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Iran Update Special Report, July 6, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
The Lebanese government appears to be implementing the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement and other diplomatic initiatives in a way that advances the government’s primary objective of ensuring stability in Lebanon. The Lebanese government may hesitate to implement parts of the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement that it assesses would risk igniting widespread conflict in Lebanon.
The Lebanese government may also be postponing or preventing the Iran-Lebanon-United States “deconfliction cell” from commencing operations because the mechanism contradicts other Lebanese government objectives, especially expelling Iranian influence from Lebanon. Lebanese media reported on July 6 that Iranian regime officials have expressed frustration regarding the Lebanese government’s refusal to appoint representatives to the cell. Lebanese media also reported that the Lebanese government has largely ignored the deconfliction cell since Israel, Lebanon, and the United States signed the framework agreement on June 26.
Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei reappointed Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei as judiciary chief on July 5. Ejei’s appointment is Mojtaba’s third appointment since becoming supreme leader in March 2026. Ejei has historically taken a harsh stance against regime dissidents, such as when he publicly defended executing protesters during the Mahsa Amini protests in 2022 and described protesters as “terrorists” in 2026.
Toplines
The Lebanese government appears to be implementing the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement and other diplomatic initiatives in a way that advances the government’s primary objective of ensuring stability in Lebanon.[1] The Lebanese government has multiple objectives, including weakening and disarming Hezbollah, securing an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, and expelling Iranian influence from Lebanon, but its overriding objective appears to be ensuring internal stability. Senior Lebanese government officials, including President Joseph Aoun, have repeatedly expressed support for the framework agreement as the best means to end conflict and instability in Lebanon.[2] The Lebanese government may hesitate to implement parts of the framework agreement that it assesses would risk igniting widespread conflict in Lebanon, however. Hezbollah leaders have threatened that Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) attempts to disarm the group would result in a civil war, which is consistent with Hezbollah’s long-term efforts to deter the LAF from threatening the group’s existence.[3] Unnamed sources told Lebanese media on July 6 that the LAF refuses to establish “pilot zones,” in which the LAF would disarm Hezbollah, north of the Litani River until Israeli forces withdraw from Lebanese territory.[4] The sources claimed that the LAF is concerned that Israeli forces would remain in Lebanon in the event of a Hezbollah-LAF conflict, which would undermine the Lebanese government’s objective of facilitating an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.[5] The sources also claimed that the LAF refuses to initiate an “internal confrontation” with Hezbollah because of the risk of starting a civil war with the group and fracturing the LAF.[6]
The Lebanese government may also be postponing or preventing the Iran-Lebanon-United States “deconfliction cell” from commencing operations because the mechanism contradicts other Lebanese government objectives, especially expelling Iranian influence from Lebanon. The Qatari Foreign Ministry announced on June 21 that Iran would take part in a multilateral deconfliction cell to monitor and report violations of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire.[7] Lebanese media reported on July 6 that Iranian regime officials have expressed frustration regarding the Lebanese government’s refusal to appoint representatives to the cell.[8] The mechanism requires the appointment of Lebanese representatives to the cell before it can commence operations.[9] Lebanese media also reported that the Lebanese government has largely ignored the deconfliction cell since Israel, Lebanon, and the United States signed the framework agreement on June 26.[10] The deconfliction cell would give Iran a formal role in monitoring the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire in Lebanon. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran could use its on-the-ground presence in southern Lebanon to quickly report incidents to the deconfliction cell and thereby shape the narrative about such incidents in the cell.[11] The Lebanese government views Iranian influence in Lebanon negatively because the Iranian regime empowers Hezbollah, whose activities have repeatedly destabilized Lebanon.[12] Lebanese officials have rejected Iranian efforts to link the conflict in Lebanon to broader US-Iran negotiations and have urged an end to Iranian interference in Lebanon.[13]
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf
Nothing significant to report.
US and Israeli Air Campaign
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei reappointed Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei as judiciary chief on July 5.[14] Ejei’s appointment is Mojtaba’s third appointment since becoming supreme leader in March 2026. Mojtaba appointed former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei as his military adviser on March 17 and Mehdi Khamoushi as his chief of staff on May 12.[15] Ejei previously served as the intelligence minister under former hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[16] Ejei has served as the judiciary chief since 2021. Ejei has historically taken a harsh stance against regime dissidents, such as when he publicly defended executing protesters during the Mahsa Amini protests in 2022 and described protesters as “terrorists” in 2026.[17] The United States sanctioned Ejei in September 2010 for committing human rights abuses.[18]
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
Unidentified Israeli security officials told Israeli media on July 6 that Hezbollah is attempting to reconstitute its forces in southern Lebanon.[19] The Israeli security officials said that Hezbollah is transferring fighters to unspecified areas of southern Lebanon in preparation for a potential resumption of combat with Israeli forces.[20] The officials added that the IDF has encircled Hezbollah positions in Bint Jbeil District and Deir Seryan in Nabatieh Governorate and Majdal Zoun in South Governorate.[21]
The IDF continued to strike Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure in southern Lebanon on July 5 and 6. Lebanese media reported that the IDF struck unspecified targets near Nabatieh al Fawqa and Kfar Tebnit in Nabatieh Governorate on July 5.[22] The IDF reported that it killed four Hezbollah fighters driving a vehicle toward IDF positions in Nabatieh al Fawqa on July 6.[23] Lebanese media reported that the IDF conducted five additional strikes on unspecified targets in Nabatieh Governorate on July 6.[24]
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
The Iraqi federal government reportedly barred Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) leaders, including Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, from attending funeral ceremonies for former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iraq, according to an informed source speaking to Iraqi media on July 5.[25] A second source stated that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi permitted funeral ceremonies in the cities of Karbala and Najaf but not in Baghdad.[26] This decision could reflect Zaydi’s attempts to balance between Iran and the United States and distance the Iraqi federal government from Iran amid ongoing US pressure on the Iraqi government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq.[27]
The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) engaged possible Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah fighters in Dora District, Baghdad Province, on July 3.[28] Iraqi security sources told Saudi media on July 3 that CTS attempted to retake an Iraqi militia-controlled farm in Dora District, which triggered a firefight.[29] The sources added that an unspecified Iraqi militia had previously seized the area from a local farmer.[30] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, have used areas under their control to store weapons and conduct rocket attacks targeting US interests in Iraq.[31] Iraqi security forces, including CTS, have sporadically targeted Kataib Hezbollah sites in Dora District since 2020.[32] Iraqi Federal Police officers engaged Kataib Hezbollah members in Dora District in July 2025, for example.[33] CTS also raided a Kataib Hezbollah headquarters in Dora District in 2020 following militia attacks on US forces in Iraq.[34] CTS’s July 3 operation comes as the Iraqi federal government has recently taken steps to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[35]
Endnotes
[1] https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/2072203643822932280?s=20 ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1540253/aoun-i-am-waiting-for-any-solution-that-allows-us-to-get-out-of-the-war.html
[2] https://x.com/ALJADEEDNEWS/status/2073663608269980151?s=20 ; https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/2071592126240952637?s=20 ; https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/2072203643822932280?s=20 ; https://www.almanar dot com.lb/article/990757/
[3] https://t.me/sameralhajali/8183 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-27-2026/
[4] https://www.annahar dot com/lebanon/326878/لقا-بري-وهيكل-رسائل-تتجاوز-الجنوب
[5] https://www.annahar dot com/lebanon/326878/لقا-بري-وهيكل-رسائل-تتجاوز-الجنوب
[6] https://www.annahar dot com/lebanon/326878/لقا-بري-وهيكل-رسائل-تتجاوز-الجنوب
[7] https://x.com/MofaQatar_EN/status/2068863423987778035
[8] https://www.annahar dot com/lebanon/327005/إيران-تحرض-على-الرئاسة-وواشنطن-تدفع-قدما-الاتفاق-كليرفيلد-للجنة-الإشراف-وأول-انسحاب-من-الزوطرين
[9] https://www.annahar dot com/lebanon/327005/إيران-تحرض-على-الرئاسة-وواشنطن-تدفع-قدما-الاتفاق-كليرفيلد-للجنة-الإشراف-وأول-انسحاب-من-الزوطرين
[10] https://www.annahar dot com/lebanon/327005/إيران-تحرض-على-الرئاسة-وواشنطن-تدفع-قدما-الاتفاق-كليرفيلد-للجنة-الإشراف-وأول-انسحاب-من-الزوطرين
[11] https://x.com/MofaQatar_EN/status/2068863423987778035 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-23-2026/
[12] https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/05/world/live-news/iran-trump-lebanon-israel-war-news?post-id=cmq0ujxgr00013b6solqhgbuj
[13] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/321075-aoun-says-hezbollah-used-to-foreign-control-and-tutelage ; https://www.newarab.com/news/lebanons-aoun-israel-negotiations-independent-iran-deal
[14] https://t.me/rahbar_enghelab_ir/733
[15] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260317-mohsen-rezaei-appointed-military-adviser-to-mojtaba-khamenei/ ; https://iranwire.com/en/features/152296-what-do-we-know-irans-absent-leaders-chief-of-staff/
[16] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/UANI_Resource_Mohseni-Ejei_Profile_Update_JR_KA.pdf
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-crisis-update/
[18] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg877
[19] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-the-idf-is-preparing-for-a-possible-resumption-of-fighting-against-hezbollah
[20] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-the-idf-is-preparing-for-a-possible-resumption-of-fighting-against-hezbollah
[21] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-the-idf-is-preparing-for-a-possible-resumption-of-fighting-against-hezbollah
[22] https://x.com/NidaaWatan/status/2073832826793848915?s=20 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/8524
[23] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2074141499877388561 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2074142398129525167
[24] https://t.me/sameralhajali/8542 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/8539 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/8528 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/77138 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2074096946323587521?s=20 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/77130
[25] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/حصري-بغداد-تقيد-تشييع-خامن-ي-وجدل-بش-ن-دخول-قا-ني-للعراق
[26] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/حصري-بغداد-تقيد-تشييع-خامن-ي-وجدل-بش-ن-دخول-قا-ني-للعراق
[27] https://almadapaper dot net/440334 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2026-2/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-22-2026/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/21/world/middleeast/us-iraq-security-cooperation.html
[28] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5291747-مكافحة-الإرهاب-يشتبك-مع-فصيل-في-بغداد-واعتقال-مهربي-نفط
[29] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5291747-مكافحة-الإرهاب-يشتبك-مع-فصيل-في-بغداد-واعتقال-مهربي-نفط
[30] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5291747-مكافحة-الإرهاب-يشتبك-مع-فصيل-في-بغداد-واعتقال-مهربي-نفط
[31] https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/middle-east/1452489-البوعيثة-مناهضة-القاعدة-معقل-حزب-الله-المفضل
[32] https://mei.edu/publication/al-kadhimi-and-kataib-hezbollah-raid/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-july-28-2025/
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-july-28-2025/ ; https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2025/07/27/iraqi-police-clash-with-paramilitary-fighters-who-stormed-government-building
[34] https://mei.edu/publication/al-kadhimi-and-kataib-hezbollah-raid/ ; https://english.aawsat dot com/home/article/2360631/baghdad-washington-raid-kataib-hezbollah-hq-was-strictly-iraqi
[35] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/حصر-السلاح-بيد-الدولة-بد-جرا-ات-دمج-كتا-ب-ال-مام-علي ; https://almadapaper dot net/437879/
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