Iran Update Special Report, March 20, 2026

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Iran Update Special Report, March 20, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is still badly injured or otherwise incapacitated. The regime could easily dispel these rumors with a simple video but has not, despite having many incentives to do so. This comes as US officials have stated that Mojtaba was seriously wounded.

Iranian leaders have said that they will continue to impede international shipping around the Strait of Hormuz after the war ends. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said on X on March 17 that “the Strait of Hormuz situation won’t return to its pre-war status.”

Hezbollah claimed 55 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as targeting northern Israeli towns between 3:00 PM ET on March 18 and 3:00 PM ET on March 19. Most of Hezbollah’s claimed attacks targeted Israeli forces and military sites in southern Lebanon and northern Israel.

Toplines

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is still badly injured or otherwise incapacitated. Mojtaba has yet to appear in public or in any new images or videos since becoming the supreme leader on March 8.[1] The regime has instead recycled old images and videos of him and issued only written statements.[2] This continued absence has fueled rumors about Mojtaba’s status. The regime could easily dispel these rumors with a simple video, but has not, despite having many incentives to do so. This comes as US officials have stated that Mojtaba was seriously wounded.[3]

Mojtaba emphasized narrative control, economic resilience, and regional policy in his Nowruz written statement on March 20.[4] Mojtaba claimed that Iran’s adversaries had tried to exploit economic grievances and target senior leaders in order to “create fear” and collapse the regime.[5] Mojtaba warned that adversaries used media operations to target the “minds and psyches of people” and undermine national unity.[6] Mojtaba also urged domestic media to avoid emphasis on internal weaknesses.[7] Mojtaba announced the Iranian New Year slogan as “Resistance Economy in the Shadow of National Unity and National Security” and reinforced the regime’s emphasis on economic self-sufficiency and resilience.[8] Mojtaba also emphasized relations with neighboring states, highlighted shared religious, cultural, and strategic ties, and called on Afghanistan and Pakistan to improve relations.[9] Mojtaba also falsely claimed that Iran and the Axis of Resistance did not conduct their recent attacks into Turkey and Oman.[10] He described the attacks as part of an Israeli “false flag tactic” meant to create division between Iran and its neighbors.[11]

Iranian leaders have said that they will continue to impede international shipping around the Strait of Hormuz after the war ends. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said on X on March 17 that “the Strait of Hormuz situation won’t return to its pre-war status.”[12] Expediency Discernment Council member Mohammad Mokhber stated on March 19 that there will be a ”new regime for the Strait of Hormuz” following the war.[13] He said that Iran can use its position along the strait to “sanction [the West] and prevent their ships from passing through this waterway” even after the war ends.[14] Iran has recently allowed certain vessels to transit the strait through an IRGC-managed “safe corridor.”[15] A Tehran parliamentarian said on March 19 that the Iranian parliament is considering a proposal to impose fees on vessels that seek to transit the Strait of Hormuz.[16] Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei wrote in his first statement since becoming the supreme leader that Iran will forcefully ”extract reparations from the enemy” and will “take” or destroy US and Israeli assets.[17] Daily oil exports from the Middle East have fallen by at least 60 percent since the start of the war.[18]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian missile and drone infrastructure to degrade the Iranian ability to retaliate. An Israeli OSINT account reported on March 20 that the combined force conducted three strikes targeting the IRGC Chamran missile base in Jam, Bushehr Province.[19] The combined force previously struck and damaged above-ground structures at the missile base, according to commercially available satellite imagery from March 6.[20]

The combined force has continued to suppress and degrade Iranian air defense capabilities. An Iranian OSINT account reported on March 19 that the combined force struck the 4th Artesh Ground Forces Aviation base in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.[21] The combined force previously struck the base on March 7.[22] Anti-regime media separately reported smoke rising from multiple explosions near Shiraz International Airport, Fars Province, on March 20.[23] The 7th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase is co-located at Shiraz International Airport.[24] The combined force has repeatedly struck the 7th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase since the start of the conflict.[25] The combined force separately struck the 9th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, according to an Iranian OSINT account on March 20.[26] The combined force previously struck the 9th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase on March 10.[27]

The combined force has continued to strike Iran’s defense industrial base to prevent it from rebuilding its missile, drone, and air defense capabilities. The IDF struck unspecified weapons production and long-range ballistic missile component and launcher production sites in Tehran Province on March 20.[28] An Israeli analyst published US Central Command footage on March 20 that shows the combined forces striking a ballistic missile production site at Simin Dasht Industrial Town in Alborz Province on March 11.[29]

An Israeli OSINT account citing FIRMS data assessed on March 19 that the combined force struck the IRGC Shahid Borujerdi logistics support headquarters in Tehran City, Tehran Province.[30]

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian internal security sites across Iran. The combined force reportedly targeted the IRGC Ground Forces 41st Sarallah Division headquarters in Kerman City, Kerman Province, on March 20.[31] The headquarters is co-located with the division’s 38th Zolfaghar Independent Armored Brigade. This brigade deployed to Syria to support the Bashar al Assad regime.[32] An OSINT account posted a photo of an explosion on March 20 and claimed that a strike targeted the Kolahdouz IRGC base in Shahmirzad, Semnan Province.[33] The user could be referring to a Basij base in the area. The combined force separately struck a Basij base in Semnan City, Semnan Province, as well as an IRGC intelligence building on Kakh Street in Tehran.[34]

An Israeli outlet reported on March 19 that the combined force conducted “heavy” strikes targeting IRGC positions on Qeshm Island.[35] Satellite imagery from March 17 shows that strikes have destroyed at least 19 buildings at the IRGC Navy base and Basij base on the island since the start of the war.[36] An OSINT account geolocated FIRMS data from March 5 and claimed that the combined force struck a military port, likely referencing the port at the IRGC Navy base.[37]

The IDF reportedly killed Basij Organization Intelligence Chief Esmail Ahmadi.[38] ISW-CTP assessed on March 19 that Israeli strikes targeting the Iranian internal security services, including decapitation strikes, have likely caused shock and confusion within the internal security apparatus and disrupted internal security operations to some degree.[39] The IDF also killed Basij Organization Commander Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani and his deputy Ghassem Ghoreyshi in airstrikes in Tehran on March 17.[40] The Basij is a paramilitary force generally designed for social control and civil defense.

The IDF also killed the following individuals in its ongoing decapitation strikes:

IRGC Spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini.[41] Naeini played a key role in spreading regime propaganda and disinformation. Naeini repeatedly issued threats to attack US and Israeli interests in the region. The United Kingdom sanctioned Naeini following the October 2024 Iranian missile attacks on Israel.[42]

IRGC Aerospace Force Commander in Esfahan Mehdi Ghoreyshi.[43] The IRGC Aerospace Force is the principal operator of the Iranian missile and drone arsenals. The combined force has targeted several missile, drone, and air defense sites in Esfahan Province since February 28 to degrade Iranian capabilities there.

The IDF also killed an Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry official, Mehdi Rostami Shamestan.[44] Shamastan played a role in promoting attacks against Israeli and Jewish civilians across the world.

Iranian Response

Iran launched 11 missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 19 and 3:00 PM ET on March 20.[45] One Iranian ballistic missile landed in an open area of Beit Shemesh, Central Israel, on March 20 but did not cause casualties or damage.[46] A previous Iranian missile strike on Beit Shemesh on March 1 killed at least nine people.[47] An Israeli OSINT account on X reported on March 20 that ballistic missiles landed in Ramallah in the West Bank, Rehovot, and Jerusalem.[48] Israeli media reported on March 20 that 70 percent of Iran’s launches against Israel have used cluster munitions and that the percentage is increasing.[49] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran likely began using cluster munition warheads to maximize the damage inflicted by its ballistic missiles, given their relatively low accuracy when fitted with standard warheads.[50] The IDF stated on March 20 that Iran is firing mostly from central Iran after Israel destroyed most of Iran’s missile launchers in western Iran, a process that began during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[51] An Israeli analyst stated on March 20 that Iran fired its latest barrage of missiles from Esfahan Province in central Iran.[52]

Iran continued to conduct drone and ballistic missile attacks against the Gulf states, which the Gulf states mostly intercepted. The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted four Iranian missiles and 26 drones on March 20.[53] The Kuwaiti Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted 15 of 25 Iranian drones on March 20, with eight of them landing harmlessly and two of them hitting Kuwait’s national oil company, which ISW-CTP reported on March 19.[54] The Saudi Defense Ministry said that it intercepted 38 Iranian drones on March 20.[55] The Bahrain Defense Force reported that it intercepted two Iranian missiles and four drones on March 20.[56] Regime-affiliated media stated on March 20 that Iran targeted a US Patriot defense system in Bahrain.[57]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed 55 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon as well as targeting northern Israeli towns between 3:00 PM ET on March 18 and 3:00 PM ET on March 19.[58] Most of Hezbollah’s claimed attacks targeted Israeli forces and military sites in southern Lebanon and northern Israel.[59] Hezbollah claimed three direct attacks against IDF forces in southern Lebanon.[60] Hezbollah claimed among these direct engagements that the group conducted two attacks using improvised explosive devices for the first time since the start of the conflict in Taybeh, Marjaayoun District, and Aitaroun, Bint Jbeil District.[61] Hezbollah also claimed seven rocket and drone attacks targeting Israeli military sites in northern Israel, including the IDF 91st Division headquarters.[62] Hezbollah previously claimed that it targeted the 91st Division headquarters on March 7.[63] Hezbollah also targeted several northern Israeli towns, including six claimed rocket and drone attacks targeting Kiryat Shmona.[64] Israel issued ”Red Alert” warnings for many of these northern Israeli towns on March 18 and 19.[65] Hezbollah is likely continuing to attempt to displace northern Israeli residents from their homes by targeting northern Israeli towns in order to increase political pressure on the Israeli government to halt its war effort against Iran.

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon. The IDF said that it has targeted and destroyed over 2,000 Hezbollah sites in Lebanon since March 2, including around 120 headquarters, over 100 weapons depots, and 130 rocket launchers.[66] The IDF said that it has also eliminated over 570 Hezbollah fighters, including about 220 Radwan Force members, about 150 rocket unit fighters, two “major general”-equivalent commanders, four “brigadier general”-equivalent commanders, and 22 “battalion commanders.”[67] The IDF said that the 36th, 91st, and 146th divisions are continuing to conduct raids against Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[68]

The United States and the UAE tried to disrupt Hezbollah-affiliated money laundering networks on March 20.[69] The United States sanctioned 16 individuals and entities on March 20, connected to Hezbollah financier Alaa Hassan Hamieh that fundraised and laundered over 100 million US dollars for Hezbollah since 2020.[70] The Hezbollah network operated front companies in Lebanon, Syria, Canada, Poland, and Slovenia.[71] One Hamieh affiliate, Hamdan Ali al Lakis, established a money exchange operation in Lebanon where Hamieh collected most of the profits for Hezbollah from his international laundering and fundraising network.[72] The US Treasury reported in early November 2025 that the IRGC Quds Force had transferred over one billion US dollars to Hezbollah using Lebanese money exchanges.[73] Emirati state media reported that Emirati authorities dismantled a Hezbollah and Iran-funded and operated “terrorist network” on March 20 that used commercial cover to launder money for Hezbollah.[74] Lebanon’s government strongly condemned this “terrorist plot” against the UAE and offered cooperation by Lebanese authorities to ensure that those responsible were held accountable.[75]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ front groups continued to conduct drone attacks targeting US forces and interests in Iraq and the region. Saraya Awliya al Dam, which is considered a front group for Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, claimed it conducted three “qualitative” operations targeting American bases inside Iraq within the past 24 hours.[76] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front group Jaysh al Ghadab reported that the Islamic Resistance conducted a drone attack on the US Victory Base near Baghdad International Airport.[77] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly claimed attacks targeting the former US Victory base since the start of the war.[78]

The combined force has continued to target Iranian-backed Iraqi militia positions. A security source told Iraqi media on March 19 that the combined force launched airstrikes targeting a 6th PMF Brigade base in northeast Salah al Din Province.[79] The source said that it was unclear whether the strikes caused casualties or damage to the base.[80] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Jund al Imam controls the 6th PMF Brigade.[81]

The United States, NATO, and European countries reportedly applied “intense pressure” on Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to compel Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah to temporarily and conditionally halt attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad.[82] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah offered on March 18 to temporarily and conditionally halt attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad.[83] An unspecified Iraqi security official told a Kurdish journalist that Kataib Hezbollah issued its statement after unspecified US, NATO, and European actors applied “intense pressure” on Sudani.[84] Sudani received a phone call from NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on March 19 to discuss the security situation in Iraq and the “dangerous escalation“ in the conflict.[85] Sudani reportedly shared the US and European concerns with senior Shia Coordination Framework leadership.[86] An unspecified coordination framework adviser confirmed to the Kurdish journalist that a majority of Shia Coordination Framework leaders “pushed for an immediate halt” to Kataib Hezbollah attacks.[87] Kataib Hezbollah‘s political wing is notably a member of the Shia Coordination Framework.[88] ISW-CTP previously assessed on March 19 that Kataib Hezbollah’s statement likely came in response to recent combined force strikes that targeted senior Kataib Hezbollah leaders, including a March 16 strike that killed Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson and security head Abu Ali al Askari and a March 13 strike in Baghdad that reportedly nearly killed the group’s leader, Abu Hussein al Hamidawi.[89]

NATO announced the withdrawal of NATO forces from Iraq on March 20. NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe US Air Force General Alexus Grynkewich reported that NATO has withdrawn all its forces from its advisory mission in Iraq.[90] The NATO mission in Iraq was originally established in 2018 to advise Iraqi security forces.[91] An unspecified NATO official told Reuters that “several hundred” NATO soldiers have withdrawn from the Middle East to Europe.[92] NATO said it will continue to advise Iraqi security forces from NATO’s headquarters in Naples, Italy.[93] An Iraqi Joint Operations Command official told Iraqi media that the NATO mission left the Union III base in Baghdad “temporarily” due to the current security situation.[94]

Iranian Internal Security

The Iranian regime is continuing to try to securitize the internal environment amid ongoing conflict and perceived instability. The IRGC Intelligence Organization is reportedly sending text messages to Iranian citizens, warning that their activity on opposition Telegram channels and Instagram pages is under surveillance and threatens prosecution for continued engagement.[95] The Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry and Law Enforcement Command separately reported multiple waves of arrests across Iran targeting individuals accused of links to opposition networks, information dissemination, or coordination with anti-regime actors.[96] Persistent internet disruptions and blackouts further support this effort by limiting communication and enabling tighter state control over the information space.[97]

Endnotes

[1] https://iranwire.com/fa/news-1/150110-%D9%86%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%82%D8%B7-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%88-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF/ ; https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cd03x12gr4zo [2] https://nypost.com/2026/03/12/us-news/iran-used-ai-on-newly-released-photo-of-irans-no-show-supreme-leader-khamenei/ [3] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/2034761893152162029?s=20 [4] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/12/29/3545599/ [5] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/12/29/3545599/ [6] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/12/29/3545599/ [7] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/12/29/3545599/ [8] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/12/29/3545599/ [9] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/12/29/3545599/ [10] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/12/29/3545599/ [11] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/12/29/3545599/ [12] https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2033972126948937872?s=20 [13] https://www.iranintl.comhttps//www.iranintl.com/en/202603196781 [14] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-considers-levying-transit-fees-ships-hormuz-strait-lawmaker-says-2026-03-19/ [15] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156656/Iran-establishes-safe-shipping-corridor-for-approved-and-paid-for-transits [16] https://www.iranintl.comhttps//www.iranintl.com/en/202603196781 [17] https://x.com/ME_Observer_/status/2032102626972610707?s=20 [18] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/middle-east-oil-exports-drop-least-60-hormuz-stays-mostly-closed-data-shows-2026-03-16/ [19] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2034945722089447592?s=20 [20] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026/ [21] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2034769774798876734?s=20 [22] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-7-2026/ ; https://t.me/kianmeli1/83180 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2030246113567973544/history ; https://x.com/ayatsubzero/status/2030238513279484383?s=20 [23] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2034957912553013518?s=20 [24] https://israel-alma dot org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Islamic-Revolutionary-Guard-Corps-Aerospace-Force-IRGC-ASF.pdf [25] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-17-2026/ ; https://t.me/BenTzionM/7135 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-11-2026/ [26] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2034995577235087647 ; [27] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-10-2026/ ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031310960237986086?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031310960237986086?s=20 ; https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2031249379458167079

[28] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2035038356640268300 ; https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2035041366351528428 [29] https://t.me/BenTzionM/7163 ; https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2034722725323821095?s=20 [30] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2034776945892712809?s=20 [31] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2034830788173189620?s=20 [32] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf [33] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2034919195343733105?s=20 [34] https://x.com/mamlekate/status/2034952271620968650?s=20 ; https://x.com/WillUnderhill23/status/2034964882538258559?s=20 ; https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2035046104186683683 [35] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2034716866749292898?s=20 [36] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2034716866749292898?s=20 [37] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2029659286368923687?s=20 [38] https://www.didbaniran dot ir/بخش-سیاسی-3/277527-اسرائیل-اسماعیل-احمدی-معاون-اطلاعات-بسیج-را-ترور-کرد [39] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-19-2026 [40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2033826032667496787?s=20 ; https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2033984460039872903?s=20 [41] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034921804913885404 [42] https://www.bvifsc.vg/sites/default/files/14_october_2024_-irn0236-_ali-mohammad_naini.pdf [43] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2034927713299902690?s=20 [44] https://x.com/IDF/status/2034994335242944624?s=20 [45] Data available upon request. 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[59] Data upon request. 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