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Iran Update Special Report, April 19, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
Any US settlement or resolution of the conflict that enables Iran to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would represent a major US defeat and set a precedent with critical implications for global trade, given the strait’s role as a critical energy chokepoint. Any US acceptance of Iran’s ability to regulate transit would undermine the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and enable Iran to condition access to the strait on compliance with its demands, thereby enabling Tehran to exert persistent pressure on the global economy and the United States and its allies.
Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz by granting priority transit to vessels that pay fees and comply with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) protocols as part of its effort to try to consolidate control over the strait. Iran has also continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the strait.
US forces seized an Iranian-flagged container ship for the first time during the war. Commercially available shipping data indicates that the US Navy also forced at least three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships to change course toward Iranian ports on April 19.
US Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner are expected to travel to Islamabad, Pakistan, to engage in negotiations with Iran on April 21. ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian sources confirming Iran’s participation in the negotiations as of 6:00 PM ET on April 19, however.
Incomplete reporting about the damage that the US-Israeli combined force inflicted on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs precludes the development of a quantitative assessment about the threat that Iranian missiles and drones still pose.
A statement released by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah on April 18 appears to confirm that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad on April 18. Ghaani may have specifically discussed enhancing coordination between Iraqi militias and other Axis of Resistance groups against the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states in the event of renewed conflict.
Toplines
Any US settlement or resolution of the conflict that enables Iran to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would represent a major US defeat and set a precedent with critical implications for global trade, given the strait’s role as a critical energy chokepoint. Iran has repeatedly claimed sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, but Iran has no legal claim to the strait, which international law defines as an international waterway.[1] Iran has repeatedly attempted to regulate traffic through the strait by directing vessels through Iranian territorial waters, extracting fees, and attacking and threatening maritime traffic.[2] Recent Iranian proposals to the United States have also implicitly demanded that the United States and international community recognize Iran’s “control” over the strait.[3] Iran has offered to “let” vessels transit the strait in these proposals, but Iran’s “letting” traffic through the strait implies that Iran can “let” traffic through an international waterway.[4] These proposals are consistent with persistent Iranian messaging throughout the war that Iran seeks to impose a new status quo for transit through the strait.[5] Any US acceptance of Iran’s ability to regulate transit would undermine the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and enable Iran to condition access to the strait on compliance with its demands, thereby enabling Tehran to exert persistent pressure on the global economy and the United States and its allies.
Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz by granting priority transit to vessels that pay fees and comply with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) protocols as part of its effort to try to consolidate control over the strait. A senior Iranian official told CNN on April 18 that vessels that pay “security fees” and comply with the IRGC’s protocols will receive priority transit through the Strait of Hormuz, while those that refuse to pay will face delayed passage.[6] Iran has reportedly charged vessels around $2 million USD to transit the strait.[7] Extracting fees from commercial vessels enables Iran to earn income amid the United States’ efforts to impose economic pressure on Iran through its blockade of Iranian ports.
The IRGC has also continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the strait. Bloomberg reported on April 18 that at least five liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers reversed course after Iran warned the vessels’ captains that it had closed the Strait of Hormuz.[8] No LNG tankers have exited the Strait of Hormuz since the war began in February.[9] Iranian media separately reported on April 19 that the IRGC forced the Botswana-flagged Meda and the Angola-flagged G Summer to change course after the vessels attempted to cross the Strait of Hormuz.[10] Commercially available shipping data indicates that the G Summer later transited the Strait of Hormuz via the Iranian-approved route on April 19.[11]
US forces seized an Iranian-flagged container ship for the first time during the war. US President Donald Trump announced on April 19 that the US Navy’s USS Spruance, a guided missile destroyer, intercepted the Touska in the Gulf of Oman, disabled the vessel’s engines, and commandeered the ship after the Iranian crew refused to return to port.[12] US forces seized the Touska after it attempted to pass the US blockade line. The United States previously sanctioned the Touska, which is owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.[13]
Commercially available shipping data indicates that the US Navy also forced at least three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships to change course toward Iranian ports on April 19. The vessels include the US-sanctioned Guinea-flagged Raine tanker, the Iranian-flagged Shamim container ship, and the Hong Kong-flagged Flora tanker, which was previously Iranian-flagged.[14]
At least four Iranian or Iranian-linked ships appear to be attempting to pass the US Navy’s blockade line. US officials have stated that the United States will interdict vessels beyond the blockade line. The vessels include the Iranian-flagged Artman container ship, the Liberian-flagged Basel, the Marshall Islands-flagged CECI, and the Vietnam-flagged NV Aquamarine.[15] Both the Basel and CECI originated from Iranian ports, while the NV Aquamarine is under US sanctions and is blacklisted by United Against Nuclear Iran.[16] US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on March 16 that US forces will interdict any ship that crosses the blockade line, which runs diagonally across the Gulf of Oman from Ras al Hadd, Oman, to the Iran-Pakistan border.[17]
The US Navy is reportedly conducting naval mine-clearing operations in the Strait of Hormuz to restore the official transit route through the strait amid the Navy’s continued blockade of Iranian ports. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 19 that the US Navy is using uncrewed surface vessels (USV) and submersible drones to clear an unspecified number of Iranian naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz.[18] Clearing Iranian naval mines from the Strait of Hormuz is necessary to restore trust in the safety of the official traffic separation scheme, where Iran has reportedly laid the mines.[19] Military analysts told the Wall Street Journal that US Navy USVs and submersible drones could identify naval mines in the strait relatively quickly and that the US Navy could then deploy a second wave of drones to conduct explosive ordnance disposal operations.[20] Iran deployed a limited number of naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz in March 2026, but a former US Navy official told the Wall Street Journal that Iran laid fewer mines than expected due to US military pressure that constrained Iran’s use of large mine-laying ships.[21]
US Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner are expected to travel to Islamabad, Pakistan, to engage in negotiations with Iran on April 21.[22] ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian sources confirming Iran’s participation in the negotiations as of 6:00 PM ET on April 19, however. Unspecified Iranian sources, including an unidentified member of Iran’s negotiating team, told Iranian state media on April 19 that Iran does not currently have any plans to participate in the next round of talks.[23] IRGC-affiliated media reported on April 19 that there are no clear prospects for future negotiations due to the United States’ demands and continued naval blockade of Iranian ports.[24] ISW-CTP assessed on April 18 that the IRGC has likely consolidated control over Iran’s negotiations policy.[25] Iranian officials echoed similar sentiments to Pakistani officials on April 19.[26] The 14-day ceasefire between the United States, Israel, and Iran is set to expire on April 22.[27]
A statement released by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah on April 18 appears to confirm that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad on April 18. Ghaani may have specifically discussed enhancing coordination between Iraqi militias and other Axis of Resistance groups against the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states in the event of renewed conflict. Kataib Hezbollah Security Chief Abu Mujahid Aasaf issued a statement after Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad that called for increased coordination between the “resistance forces and other parties,” which implicitly refers to military cooperation.[28] The “other parties” may refer to other Axis of Resistance groups such as the Houthis or Hezbollah. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have launched drone and rocket attacks targeting US and foreign interests in Iraq, as well as the Gulf countries, during the war.[29] Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis may have attempted to coordinate some attacks during the war, but ISW-CTP has not observed any instances of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias coordinating their attacks with other Axis of Resistance groups.[30]
Incomplete reporting about the damage that the US-Israeli combined force inflicted on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs precludes the development of a quantitative assessment about the threat that Iranian missiles and drones still pose. Multiple US officials told the New York Times on April 19 that Iran retains around 40 percent of its attack drones, around 60 percent of its missile launchers, and around 70 percent of its missile stockpile.[31] The officials stated that the 60 percent of missile launchers includes around 100 launchers that Iran has dug out from underground facilities since the ceasefire went into effect.[32] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran is exploiting the ceasefire to reorganize and regenerate its ballistic missile forces on a tactical level, including by clearing debris from tunnel entrances to retrieve missile launchers from underground missile bases.[33] The recent assessments about Iran’s remaining offensive capacities do not specify whether the launchers that Iran has dug out from underground facilities are intact or operational. Shockwaves from combined force strikes may have damaged launchers stored in underground facilities without directly hitting them. The recent assessments also do not specify what kinds of launchers Iran has retrieved. Iran possesses different kinds of launchers for ballistic missiles with different ranges. These gaps preclude the development of a quantitative assessment about the current status of Iran’s missile program.
US and Israeli Air Campaign
See topline section.
Iranian Response
Nothing significant to report.
Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response
The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement appears to be holding despite reports of limited engagements in southern Lebanon. A Middle East-focused journalist reported that Israeli forces engaged Hezbollah fighters in Deir Seryan, southeastern Lebanon, on April 19.[34] Two Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers were killed, and 37 were wounded in southern Lebanon in the past 24 hours.[35] The majority of the wounded soldiers were injured by improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[36] Israeli and Lebanese sources reported that Hezbollah planted the IEDs, which also killed the two Israeli soldiers, before the ceasefire.[37] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on April 19 that he and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to use “full force” on the ground and in the air to protect Israeli soldiers in Lebanon “from any threat.”[38] Katz noted that the IDF has received orders to “remove” homes in border villages that Hezbollah used and added that the IDF aims to disarm Hezbollah and remove the threat that Hezbollah poses to northern Israeli villages.[39]
A diplomatic source told Lebanese media on April 19 that Lebanese and Israeli officials will hold their second preparatory meeting next week.[40] Israeli and Lebanese officials will reportedly use the preparatory meeting to reach an agreement on the date and location for direct negotiations.[41] It is unclear which Israeli and Lebanese officials will attend the preparatory meeting. A Lebanese ministerial source told Saudi media on April 18 that Lebanese officials’ top priority is to request an extension of the temporary ceasefire.[42] The proposed extension period would reportedly range from 10 days to one month.[43] Israel and Lebanon’s current 10-day ceasefire is set to expire on April 26.[44] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam are reportedly leading an effort to establish a unified Lebanese position.[45] Lebanese sources stated that the Lebanese government has prepared its proposal for negotiations, which revolves around a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the release of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel, and the 13 disputed points along the Israel-Lebanon border.[46] Israeli officials have consistently stated that Israeli forces will not withdraw from Lebanese territory, however.[47]
The IDF has established and maintained control over approximately 55 villages in southern Lebanon.[48] The IDF announced on April 18 that Israeli forces established a “yellow line” in southern Lebanon, where Israeli forces control approximately 55 southern Lebanese villages.[49] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent clarified that the IDF does not have a physical presence in all 55 villages and that some of the villages are considered “fire control and observation” areas, where the IDF maintains control from a distance without a physical presence.[50] The IDF noted that five IDF divisions and naval forces are currently operating in the area.[51] An Israeli journalist noted that Israeli forces aim to dismantle all Hezbollah infrastructure up to the “yellow line.”[52] An Israeli military source similarly noted that Israeli forces are conducting clearing operations between the Israel-Lebanon border and the “yellow line.”[53] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz noted on April 19 that Israel’s “yellow line” must be extended to the anti-tank zone in southern Lebanon, which refers to the “anti-tank line” that Israeli forces have established several kilometers into southern Lebanon.[54]
The IDF has continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon in accordance with the temporary ceasefire agreement. The temporary ceasefire agreement contains a provision that permits Israel to act in self-defense against any “planned, imminent, or ongoing” Hezbollah threats against Israel.[55] The IDF 162nd Armored Division has continued to conduct operations in southern Lebanon to remove direct threats to northern Israeli towns.[56] The IDF reported that the division’s forces have killed over 250 Hezbollah fighters, destroyed over 405 Hezbollah sites, and seized over 1,000 weapons in southern Lebanon since the start of the conflict.[57] The 162nd Armored Division has been operating in southern Lebanon since at least March 26, including in Bint Jbeil, southeastern Lebanon, which IDF forces “completed [their] siege” of on April 15.[58] Israeli media reported on April 19 that Israeli forces have established a new position in Aita al Shaab, southwestern Lebanon.[59] Lebanese media reported that Israeli forces demolished buildings in several areas of southern Lebanon on April 18 and 19.[60] Unspecified sources speaking to Israeli media on April 19 reported that dozens of heavy machinery vehicles have moved to areas of southern Lebanon in recent weeks to support the IDF’s clearing operations.[61] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has continued to reiterate that Israeli forces will continue to operate in southern Lebanon.[62]
The IDF announced that it killed over 150 Hezbollah fighters and struck over 300 Hezbollah sites in the 24 hours before the ceasefire came into effect on April 16.[63] The IDF stated that it struck approximately 300 Hezbollah sites across Lebanon, including launch sites, command centers, and weapons depots.[64] The IDF noted that it has killed over 1,800 Hezbollah operatives and commanders since the IDF started its campaign in Lebanon on March 2.[65] The IDF confirmed that it killed Hezbollah senior military commander Ali Reda Abbas in Bint Jbeil on April 15.[66] Abbas was one of the most senior commanders in Hezbollah’s military command and had significant experience fighting against Israel.[67] Abbas received training in Iran and held various positions in Hezbollah during his 40 years in the group.[68] Regional media previously reported in September 2024 that Abbas was appointed Hezbollah’s Radwan Force commander following the death of former Radwan Force Commander Ibrahim Aqil.[69] Abbas was reportedly a crucial figure in the reconstitution and reorganization of the Radwan Force following the fall 2024 conflict.[70] The IDF stated on April 19 that Abbas was Hezbollah’s Bint Jbeil sector commander during the current war.[71] It is unclear when Abbas became the Bint Jbeil sector commander.
Syrian forces dismantled a Hezbollah-linked cell on April 19 that reportedly planned to launch rockets from southern Syria toward Israel.[72] Syrian forces arrested two individuals and seized several rockets.[73] Hezbollah denied the report and reiterated its claim that Hezbollah has no presence in Syrian territory.[74]
Other Axis of Resistance Response
See topline section.
Endnotes
[1] https://www.justsecurity.org/133996/legal-operational-strait-hormuz-transit-passage/ [2] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-25-2026/ ; https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156720/Tehrans-toll-booth-system-is-now-controlling-Hormuz-traffic [3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-offers-proposal-allowing-ships-exit-oman-side-hormuz-free-attack-source-2026-04-15/ [4] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-offers-proposal-allowing-ships-exit-oman-side-hormuz-free-attack-source-2026-04-15/ [5] https://iranwire.com/en/news/151038-new-phase-for-strait-of-hormuz-mojtaba-khameneis-first-message-points-at-hardline-shift/ [6] https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/18/world/live-news/iran-war-trump-israel?post-id=cmo4kiwvc0000356rh6w0qpvj [7] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604162208 [8] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-18/lng-tankers-make-u-turns-from-hormuz-as-iran-keeps-strait-shut?srnd=phx-economics-v2 [9] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-18/lng-tankers-make-u-turns-from-hormuz-as-iran-keeps-strait-shut?srnd=phx-economics-v2 [10] https://t.me/mehrnews/372800 ; [11] https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:202143/mmsi:603896000/imo:9143506/vessel:G%20SUMMER [12] https://www.trumpstruth.org/statuses/37927 [13] https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=25315 [14] https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:726803/mmsi:632001122/imo:9223540/vessel:RAINE ; https://tankertrackers.com/report/sanctioned/results?flag=86 ; https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:657727 ; https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:376123 ; https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:657791 ; https://www.trumpstruth.org/statuses/37927 [15] https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:657905 ; https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:415216/mmsi:636024636/imo:9433614/vessel:BASEL ; https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:687881 ; https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:184364 [16] https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:415216/mmsi:636024636/imo:9433614/vessel:BASEL ; https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:687881 ; https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:184364 ; https://tankertrackers.com/report/sanctioned/results?flag=241 [17] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-16-2026/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnJPFeOeFG4 [18] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-navy-sends-in-the-robots-to-clear-hormuz-of-mines-1c107caa?mod=livecoverage_web [19] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-navy-sends-in-the-robots-to-clear-hormuz-of-mines-1c107caa?mod=livecoverage_web [20] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-navy-sends-in-the-robots-to-clear-hormuz-of-mines-1c107caa?mod=livecoverage_web [21] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-navy-sends-in-the-robots-to-clear-hormuz-of-mines-1c107caa?mod=livecoverage_web [22] https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/19/world/live-news/iran-war-us-trump-hormuz?post-id=cmo5uqeps000f3b6sczimg2d4 [23] https://t.me/iribnews/333653 ; https://t.me/iribnews/333643 [24] https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/195152 [25] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-18-2026/ [26] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/350031 ; https://t.me/presstv/186264 ; https://t.me/Nournews_ir/350035 [27] https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/iran-distance-peace-deal-hormuz-closure-halts-shipping-rcna340846 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2045397526006604007 [28] https://t.me/AbumujahidAlasaf/10 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-18-2026/ [29] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-13-2026/ ; https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2026/03/29/two-drones-targeting-us-embassy-in-baghdad-intercepted-security-officials ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2032257902489075975 [30] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-6-2026/ [31] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/18/us/politics/iran-hormuz-strait-trump.html [32] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/18/us/politics/iran-hormuz-strait-trump.html [33] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-15-2026-69e02b0828f4e [34] https://x.com/ejmalrai/status/2045896923631038480?s=20 ; https://x.com/ejmalrai/status/2045859029818253775?s=20 [35] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260419-16-israeli-soldiers-killed-690-wounded-since-feb-28-army/ [36] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260419-16-israeli-soldiers-killed-690-wounded-since-feb-28-army/ [37] https://t.me/moriahdoron/30092 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2045698276473569335 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/65329 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2045565419558498750 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/30104 [38] https://www.alhadath dot net/2026/04/19/كاتس-يهدد-سنستخدم-كل-قوتنا-في-لبنان-ان-تعرض-جنودنا-للخطر [39] https://www.alhadath dot net/2026/04/19/كاتس-يهدد-سنستخدم-كل-قوتنا-في-لبنان-ان-تعرض-جنودنا-للخطر [40] https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/65463 [41] https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/65463 [42] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5264194-لبنان-يطلب-تدخل-واشنطن-لتمديد-الهدنة-لتفادي-التفاوض-تحت-النار [43] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2045923411315019877 [44] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/ten-day-cessation-of-hostilities-to-enable-peace-negotiations-between-israel-and-lebanon [45] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5263875-لبنان-جاهز-للمفاوضات-المباشرة-مع-إسرائيل-وتوجه-لتشكيل-وفد-مصغر [46] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5263875-لبنان-جاهز-للمفاوضات-المباشرة-مع-إسرائيل-وتوجه-لتشكيل-وفد-مصغر [47] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/katz-ceasefire-with-hezbollah-is-temporary-idf-not-withdrawing-from-positions-in-lebanon/ ; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwy32277e58o [48] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2045849027221053923 [49] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2045849027221053923 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2045846466359345242?s=20 ; https://www.alhadath dot net/2026/04/18/الجيش-الاسرائيلي-انشانا-الخط-الاصفر-في-جنوب-لبنان-على-غرار-غزة- [50] https://t.me/moriahdoron/30111 [51] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2045846466359345242?s=20 [52] https://x.com/i24NEWS_EN/status/2045855690254614844 [53] https://www.alhadath dot net/2026/04/19/عبارة-استعملتها-اسرائيل-لاول-مرة-ما-هو-الخط-الاصفر-في-لبنان- [54] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041397765138166177?s=20 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/65402 [55] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/ten-day-cessation-of-hostilities-to-enable-peace-negotiations-between-israel-and-lebanon [56] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2045897495717539928 [57] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2045897495717539928 [58] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2026/3/26/israel-sends-more-troops-into-southern-lebanon-as-ground-invasion-expands ; https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2044471937930297671; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-15-2026/ [59] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/article-893531 [60] https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/65363 ; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2045592969034768789?s=20 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/65433 [61] https://www.haaretz dot com/israel-news/israel-security/2026-04-19/ty-article/.premium/like-gaza-idf-razes-south-lebanon-villages-during-cease-fire-sources-say/0000019d-a43d-d31c-a1df-ae3f8a660000 [62] https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/65336 [63] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2045779498776347089 [64] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2045779498776347089 [65] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2045779498776347089 [66] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2045779498776347089 ; https://www.mtv dot com.lb/news/1684542 [67] https://janoubia dot com/2026/04/19/من-هو-علي-رضا-عباس-هل-اغتالت-إسرائيل-قا/ ; https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/2024/09/21/من-هو-قائد-قوة-الرضوان-الجديد-بعد-مقتل-غيراهيم-عقيل-ومن-هو-نائبه [68] https://janoubia dot com/2026/04/19/من-هو-علي-رضا-عباس-هل-اغتالت-إسرائيل-قا/ ; https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/2024/09/21/من-هو-قائد-قوة-الرضوان-الجديد-بعد-مقتل-غيراهيم-عقيل-ومن-هو-نائبه [69] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/2024/09/21/من-هو-قائد-قوة-الرضوان-الجديد-بعد-مقتل-غيراهيم-عقيل-ومن-هو-نائبه ; https://www.mtv dot com.lb/en/news/live_feed/1486723/ali-reda-abbas-has-been-appointed-as-the-commander-of-the-radwan-force–with-ali-moussa-dakouk-serving-as-his-deputy ; https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/article-821191 [70] https://janoubia dot com/2026/04/19/من-هو-علي-رضا-عباس-هل-اغتالت-إسرائيل-قا/ [71] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2045779498776347089 [72] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2045852928238297380 [73] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2045852928238297380 [74] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2045898394166612330
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