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Iran Update Special Report, April 24, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle have repeatedly blocked attempts by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and other “pragmatist” officials to push the regime toward a more flexible negotiating position. Vahidi appears to have prevailed in this internal power struggle and will likely shape the regime’s approach toward negotiations and the war with a maximalist and uncompromising stance. Ghalibaf likely lacks the leverage to alter this trajectory in a meaningful way at this time.
Recent reports that Ghalibaf may resign from being a member of the negotiating team are consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that Vahidi has emerged as the winner of the intra-regime rivalry. Sources told Western media that Ghalibaf has grown frustrated with internal divisions and has considered resigning from the negotiating delegation, while some outlets have claimed that Ghalibaf has already resigned from the negotiating team due to disagreements over nuclear concessions.
“Pragmatist” officials may continue to advocate for a more flexible approach, but their efforts are unlikely to meaningfully shape regime decision-making in the near term.
Vahidi’s apparent victory will likely have significant implications for potential future US-Iran negotiations. Vahidi has also shown greater willingness than “pragmatist” officials to accept the risk of renewed conflict with the United States.
Iran and the United States are both sending delegations to meet with Pakistani mediators in Islamabad this weekend, but it remains unclear whether the delegations will engage in a second round of negotiations at the time of this writing. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived in Islamabad on April 24, and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner will travel to Islamabad on April 25. Sources told Axios that a trilateral meeting between Araghchi, Witkoff, and Kushner could take place following separate bilateral discussions between Witkoff, Kushner, and Pakistani mediators.
Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted two fiber-optic drone attacks on Kuwaiti border posts on April 24. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not claimed these attacks at the time of this writing. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have demonstrated their ability to use fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones during the war, however.
The US naval blockade appears to be constraining Iran’s oil storage capacity. Tanker Trackers reported on April 23 that Iran has recommissioned the retired very large crude carrier (VLCC) Nasha into service, likely to expand Iran’s floating storage capacity near Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf as Iran’s onshore storage capacity decreases.
Toplines
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle have repeatedly blocked attempts by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and other “pragmatist” officials to push the regime toward a more flexible negotiating position. Vahidi appears to have prevailed in this internal power struggle and will likely shape the regime’s approach toward negotiations and the war with a maximalist and uncompromising stance. Ghalibaf likely lacks the leverage to alter this trajectory in a meaningful way at this time. ISW-CTP has observed and reported on a sustained intra-regime rivalry between Vahidi and his inner circle and a “pragmatist” bloc that includes Ghalibaf, President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi since late March.[1] The rivalry has shown significant divergences between the two blocs over how to approach the war and negotiations. The divergences first surfaced around March 28 when Pezeshkian criticized the IRGC’s actions in the war. Pezeshkian subsequently accused Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander IRGC Brigadier General Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi of “acting unilaterally and fueling escalation.”[2] The United States and Iran agreed to a ceasefire on April 7 after Araghchi reportedly persuaded the IRGC to accept it, which suggests that Vahidi disapproved of the ceasefire and, likely, negotiations. Vahidi and his inner circle then took steps to constrain the authority of Iran’s negotiating team, which included Ghalibaf and Araghchi, by attempting to insert Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr into the delegation and limit its mandate, particularly regarding Iran’s missile and nuclear programs.[3] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Vahidi almost certainly attempted to insert Zolghadr into the delegation to ensure that someone from his inner circle could keep tabs on whether Araghchi or Ghalibaf tried to negotiate outside of Vahidi’s red lines.[4] Zolghadr accused Ghalibaf and Araghchi of showing flexibility on certain issues during negotiations in Islamabad on April 11 and 12, after which IRGC leaders called the delegation back to Tehran.[5] The talks collapsed without an agreement, and reports emphasized that the Iranian negotiating team lacked the authority to finalize an agreement.[6] Vahidi continued to reject “pragmatist” efforts to ease tensions with the United States after the first round of negotiations. The IRGC harshly criticized Araghchi after he announced that the Strait of Hormuz was “completely open” on April 17, and the IRGC Navy subsequently attacked several commercial vessels and declared that no vessels of “any type or nationality” were permitted to transit through the strait, for example.[7] Recent US-Iran talks that were expected to take place on April 21 or 22 before the ceasefire expired were canceled due to regime infighting and likely an effort by Vahidi and his camp to derail the talks. Vahidi has consolidated power throughout this rivalry while the “pragmatist” faction has lost influence over regime decision-making.
Vahidi appears to have prevailed over Ghalibaf at this time. Officials from various factions issued coordinated statements on April 23 and 24 that emphasized unity and reaffirmed revolutionary principles.[8] Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian, Araghchi, and Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei started this messaging, followed by figures aligned with the hardline camp, including Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, Zolghadr, IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, and ultra-hardline politician Saeed Jalili.[9] The participation of “pragmatist” figures in this display of unity behind “revolutionary” principles indicates that they have, at least for now, accepted Vahidi’s dominance.
Recent reports that Ghalibaf may resign from being a member of the negotiating team are consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that Vahidi has emerged as the winner of the intra-regime rivalry.[10] Sources told Western media that Ghalibaf has grown frustrated with internal divisions and has considered resigning from the negotiating delegation, while some outlets have claimed that Ghalibaf has already resigned from the negotiating team due to disagreements over nuclear concessions.[11] The latter reports are consistent with reports that the Iranian negotiating delegation discussed the nuclear issue “contrary to instructions from Tehran” during the first round of negotiations. Ghalibaf’s resignation, if confirmed, would further signal his defeat and reduce the pragmatists’ influence over negotiations, as well as further consolidate Vahidi’s position within the regime.
“Pragmatist” officials may continue to advocate for a more flexible approach, but their efforts are unlikely to meaningfully shape regime decision-making in the near term. Some senior Iranian officials reportedly signed a secret letter to Mojtaba in recent days, warning that Iran’s economic crisis is unsustainable and that serious negotiations with the United States over Iran’s nuclear program are unavoidable, according to unspecified individuals familiar with the matter speaking to an Iranian journalist and media executive.[12] The signatories of the letter reportedly included Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian, Araghchi, and Mostafa Pourmohammadi. Pourmohammadi is a hardline politician and cleric from Qom who has served in several positions in the regime.[13] Pourmohammadi implied in May 2025 that he supported US-Iran talks.[14] Repeated failed efforts by this camp to shift policy suggest that the “moderate” or “pragmatist” camp has lost influence over regime decision-making for at least the time being, however.
Vahidi’s apparent victory will likely have significant implications for potential future US-Iran negotiations. His camp supports maximalist demands that are irreconcilable with stated US demands.[15] Vahidi prioritizes ideological consistency and hard power, and he views concessions as incompatible with the principles of the Islamic Revolution. Vahidi’s rejection of certain concessions and control over the scope of talks reflects this view. Iran will likely adopt positions that do not align with stated US demands if Vahidi continues to dominate decision-making.
Vahidi has also shown greater willingness than “pragmatist” officials to accept the risk of renewed conflict with the United States. ISW-CTP previously assessed that the IRGC’s actions in the Strait of Hormuz suggest that Vahidi and individuals close to him have accepted the risk of incurring a potential US military response in order to assert Iranian “control” over the strait.[16] IRGC-affiliated media has also recently signaled readiness for renewed hostilities, and Iranian military preparations have reportedly intensified.[17] Senior officials have also warned of a high likelihood of renewed conflict.[18] The ostentatious Farsi-language show of regime unity behind “revolutionary principles” is likely part of an effort to prepare the Iranian people for a return to war under an ostensibly unified government, as ISW-CTP has previously assessed.[19]
Iran and the United States are both sending delegations to meet with Pakistani mediators in Islamabad this weekend, but it remains unclear whether the delegations will engage in a second round of negotiations at the time of this writing.[20] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived in Islamabad on April 24 for talks with Pakistani mediators.[21] Araghchi stated that the purpose of his trip is to “discuss bilateral relations and regional cooperation.”[22] IRGC-affiliated media, as well as Pakistani sources and an unspecified Iranian source speaking to Western media, emphasized that Araghchi will not negotiate with US officials while in Islamabad.[23] Ghalibaf is notably not part of the Iranian delegation despite leading the Iranian delegation during the first round of negotiations in Islamabad on April 11 and 12.[24] Araghchi stated that he will travel to Oman, which has historically mediated between Iran and the United States, and Russia after his visit to Islamabad.[25] Araghchi’s planned trip to Russia comes as the Iranian regime is preparing for a potential resumption of conflict (see above).[26] The White House confirmed on April 24 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner will travel to Islamabad on April 25.[27] White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that “the Iranians want to talk” and “they want to talk in person, and the president is always willing to give diplomacy a chance.”[28] Leavitt added that “we have certainly seen some progress from the Iranian side in the last few days.”[29] Pakistani sources told Western media on April 24 that a US technical and logistics team is in Islamabad, while a Pakistani official told Axios that the possibility of a trilateral meeting involving Iran, the United States, and Pakistan would be assessed after Araghchi meets with Pakistani officials.[30] Two other unspecified sources told Axios that a meeting between Araghchi, Witkoff, and Kushner could take place on April 27 following separate bilateral discussions between Witkoff, Kushner, and Pakistani mediators.[31]
Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted two fiber-optic drone attacks on Kuwaiti border posts on April 24.[32] The Kuwaiti Army reported that unspecified actors launched two fiber-optic drones from Iraq that hit two Kuwaiti border posts, causing material damage but no casualties.[33] Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir Shammari condemned the attacks in a call with Kuwaiti Interior Minister Fahad Yousef Saud al Sabah.[34] Shammari stated that the Iraqi government will form a specialized committee to investigate the attacks and identify and arrest the perpetrators.[35] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not claimed these attacks at the time of this writing. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have demonstrated their ability to use fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones during the war, however.[36] FPV drones can be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or outfitted with strike capabilities to conduct precise targeting.[37] Open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts have assessed that drone footage posted by Iraqi militias during the war appeared to be from fiber-optic FPV drones, which are immune to jamming.[38] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Russia is the most likely actor to have provided Iran with fiber-optic drone capabilities, which Iran likely shared with Axis of Resistance groups, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[39] Russia and Ukraine have extensively used FPV drones in their war.[40]
These attacks come after three Iraqi militia members and two unspecified officials told Western media on April 21 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia “hardline factions” are operating under a decentralized command structure with Iranian advisers.[41] ISW-CTP assessed that these ”hardline” factions could refer to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, both of which are relatively more subordinate to Iran than other militias.[42]
The US naval blockade appears to be constraining Iran’s oil storage capacity. Tanker Trackers reported on April 23 that Iran has recommissioned the retired very large crude carrier (VLCC) Nasha into service, likely to expand Iran’s floating storage capacity near Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf as Iran’s onshore storage capacity decreases.[43] An Iranian parliamentarian warned on April 24 that Iran continues to produce and store oil on Kharg Island but may have to shut in oil wells if Iran’s storage capacity runs out.[44] He noted that restarting production would require billions of dollars.[45] These developments indicate that the blockade is not only limiting Iran’s oil exports but also creating downstream pressure on Iran’s production system by reducing Iran‘s available storage capacity. Iran’s Petroleum Products Exporters Union Spokesperson, Hamid Hosseini, told Iranian media on April 16 that the US naval blockade makes a reduction in oil production “inevitable.”[46] Hosseini added that alternative export routes, such as pipelines, can only handle limited volumes and cannot replace the Strait of Hormuz.[47] Shutting in oil wells risks permanent damage to the wells because the wells may not be able to return to previous output levels.[48]
US and Israeli Air Campaign
The US Navy has continued to enforce its blockade on Iranian ports. US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine stated during an April 24 press conference that US forces have forced 34 vessels to turn around since the start of the blockade and that US forces remain prepared to intercept any vessels that attempt to breach the blockade.[49] US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth separately described the blockade as “ironclad.”[50]
An unspecified US official and a source with knowledge of the issue told Axios on April 24 that the IRGC Navy laid additional naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz this week.[51] If this report is true, the IRGC’s decision to lay additional mines in the strait would be consistent with the IRGC’s effort to try to assert its “control” over the strait. Axios added that this marks the second time that Iran has mined the strait since the war began and noted that it remains unclear whether all of the previously laid mines have been found and cleared.[52] US officials estimated that the United States has destroyed more than 90 percent of Iran’s large mine-laying vessels and mine storage sites but assessed that Iran still retains mine stockpiles along its coast.[53]
Iranian Response
US President Donald Trump told reporters on April 23 that US forces struck around 75 percent of the targets that the US Military identified during the war with Iran.[54] Trump acknowledged that Iran may have reconstituted its weapons stockpiles “a little bit” in the past two weeks amid the ceasefire but that the United States could “knock that out in one day, if they did.”[55]
Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response
Hezbollah claimed that it targeted an Israeli community in northern Israel for the first time since the ceasefire went into effect on April 16.[56] Hezbollah claimed that it fired rockets targeting the northern Israeli border community of Shtula on April 23.[57] The attack coincided with a US-brokered meeting between Israeli and Lebanese officials in Washington, DC, on April 23.[58] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that Hezbollah fired a small barrage of three or four rockets targeting Shtula and that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) intercepted the rockets.[59] Hezbollah also claimed that it has conducted four attacks, including two first-person view (FPV) drone attacks, targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on April 23.[60] Israeli media characterized IDF and Hezbollah operations during the ceasefire as a “low-intensity conflict” on April 23.[61] Hezbollah parliamentarian Ali Fayyad called the ceasefire “meaningless” on April 24 because it allows the IDF to respond to imminent Hezbollah threats. Fayyad claimed that Israeli military activity gives Hezbollah “the right to a proportionate response.”[62]
Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Nada Hamadeh said that the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire will remain in effect until May 17, three weeks past its original expiration date on April 26.[63] US President Donald Trump also announced on April 23 that Israel and Lebanon agreed to extend the ceasefire by three weeks.[64] Lebanese leaders previously requested that Israel agree to extend the ceasefire for up to 60 days.[65] Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter, the Israeli government’s primary point of contact with the Lebanese government, urged Lebanese officials to cease their demand for a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon during the April 23 Israel-Lebanon meeting.[66] Israel’s military presence in southern Lebanon remains a key point of disagreement between Israel and Lebanon.[67] Israeli media reported on April 23 that Israel’s security cabinet has not yet decided whether to pursue joint initiatives with the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah or to act unilaterally and expand military operations against the group.[68]
Other Axis of Resistance Response
The IDF reported on April 24 that the IRGC Intelligence Organization’s covert operations Unit 4000 oversaw and financed a planned “subversive plot” by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in Iraq.[69] The IDF, Mossad, and Shin Bet released a statement on April 20 warning that Unit 4000 established a global network to target Israeli officials and “strategic infrastructure.”[70] The Israeli security organizations stated that an Iranian-backed militant cell was preparing to target the Israeli Embassy in Azerbaijan, a synagogue in Baku, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline with improvised explosive devices (IED) and drones, for example.[71]
Endnotes
[1] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-22-2026 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-16-2026/
[2] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604074692?source=share-link [3] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/08/exclusive-how-irans-supreme-leader-reached-a-truce-with-trump [4] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-18-2026/; https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604149552?source=share-link [5] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604149552?source=share-link [6] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/04/11/world/iran-war-trump-talks-pakistan [7] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-22-2026
[8] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-23-2026 ; https://x.com/DrSaeedJalili/status/2047619461063020829?s=20 ; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/410155 ; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/410093 [9] https://x.com/ejei_org/status/2047354428898894005 ; https://x.com/ejei_org/status/2047354278847643748 ; https://x.com/drpezeshkian/status/2047378690284093905?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet ; https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2047358416989847705 ; https://x.com/Rahbarenghelab_/status/2047392790330413371?s=20 ; https://x.com/WarMessage_IR/status/2047412937510264911?s=20 ; https://x.com/WarMessage_IR/status/2047405726864158972?s=20 [10] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604200812?source=share-link
[11] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/24/witkoff-kushner-iran-talks-pakistan ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2047660187532583339?s=20
[12] https://parpanchi.com/p/behind-tehrans-unity-show-the-secret [13] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Iran20Update2C20June20102C20202420PDF.pdf ; https://iran-hrm.com/2019/06/28/perpetrator-of-the-1988-massacre-mostafa-pourmohammadi/ [14] https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1918619993081549083?s=20
[15] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-23-2026 [16] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-22-2026/ [17] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/409485 [18] https://t.me/iribnews/333965 [19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-23-2026 [20] https://x.com/IraninIslamabad/status/2047746661901017237?s=20; https://www.axios.com/2026/04/24/witkoff-kushner-iran-talks-pakistan [21] https://x.com/IraninIslamabad/status/2047746661901017237 [22] https://x.com/araghchi/status/2047685407941296331 [23] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/410260; https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/24/world/live-news/iran-war-trump-israel-lebanon?post-id=cmoctfmbr00003b6uf4spq61y; https://x.com/alaynatreene/status/2047647957512606120?s=20; https://vhttps://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-lebanon-extend-ceasefire-trump-seeks-best-deal-with-iran-2026-04-24/ [24] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-11-2026/ [25] https://x.com/araghchi/status/2047685407941296331 [26] https://x.com/araghchi/status/2047685407941296331 [27] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/24/witkoff-kushner-iran-talks-pakistan [28] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/24/witkoff-kushner-iran-talks-pakistan [29] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/24/witkoff-kushner-iran-talks-pakistan [30] https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/24/world/live-news/iran-war-trump-israel-lebanon?post-id=cmoctfmbr00003b6uf4spq61y ; https://x.com/alaynatreene/status/2047647957512606120?s=20 ; https://vhttps://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-lebanon-extend-ceasefire-trump-seeks-best-deal-with-iran-2026-04-24/ ; https://www.axios.com/2026/04/24/witkoff-kushner-iran-talks-pakistan
[31] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/24/witkoff-kushner-iran-talks-pakistan [32] https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2047613443843203195 [33] https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2047613443843203195
[34] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سا-ة-لسمعة-العلاقات-العراق-يدين-استهداف-مخفر-حدودي-كويتي-بالمسيرات
[35] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سا-ة-لسمعة-العلاقات-العراق-يدين-استهداف-مخفر-حدودي-كويتي-بالمسيرات
[36] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1605 ; https://x.com/war_noir/status/2036608124551840012 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2033736540724121891 ; https://x.com/kelliemeyernews/status/2042663756136607989?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q [37] https://www.armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/russia-ukraine-war-2022/electronic-warfare-how-fiber-optic-fpv-drones-are-redefining-the-ukrainian-battlefield ; https://cepa.org/article/how-are-drones-changing-war-the-future-of-the-battlefield/ [38] https://x.com/war_noir/status/2036608124551840012 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2033736540724121891 ; https://www.armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/russia-ukraine-war-2022/electronic-warfare-how-fiber-optic-fpv-drones-are-redefining-the-ukrainian-battlefield [39] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-10-2026/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-is-sharing-satellite-imagery-and-drone-technology-with-iran-0dd95e49?msockid=10aa56d3f3c06c1307a841c1f2916db9 [40] https://understandingwar.org/research/future-of-war/ukraine-and-the-problem-of-restoring-maneuver-in-contemporary-war/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/defense-taiwan-ukrainian-characteristics-lessons-war-ukraine-western-pacific [41] https://apnews.com/article/iraq-militias-iran-war-c2fce96e2769bc8b3be43a729da5517b [42] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-10-2026/ ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-harakat-hezbollah-al-nujaba ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-kataib-hezbollah [43] https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2047448310735081483 [44] https://www.sharghdaily dot com/بخش-سیاست-6/1099848-یک-نماینده-مجلس-محاصره-دریایی-در-کوتاه-مدت-به-ایران-فشار-می-آورد ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2047622474376815091
[45] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2047622474376815091 [46] https://www.rouydad24 dot ir/fa/news/453492
[47] https://www.rouydad24 dot ir/fa/news/453492
[48] https://www.resilience dot org/stories/2020-05-28/shutting-down-oil-wells-a-risky-and-expensive-option/ [49] https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4470197/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-dan/ [50] https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4470197/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-dan/ [51] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/23/iran-strait-hormuz-mines-trump [52] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/23/iran-strait-hormuz-mines-trump [53] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/23/iran-strait-hormuz-mines-trump [54] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-iran-may-have-reloaded-during-two-week-truce-2026-04-23/ ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2047408082565714014?s=20
[55] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-iran-may-have-reloaded-during-two-week-truce-2026-04-23/ [56] https://t.me/mmirleb/15519 [57] https://t.me/mmirleb/15519 [58] https://t.me/mmirleb/15519 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/65974 ; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/116456113408853958 [59] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2047412887069593871?s=20 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/66214 [60] https://t.me/mmirleb/15516 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15517 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15526 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15529 [61] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/2026_q2/Article-dd0e82d544bbd91026.htm
[62] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-mp-ceasefire-meaningless-light-israeli-attacks-2026-04-24/ [63] https://x.com/HibaNasr/status/2047467617594626410 [64] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116456113408853958 [65] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1504765/lebanon-israel-talks-at-the-white-house-what-you-need-to-know.html [66] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/trump-declares-3-week-truce-extension-after-hosting-2nd-round-of-israel-lebanon-talks/ ; https://embassies dot gov.il/usa/en/news/https-govextragovil-foreign-affairs-justthefactsapr24-home [67] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-17-2026/ [68] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/2026_q2/Article-dd0e82d544bbd91026.htm
[69] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2047669687459238038?s=20 ; https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2047669912458416389?s=2 [70] https://www.gov dot il/en/pages/mossad-idf-and-isa-joint-announcement-20-apr-2026
[71] https://www.gov dot il/en/pages/mossad-idf-and-isa-joint-announcement-20-apr-2026
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