that an Iranian Shahed drone struck the Royal Air Force Akrotiri Airbase in Cyprus, causing limited damage and no casualties.[99] Senior Cypriot officials told Reuters on March 2 that Hezbollah most likely fired the Shahed drone targeting the UK base.[100] Hezbollah has historically used Shahed drones to attack Israel.[101] Hezbollah’s attack may have been a response to the United Kingdom’s recent decision to allow the United States to use UK bases in the Middle East to intercept and destroy Iranian missiles.[102] The United Kingdom has several military bases in Gulf countries, including in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Bahrain.[103]

Some members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, specifically Lebanese Hezbollah and the Houthis, did not conduct any successful retaliatory attacks against Israel on March 2. Hezbollah launched one drone against Israel on March 2, which the IDF intercepted.[104] The Houthis have not conducted any retaliatory attacks against Israel at the time of this writing. The Houthis’ continued inaction is notable given that the Houthis were the only Axis of Resistance member that participated in the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[105] The Houthis could decide at any time to attack US interests or Israel in response to the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, however.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to conduct attacks and threaten to conduct attacks against US forces and Israel. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 2 that its fighters conducted 28 attacks targeting “enemy bases” in Iraq and the region with dozens of drones and missiles.[106] The Islamic Resistance of Iraq also posted a video of its fighters launching missiles and drones at US bases in Iraq and the region.[107] Iran has provided its partner militias in Iraq with missiles and drones for years.[108] ISW-CTP has not observed any indications of successful militia missile attacks or interceptions of militia missile attacks at the time of this writing. Saraya Awliya al Dam, which is commonly believed to be a front group for larger Iraqi militias, claimed responsibility for targeting the US military’s former Victory Base at Baghdad International Airport on March 1 with a “swarm of drones” in response to the combined force’s killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[109] The United States transferred control of the Victory Base to the Iraqi government in 2011, but many Iranian-backed actors continue to assert that the area is still a US base.[110] A security source confirmed to Iraqi media on March 2 that drones targeted the former US Victory Base near Baghdad International Airport and the Iraqi Special Operations Headquarters in Baghdad.[111] Iraqi air defense systems reportedly intercepted one drone near the airport, but another drone crashed into the Special Operations Headquarters.[112]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear to be threatening to expand their attacks to regional countries that host US troops. Kataib Hezbollah claimed on March 2 that the fighter jets and drones that have attacked Iraq are based at US bases in Jordan.[113] Kataib Hezbollah also condemned the UAE and Saudi Arabia for allowing their “territory and capabilities” to “serve the Zionist-American project.”[114] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah claimed on March 2 that they launched ballistic missiles targeting US bases in Iraqi Kurdistan and Kuwait.[115] An Iraqi OSINT account claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias attacked Saudi Arabia’s Aramco but did not provide any evidence for this claim.[116] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously attacked regional countries that host US forces, such as a January 2024 attack on a US outpost in Jordan that killed three US service members.[117]

NOTE: A version of the following text will also appear in CTP’s March 3 Africa File Special Edition:

The Houthis could target Emirati, Israeli, or US military positions the Horn of Africa if it joins Iran’s regional retaliatory campaign. Iran has attacked Israel, US bases in the Middle East, and all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in response to the US-Israel strikes.[118] The UAE, followed by Kuwait and Qatar, have predominantly borne the brunt of the hundreds of Iranian ballistic missiles and drones launched at the Arabian Peninsula. The campaign aims to exploit relatively softer GCC defenses compared to Israel or US bases in the Arabian Peninsula to force the GCC to capitulate and pressure the United States to cease attacks on Iran and enter talks, despite the GCC countries refusing Israel and the United States permission to use their airspace to attack Iran.[119]

The Houthis would likely directly target Israel and the Gulf countries if they joined the campaign. The Houthis regularly used drones and missiles to target energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE from 2015 to 2022, until a UN-mediated truce entered effect in April 2022.[120] The Houthis then shifted their focus to attacking Israel and Red Sea shipping in response to the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023. The Houthis conducted several major drone and missile attacks on Israel and in the Red Sea throughout mid-2025, including surrounding the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, before voluntarily slowing and eventually halting attacks in relation to the US-brokered ceasefire in Gaza.[121]

The Houthis could target Emirati or Israeli military positions in the de facto independent Somaliland region as part of a Red Sea attack campaign. The UAE has upgraded military facilities in the Somaliland port city of Berbera, which lies less than 200 miles from the southern entrance to the Red Sea at the Bab el Mandeb Strait in recent years. Emirati facilities include a modern military port, a deepwater dock, and an airstrip with hangars and other facilities to support Emirati military operations in Yemen and the Horn of Africa.[122] The UAE helped facilitate Israeli recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, which CTP assessed partially aimed to boost Israeli strategic depth to counter the Houthis.[123] Israeli and Somaliland officials had discussed base options as part of recognition talks, and Somaliland officials confirmed in January that basing talks were still ongoing.[124] Agence France Press reported on March 2 that “it is possible that Israeli forces are already present in the Berbera military base” and quoted a Western official who said that “there is a widespread assumption that there is an Israeli military or security presence that is already in the country.”[125] Houthi leader Abdul Malik al Houthi warned after the recognition that any Israeli assets in Somaliland would be legitimate military targets.[126]

The Houthis could also target the US base in Djibouti—Camp Lemonnier—as part of a Red Sea attack campaign. Camp Lemonnier lies less than 100 miles from the Yemeni coast and hosts more than 4,000 US personnel who support counterterrorism and maritime security initiatives in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. The multitude of foreign military bases in the area around Camp Lemonnier, which includes China, increases the risk of accidental collateral damage.[127] Analysts have previously noted that this risk, Djiboutian support for Palestine, and Djibouti’s non-confrontational approach to the Houthis have likely decreased Houthi incentives to target the base.[128]

The Houthis could also use their ties with al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate al Shabaab to increase disruptions to shipping in the greater Red Sea area. The Houthis have established ties with al Shabaab since 2024, cooperating on weapons smuggling, technical training, operational tactics, and logistic support.[129] Houthi support has included training on improvised explosive device and drone technology, and Somali security forces claimed that some Somali armed groups had acquired global positioning system (GPS) satellite devices to better track commercial vessels.[130] The Houthis lack command and control over al Shabaab, but al Shabaab has previously offered to increase lucrative piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in exchange for Houthi support.[131] These attacks would be highly lucrative for al Shabaab and bolster its propaganda if it decides to claim them. A piracy campaign in the Gulf of Aden would strain the bandwidth of maritime security forces focusing on countering Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

Iran could also conduct terror attacks against Emirati, Israeli, and US targets across Africa. The Iranian regime is facing an existential threat and its attacks on the GCC countries demonstrate a willingness to expand the conflict and attack relatively softer US-allied targets than Israel or US bases in the region. Iran has attempted to use its covert apparatus to attack US and allied personnel and across Africa as a form of horizontal escalation for US sanctions multiple times since 2013. Kenyan and Nigerian officials claimed to disrupt plots backed by the IRGC Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah in 2013 that aimed to attack British, Israeli, Saudi, and US targets in both African countries as the US tightened sanctions on the Iranian regime.[132]

Iran surged attack plots between 2019 and 2022 in response to heightened US sanctions. Anonymous Western intelligence officials told the Telegraph in June 2019 that former IRGC Quds Force Major General Qassem Soleimani had organized attack cells in the Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Niger, and Sudan to attack Western targets in response to new US sanctions.[133] US intelligence exposed a potential Iranian plot to assassinate the US ambassador to South Africa in 2020 in retaliation for the US assassination of Soleimani.[134] Security forces also thwarted IRGC-QF-backed plots against Israeli tourists and Jewish centers in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and Tanzania in 2021 and US targets in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2022.[135]

Other Activity

US CENTCOM announced on March 2 that six US servicemembers have been killed in the war with Iran thus far.[136] The servicemembers were killed in an Iranian attack on Camp Arifjan in Kuwait on March 1.[137] Eighteen US service members have been seriously wounded in the war thus far, according to CENTCOM Spokesperson Captain Tim Hawkins.[138]

The Iranian regime sustained its internet blackout on March 2.[139] An Iranian OSINT account, citing an eyewitness, reported on March 2 that Basij forces in Sattarkhan neighborhood in Tehran City fired at several buildings after they heard Iranians chanting anti-regime slogans from their homes.[140] ISW-CTP has not observed any anti-regime protests during the war. The regime’s internet shutdown during the December 2025-January 2026 protest movement reduced the spread of information from Iran, including reports and videos of protests.

Some Iranians are attempting to migrate to Turkey. A witness told Reuters on March 2 that “hundreds” of Iranians have crossed Iran’s northwestern border to Turkey.[141] Reuters reported that Turkey and Iran mutually suspended operations at three border gates.[142] Travelers also told Reuters that border guards stopped Iranians from crossing into Turkey on March 1.[143] Bloomberg previously reported on February 24 that Turkish authorities made contingency plans to prepare for an influx of Iranian refugees, citing people familiar with the matter.[144] Turkey‘s plans reportedly included establishing refugee camps at the border and deploying forces into Iran to prevent mass migration in the event of a power vacuum in Iran.[145]

Endnotes

[1] https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2028466436205666673?s=20 [2] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2028453160423948749?s=20 [3] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2028050598856110537?s=20 [4] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2028523298531815920?s=20 ; https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2028452773897900481?s=20 [5] https://israel-alma dot org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Islamic-Revolutionary-Guard-Corps-Aerospace-Force-IRGC-ASF.pdf [6] https://israel-alma dot org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Islamic-Revolutionary-Guard-Corps-Aerospace-Force-IRGC-ASF.pdf [7] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2028533301724557433?s=20 ; https://x.com/mamlekate/status/2028440972200128836?s=20 ; https://x.com/PanteaPeyvandi/status/2028589365363150957?s=20 ; https://x.com/PanteaPeyvandi/status/2028521026338816187?s=20 ; https://x.com/PanteaPeyvandi/status/2028487687347306654?s=20 ;

[8] https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1933930436083724602 [9] https://www.iranintl.com/202506144854 [10] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2028430287806349508?s=20 [11] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1745 [12] https://x.com/michaeldweiss/status/2028128216561430896 [13] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-1-2026/ [14] https://x.com/bbcpersian/status/2028503161476911186?s=20 ; https://x.com/dw_persian/status/2028490933122007403?s=20 [15] https://www.google.com/maps/place/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9+%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87%DB%8C+%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7+%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87+%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%AA%DB%8C+%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%DA%A9+%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1+%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%E2%80%AD/@35.7818723,51.4894102,208a,35y,350.59h,24.31t/data=!3m1!1e3!4m12!1m5!3m4!2zMzXCsDQ2JzQ4LjciTiA1McKwMjknMTcuMyJF!8m2!3d35.780188!4d51.48813!3m5!1s0x3f8e05324adfca3d:0x525da5c0e0ba9cd8!8m2!3d35.7829094!4d51.489476!16s%2Fg%2F11ghggq_78?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI2MDIyNS4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D ; https://x.com/ayatsubzero/status/2028507479093526971

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Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 2, 2026

👥 Key Players

⚡ Actions

📰 What Happened

💡 Why It Matters

📚 Background

📝 Key Evidence

🏷️ Entities Mentioned

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