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Iran Update Special Report, June 28, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
Iran has continued to attack US forces in the region to try to deter the United States from undermining Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz. An Iranian drone struck the Panama-flagged M/T Kiku on June 27. US military aircraft targeted Iranian military surveillance infrastructure, communications systems, air defense sites, drone storage facilities, and mine-laying capabilities in response. The IRGC launched drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting the US Fifth Fleet Naval Base in Bahrain and the Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait on June 28.
Iran’s strikes may reflect an Iranian effort to dissuade the Gulf states from resisting Iranian control over the strait. Iran may have intended for its strikes to signal to Gulf states that Iran will respond with force to any Gulf opposition to its control of the strait, amid recent Gulf resistance to this Iranian effort. Iranian media and officials have adopted a harsher tone toward Gulf countries in recent days, likely in response to these countries’ opposition to Iranian management of the strait.
Iran is threatening to suspend negotiations as part of its efforts to deter the United States from challenging Iranian sovereignty over the strait. The IRGC Navy stated on June 27 that US strikes on Iran violated the ceasefire and “will result in the complete halt of all diplomatic processes.”
The Israeli government confirmed the locations of two “pilot zones” where the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will backfill the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon as part of the June 26 trilateral framework agreement. Both of the announced pilot zones lie beyond the IDF’s “anti-tank line,” which would likely reduce the risk of Hezbollah launching attacks on Israeli territory from those zones following the IDF’s withdrawal.
Toplines
Iran has continued to attack US forces in the region to try to deter the United States from undermining Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz. An Iranian drone struck the Panama-flagged M/T Kiku on June 27.[1] US military aircraft targeted Iranian military surveillance infrastructure, communications systems, air defense sites, drone storage facilities, and mine-laying capabilities in response.[2] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy then released a statement that threatened US bases in the region.[3] The IRGC launched drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting the US Fifth Fleet Naval Base in Bahrain and the Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait on June 28.[4] Bahraini air defenses intercepted several projectiles, but the Iranian attack destroyed a residential building, according to Bahrain’s Interior Ministry.[5] These strikes are likely intended to deter the United States from continuing to undermine Iranian efforts to control the strait by signaling to the United States that Iran will attack US forces in response to US strikes on Iran that seek to reduce Iran’s ability to threaten international shipping. Iranian officials have continued to emphasize after the recent exchange of fire that Iran intends to assert sovereignty over the strait. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on June 28 that Iran is “solely responsible” for managing the Strait of Hormuz under the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU).[6] The fifth article of the MoU explicitly states that Iran must engage in dialogue with Oman and the Persian Gulf littoral states to determine the “future administration” of the strait.[7] Iranian Artesh Spokesperson Mohammad Akraminia separately stated on June 28 that Iran seeks to use control of the strait to strengthen its regional power, not just to collect tolls.[8] ISW-CTP has previously assessed that Iran is prioritizing securing recognized control over the strait over collecting tolls.[9]
Iran’s strikes may also reflect an Iranian effort to dissuade the Gulf states from resisting Iranian control over the strait. Iran may have intended for its strikes to signal to Gulf states that Iran will respond with force to any Gulf opposition to its control of the strait, amid recent Gulf resistance to Iranian management of the waterway. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the United States explicitly rejected on June 25 any Iranian attempts to assert control over the strait, including by charging tolls.[10] Omani officials told CNN on June 28 that Oman opposes any mandatory fees or tolls in the Strait of Hormuz, citing international freedom of navigation.[11] Iranian media and officials have adopted a harsher tone toward Gulf countries in recent days, likely in response to these countries’ opposition to Iranian management of the strait. Iran’s English-language media outlet published an article on June 26 in which it criticized the Gulf states and claimed that these countries are attempting to “conceal” the reality that Iran has established a new “regional balance” with its control over the strait, for example.[12]
Iran is also threatening to suspend negotiations as part of its efforts to deter the United States from challenging Iranian sovereignty over the strait. The IRGC Navy stated on June 27 that US strikes on Iran violated the ceasefire and “will result in the complete halt of all diplomatic processes.”[13] Iran may calculate that threatening to stop negotiations could alter US decision-making, given that US officials have repeatedly stated that they seek to resolve key nuclear issues with Iran. Iran previously suspended negotiations with the United States prior to the signing of the MoU in order to try to compel the United States to pressure Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah.[14]
The Israeli government confirmed the locations of two “pilot zones” where the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will backfill the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon as part of the June 26 trilateral framework agreement.[15] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu displayed a map of two zones located on opposite banks of the Litani River during a press conference on June 27.[16] The northern pilot zone includes territory surrounding Zawtar el Gharbiyeh, Nabatieh District, and the southern pilot zone includes territory surrounding Ghandouriyeh and Froun, Bint Jbeil District. The June 26 framework agreement’s second and third clauses require the LAF to assume responsibility for security in pilot zones after it disarms and dismantles armed groups in those areas.[17] Both of the announced pilot zones lie beyond the IDF’s “anti-tank line,” which would likely reduce the risk of Hezbollah launching attacks on Israeli territory from those zones following the IDF’s withdrawal.[18] Hezbollah has also not conducted major attacks in Froun, Ghandouriyeh, or Zawtar el Gharbiyeh in recent weeks and has instead concentrated operations east of Nabatieh City.[19] An Israeli military correspondent reported on June 27 that the IDF will retain its positions on advantageous terrain surrounding Ali al Taher, Beaufort Castle, and Kfar Tebnit, which the IDF deems necessary for preventing Hezbollah anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) attacks on northern Israel.[20]
Hezbollah has continued to threaten civil war in Lebanon if the Lebanese government attempts to implement the framework agreement as part of an information operation to weaken the government’s resolve to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah Parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah warned on June 28 that disillusionment with the Lebanese government would drive civilians to arm and train with Hezbollah and accused the government of inciting civil war.[21] Fadlallah said that Hezbollah’s “fingers will remain on the trigger” and that the group possesses the “internal strength” to counter all “conspiracies,” likely referring to the government’s intention to disarm Hezbollah.[22] An unspecified Hezbollah source separately told Israeli media on June 28 that the agreement will lead to civil war in Lebanon.[23] These statements are consistent with Hezbollah’s recent and long-term efforts to leverage the threat of civil war to deter the LAF from disarming the group.[24] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened in August 2025 to organize anti-government protests and said that there would be “no life” in Lebanon if the LAF attempted to disarm Hezbollah, for example.[25]
Hezbollah and the Iranian regime continue to assert that the framework agreement violates the Lebanon provision of the US-Iran MoU. Iran may use this claim to further delay nuclear talks with the United States. Fadlallah claimed on June 28 that the framework agreement’s true purpose is to undermine the MoU and warned that Iran will not sign any agreement with the United States without a guaranteed Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.[26] Iranian officials and state media portrayed the agreement as a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and continued to demand a full IDF withdrawal from Lebanon as part of the MoU.[27] ISW-CTP continues to assess that Iran is attempting to condition US-Iran nuclear negotiations on the United States compelling Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon and withdraw from Lebanese territory as part of its efforts to preserve Hezbollah and delay nuclear negotiations.[28]
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf
See topline section.
US and Israeli Air Campaign
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Nothing significant to report.
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
Hezbollah fighters killed an Israeli officer in Deir Seryan, Marjaayoun District, on June 28 amid continued Israeli strikes on Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon.[29] The IDF said that Hezbollah fighters killed an IDF officer and wounded a soldier during a small arms engagement in Deir Seryan.[30] The IDF said that its forces later killed the Hezbollah fighters responsible for the attack.[31] The IDF also struck likely Hezbollah targets in Deir Seryan, Baraachit, Froun, and Nabatieh el Fawqa on June 27 and 28, according to Lebanese media.[32] The IDF separately published footage of June 27 of airstrikes that targeted rocket launchers and Hezbollah fighters armed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) in Nabatieh City on June 28.[33]
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
Iraqi media reported on June 28 that unspecified Iraqi political parties with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia wings plan to publicly announce their separation from their affiliated militias in response to US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq.[34] This disengagement, however, is reportedly part of an effort by Iranian-backed parties to further entrench themselves in Iraqi state institutions.[35] Multiple sources, including Shia sources and a source close to the Shia Coordination Framework, told Iraqi media that political parties with armed wings are preparing to publicly announce the “removal of military uniforms,” which appears to refer to the separation of armed groups from their affiliated political parties, as part of a plan to “covertly take [over]” Iraqi state institutions.[36] Iraqi media estimated that around 3,000 senior civil servant positions could be redistributed to these political parties after their separation from armed groups.[37] Unspecified sources claimed that the United States’ opposition to militia-linked figures filling positions in the Iraqi federal government would be irrelevant if political parties disengage from their armed wings.[38] The United States has repeatedly opposed militia-affiliated individuals occupying high-level Iraqi federal government positions, even if they are affiliated with a militia that has been disarmed.[39] ISW-CTP has previously assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali, which both have political wings in the Shia Coordination Framework, may have signaled willingness to disarm to reduce US opposition to their participation in the Iraqi government.[40] It is also possible that these militias seek to receive some of the 35,000 jobs in Iraqi security institutions that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has reportedly proposed to be allocated to militia members who disarm.[41]
Shia sources added to Iraqi media that Iraqi political parties with militia wings devised this plan following Zaydi’s meeting with US Special Envoy to Iraq and Syria Tom Barrack in mid-June, during which Barrack pressured Zaydi to implement several reforms related to reducing Iranian influence in Iraq.[42] A Shia source told Iraqi media on June 28 that Barrack presented Zaydi with a plan for “investment in exchange for arms.”[43] The United States would support US investment in Iraq in exchange for Zaydi’s government limiting Iranian influence in Iraq by disarming the militias, dismantling corrupt financial networks, and removing militia-aligned figures from senior-level government positions.[44] Regional media similarly suggested on June 17 that the United States is conditioning economic support for the Iraqi government on the government meeting the United States’ demands.[45] The Iraqi federal government has taken initial steps to strengthen its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures following Barrack’s visit, including by replacing the Central Bank of Iraq governor with the head of the bank’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing reform office.[46] Zaydi’s government also began a large crackdown on corruption on June 27 in which Iraqi authorities have already arrested over 45 people throughout Iraq, particularly in Baghdad.[47] A Shia parliamentarian claimed on June 28 that most people who have been arrested are either Sunni or members of former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s parliamentary coalition but denied that the campaign is a political attack.[48]
Endnotes
[1] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2070987021930102919 [2] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2070987021930102919 [3] https://t.me/farsna/445249 [4] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/06/28/world/us-iran-strikes-hormuz/d458155b-4efc-5d1f-b72c-f66868287755?smid=url-share https://t.me/defapress_ir/62070 [5] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2071109263712190796?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/2071114136851804590?s=20 [6] https://t.me/farsna/445291 ; https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/06/28/world/us-iran-strikes-hormuz/f50ce8bc-5277-565a-961e-8a02354d6186?smid=url-share [7] https://www.npr.org/2026/06/18/nx-s1-5863027/us-iran-trump-memorandum-of-understanding-full-text [8] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/5837756/ [9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/how-iran-hopes-to-control-the-strait-of-hormuz-its-not-just-about-fees [10] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/joint-statement-following-the-ministerial-meeting-of-the-united-states-and-the-gulf-cooperation-council-gcc/ [11] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202606277973 [12] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2026/06/26/771126/strategic-dilemma-persian-gulf-states-between-american-pessure-iran-postwar-leverage [13] https://x.com/PressTV/status/2071031546501300620?s=20 [14] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-5-2026/ [15] https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2070940344967893212?s=20 ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/trilateral-framework-between-the-united-states-of-america-the-state-of-israel-and-the-republic-of-lebanon/ [16] https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2070940344967893212?s=20 [17] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/trilateral-framework-between-the-united-states-of-america-the-state-of-israel-and-the-republic-of-lebanon/ [18] https://t.me/moriahdoron/32064 [19] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2069745452501582194 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/31980 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75046 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/17541 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/75102 [20] https://t.me/moriahdoron/32064 [21] https://t.me/sameralhajali/8215 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/256194 [22] https://t.me/sameralhajali/8215 [23] https://x.com/i24NEWS_HE/status/2071280336944713740 [24] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/weakening-hezbollah-requires-faster-international-support-to-lebanon/ [25] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-warns-lebanon-will-have-no-life-if-state-moves-against-it-2025-08-15/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-15-2025/ [26] https://t.me/sameralhajali/8215 [27] https://t.me/mehrnews/390923 ; https://t.me/defapress_ir/62113 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/8228 ; https://t.me/defapress_ir/62001 ; https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl ; https://t.me/Nournews_ir/367595 [28] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-27-2026/ [29] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-900702 [30] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-900702 [31] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2071262557864681929 [32] https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/76340 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/76299 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/76355 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/8238 [33] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2071083795814469774?s=20 [34] https://almadapaper dot net/441014/ [35] https://almadapaper dot net/441014/ [36] https://almadapaper dot net/441014/ [37] https://almadapaper dot net/441014/ [38] https://almadapaper dot net/441014/ [39] https://almadapaper dot net/437645/ [40] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2026-2/ [41] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/خاص-الزيدي-يقترح-مقايضة-سلاح-الفصا-ل-بمشاريع-ميركية ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/خاص-الزيدي-يقر-خطة-دمج-الفصا-ل-35-لف-فرصة-عمل-مقابل-تسليم-السلاح [42] https://almadapaper dot net/437645/ ; https://almadapaper dot net/441014/ [43] https://almadapaper dot net/441014/ [44] https://almadapaper dot net/440334 [45] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/economy/خاص-وصول-دفعتين-من-الدولار-نقداً-إلى-بغداد-تزامنا-مع-زيارة-توم-براك [46] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-PM-appoints-new-central-bank-governor-investment-chief [47] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%BA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%B6-%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF ; https://ina dot iq/ar/political/266920-47.html [48] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ckb/story/922625/%DA%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%86%DB%8E%D9%88%DB%95%DB%8C-%D9%87%DB%95%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87%DB%95%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%DB%86-%D8%A8%DB%95%D8%B1%DB%95%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%88%D9%86%DB%95%D9%88%DB%95%DB%8C-%DA%AF%DB%95%D9%86%D8%AF%DB%95%DA%B5%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D9%84%DB%86%D9%BE%DB%8C-%D8%B3%DB%95%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%A8%DB%86-%D8%B9%DB%95%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%B2%DB%95%DB%8C%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D9%87%DB%95%DA%B5%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%88%DB%95
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