Previous
Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
The US-Iran ceasefire has effectively ended with relatively more intense and consistent exchanges of fire in the Persian Gulf. The present fighting is relatively less widespread in geographic scope and smaller in terms of total strikes compared to March and April 2026, but the increase in strikes and reimposition of the blockade nonetheless mark the end of the ceasefire.
The US naval blockade had a limited but notable effect on Iranian willingness to continue fighting in Spring 2026 and was critical to securing the memorandum of understanding (MoU). Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, reportedly fearful of the US blockade and the deteriorating economic situation in Iran, implored Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to accept the June 18 MoU despite the supreme leader’s concerns and desire to retain control over the Strait of Hormuz. Pezeshkian’s efforts to secure the MoU do not imply that other elements of the Iranian regime were seriously affected by the blockade, however.
The recent MoU breakdown and the reimposition of the US naval blockade can cause negative political effects within Iran that are not immediately related to a breakdown in the regime’s willingness to continue the fight. The regime’s decision to continue firing into the Strait of Hormuz ultimately reignited the war, and the regime will need to argue the case to its own people and among itself as to why continuing the conflict is necessary. This situation will likely revive the intra-regime debate over how to handle the strait, economy, and negotiations with the United States.
The United States and Iran are in a new phase in the war, and both sides have had time to internalize lessons and reconstitute after the initial round of conflict.
Toplines
The US-Iran ceasefire has effectively ended with relatively more intense and consistent exchanges of fire in the Persian Gulf. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on July 11 that it closed the strait, struck a Cyprus-flagged vessel, and then struck a second unspecified vessel on July 12.[1] The United States struck dozens of Iranian military targets on July 12 to degrade Iran’s ability to threaten shipping.[2] The United States has conducted over 300 strikes in Iran since July 10.[3] Iran retaliated on July 12 with strikes against US military bases in Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait, likely in order to deter these countries from allowing US forces to use their territories to launch strikes against Iran.[4] Iran also claimed that it struck a US radar site in Oman on July 13, but neither the United States nor Oman commented on the strike.[5] The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.[6]
The present fighting is relatively less widespread in geographic scope and smaller in terms of total strikes compared to March and April 2026, but the increase in strikes and reimposition of the blockade nonetheless mark the end of the ceasefire. Most US strikes have targeted military sites in southern Iran, though the United States has conducted some strikes on infrastructure deeper into Iran.[7] Three hundred US strikes over three days is also roughly a third as many strikes as the United States alone conducted during the peak of the US-Israel campaign in March and April 2026.[8] Iran has continued to expand the geographic scope of its attacks, however, by targeting most of the Gulf states.[9] It has so far declined to target Israel or commit to large-scale targeting of civilian infrastructure in the Gulf states, as Iran chose to do in March and April 2026.
The US naval blockade had a limited but notable effect on Iranian willingness to continue fighting in Spring 2026 and was critical to securing the memorandum of understanding (MoU). The New York Times reported on July 4 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, reportedly fearful of the US blockade and the deteriorating economic situation in Iran, implored Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to accept the June 18 MoU despite the supreme leader’s concerns and desire to retain control over the Strait of Hormuz.[10] Mojtaba reportedly agreed to the MoU only on the conditions that Iran’s negotiating team would not cross his “red lines” and that Pezeshkian would accept responsibility if the MoU were to fail.[11] Pezeshkian‘s effort to pressure Mojtaba indicates that the US naval blockade played a major role in pressuring the Iranians to accept the MoU.
Pezeshkian’s efforts to secure the MoU do not imply that other elements of the Iranian regime were seriously affected by the blockade, however. Other elements from the IRGC — the leaders of which are close with Mojtaba — were far less willing to accept the MoU. Mojtaba’s concerns about the control of the Strait of Hormuz under the MoU are likely emblematic of the position of the anti-negotiations camp. It is notable in the context of Mojtaba’s concerns about controlling the strait that as soon as the United States, Oman, and others made efforts to undermine Iranian control through the southern transit route in the strait, the IRGC began attacking shipping again. It remains far from clear when and if economic damage caused by the blockade will affect the willingness of the IRGC to continue the fight.
The recent MoU breakdown and the reimposition of the US naval blockade can cause negative political effects within Iran that are not immediately related to a breakdown in the regime’s willingness to continue the fight. Many Iranians, including, presumably, many regime supporters, are suffering under an extremely devastating economic situation.[12] The present MoU had promised an end to the conflict on a relatively acceptable basis for the Iranian regime. The regime’s decision to continue firing into the Strait of Hormuz ultimately reignited the war, and the regime will need to argue the case to its own people and among itself as to why continued conflict is necessary. This situation will likely revive the intra-regime debate over how to handle the strait, economy, and negotiations with the United States. The anti-negotiations camp will likely use the reimposition of the US blockade as evidence that negotiating with the United States was a mistake and that Iran should pursue its strategic objectives, including the preservation of its nuclear program, control of the strait, and survival of Hezbollah, even at the risk of a longer conflict with the United States and its ensuing economic costs. The effect of the new US blockade will likely manifest differently if the anti-negotiations camp can successfully argue that negotiations and the MoU were a failure.
This is a new phase in the war, and both sides have had time to internalize lessons and reconstitute after the initial round of conflict. Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8.[13] The United States has presumably also had time to undertake reconstitution tasks and apply lessons learned. Both sides have also had significant economic and political reprieves. The Iranians were able to execute some oil exports, while the global economy reacted to the ceasefire and MoU. The price of oil dropped from $92 USD per barrel on June 1 (down from a high of $104 USD on May 18) to as low as $68 USD on July 2.[14] These military and political effects will probably change some features of the conflict relative to its previous iteration in March and April 2026.
US-Iran Negotiations
See topline.
Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf
See topline.
US and Israeli Air Campaign
See topline.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
See topline.
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
An unspecified Lebanese official told international media on July 13 that the next round of US-brokered Israel-Lebanon negotiations will begin in Rome, Italy, on July 14.[15] The negotiations will likely focus on plans to implement the first two “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon. Lebanese media reported on July 13 that the Lebanese delegation’s primary objective for the talks is to secure a timeframe to implement the pilot zones that are stipulated in the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[16] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun instructed the Lebanese negotiating delegation to demand that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdraw from the pilot zones as a precondition to further technical discussions.[17] The Lebanese government previously conditioned its participation in the Rome meetings on the IDF’s withdrawal from the pilot zones, according to Saudi media on July 11.[18] Hezbollah-aligned media reported on July 11 that Israeli officials proposed to the Lebanese government that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deploy in pilot zones and begin disarming Hezbollah with Israeli and US oversight before authorizing any IDF withdrawals, which the Lebanese government rejected.[19]
US military representatives have continued to meet with LAF commanders in Lebanon to discuss plans to implement the pilot zones since July 11.[20] An unspecified US official told international media on July 11 that the LAF would begin backfilling IDF positions in the pilot zones “in a matter of days” and stated that Israel, Lebanon, and the United States are planning to establish future pilot zones.[21] Lebanese media reported on July 12 that the IDF will “attempt” to withdraw from one of the two initial pilot zones before negotiations begin in Rome to demonstrate Lebanese government progress in direct talks with Israel and combat Hezbollah’s argument to Lebanese citizens that the negotiations are fruitless.[22] ISW-CTP has not observed any indicators that Israeli forces are currently withdrawing from the pilot zones, however.
The Lebanese government is attempting to balance the need to disarm Hezbollah with the significant latent threat Hezbollah poses to Lebanese stability amid unprecedented Hezbollah weakness. Hezbollah remains unprecedentedly weak despite its relative military success against Israel. The group still lacks experienced commanders and a charismatic leader, and increasing reliance upon Iranian guidance has made it appear significantly less Lebanese.[23] This weakness, however, disguises the serious latent threat that Hezbollah poses to Lebanon’s stability. Unspecified sources close to Lebanese President Joseph Aoun told Lebanese media on July 13 that Aoun seeks to “contain” Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon, not forcibly disarm the group.[24] Aoun previously stated on July 10 that the Lebanese government must “cooperate with Hezbollah” in order to disarm the group.[25] Aoun’s hesitancy and caution reflect the latent threat Hezbollah poses. The risk of a clash with Hezbollah is relatively greater because the group feels threatened and its military wing is full of Iranian and other foreign cadres.[26] These cadres may be less restrained in their dealings with the Lebanese government given Lebanon is not their country.
Any disarmament plan that relies on cooperating with Hezbollah — and therefore its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Iraqi, Syrian, and other militia cadres — will almost certainly fail, because none of these actors will acquiesce to disarming Hezbollah.[27] Hezbollah leaders and Hezbollah-allied politicians have continued to assert that Hezbollah will remain armed in southern Lebanon and have threatened that attempts by the LAF to disarm the group would cause civil war.[28] Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and unspecified Hezbollah officials told Hezbollah-aligned media on July 13 that LAF commanders are aware that it would be “extremely difficult” to disarm Hezbollah.[29]
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, released a statement on July 12 outlining its views on several topics, including the Iraqi federal government’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign and US-Iraq relations.[30] The coalition noted its support for the anti-corruption campaign, which has included over 50 arrests in recent weeks as part of the government’s efforts to recover public funds.[31] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq may support the campaign because anti-corruption has broad public support in Iraq, and the campaign has not affected Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians and officials. Iraqi authorities have instead mainly arrested Sunnis and political allies of former Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[32] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq argued that the Iraqi federal government should prioritize an end to the US “occupation” and condemned Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s visit to Washington, DC, which begins on July 13.[33] US-led international coalition forces are expected to leave Iraqi Kurdistan in September 2026.[34] Coalition forces previously withdrew from federal Iraq in January 2026.[35]
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also argued in the July 12 statement that the Iraqi federal government should “liberate” the Iraqi economy from “American hegemony,” amid continued reports that Zaydi will focus on expanding US-Iraq economic relations during his visit to Washington.[36] The coalition’s statement said that the United States imposes control over Iraqi resources and funds, almost certainly in reference to the US Treasury Department temporarily pausing shipments of Iraq’s oil earnings to Iraq during the war due to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia activity.[37] The Iraqi Central Bank has managed an account at the New York Federal Reserve that has held the Iraqi federal government’s oil export revenue in US dollars since 2003.[38] Zaydi wrote in a Washington Post op-ed on July 13 that he hopes US companies will invest in Iraq and that his visit to DC, during which he will meet with US President Donald Trump, will transform US-Iraq relations from “crisis management to opportunity creation.”[39] Iraqi federal government spokesperson Haider al Aboudi said on July 13 that the agenda for Zaydi’s visit includes developing economic relations in the US oil, gas, energy, technology, and infrastructure sectors.[40] Aboudi added that the United States and Iraq will sign an MoU related to the oil and gas sectors.[41] It is unclear if this MoU is related to the agreement Zaydi is reportedly expected to sign with the United States, in which the US government will support investment in Iraq in exchange for the Iraqi federal government taking steps to limit Iranian influence in Iraq, including by disarming the Iraqi militias.[42]
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq reaffirmed its commitment to armed resistance against the United States and Israel on July 10, which further exemplifies the problems the Iraqi federal government faces in attempting to comply with US demands to disarm the militias.[43] The coalition includes Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya. The first three of these militias conducted the most attacks during the war and are the closest Iraqi militias groups to Iran.[44] Zaydi noted in his Washington Post op-ed that the Iraqi federal government is committed to restricting arms to the state and has made “significant progress” in disarming several unspecified armed groups.[45] The federal government has not yet clarified how it plans to disarm militias that refuse to disarm, however. Zaydi’s op-ed follows an Iraqi media report on July 9 that unidentified militias are handing “scrap” missiles and inoperable drones to the government but holding onto functional heavy weapons.[46] The Iraqi federal government also has historically lacked accurate information on the number and types of militia weapons to the covert nature of the militias, including those within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[47]
The Houthis launched an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and drones on July 13 targeting Abha International Airport, Saudi Arabia, in response to likely Saudi strikes on Houthi-controlled Sanaa International Airport, Yemen.[48] The Saudi Defense Ministry spokesperson confirmed on July 13 that it intercepted Houthi ballistic missiles targeting Saudi Arabia’s southern region.[49] The Houthi Political Bureau previously claimed on July 13 that Saudi Arabia struck Sanaa International Airport to prevent an IRGC-affiliated Mahan Air passenger jet from landing at the airport.[50] The aircraft was reportedly carrying a Houthi delegation returning from former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s funeral in Tehran.[51] Some missile remnants found at the airport appeared to come from a Storm Shadow cruise missile, according to a munitions researcher.[52] Saudi Arabia uses the Storm Shadow.[53] This escalation comes after Mahan Air resumed direct flights between Tehran and Sanaa on July 3.[54] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on July 3 that Saudi aircraft attempted to prevent the Mahan Air flight from landing in Sanaa, but that Houthi air defenses forced the Saudi aircraft to withdraw.[55] Sarea also warned Saudi Arabia that the Houthis would retaliate against any future Saudi “airspace violations” with strikes on Saudi airports and other “vital interests on land and sea.”[56]
Endnotes
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/iran-declares-strait-hormuz-closed-unauthorised-vessel-hit-2026-07-11/
[2] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2076495252454584794
[3] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2076147990771663261
[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-war-live-sirens-bahrain-iran-escalates-after-more-us-strikes-2026-07-13/
[5] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/en/news/2026/07/13/3645912/irgc-navy-destroys-us-radar-sites-in-oman
[6] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116913091653271692 ; https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2076732825349628250
[7] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2076524198701277545?s=20 ;
https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2076429243588681976?s=20 ;
https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2076438118253670813?s=20 ;
https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2076415064609861843?s=20 ;
https://t.me/defapress_ir/63355 ;
https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2076652971870327151 ;
https://t.me/defapress_ir/63355 ;
https://t.me/presstv/198408 ;
https://t.me/iribnews/351144 ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2076601312389615781?s=20 ;
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2076681449533477272?s=20 ;
https://t.me/presstv/198409 ;
https://t.me/iribnews/351158 ;
https://t.me/iribnews/351149 ;
https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/205038 ;
https://t.me/presstv/198413 ;
https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2076423675939877348?s=20 ;
https://t.me/presstv/198416 ;
https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2076691083975659839?s=20 ;
https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2076695862705619198?s=20 ;
https://t.me/presstv/198549 ;
https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/205143 ;
https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/middle-east/new-explosions-heard-in-southern-iran-as-tensions-escalate-with-us/3996987
[8] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/war-in-numbers-us-hit-tens-of-thousands-of-targets-in-iran-but-capabilities-remain/
[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/iran-declares-strait-hormuz-closed-unauthorised-vessel-hit-2026-07-11/
[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/04/world/middleeast/iran-supreme-leader-funeral-divisions.html
[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/19/world/middleeast/mojtaba-khamenei-iran-deal-reaction.html ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/04/world/middleeast/iran-supreme-leader-funeral-divisions.html
[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/11/world/middleeast/iran-steel-plant-civilian-military.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/19/us/politics/iran-war-costs-deaths.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/07/world/middleeast/iranians-despair-war-economy-inflation.html
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-13-2026/
[14] https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/crude-oil
[15] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5295573-new-round-lebanon-israel-talks-begin-tuesday
[16] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/lebanon-news/946274/lbci-source-lebanese-delegation-in-rome-seeks-agreement-on-start-of-pi/en
[17] https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/2076704127455768949?s=20
[18] https://www.alhadath dot net/2026/07/11/تحركات-اميركية-وغارات-اسرائيلية-تطورات-جديدة-بجنوب-لبنان
[19] https://t.me/alakhbar_news/90892 ; https://t.me/alakhbar_news/90890
[20] https://www.nna-leb.gov dot lb/ar/news/551640/وفد-عسكري-أميركي-في-لبنان-للبحث-في-آليات-انسحاب-اسرائيل-من-منطقة-تجريبية-2 ; https://www.annahar dot com/lebanon/329256/جولة-سادسة-من-المفاوضات-بين-لبنان-وإسرائيل-في-روما-غدا-بحث-بتفعيل-المناطق-التجريبية
[21] https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/us-iran-war-trump-ceasefire-talks-strait-of-hormuz/#post-update-c72e4817
[22] https://www.annahar dot com/lebanon/329089/الجيش-جاهز-للتطبيق-في-التجريبية-بري-وصلنا-إلى-تحت-الصفر
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/weakening-hezbollah-requires-faster-international-support-to-lebanon/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-irans-irgc-rebooted-lebanons-hezbollah-be-ready-war-2026-03-21/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-29-2024/
[24] https://www.annahar dot com/lebanon/328820/عون-متمسك-بالبعد-الداخلي-لمعالجة-سلاح-الحزب
[25] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/321198-what-will-aoun-tell-trump-about-hezbollah-s-weapons
[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-irans-irgc-rebooted-lebanons-hezbollah-be-ready-war-2026-03-21/ ; https://almanar dot com.lb/article/1011097/?s=tg ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/8183 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/8666 ; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2026/07/08/lebanon-accepts-us-invitation-for-direct-israel-talks-in-rome-after-initial-refusal/?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1783520037 ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/trilateral-framework-between-the-united-states-of-america-the-state-of-israel-and-the-republic-of-lebanon/ ; https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2045718162008588665 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2056345286146957487?s=20
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-26-2025/
[28] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/321227-berri-claims-vast-majority-of-muslims-half-of-christians-against-framework-agreement ; DNGTS: https://www.al-akhbar dot com/NewspaperArticles/lebanon/898628/اتفاق-الإطار-يترنح-مع-رفض-غالبية-المسلمين-ونصف-المسيحيين–جو ; https://almanar dot com.lb/article/1011097/?s=tg ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/8183 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/8666 ; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2026/07/08/lebanon-accepts-us-invitation-for-direct-israel-talks-in-rome-after-initial-refusal/?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1783520037
[29] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/321227-berri-claims-vast-majority-of-muslims-half-of-christians-against-framework-agreement ; DNGTS: https://www.al-akhbar dot com/NewspaperArticles/lebanon/898628/اتفاق-الإطار-يترنح-مع-رفض-غالبية-المسلمين-ونصف-المسيحيين–جو
[30] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1639
[31] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1639 ; https://almadapaper dot net/443223/
[32] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ckb/story/922625/%DA%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%86%DB%8E%D9%88%DB%95%DB%8C-%D9%87%DB%95%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87%DB%95%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%DB%86-%D8%A8%DB%95%D8%B1%DB%95%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%88%D9%86%DB%95%D9%88%DB%95%DB%8C-%DA%AF%DB%95%D9%86%D8%AF%DB%95%DA%B5%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D9%84%DB%86%D9%BE%DB%8C-%D8%B3%DB%95%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%A8%DB%86-%D8%B9%DB%95%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%B2%DB%95%DB%8C%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D9%87%DB%95%DA%B5%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%88%DB%95 ; https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2071281219405336922 ; https://almadapaper dot net/443223/
[33] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1639
[34] https://english dot aawsat.com/arab-world/5288763-al-zaidi-no-justification-presence-%E2%80%98resistance%E2%80%99-iraq-after-september
[35] https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/18/middleeast/iraq-announces-full-withdrawal-of-us-forces-from-its-federal-territory
[36] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1639 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/تقارير-وتحليلات/الزيدي-في-البيت-ال-بيض-شراكة-مستدامة-م-مجرد-دارة-زمات ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/07/13/prime-minister-al-zaidi-iraq-is-ready-new-us-partnership/
[37] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-blocks-iraqs-dollar-shipments-to-squeeze-its-iran-backed-militias-3270d5af ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1639
[38] https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/122652/1/MEC_a_fistful_of_dinars_paper_85.pdf
[39] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/07/13/prime-minister-al-zaidi-iraq-is-ready-new-us-partnership/
[40] https://shafaq dot com/ar/تقارير-وتحليلات/الزيدي-في-البيت-ال-بيض-شراكة-مستدامة-م-مجرد-دارة-زمات
[41] https://shafaq dot com/ar/تقارير-وتحليلات/الزيدي-في-البيت-ال-بيض-شراكة-مستدامة-م-مجرد-دارة-زمات
[42] https://almadapaper dot net/442723/ ; ttps://almadapaper dot net/440334 ; https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/economy/خاص-وصول-دفعتين-من-الدولار-نقداً-إلى-بغداد-تزامنا-مع-زيارة-توم-براك
[43] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1638
[44] https://rudaw dot net/english/categories/iraq/958915 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-10-2026/ ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1625 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1612;
[45] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/07/13/prime-minister-al-zaidi-iraq-is-ready-new-us-partnership/
[46] https://almadapaper dot net/442723/
[47] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyFocus163-KnightsMalikTamimi-v3%281%29.pdf#pdfjs.action=download
[48] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2076738625832722523 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemeni-military-targets-sanaa-airport-runway-stop-iranian-plane-landing-defence-2026-07-13/
[49] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2076715294806937782
[50] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2076640546488230264
[51] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2076640546488230264 ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1322 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2076642985995854224
[52] https://x.com/Easybakeovensz/status/2076687849806594342
[53] https://x.com/Easybakeovensz/status/2076687849806594342 ; https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/apache-ap/
[54] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-july-3-2026 ; https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/IRM1199 ; https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/w51198
[55] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-july-3-2026
[56] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2073059712485179809 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-july-3-2026
Previous