Iran Update Special Report, April 10, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

The Iranian delegation arrived in Islamabad on April 10 ahead of planned negotiations on April 11. US Vice President JD Vance departed for Pakistan on April 10, operating under strict guidance from President Donald Trump.

It will remain difficult to determine whether the Middle East ceasefire conditions are being upheld, given the lack of mutually agreed-upon, written ceasefire documents available to the public.

The US-Iran ceasefire talks are complicated by the fragmented nature of the Iranian negotiating team, composed of competing political, military, and security factions, rather than a unified delegation with a clear mandate and unified positions.

The Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense spokesperson stated on April 10 that Kuwaiti armed forces detected and engaged seven Iranian drones in Kuwaiti airspace over the past 24 hours.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias probably used first-person view (FPV) drones to ambush US Embassy personnel near the Baghdad International Airport on April 8. The Iraqi authorities’ arrest of an IRGC officer connected to militia attacks on the airport and the claimed FPV drone attack against the same facility is further evidence that the IRGC is providing guidance to the militias and supporting their attacks on US personnel in Iraq.

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 49 attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and 43 attacks targeting IDF infrastructure and Israeli communities in northern and southern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 9 and 2:00 PM ET on April 10

Iranian banks are in poor condition and are warned that current challenges risk pushing banks toward crisis or bankruptcy. Unspecified political insiders close to the Iranian establishment also told Reuters on April 8 that Iranian officials viewed the economy as Iran’s “Achilles heel” and feared that economic deterioration could threaten the regime’s ability to govern.

Toplines

The Iranian delegation arrived in Islamabad on April 10 ahead of planned negotiations on April 11.[1] US Vice President JD Vance departed for Pakistan on April 10, operating under strict guidance from President Donald Trump.[2] Jared Kushner and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff are also part of the US negotiating team, which also reportedly includes officials from the Pentagon, National Security Council, and State Department.[3] CBS reported that the negotiating teams are expected to remain in Pakistan even if Vance departs.[4] A Pakistani source familiar with April 11 talks told Reuters that “everything is on track,” citing de‑escalation in Lebanon as a “good sign,” and confirmed that advance teams from both Iran and the United States are already in place in Islamabad.[5]

It will remain difficult to determine whether the Middle East ceasefire conditions are being upheld, given the lack of mutually agreed-upon, written ceasefire documents available to the public. Iranian officials are using this ambiguity to frame the United States and its partners as aggressors who are attempting to collapse the ceasefire, which is far from clear. Iranian officials, including Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who are leading the Iranian negotiating delegation, insist that Lebanon must be included in the ceasefire and that Iran will be able to restrict shipping in the Strait of Hormuz as part of the ceasefire.[6] Ghalibaf wrote on X on April 10 that two ”mutually agreed“ measures — a ceasefire in Lebanon and the release of Iran’s blocked assets — must be implemented before negotiations begin.[7] There is zero public evidence that any of these measures were ever included in the ceasefire by either party. It is additionally unclear whether the ceasefire extends to Iraq, for example, where Iranian-backed groups ambushed US diplomats on April 8. President Masoud Pezeshkian told Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan during a phone call on April 9 that the ceasefire depends on US commitments, while Araghchi separately stressed Lebanon’s centrality to the ceasefire in a call with Iran’s ambassador in Beirut.[8]

Iranian media reported on April 10 that Iranian parliamentarians are preparing to vote on a strategic Strait of Hormuz plan that would prohibit ”hostile” shipping (which would include US, Israel, and other vessels), require transit fees in rials, and mandate use of the term “Persian Gulf.”[9] This plan would force crews or countries to negotiate for safe passage through the international waterway, which would have economic impacts because it implies that Iran’s conditions in these negotiations could change at any time and for any reason. An Iranian analyst close to the regime argued that the US-Iran War has reshaped Iran’s security doctrine and deterrence posture, referring to Iran’s control of the Strait.[10] An agreement that allows Iran to restrict shipping in the Strait, tax it, or otherwise threaten international shipping and keep energy prices high for the consumer.[11] Some shipping firms are calling on tankers not to pay Iran‘s toll, as it is a violation of freedom of navigation.[12] Even without a formal toll system, Iran is aware that it can coerce other powers in the future by threatening shipping through the strait.[13]

US President Trump warned on Truth Social on April 10 that Iran is engaging in “short‑term extortion” in the Strait of Hormuz and said that its leadership is negotiating only because it has “no cards.”[14] Fox News reporter Trey Yingst reported on April 10 that US intelligence agencies assessed that the IRGC is exploiting the two‑week ceasefire to solidify control over maritime traffic.[15] Vance stated that he and the negotiating team would not allow Iran to ”play them” before boarding his flight on April 10.[16]

Neither the US nor Iran has signaled any public shift on their stances on key issues in previous negotiations, which include nuclear enrichment limits, the highly enriched uranium stockpile, the missile program, sanctions, and access to frozen assets. Now these sticking points include the Strait of Hormuz as well. Trump continues to hold a firm red line against Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, while Iranian officials such as Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi have reportedly refused to discuss the missile program, according to anti-regime media on April 10.[17] Mediators cited by the Wall Street Journal on April 8 said Iran has privately softened on several demands, including its previous positions on enrichment, US troop withdrawals from the region, and war reparations — though it remains unclear whether this reflects an official regime stance, however.[18] These mixed messages underscore the fragility of both the ceasefire framework and the diplomatic process now unfolding through indirect channels in Pakistan.

The US-Iran ceasefire talks are complicated by the fragmented nature of the Iranian negotiating team. The United States is dealing with a de facto committee composed of competing political, military, and security factions, rather than a unified delegation with a clear mandate and unified positions. These actors hold divergent views on the scope and purpose of the negotiations, and several are operating outside the formal responsibilities of their offices. The result is a fragmented team marked by internal rivalries, mixed signaling, and unclear lines of authority, especially between Iran’s diplomatic institutions, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).

Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi represents the diplomatic wing of the Iranian regime and has been supportive of using engagement as a tool to reduce pressure and stabilize the regional environment.[19] His position has been weakened by overt hostility from hardline elements. Social media users shared footage on April 9 of local IRGC affiliates and Basij supporters protesting outside the Foreign Affairs Ministry against Araghchi for negotiating with the United States.[20]

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has emerged as the lead figure for the Iranian delegation for negotiations in Islamabad, a role more traditionally suited to the president or foreign minister.[21] President Masoud Pezeshkian has reportedly been sidelined in the regime’s decision-making process.[22] Ghalibaf is a powerful political operator with strong ties to conservative networks, but he appears not to exercise command authority over the IRGC.[23] His leadership of the delegation creates a mismatch between responsibility and control, which may leave him exposed to criticism from hardliners and the IRGC while lacking the leverage to enforce consensus.[24]

IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi appears to wield outsized influence over Iran’s diplomatic posture despite being a senior military officer and not a formal negotiator. Vahidi is a long-time IRGC member, serving as IRGC Quds Force Commander from 1988 to 1997 and now as the senior-most IRGC commander.[25] Iranian media reported that Vahidi was one of the five influential figures involved in the establishment of Hezbollah, which may make him more supportive of demanding a Lebanon ceasefire and reticent to cast aside Hezbollah in negotiations.[26] Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are driving military decisionmaking, according to anti-regime media on April 7.[27] Vahidi is reportedly at odds with both Ghalibaf and Araghchi because Vahidi has pushed for SNSC Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr to be on the negotiating team, according to anti-regime media on April 10.[28] The SNSC Secretary does not normally take up these sorts of diplomatic responsibilities.[29] Ghalibaf and Araghchi’s negotiating team have pushed back on Vahidi’s request because Zolghadr lacks the necessary experience to be involved in these negotiations.[30] Vahidi notably pushed for Pezeshkian to select Zolghadr, whom he has worked with for decades, as SNSC secretary.[31] Vahidi’s influence highlights the continued dominance of security institutions over foreign policy when core defense capabilities are perceived to be at stake. His position effectively sets red lines that constrain negotiators who are ostensibly leading the delegation.

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr oversees coordination among Iran’s military, intelligence, and security bodies and plays a central role in shaping national security policy, including war planning and crisis management. Zolghadr is a hardline IRGC veteran and long‑time power broker with deep ties to Iran’s security and judicial apparatuses, he commanded the IRGC Ramadan Headquarters during the Iran–Iraq War, rose through senior IRGC leadership roles in the 1990s and early 2000s, helped engineer Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 2005 election after opposing reformist President Mohammad Khatami, later oversaw internal security and Basij repression—including during the 2009 Green Movement—and was sanctioned by the UN in 2007 for involvement in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.[32] Zolghadr appears not to be in the negotiating delegation, however.[33] It also remains unclear what role the SNSC plays at the moment, whether it is directing strategy, arbitrating disputes, or simply lending institutional cover to factional maneuvering.

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is notably absent from the process. The Supreme Leader is often viewed as an informal but critical mediator among Iran’s rival factions during periods of elite disagreement.[34] Mojtaba’s lack of visible involvement has deprived the negotiations of a potential internal arbiter capable of harmonizing positions between the IRGC, the government, and the parliamentary leadership. This absence of clear mediation and coordination leaves the Iranian negotiating posture internally divided and externally unpredictable, which may complicate US efforts to assess credibility and reach enforceable agreements.

The Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense spokesperson stated on April 10 that Kuwaiti armed forces detected and engaged seven Iranian drones in Kuwaiti airspace over the past 24 hours.[35] The Kuwaiti Defense Ministry added that Iranian drone attacks targeted Kuwaiti National Guard facilities, injuring several personnel.[36] The ministry reported that explosive ordnance disposal teams handled 14 separate incidents during the same period.[37] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Public Relations office denied reports that Iran conducted drone or missile attacks in Gulf states.[38]

Iranian threats and restrictions regarding the Strait of Hormuz continue to limit the flow of maritime traffic through the strait. Commercially available maritime tracking data shows that three cargo vessels, including one ship sanctioned by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), have entered the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on April 9.[39] The ship sanctioned by OFAC is the Iranian-flagged Ganj, which is subject to secondary sanctions.[40] Commercially available maritime tracking data also shows that five vessels, including four cargo ships and one tanker, exited the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.[41] Three of the five vessels were Iranian-flagged, and two of the Iranian vessels, the Basht and the Negar, are sanctioned by OFAC.[42] The Basht and the Negar are both subject to secondary sanctions.[43]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias probably used first-person view (FPV) drones to ambush US Embassy personnel near the Baghdad International Airport on April 8. An unspecified US State Department official told a White House correspondent that Iraqi militias launched multiple drones at US embassy staff near the airport, causing no casualties.[44] The official did not specify the type of drone, but ordinary Iranian-made drones would lack the accuracy to ”ambush” moving personnel, especially individual personnel on foot or in a vehicle. This suggests that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia responsible for this attack utilized a FPV drone. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to use FPV drones.[45] FPV drones can be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or outfitted with strike capabilities to conduct precise targeting, thus making this the most likely type of drone used in the attack.[46] Open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts have assessed that drone footage posted by multiple Iraqi militias during the war has appeared to be from fiber-optic FPV drones, making it likely that the militias already possess this technology.[47] US Deputy Secretary of State Christoper Landau summoned Iraqi Ambassador to the United States Nizar Khirullah on April 9 to condemn Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against US diplomatic personnel and facilities, including the attack on the Embassy personnel near the airport on April 8.[48]

The State Department noted on April 9 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted hundreds of attacks during the war against US citizens, diplomatic facilities, and commercial interests, as well as Iraqi institutions, civilians, and neighboring countries.[49] Landau emphasized the Iraqi government’s failure to prevent these attacks.[50] Iraqi authorities conducted a few arrests during the war, but militia attacks continued. Iraqi authorities arrested four individuals on March 25 responsible for launching a drone attack at a former US military base in Hasakah Province, Syria.[51] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s office said on March 8 that Sudani told French President Emmanuel Macron that the Iraqi authorities had arrested the perpetrators of a drone attack on a French base in Iraqi Kurdistan on March 12 that killed one French soldier.[52]

An Iraqi security source told US-funded, Arabic-language media on April 9 that Iraqi authorities arrested an IRGC officer for suspected involvement in directing Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone attacks on Baghdad International Airport.[53] Iraqi authorities reportedly also arrested three Iraqis in connection with these attacks.[54] The Iraqi security source added that the IRGC officer and the three Iraqis remain in Iraqi government custody, despite pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to release them.[55] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed that it attacked the former US Victory Base at the airport on March 24 and posted drone footage of the attack.[56] There were also multiple other drone attacks on the airport.[57] A longtime observer of drone operations suggested on March 25 that the drone footage is consistent with a fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone.[58] ISW-CTP still cannot authenticate the Islamic Resistance in Iraq‘s video or confirm that a militia attack occurred at the airport on March 24, however.

The Iraqi authorities’ arrest of an IRGC officer connected to militia attacks on the airport and the claimed FPV drone attack against the same facility is further evidence that the IRGC is providing guidance to the militias and supporting their attacks on US personnel in Iraq. This support may include FPV drones, given that the militias used FPV drones to attack US facilities and personnel at and near the airport. Iran potentially transferring this technology to its regional partners and proxies would pose a significant threat to US interests in the Middle East because FPV drones are difficult to shoot down using conventional systems and can be used to precisely target individuals or lone vehicles.[59] Some of the Iraqi FPV drones have been fitted with fiber-optic cables, as well, which makes them impossible to jam. Russia and Ukraine have extensively used FPV drones in their war.[60] Russia has given drone components to Iran, and Russia would be the most likely actor to have provided Iran with fiber-optic drone capabilities.[61]

Current economic challenges in Iran are causing Iranian officials to fear that economic deterioration could threaten the regime’s ability to govern. Iranian Parliament Budget Committee member Mehrdad Lahouti stated on April 10 that Iranian banks are in poor condition and warned that current challenges risk pushing banks toward crisis or bankruptcy.[62] Lahouti added that production has ”practically” stalled and that exporters have halted activity.[63] Lahouti stated that producers cannot pay wages and that many hotels in Tehran have closed, noting that these businesses must pay workers.[64] Unspecified political insiders close to the Iranian establishment told Reuters on April 8 that Iranian officials viewed the economy as Iran’s “Achilles heel” and feared that economic deterioration could threaten the regime’s ability to govern.[65] Unspecified insiders added that any comprehensive peace agreement would need to lift sanctions and release frozen funds because Iranian authorities would otherwise face severe difficulty meeting payroll obligations and repairing damaged infrastructure.[66] The internet blackout has also exacerbated economic strain. A recent NetBlocks report on April 10 indicates that Iran’s nationwide internet blackout, exceeding 42 days, has severely disrupted financial transactions, commercial activity, and business operations, compounding broader economic deterioration.[67] Netblocks previously estimated that the countrywide internet shutdown costs the Iranian economy over $37 million USD per day.[68]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

New satellite imagery shows damage to a number of Iranian facilities across the country. These strikes occurred prior to the ceasefire, with the exception of a strike on Lavan Island on April 9.

Satellite imagery from April 8 shows that the combined force struck the Besat Research Complex in Shiraz, Fars Province, on April 6.[69]

Satellite imagery from April 6 shows heavy damage to several warehouses and support structures at the IRGC Navy base in Gheshm Island, Hormozgan Province.[70]

Satellite imagery from March 6 also shows the combined force struck six buildings at the 26th Salman Missile Group near Borazjan, Bushehr Province.[71]

An Israeli journalist reported on April 10 that satellite imagery shows smoke from storage tanks at the oil terminal on Lavan Island, Hormozgan Province, following explosions that occurred on April 9 after the ceasefire took effect.[72] It is unclear who conducted the strike. Israel denied involvement, as did the United States.

The Institute for Science and International Security reported on April 9 that Iran likely aims to restrict access to the tunnel complex and delay or complicate any ground operation to reach or seize the highly enriched uranium stored at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) in Esfahan Province. The Institute reported that Iran has constructed new makeshift roadblocks at all three tunnel entrances at the ENTC.[73] All three tunnel portals remain backfilled with dirt, and Iran has not made any effort to clear them or regain access.[74] The Institute added that Iran added additional barriers, including earthen berms, rubble piles, and possible fencing and a chicane at the northern entrance to restrict movement toward the tunnel complex.[75] French outlet Le Monde previously reported on March 28 that satellite imagery from June 9, 2025, showed a large convoy transporting sealed blue barrels, possibly containing nuclear-related material or highly enriched uranium, into the ENTC ahead of the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[76]

Iranian media reported on April 9 that Strategic Council on Foreign Relations Chairman Kamal Kharrazi died from his injuries.[77] The combined force targeted Kharrazi at his home in Tehran Province on April 1, severely injuring Kharrazi, according to Iranian media.[78] Kharrazi was a senior and trusted member of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle.[79] Kharrazi stated in May 2024 that Iran has the capability to build a nuclear bomb but has not decided to do so, and warned it would change its nuclear doctrine if its existence is threatened.[80]

The IDF reported on April 10 that the Israeli Air Force conducted more than 8,500 operational sorties and over 1,000 air missions in Iran since the beginning of the war.[81] The IDF added that it employed more than 18,000 munitions and executed over 10,800 strikes across more than 4,000 targets and 6,700 target components.[82]

Iranian Response

See the topline section.

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 49 attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on April 9 and 2:00 PM ET on April 10.[83] This marks the highest number of attacks Hezbollah has claimed against IDF forces in Lebanon since March 29. Hezbollah claimed 25 attacks against Israeli forces in the vicinity of Bint Jbeil and Ainata, both in the Bint Jbeil District, southeastern Lebanon.[84] An Israeli journalist confirmed that Israeli units directly engaged Hezbollah fighters in Bint Jbeil on April 9, after the IDF recently isolated the town.[85] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir stated during a tour in Bint Jbeil on April 9 that the IDF’s “main battlefield” is in Lebanon.[86] Bint Jbeil is operationally significant because it is located at the nexus of multiple main roads in southeastern Lebanon, including the Tebnine-Bint Jbeil Road, that the IDF could use to advance north. Bint Jbeil is also symbolically significant to Hezbollah. Former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah proclaimed ”victory” in Bint Jbeil after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.[87] Hezbollah has also previously fought the IDF at Bint Jbeil in previous conflicts, including in 2006 and in the October 7 War.[88]

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 43 attacks targeting IDF infrastructure and Israeli communities in northern and southern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 9 and 2:00 PM ET on April 10.[89] Hezbollah fired a missile at Ashdod, southern Lebanon, which is located roughly 150 kilometers south of the Israel-Lebanon border.[90] Hezbollah claimed that the missile targeted the Ashdod Naval Base.[91] An Israeli journalist said that Israeli air defenses intercepted the missile.[92] The journalists reported that the Hezbollah missile caused no damage or casualties.[93] The IDF detected at least 30 Hezbollah rockets launched at northern Israel on April 10, according to an Israeli journalist.[94] Israeli journalists and media confirmed that Hezbollah fired at least nine rocket barrages targeting northern Israeli communities between 2:00 PM ET on April 9 and 2:00 PM ET on April 10.[95] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah intercepted a Hezbollah rocket that injured four citizens in Biina, northern Israel.[96]

The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah sites and personnel throughout Lebanon. The IDF said on April 10 that it has killed over 1,400 Hezbollah operatives, including hundreds of Radwan Force members, 250 Hezbollah rocket operators, and 15 Hezbollah rocket artillery unit commanders since the start of the campaign on March 2.[97] The IDF also announced on April 10 that it has destroyed over 200 Hezbollah rocket launchers and 1,300 rocket launch tubes since March 2.[98] The IDF struck 120 Hezbollah targets in Lebanon on April 10.[99] The IDF also killed a Hezbollah Nasr Unit rocket artillery commander in southern Lebanon in recent days.[100] The Nasr Unit is responsible for the eastern sector of southern Lebanon.[101] Each of Hezbollah’s geographical units possesses organic engineering, rocket, logistics, drone, and medical capabilities.[102] The Nasr Unit played a crucial role in Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel after October 7, 2023, and during the Fall 2024 conflict.[103]

The IDF has continued to conduct ground operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters across southern Lebanon. The IDF reported that 162nd Armored Division and 36th Armored Division units have destroyed over 2,700 Hezbollah sites and seized over 250 weapons and explosives in southern Lebanon.[104] IDF reported on April 10 that the 401st Armored Brigade (162nd Armored Division) destroyed a loaded Hezbollah rocket launcher that Hezbollah fighters had prepared to fire on northern Israel at an unspecified site in Lebanon.[105] The IDF also said that the 401st Armored Brigade located two Hezbollah tunnels during raids in southern Lebanon and destroyed weapons and ammunition, including anti-tank guided missiles.[106] The IDF said that the 91st Territorial Division, 98th Paratrooper Division, and 146th Reserve Division units have destroyed over 1,500 Hezbollah sites and seized over 1,000 weapons and explosives.[107] IDF said that the 91st Territorial Division has killed hundreds of Hezbollah fighters since March 2.[108] The 91st Territorial Division has reportedly directed airstrikes that destroyed over 50 Hezbollah sites and killed over 40 fighters in the past week.[109] The 769th (Hiram) Territorial Brigade (91st Territorial Division) directed an Israeli Air Force (IAF) strike on Hezbollah fighters and a vehicle in southern Lebanon on April 8.[110]

The IDF announced on April 10 that a Hezbollah drone injured two Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon.[111] The IDF reported that shrapnel from a Hezbollah drone injured two Israeli soldiers from unspecified units in southern Lebanon.[112]

An Israeli official told Reuters on April 10 that Israel may “scale down” its operations in Lebanon ahead of direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon under US auspices next week in Washington, DC.[113] A senior Israeli official told Reuters on April 10 that Israel would scale down attacks in Lebanon ahead of direct negotiations between Israeli and Lebanese officials.[114] CBS News reported on April 9 that US President Donald Trump called on Israel to scale back its strikes on Lebanon.[115] Multiple Lebanese officials told multiple Western media that negotiations with Israel are contingent upon the two sides agreeing to a ceasefire. A senior official in the Lebanese president’s office told the BBC that Lebanon will participate in direct negotiations with Israel next week only if there is a ceasefire in place.[116] A senior Lebanese official told Reuters direct Israel-Lebanon negotiations would focus on discussing and announcing a ceasefire, which the Lebanese official described as a precondition for further talks to reach a broader deal with Israel.[117] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on April 10 that Hezbollah refuses to return to the “previous situation” and will continue to fight against Israel “until the last breath.”[118] Qassem also called on Lebanese officials to “stop offering free concessions” in negotiations with Israel.[119]

The Lebanese government has continued to take steps to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon. Lebanese media reported that the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed units, including soldiers from its Commando Regiment, to secure the Government Palace and begin patrols in Beirut.[120] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam ordered the LAF on April 9 to immediately enforce the Lebanese state’s monopoly over weapons in Beirut.[121]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) announced on April 10 that combined force strikes during the war have killed about 80 PMF members and wounded 270 other members.[122] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control multiple brigades within the PMF.[123] Iraqi media reported on April 10 that combined force strikes in Anbar, Ninewa, and Babil provinces have resulted in most PMF casualties.[124] Combined force strikes on PMF positions during the war have attempted to degrade the ability of militias that operate under the PMF to conduct retaliatory attacks on the United States and Israel.

Endnotes

[1] https://t.me/mehrnews/370330 [2] https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/2042582932477432149?s=20; https://x.com/JenniferJJacobs/status/2042684906627572149?s=20

[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/10/us/politics/vance-iran-talks.html [4] https://www.cbsnews.com/video/vance-heads-to-pakistan-for-iran-talks/ [5] US VP Vance leaves for Islamabad, Iran demands measures as ‘make-or-break’ talks near | Reuters [6] https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2042614290192957698?s=20 [7] https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2042614290192957698?s=20 [8] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/406635; https://t.me/presstv/184849

[9] https://www.bbc.com/persian/live/clyxkkj9rk1t?at_medium=social&at_link_id=13E4ABE6-34C6-11F1-99CC-DB7442F48859&at_ptr_name=twitter&at_format=image&at_campaign_type=owned&at_bbc_team=editorial&at_link_origin=bbcpersian&at_link_type=web_link&at_campaign=Social_Flow [10] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/2042307533902086625 [11] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3dl0gdvvveo [12] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3dl0gdvvveo [13] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-9-2026/ [14] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-latest-news-israel-us-lebanon-2026/card/trump-says-iran-has-no-cards-other-than-power-over-international-waterways-HHyUjAGfxmvPkxGs32ZU [15] https://x.com/TreyYingst/status/2042611375734706320?s=20 [16] https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/2042582932477432149?s=20 [17] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116376868752554780 ; https://www.iranintl.com/202604104967?source=share-link

[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-9-2026/; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/a-closer-look-at-irans-10-demandsand-which-the-u-s-might-accept-c0148284?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos5 [19] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-8-2026/; https://www.axios.com/2026/04/08/exclusive-how-irans-supreme-leader-reached-a-truce-with-trump [20] https://x.com/MohamadAhwaze/status/2042391712715125050?s=20 [21] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/04/10/world/iran-war-trump-israel-lebanon/0c2680d6-e883-5586-b097-27e5349ca537?smid=url-share [22] https://iranwire.com/en/news/150515-exclusive-irgc-has-no-post-war-plan-pezeshkian-warns/ [23] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-june-18-2024/; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/16/world/middleeast/iran-mojtaba-khamenei-election-supreme-leader.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share; https://www.iranintl.com/202604104967?source=share-link [24] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2042146425849684395?s=20 [25] https://www.etemadnewspaper dot ir/fa/main/detail/196049; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-31-2025 [26] https://www.etemadnewspaper dot ir/fa/main/detail/196049 [27] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604074692?source=share-link; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-7-2026/

[28] https://www.iranintl.com/202604104967?source=share-link [29] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/516619/The-Supreme-National-Security-Council-in-Iran; https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/government-institution/supreme-national-security-council-snsc#:~:text=Other%20Iranian%20officials%20may%20participate,streamline%20decision%2Dmaking%20during%20wartime.

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Iran Update Special Report, April 10, 2026

👥 Key Players

⚡ Actions

📰 What Happened

💡 Why It Matters

📚 Background

📝 Key Evidence

🏷️ Entities Mentioned

📰 Related Coverage

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