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Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 7, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing two updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.
Key Takeaways
Senior Iranian hardline officials are upset over Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s March 7 statement about Iranian attacks on regional countries. Pezeshkian’s comments reiterated a long-standing regime policy rather than signal a policy shift, yet still drew criticism from hardliners, which highlights the extent of divisions within Iran’s leadership.
The combined force expanded its airstrike campaign to include Iranian oil production and storage facilities for the first time on March 7. The IDF struck two oil refineries and two oil storage facilities in Iran. Disruptions to Iran’s energy sector will likely worsen the country’s ongoing energy crisis and lead to more widespread and frequent electricity shortages and outages.
An Israeli journalist reported on March 7 that Israel estimates that Iran has about 120 missile launchers remaining. US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper stated on March 5 that ballistic missile attacks from Iran have declined by roughly 90 percent since the strikes began.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky discussed the Iranian drone threat with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud on March 7. Iranian drone strikes targeting Saudi territory have damaged civilian infrastructure and forced the closure of Saudi Arabia’s largest domestic oil refinery and export terminal. Zelensky said that Ukraine is “ready to help” Saudi Arabia address the threat posed by Shahed drones.
The combined force struck the IRGC Aerospace Force infrastructure in Tehran on March 7, likely to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities and command and control. The IRGC Aerospace Force is the principal operator of the Iranian missile and drone arsenals.
Toplines
Senior Iranian hardline officials are upset over Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s March 7 statement about Iranian attacks on regional countries. Pezeshkian’s comments reiterated a long-standing regime policy rather than signal a policy shift, yet still drew criticism from hardliners, which highlights the extent of divisions within Iran’s leadership.[1] Pezeshkian apologized on March 7 to regional countries that Iran has attacked since the start of the conflict and said that the Leadership Council, which assumed the duties of the supreme leader after his death, ordered the Armed Forces not to attack any country unless that country attacks Iran.[2] Pezeshkian clarified in a post on X that Iranian attacks on regional countries exclusively target US facilities rather than host countries themselves.[3] This claim is false. Iran has struck sites in Middle Eastern countries that are not US bases, including a drone strike on the Hayat Palace Hotel in Bahrain on March 3.[4] Pezeshkian’s statement echoes the regime’s long-standing position on regional attacks. The regime has historically threatened or used military force to pressure Gulf countries to sever ties with the United States and to deter US action against Iran.[5] Iran and Iran-backed actors have previously cited the presence of US assets in Middle Eastern countries to justify indiscriminate attacks on those countries.[6] Hardline parliamentarian Hamid Rasaei dismissed Pezeshkian’s statement as “weak, unprofessional, and unacceptable” and urged the Assembly of Experts to select a new supreme leader soon so it can dissolve the Leadership Council.[7] An unspecified hardliner close to the office of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told Reuters that several senior commanders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were also upset with Pezeshkian’s statement.[8] Pezeshkian’s office released a readout of the speech after the backlash that once again reiterated the regime’s position but notably omitted Pezeshkian’s apology to regional countries, which was almost certainly a response to the criticism.[9]
The combined force expanded its airstrike campaign to include Iranian oil production and storage facilities for the first time on March 7. The IDF struck two oil refineries and two oil storage facilities in Iran on March 7.[10] This included the Tondgouyan Oil Refinery in Shahr Rey, Tehran Province, and the Shahran Oil Refinery in Tehran City.[11] The Tondgouyan Oil Refinery is one of Iran’s largest oil refineries, and the IDF previously struck it during the 12-Day War.[12] The Shahran Oil Refinery previously had the capacity to store three days’ worth of fuel for Tehran across at least 11 storage tanks.[13] The IDF also struck this facility during the 12-Day War.[14] Israeli forces also struck oil storage facilities in Karaj, Alborz Province, and a separate facility in Tehran City on March 7, marking the first recorded strikes on these facilities.[15] The IDF said that it struck oil production and storage facilities that directly supported Iran’s military industrial complex.[16] Disruptions to Iran’s energy sector will likely worsen the country’s ongoing energy crisis and lead to more widespread and frequent electricity shortages and outages. Iranians have reported daily blackouts due to the energy crisis since February 2025.[17]
An Israeli journalist reported on March 7 that Israel estimates that Iran has about 120 missile launchers remaining.[18] The journalist’s report is consistent with the IDF’s estimate on March 6 that Iran has around 100 to 200 missile launchers remaining.[19] US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper stated on March 5 that ballistic missile attacks from Iran have declined by roughly 90 percent since the strikes began.[20]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky discussed the Iranian drone threat with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud on March 7.[21] Iranian drone strikes targeting Saudi territory have damaged civilian infrastructure and forced the closure of Saudi Arabia’s largest domestic oil refinery and export terminal.[22] Zelensky said that Ukraine is “ready to help” Saudi Arabia address the threat posed by Shahed drones.[23] Ukraine has years of experience defending against almost nightly large-scale Russian drone and missile strike packages, which have included Iranian-origin strike drones much like those the United States and its allies currently face in the Middle East.[24] Ukraine has a reported 90 percent interception rate of such drones.[25] Reuters reported on March 5, citing a source familiar with the matter, that US and Qatari officials are in talks with Ukraine to purchase Ukrainian interceptor drones to intercept Iranian Shahed drones.[26]
USS George H. W. Bush Carrier Strike Group is reportedly expected to deploy soon, potentially to the Middle East.[27] The US Navy announced that USS George H. W. Bush Carrier Strike Group (CSG) completed Composite Training Unit Exercise on March 6.[28] CSG Commander Rear Admiral Alexis Walker said that the completion of the training exercise means that the CSG is “ready for major combat operations around the world.”[29] The US Naval Institute News said that the USS George H W Bush CSG is the “next expected [CSG] to deploy from the United States.”[30] The United States currently has two CSGs within the US Central Command area of responsibility in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.[31]
US and Israeli Air Campaign
The combined US-Israeli force struck Iranian military assets and headquarters, internal security forces, defense industrial sites, and oil infrastructure across western, southwestern, and central Iran on March 7. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on March 6 that it has struck over 3,000 targets in Iran since the beginning of the campaign on February 28.[32] The IDF announced on March 7 that it struck over 300 targets in Iran over the past two days.[33]
The IDF struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) General Command headquarters and other internal security forces in southeastern Tehran on March 4.[34] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 6 showed damage to several IRGC-affiliated headquarters, compounds, storage facilities, and possible training facilities. The imagery showed extensive damage to four buildings within the IRGC General Command Headquarters.[35] The IRGC is the primary body responsible for controlling the Iranian missile and drone arsenals and managing and supporting the so-called “Axis of Resistance.”[36]
The IRGC General Command Headquarters presumably also oversees IRGC units that function primarily as an internal security force. The 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Operational Division, for example, is the IRGC Ground Forces’ provincial unit for Tehran City.[37] The IDF also struck the Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Operational Division on March 4.[38] Satellite imagery from March 6 showed extensive damage to at least six buildings or structures on the operational division’s compound. The IDF also struck a facility about three kilometers west of the Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Operational Division that the IDF identified in a graphic as the headquarters for the ”Internal Security unit responsible for suppressing protests.[39] The IDF also assigned an IRGC logo to the facility in the graphic, which suggests that it is an IRGC-affiliated entity with an internal security mission. At least several of the buildings in the compound appear to have housed IRGC military police as of 2012.[40]
The combined force struck the IRGC Aerospace Force infrastructure in Tehran on March 7, likely to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities and command and control. The IRGC Aerospace Force is the principal operator of the Iranian missile and drone arsenals.[41] The IDF struck the Aerospace Force air defense command center west of Tehran on March 7.[42] The Aerospace Force has some air defense platforms and aircraft that it uses in collaboration with the Artesh Air Defense Force to defend Iranian airspace.[43] The IDF reported that it also hit air defense systems, headquarters, logistical warehouses, and other buildings surrounding the air defense center.[44] Iranian sources posted footage of a purported airstrike on the Aerospace Force’s headquarters in Kuhak neighborhood, Tehran, on March 7.[45] The facility in Kuhak is the Aerospace Force’s service headquarters.
The combined force has continued to target Iranian ballistic missile manufacturing sites as part of an effort to degrade Iran’s ballistic missile program. Iranian media posted footage of explosions at Parchin Military Complex on March 5, and the IDF announced on March 7 that it had struck a ballistic missile production site at the complex.[46] It is unclear if the combined force conducted two separate strikes on March 5 and then a later date, or if the IDF was confirming the March 5 strike on March 7. Iran has used the Parchin complex to develop and manufacture advanced munitions, including drones and missiles.[47] The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that airstrikes targeting Parchin on March 5 destroyed two to three solid propellant production facilities.[48] The IDF previously destroyed these facilities in October 2024 and in June 2025, but Iran subsequently acquired new equipment.[49] The combined force has also struck Parchin’s underground facility.[50]
The IDF also announced on March 7 that it struck the IRGC Shahroud Missile Facility in Semnan Province within the past week.[51] The IRGC uses the facility to develop, test, and launch solid-propellant missiles.[52] The IDF identified two complexes at the facility for mixing and casting missile engines and warheads, in addition to a launch area.[53] The IDF previously struck the facility during its October 2024 airstrikes on Iran and during the June 2025 12-Day War.[54] The IDF targeted planetary mixers and missile engine manufacturing equipment during the June strikes.[55]
The combined force struck at least two buildings at the Khojir Missile Production Complex in Hajarabad, Tehran Province, likely on March 3.[56] The Khojir complex is a research, development, and manufacturing facility for solid fuel missiles.[57] An analyst from the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies assessed that the strikes damaged several buildings that host planetary mixers and casting facilities.[58] The Iranian regime expanded the Khojir complex in August 2023 in order to increase missile production capacity.[59]
The combined force continued to strike Iran’s defense industrial base to degrade its ballistic missile, air defense, nuclear, and drone programs. Satellite imagery published on March 6 showed that the combined force struck the Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI) Zone in Fars Province at least 13 times.[60] SEI produces military electronics for the Iranian armed forces, including radars, avionics, and missile guidance components, and is under US sanctions.[61] Repeated combined forces strikes on SEI, including a previous strike on March 3, likely aim to disrupt production that supports Iran’s air defense and drone industries.[62]
Satellite imagery from March 6 also showed strikes on the Raja Shimi Industries plant in Tehran Province, located adjacent to the Imam Sajjad Missile Base.[63] The facility is likely involved in Iranian missile production, given its proximity to the missile base and a report that it produced rocket propellants.[64] The combined force previously struck the site on March 4, and the IDF reported three unexplained explosions at the facility in 2015, which further suggests the facility’s involvement in missile production.[65]
An Iranian OSINT account reported that the combined force likely struck the Esteghlal Industrial Zone in Tehran Province again, after previously targeting the facility on March 6.[66] The industrial zone includes companies tied to Iran’s defense industry, including Azmoon Pajohan Hesgar LLC, which the United States sanctioned in 2024 for links to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).[67] The IDF previously issued an evacuation order for the Esteghlal Industrial Zone on March 3.[68]
Geolocated video from March 6 also indicates that the combined force struck the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) facility in Tehran at least three times.[69] The DIO, a subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), oversees key segments of Iran’s military industrial base and supports the country’s missile and nuclear programs.[70] The United States, the United Nations, and several Western countries have sanctioned the DIO.[71] The combined force likely struck the facility previously on March 2.[72]
An Iranian OSINT account also reported that combined force airstrikes may have targeted ballistic missile launchers at the Jahan Electric Industrial Park in Meybod, Yazd Province, on March 7.[73] The Jahan Electric Industrial Park procured carbon fiber for Iran’s nuclear program, which Iran used to manufacture advanced centrifuge rotors and ballistic missile components.[74] The Jahan Electric Industrial Park is sanctioned by the United States.[75]
The IDF destroyed IRGC Quds Force-affiliated aircraft and several facilities at Mehrabad Airport on March 6 that allegedly facilitated Iranian weapons transfers to the Axis of Resistance, including Lebanese Hezbollah.[76] The IDF struck Mehrabad Airport on March 6, according to the IDF and Iranian media.[77] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 7 showed extensive damage to buildings and support facilities at the airport. The imagery also showed that strikes destroyed at least seven cargo aircraft. The IDF stated that it struck 16 Quds Force-affiliated aircraft that had transported weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon in the past.[78] These statements could refer to aircraft owned and operated by Mahan Air. Mahan Air is a US-sanctioned Iranian airline that has frequently transported Quds Force funds, weapons, and operatives in support of Iranian proxy activities abroad and to support Hezbollah directly.[79] Lebanese airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight in Beirut on suspicion of transporting funds to Hezbollah in January 2025, for example.[80]
The IDF also struck a number of Iranian fighter jets at Mehrabad Airport.[81] The Artesh Air Force 1st Tactical Airbase is co-located at Mehrabad Airport.[82]
The US-Israeli combined force continued to target internal security infrastructure across Iran, likely to degrade the regime’s ability to maintain domestic control and counter militant activity. Satellite imagery from March 6 showed extensive damage to a base in Tehran City that the IDF identified as the IRGC Intelligence Organization’s headquarters. The imagery shows several destroyed buildings in the western and southeastern sections of the compound. The IRGC created the Intelligence Organization in response to the Green Movement protests in 2009.[83] The Intelligence Organization has thus focused primarily on domestic surveillance, social control, and counterinsurgency operations, while also conducting limited operations abroad. The Intelligence Organization’s headquarters is close to the Imam Hassan Security Unit and the 13th Tehran Municipality Region’s Komeil Basij Resistance Regional Base.
The IDF also struck the headquarters of the Greater Tehran Relief Unit Command, which is the LEC’s rapid response force. Satellite imagery from March 6 shows damage to the facility. The Greater Tehran Relief Unit serves an internal security function in the capital region by deploying rapidly across the Tehran area to respond to emerging threats. LEC rapid response forces participated in suppressing the Mahsa Amini protests.[84]
Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 6 showed that the IDF struck several warehouses at the IRGC Ground Forces Saberin Special Forces Brigade headquarters in southeastern Tehran. The Saberin unit is an elite special forces unit that has previously played a role in protest suppression and expeditionary operations in Syria.[85] The combined force also struck several likely warehouses or hangars at the 33rd Al Mehdi Airborne Brigade in Jahrom, Fars Province, according to satellite imagery captured on March 6.[86] The brigade operates under the IRGC Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base, which is responsible for supporting LEC and Basij’s internal security operations in Bushehr, Fars, and Hormozgan provinces by providing rapidly deployable support to suppress internal unrest and protect the regime from insurgent activity.[87] Southeastern Iran, where this operational base is based, is a hotspot for anti-regime activity.
Iran is continuing to target commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz as part of its effort to disrupt maritime traffic and threaten freedom of navigation. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported that the IRGC conducted a drone attack on the Malta-flagged vessel Prima in the Strait of Hormuz on March 7.[88] The IRGC claimed that the vessel ignored warnings from the IRGC Navy not to transit the waterway.[89] CTP-ISW could not confirm whether this strike successfully struck the Prima. IRGC-affiliated media also reported that the IRGC conducted another drone attack on the Marshall Islands–flagged oil tanker Louise P in the Persian Gulf on March 7.[90] The IRGC claimed that the tanker was a US asset and that the strike was part of Iran’s campaign against US and Israeli interests in the region.[91] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported a “possible” drone attack on a vessel approximately 10 nautical miles north of Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, on March 7.[92] Starboard Maritime Intelligence data showed the Louise P off the coast of Jubayl at the time of the attack reported by UKMTO. The Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) separately warned on March 7 that the regional maritime risk level remains “critical.”[93] Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that Iran will attack vessels attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz.[94]
Iranian Retaliation
Iran launched ten missile attack waves at Israel between March 6 at 3:00 PM and March 7 at 3:00 PM.[95] Two Iranian missiles struck open areas in Israel during this period, one in northern Israel and one in central Israel.[96] Iran has launched at least six missile waves per day at Israel since March 2.[97] The IDF announced on March 7 that Israel had intercepted over 110 Iranian drones since the start of the conflict.[98]
Iran continued to attack regional countries on March 7 after Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s order to suspend strikes on Gulf states unless attacks originated from their countries. The Saudi Arabian Defense Ministry announced that an Iranian ballistic missile fell in an uninhabited area after Iran attempted to attack the Prince Sultan Airbase.[99] Unidentified Saudi officials also told the Wall Street Journal that a likely Iranian drone targeted the Saudi Aramco Berri oil field.[100] CTP-ISW assessed on March 2 that Iran is likely targeting energy infrastructure in Gulf countries to compel the United States and its partners to pursue a ceasefire before achieving their objective of collapsing the regime.[101] Saudi Arabia also intercepted one other Iranian ballistic missile attack, as well as eight drones, since March 6 at 3:00 PM ET.[102] Iran also continued to attack the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has faced the most Iranian attacks since February 28.[103] The Emirati Defense Ministry announced that Iran has launched 121 drones and 16 ballistic missiles at the UAE since 3:00 PM on March 6.[104] Qatar also intercepted an Iranian ballistic missile attack on March 7.[105]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to conduct attacks and claim attacks targeting US forces, including the first militia attack on the US Embassy in Baghdad since 2023. US air defenses intercepted a likely militia rocket attack targeting the US Embassy in Baghdad on March 7.[106] An OSINT account reported that the rockets were fired from eastern Baghdad.[107] CTP-ISW had assessed prior to the start of the conflict that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would likely prioritize attacking US forces in Iraqi Kurdistan over the US Embassy in Baghdad due to the negative ramifications such an attack would likely have on militia financial holdings in Iraq by deterring investment in the country.[108] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias last attacked the US Embassy in Baghdad in 2023.[109] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 6 that it had conducted 23 drone and missile operations targeting US and enemy bases in the region in the past 24 hours.[110] CTP-ISW has not yet observed any indications of Iraqi militias using missiles in their attacks as of this writing. Geolocated footage posted on X showed smoke rising from a hotel in Erbil after a drone attack on March 6.[111] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front group Rijal al Baas al Shadid claimed that it targeted US forces with unidentified projectiles at a hotel in Erbil on March 6.[112] CTP-ISW assessed on March 6 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may be using front groups in an attempt to avoid US and Israeli strikes on militia positions and obfuscate responsibility.[113]
The United States and Israel continue to conduct attacks targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militia positions in Iraq in order to deter the militias from retaliating against the United States and Israel. A security source told Iraqi media on February 7 that aircraft struck unspecified sites in Jurf al Sakhr, which is a Kataib Hezbollah stronghold south of Baghdad.[114] The combined force has repeatedly struck Kataib Hezbollah positions in Jurf al Sakhr in recent days.[115] The combined force reportedly struck a Kataib al Imam Ali headquarters south of Mosul on March 7.[116] The combined force also struck Kataib Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) positions in southeastern Anbar Province, according to Iraqi media.[117] Kataib Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control brigades within the PMF that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[118] An airstrike targeting a PMF 33rd Brigade headquarters south of Mosul, which caused minor injuries and material damage.[119] The 33rd PMF Brigade is affiliated with the armed wing of an Iraqi party that broke away from Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr.[120]
Supreme Leader Succession
Assembly of Experts member Hossein Mozafari stated on March 7 that the Assembly of Experts will likely convene within the next 24 hours to deliberate and select the next supreme leader.[121] Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani stated on March 7 that the Leadership Council has ordered security forces to prepare the necessary security measures to allow the Assembly of Experts to meet.[122] There are several unconfirmed reports that the Assembly of Experts will select Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei.[123] A Western security official told the Washington Post on March 6 that the IRGC has been pushing for Mojtaba but has faced resistance from other senior regime officials, including Larijani.[124]
Lebanon
Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 23 attacks targeting the IDF in southern Lebanon and Israeli defense sites, industrial facilities, and cities in northern Israel since CTP-ISW’s data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 6.[125] Hezbollah claimed that it engaged IDF vehicles with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) in Kfar Kila, Marjaayoun District.[126] The IDF reported that two 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (162nd Division) soldiers were injured by Hezbollah anti-tank fire in southern Lebanon, though it is unclear if this occurred during this engagement with Hezbollah.[127] Hezbollah also claimed that it launched rockets and drones at IDF positions in Jabal Balat, Tyre District, and Tal al Hamamis, Wadi al Asafir, Markaba, and Khiam, all in Marjaayoun[128].[129] Hezbollah has targeted all these locations repeatedly since the start of the conflict.[130] Two of Israel’s five permanent positions in southern Lebanon that it has occupied since February 2025 are located at Tal al Hamamis and Jabal Balat.[131] Hezbollah also claimed that it launched rockets and drones targeting six IDF bases in northern Israel.[132] Hezbollah previously attacked many of these IDF bases during the October 7 War.[133] Hezbollah also claimed that it targeted multiple industrial sites near Haifa, including an oil refinery and a defense industrial site.[134] Hezbollah targeted two Kiryat Shmona and Nahariya, which are two northern Israeli towns, with rockets and drones.[135] Hezbollah issued statements in Hebrew calling on residents of both cities to evacuate prior to the group’s claimed rocket and drone launches.[136] Israeli media reported on March 7 that one Hezbollah drone crashed in a medical center parking lot and Israeli civil defense shot down another.[137] There were no reported casualties or significant damage following these incidents. Hezbollah is likely continuing to attempt to displace northern Israeli residents from their homes to place political pressure on the Israeli government to curtail its war effort.[138]
The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military sites in Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah’s ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against Israel. The IDF reported on March 7 that it had attacked over 170 targets in Lebanon over the last 48 hours.[139] The IDF said that it continues to target Hezbollah rocket launchers, weapons depots, and personnel in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.[140] The IDF also struck Radwan Force infrastructure and multiple commanders in Majdal Salam, Marjaayoun District. [141]The IDF issued evacuation orders for all residents south of the Litani River and in Beirut’s southern suburbs.[142] The IDF previously issued evacuation orders for these areas on March 4 and March 5, prior to conducting airstrikes against Hezbollah targets.[143]
IDF special operations forces (SOF) conducted a raid into Nabi Chit, Baalbek District, to search for the remains of missing IAF pilot Ron Arad.[144] Arad was captured by Amal in 1986 after he was shot down over Lebanon.[145] The IDF SOF, acting on new intelligence, flew into the area on four helicopters and investigated a grave site in Nabi Chit.[146] As the IDF unit withdrew, Hezbollah and local residents engaged the Israeli forces with small arms and rocket fire.[147] The IDF reported that the special forces unit suffered no casualties during the mission.[148] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) reported that Israeli strikes killed three LAF soldiers and multiple civilians in the vicinity of Nabi Chit during the Israeli raid.[149] The IDF and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the raid did not yield any findings related to Arad.[150] Netanyahu said that the raid demonstrated his commitment to finding all Israeli missing persons and prisoners.[151]
Iranian diplomats have reportedly begun to leave Lebanon amid continued Israeli and Lebanese pressure. A senior Lebanese security source told Reuters that over 150 Iranian nationals, including non-essential diplomats, departed from Lebanon on March 7.[152] The source said another 20 left on March 6.[153] The source said that the Iranians were being flown to Russia on a Russian plane.[154] A source from the Iranian Embassy in Lebanon said that the non-essential Iranian diplomats were leaving due to Israeli threats and strikes near the Iranian Embassy on March 6.[155] IRGC Quds Force members have also reportedly begun to leave Lebanon in recent days.[156] The Lebanese government announced on March 5 that it will ban any IRGC activity in Lebanon and seeks to deport IRGC members from Lebanon.[157] The government also decided that Iranian civilians will no longer have visa-free entry into Lebanon.[158]
The Lebanese Government is reportedly considering legal action against Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem.[159] A source close to Lebanese Justice Minister Adel Nassar told Lebanese media on March 7 that Nassar is considering taking legal action against Qassem.[160] The Lebanese Cabinet declared on March 2 that all Hezbollah military and security activity is illegal.[161] No previous Lebanese government has attempted or considered prosecuting a Hezbollah secretary-general.
Endnotes
[1] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/12/16/3533745
[2] https://x.com/drpezeshkian/status/2030275830924898555?s=20
[3] https://x.com/BoxOfChocol8s/status/2028956566939156524?s=20
[4] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/RPT-Kagan_Attribution-Intent-and-Response-3.pdf
[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/RPT-Kagan_Attribution-Intent-and-Response-3.pdf
[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/cracks-emerge-irans-leadership-it-reels-under-bombardment-2026-03-07/?utm_source=braze&utm_medium=notifications&utm_campaign=2025_engagement
[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/cracks-emerge-irans-leadership-it-reels-under-bombardment-2026-03-07/?utm_source=braze&utm_medium=notifications&utm_campaign=2025_engagement
[9] https://x.com/hamidrezaaz/status/2030296540388962417?s=46
[10] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030366329580994651?s=20 https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030366329580994651?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/ariel_oseran/status/2030372297031192686?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/etelaf10/status/2030372347941892338?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/mamlekate/status/2030374516094898376?s=20
[11] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030366329580994651?s=20 ; https://x.com/etelaf10/status/2030372347941892338?s=20
[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/14/world/middleeast/iran-israel-energy-facility-strikes-tehran.html
[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/14/world/middleeast/iran-israel-energy-facility-strikes-tehran.html
[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/14/world/middleeast/iran-israel-energy-facility-strikes-tehran.html
[15] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2030372297031192686?s=20 https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030374522172453073?s=20 https://x.com/GhonchehAzad/status/2030375816106852654?s=20
(https://x.com/mamlekate/status/2030374516094898376?s=20)
[16] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-889166
[17] https://www.iranintl.com/video/ott_586b2876b2344be4abe52d8ed24d380c
[18] https://x.com/amichaistein1/status/2030357914926412237?s=46
[19] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-it-hit-400-targets-in-western-iran-today-estimates-100-200-ballistic-missile-launchers-remain/
[20] https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/2029684490008719384?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/RapidResponse47/status/2029684061736755392
[21] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2030384180664668513
[22] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-aramcos-ras-tanura-struck-again-by-unknown-projectile-four-sources-say-2026-03-04/; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/iranian-drones-strike-u-s-embassy-in-saudi-arabia-as-war-widens ; https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/saudi-arabia-reports-another-drone-155317855.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmluZy5jb20v&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAA1AojpB8MVAO2VcHPvWJC_Pol6npfP-f-tbSOT-qU77IENCemY9K3-SkvDst6poeLPhOA_GYcnAZlt1x8wUALv94hEStqpnDkjHs6Iyb52eKEzR9R91vk5vTY4S4pCyLwhoxwvWySUEjxciHX9fAuupTbD5SXF7Xf9DE7Zzf8Eb
[23] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2030384180664668513
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2026/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2026
[26] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-qatar-discuss-acquiring-ukrainian-drones-down-irans-shaheds-source-says-2026-03-05/
[27] https://news.usni.org/2026/03/06/uss-gerald-r-ford-now-in-the-red-sea-uss-george-h-w-bush-wraps-pre-deployment-exercises
[28] https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/display-news/Article/4426671/george-hw-bush-carrier-strike-group-completes-comptuex/
[29] https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/display-news/Article/4426671/george-hw-bush-carrier-strike-group-completes-comptuex/
[30] https://news.usni.org/2026/03/06/uss-gerald-r-ford-now-in-the-red-sea-uss-george-h-w-bush-wraps-pre-deployment-exercises
[31] https://news.usni.org/2026/03/06/uss-gerald-r-ford-now-in-the-red-sea-uss-george-h-w-bush-wraps-pre-deployment-exercises
[32] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2030032198603039061?s=20
[33] https://www.idf dot il/332981
[34] https://x.com/IDF/status/2029246755921871302
[35] https://x.com/IDF/status/2029246755921871302
[36] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces
[37] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/FINAL%20-%20The%20Tharallah%20Headquarters%20Unveiled%20JAN%2026.pdf
[38] https://x.com/IDF/status/2029246755921871302
[39] https://x.com/IDF/status/2029246755921871302
[40] https://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.663590&lon=51.524420&z=16&m=w&show=/10865321/%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B8%D9%85%DB%8C(sakhteman-shahid-kazemi)&search=35.66429%C2%B0%20N%2C%2051.52706%C2%B0%20E
[41] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces
[42] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030304975813750880
[43] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces
[44] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030304975813750880
[45] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030285224798572934; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030292266573504596
[46] https://x.com/IDF/status/2030369126099636533 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2029600023650963459, https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2029610982830493915?s=20, https://x.com/Vahid/status/2029608721542689195
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[48] https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/2030029637229633889
[49] https://x.com/TheGoodISIS/status/2030029637229633889
[50] https://t.me/BenTzionM/6959
[51] https://x.com/IDF/status/2030369126099636533
[52] https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/shahroud-missile-test-site/ ; https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/nuclear/ncri-report-irans-covert-nuclear-warhead-program-and-missile-sites-exposed/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-strikes-iran-shahroud-space-center.html
[53] https://x.com/IDF/status/2030369126099636533/photo/1
[55] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936841741971103989; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1936839060657492443
[56] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2028742312625389779?s=20 , https://x.com/Vahid/status/2028708233452408872?s=20 , https://x.com/GBENRO0/status/2028721588632228311
[57] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-photos-show-iran-expanding-missile-production-sources-say-2024-07-08; https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production
[58] https://x.com/sam_lair/status/2029980877577670782
[59] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-photos-show-iran-expanding-missile-production-sources-say-2024-07-08/
[60] https://x.com/geo27752/status/2029994375728546141
[61] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1145
[62] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2028964680761278829 https://x.com/Vahid/status/2029236800611344561
[63] https://x.com/DuitsmanMS/status/2030073790391275774
[64] https://x.com/DuitsmanMS/status/2030073790391275774
[65] https://x.com/DuitsmanMS/status/2030074410493935817 ; https://www.israeldefense dot co.il/en/node/21459
[66] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030107995011522907 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-6-2026/ ; https://x.com/mamlekate/status/2029757935409078646
[67] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/azmoon-pajohan-hesgar-limited-liability-company ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2510
[68] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2028838526519758967 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-3-2026/
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[70] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1355 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-2-2026/
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[72] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-2-2026/ ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2028452892684783816?s=20
[73] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030221964598538639
[74] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/jahan-tech-rooyan-pars
[75] https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=17237
[76] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030279482217505194
[77] https://x.com/GhonchehAzad/status/2030053479100698976; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2030063457505083504?s=20; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030279482217505194
[78] https://www.idf dot il/332981
[79] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1098
[80] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1874905309279313923 ; https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1874922046603317321
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[84] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pRIudkM6GKo
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[88] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/393667
[89] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/393667
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[92] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2030305425548046702?s=20
[93] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2030323567863194060
[94] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-tell-ships-passage-through-strait-hormuz-not-allowed-2026-02-28/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-vows-attack-any-ship-trying-pass-through-strait-hormuz-2026-03-02/ ;
https://t.me/Tasnimnews/390524
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[100] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/gulf-states-had-a-strategy-of-playing-nice-with-iran-it-failed-8859f84e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
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[130] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israeli-forces-remain-five-locations-southern-lebanon-removal-deadline-rcna192449 ; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/southern-lebanon-residents-describe-hardships-under-israeli-military-occupation
[131] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israeli-forces-remain-five-locations-southern-lebanon-removal-deadline-rcna192449 ; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/southern-lebanon-residents-describe-hardships-under-israeli-military-occupation
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[133] https://t.me/C_Military1/43655 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/4753 ; https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/GetUrlReputation ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8782
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[137] https://x.com/Wq0oQJmUSfZunt5/status/2030248429465522254 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/hezbollah-drone-crashes-in-hospital-parking-lot-after-it-was-shot-down-by-civil-defense-squad/
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[155] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/over-150-iranian-nationals-leave-lebanon-including-diplomats-lebanese-security-2026-03-07/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-6-2026/
[156] https://www.axios.com/2026/03/06/lebanon-israel-iran-irgc-hezbollah
[157] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2026/03/05/lebanese-government-bans-all-activity-by-irgc-in-lebanon
[158] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260305-lebanon-decides-to-pursue-members-of-irans-revolutionary-guards-for-deportation/
[159] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1497940/adel-nassar-considering-legal-action-against-naim-qassem-source-tells-lolj.html ; https://www.mtv dot com.lb/news/محليات/1661843/ملاحقة-نعيم-قاسم
[160] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1497940/adel-nassar-considering-legal-action-against-naim-qassem-source-tells-lolj.html
[161] https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/2028436712930545867
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