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Iran Update Special Report, June 20, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
An Iranian negotiating delegation arrived in Switzerland on June 20 to discuss the implementation of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) with US negotiators. Iran will likely use these talks to try to pressure the United States to compel Israel to cease military operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is unclear if Iran’s negotiating delegation will discuss the Iranian nuclear program in Switzerland.
The Iranian delegation will likely use Iran’s renewed closure of the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in the talks to try to pressure the United States to compel Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran likely calculates that it can use the strait as a tool to put greater economic pressure on the United States to meet Iranian demands.
Israel and Hezbollah continued to launch attacks targeting each other despite agreeing to a ceasefire on June 19. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) warned that it is committed to the ceasefire but will continue to “forcefully” strike Hezbollah if the group launches further attacks against Israeli forces.
There are some indications of disagreements within the Iranian regime regarding Iran’s participation in talks. The Iranian regime has a vested interest in maintaining the negotiating process under the MoU because Iran is receiving economic relief, such as sanctions waivers, as part of the agreement.
The composition of the Iranian negotiating delegation indicates that Iran intends to discuss economic relief components of the MoU at the talks. Iran would almost certainly use any economic relief to try to reconstitute its defense and military capabilities and the Axis of Resistance. Iran may also calculate that the United States would have less leverage to extract concessions from Iran on its nuclear program during the 60-day negotiations period if Iran can frontload economic relief.
Toplines
An Iranian negotiating delegation arrived in Switzerland on June 20 to discuss the implementation of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) with US negotiators.[1] Iran will likely use these talks to try to pressure the United States to compel Israel to cease military operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei told Iranian state media on June 20 that the purpose of the US-Iran talks in Switzerland is to “demand the fulfillment of the [United States’] obligations,” likely referring to the regime’s position that the United States is obligated under the MoU to make Israel cease its operations against Hezbollah.[2] Baghaei claimed that the United States has failed to implement the first clause of the MoU, which requires a ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon.[3] Baghaei argued that nuclear negotiations can only take place after the United States implements this clause.[4] Iran’s negotiating delegation includes Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Deputy Secretary for International Affairs Ali Bagheri Kani, Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati, Deputy Oil Minister and National Iranian Oil Company Chairman Hamid Bord, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi, and Baghaei.[5]
It is unclear if Iran’s negotiating delegation will discuss the Iranian nuclear program in Switzerland. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi is attending the talks in Switzerland.[6] CTP-ISW has not observed any Iranian officials confirm that US and Iranian officials will discuss Iran’s nuclear program in Switzerland, however. Even if nuclear discussions take place in Switzerland, CTP-ISW has not observed any indications from Iranian officials that the regime is willing to make concessions on key nuclear issues.
The Iranian delegation will likely use Iran’s renewed closure of the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in the talks to try to pressure the United States to compel Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran’s top operational headquarters, the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on June 20 that Iran has closed the strait until Israel stops operations in Lebanon.[7] Iran likely calculates that it can use the strait as a tool to put greater economic pressure on the United States to meet Iranian demands. Iran has consistently sought to keep oil prices high during the conflict to put economic pressure on the United States, and Iranian officials likely recognize that announcing the closure of the strait will raise the perceived risks of shipping companies that seek to transit through the strait, which in turn drives up oil prices. US Central Command Spokesperson Captain Tim Hawkins told Axios after Iran announced the closure of the strait on June 20 that “Iran does not control the Strait of Hormuz” and that “traffic continues to flow” through the strait, however.[8]
Israel and Hezbollah continued to launch attacks targeting each other despite agreeing to a ceasefire on June 19. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on June 20 that Israel will remain in the IDF security zone in southern Lebanon “as long as necessary to defend [Israel’s] northern border.”[9] Hezbollah continues to launch rocket, drone, anti-tank guided missile, and artillery attacks targeting IDF positions in southern Lebanon.[10] Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Leiter reported that Hezbollah has launched 147 rockets, 20 drones, and nine anti-tank guided missiles at Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and into Israel in the past 24 hours.[11] The IDF announced that a Hezbollah rocket attack killed an IDF soldier and injured 13 others near Kfar Tebnit in southeastern Lebanon.[12] IDF forces also engaged Hezbollah fighters near Ali al Taher on June 20.[13] Netanyahu’s office reported that the IDF has struck over 300 Hezbollah targets and killed over 100 fighters in the past two days in response to Hezbollah attacks on Israeli soldiers.[14] CTP-ISW observed a significant increase in Israeli airstrikes between June 19 and 20 compared to recent days.[15] Netanyahu’s office and the IDF warned that it is committed to the ceasefire but will continue to “forcefully” strike Hezbollah if the group launches further attacks against Israeli forces.[16]
There are some indications of disagreements within the Iranian regime regarding Iran’s participation in the talks. IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency stated that Araghchi has “no justification” for going to Switzerland because the United States has not fulfilled its commitment to secure a ceasefire on all fronts.[17] This report suggests that some elements within the Iranian regime oppose talks with the United States until the United States pressures Israel to cease operations against Hezbollah and withdraws from Lebanon. The Iranian negotiating delegation presumably received approval from key decision-makers within the regime, specifically Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and/or IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, to attend the talks in Switzerland. There are several reasons why these leaders may have approved the talks. The Iranian regime has a vested interest in maintaining the negotiations process under the MoU because Iran is receiving economic relief, such as sanctions waivers, as part of the agreement. Iran may also seek to avoid appearing as the party obstructing negotiations.
The composition of the Iranian negotiating delegation indicates that Iran intends to discuss economic relief components of the MoU at the talks. The inclusion of Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati and Deputy Oil Minister and National Iranian Oil Company Chairman Hamid Bord in Iran’s delegation highlights how the Iranian regime intends to focus part of the talks in Switzerland on economic issues, such as the lifting of sanctions and release of Iran’s frozen assets.[18] Iranian officials and media have emphasized the need to secure economic relief in the early stages of the implementation of the MoU.[19] Iran would almost certainly use any economic relief to try to reconstitute its defense and military capabilities and the Axis of Resistance.[20] Iran may also calculate that the United States would have less leverage to extract concessions from Iran on its nuclear program during the 60-day negotiations period if Iran can frontload economic relief.
US-Iran Negotiations
See topline section.
Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf
See topline section.
US and Israeli Air Campaign
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
See topline section.
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
See topline section.
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi appointed a new National Security Service chief and national security adviser on June 18.[21] Zaydi appointed Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) head Mohammad al Badri as the National Security Service (NSS) chief.[22] Badri, who is a member of former Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki’s Dawa Party, has served as the AJC chief since 2013.[23] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have long weaponized the AJC, which replaced the de-Baathification Committee in 2008 to prevent “the return of the Baath’s ideology, power, or practices,” to sideline political opponents.[24] Iraq analysts have previously assessed that Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors have similarly coopted the NSS since its formation following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.[25] Badri’s predecessor, Abdul Karim al Basri, is also a Dawa Party member with ties to the IRGC Quds Force.[26] Zaydi also appointed judge Qasem al Aboudi as national security adviser, replacing Iranian-backed Badr Organization-affiliated Qasem al Araji.[27] Iraqi media reported on June 20 that Zaydi appointed Araji as his “special security adviser.”[28]
The Iraqi government has taken initial steps to strengthen its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures following US Special Envoy to Iraq and Syria Tom Barrack’s meeting with Zaydi on June 15.[29] Iraqi media reported on June 18 that Zaydi replaced the current Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) governor with CBI Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Office head Nizar Nasser.[30] The CBI is responsible for implementing anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing reforms.[31] A US government official told Iraqi media on June 19 that the Iraqi government has also agreed to cooperate with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and corruption.[32] The FATF stated on June 19 that Iraq made a “high-level” commitment to work with the FATF to improve the effectiveness of Iraq’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures.[33] These steps come after Barrack reportedly demanded that the Iraqi government dismantle Iraqi militia-associated financial networks and combat corruption during his meeting with Zaydi.[34]
Endnotes
[1] https://t.me/mehrnews/388587 [2] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/365670; https://t.me/Nournews_ir/365671 [3] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/365670; https://t.me/Nournews_ir/365671 [4] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/365670; https://t.me/Nournews_ir/365671 [5] https://t.me/mehrnews/388587 [6] https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-us-war-talks-suspended-trump-mou-israel-lebanon-hezbollah-fighting/#post-update-ea6894ba [7] https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-us-war-talks-suspended-trump-mou-israel-lebanon-hezbollah-fighting/#post-update-ea6894ba [8] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2068373665964519491 [9] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2068360743326453897 [10] https://x.com/yechielleiter/status/2068364615826673698 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2068294621046706540 [11] https://x.com/yechielleiter/status/2068364615826673698 [12] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2068390012802981988 [13] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2068360743326453897 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/17559 [14] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2068360743326453897 [15] https://t.me/sameralhajali/7887 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75237 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75237 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75237 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7888 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7889 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7890 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7891 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75238 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7894 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7895 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7896 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7898 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7899 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7900 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75248 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7902 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75257 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7903 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7905 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7906 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75245 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75245 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7910 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7911 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7912 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7913 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7914 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7916 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7917 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7918 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75246 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7919 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7920 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75250 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75252 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7930 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7931 ; https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2068264725067055569 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/184523 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75259 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7933 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75248 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75277 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75261 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75264 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7934 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75266 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7935 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7937 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7938 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7941 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7943 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7944 ; https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2068275318947778828 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/184535 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7947 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7948 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75280 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7953 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7958 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7959 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7960 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7961 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7964 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7965 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7968 ; https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2068375579229900911 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/184634 ; ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2026-2/ [16] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2068360743326453897 [17] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/424166 [18] https://t.me/mehrnews/388587 [19] https://tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/03/27/3620169; https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1375624/; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6861800/امتیازات-اقتصادی-نقد-در-یادداشت-تفاهم-ایران-و-آمریکا-چیست
[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-guards-business-empire-win-big-if-us-sanctions-lifted-2026-06-20/; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/after-war-losses-hezbollah-seen-gaining-iran-us-deal-2026-06-17/; https://t.me/defapress_ir/61410 [21] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraq-names-new-national-security-adviser-intelligence-chief
[22] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraq-names-new-national-security-adviser-intelligence-chief
[23] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5285977-iraq-shakes-top-security-and-economic-posts-surprise-reshuffle ; https://ninanews dot com/website/News/Details?Key=1291559
[24] https://understandingwar.org/publications/commentaries/iraqi-parliament-passes-accountability-and-justice-law ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-14-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis-Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf, pg. 28 – 32
[25] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqs-new-regime-change-how-tehran-backed-terrorist-organizations-and-militias-captured-the-iraqi-state/
[26] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqs-new-regime-change-how-tehran-backed-terrorist-organizations-and-militias-captured-the-iraqi-state/
[27] https://enablingpeace.org/ishm547/ ; https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraq-names-new-national-security-adviser-intelligence-chief; https://www.hudson.org/international-organizations/badr-organization-irans-oldest-proxy-iraq [28] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/تعيين-قاسم-الاعرجي-مستشارا-امنيا-لر-يس-الوزرا
[29] https://almadapaper dot net/439791/ ; https://x.com/USEmbBaghdad/status/2066763147726180810
[30] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-PM-appoints-new-central-bank-governor-investment-chief
[31] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-PM-appoints-new-central-bank-governor-investment-chief
[32] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/مس-ول-ميركي-العراق-وافق-على-التعاون-لمكافحة-غسيل-ال-موال-وبد-بـ-اتخاذ-الخطوات
[33] https://www.fatf-gafi dot org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2026-2/ ; https://almadapaper dot net/439458/
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