Iran Update Special Report, March 28, 2026

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Iran Update Special Report, March 28, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

 The Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack and a drone and cruise missile attack targeting southern Israel on March 27 and 28, marking the group’s first involvement in the war. The Houthis’ decision, as of now, to participate in the war by conducting drone and missile attacks against Israel instead of attacking international shipping suggests that the Houthis may be pursuing a relatively cautious approach designed to avoid an immediate escalation with the United States and Israel.

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s Telegram channel published an infographic about the regime’s long‑standing concept of a “resistance economy” on March 28. The publication of this type of infographic is disconnected from the present economic and social realities, particularly amid the ongoing military conflict. The publication of this infographic may also reflect an effort to portray Mojtaba as an active leader amid reports that he is seriously wounded.

Iran and Russia have held “very active” discussions in March about transferring a limited shipment of “upgraded” Russian drones to Iran, according to US and European officials speaking to the Associated Press. This report follows recent Western media reports that Russia is providing Shahed drones to Iran.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on March 28 that Ukraine and Qatar signed a 10-year defense agreement that includes developing technologies, air defenses, counter-drone measures, military training, experience sharing, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence (AI), and control systems.

The combined force continued to strike Iranian defense industrial sites, including Iran’s Marine Industries Organization (MIO) and Parchin Military Complex in Tehran City and the Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA) in Bushehr Province.

US Central Command stated on March 27 that US forces struck a border guard outpost in Siranband, Kurdistan Province, along Iran’s western border with Iraqi Kurdistan.

Toplines

The Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack and a drone and cruise missile attack targeting southern Israel on March 27 and 28, marking the group’s first involvement in the war.[1] Israeli air defense systems intercepted both attacks, and neither attack caused any injuries.[2] Israeli air defense systems intercepted a Houthi drone over Eilat in southern Israel. Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed that the Houthis launched a barrage of ballistic missiles targeting “sensitive” Israeli military sites in southern Israel and a barrage of drones and cruise missiles targeting “vital and military sites” in southern Israel.[3] The spokesperson stated that the Houthis will continue to conduct unspecified operations until the United States and Israel cease their operations against Iran and the Axis of Resistance.[4] The Houthis repeatedly conducted drone and missile attacks targeting Israel and international shipping during the October 7 War.[5] The Houthis launched multiple drone and missile attacks targeting Israel during the 12-Day War in June 2025.[6] ISW-CTP has not recorded any Houthi attacks on international shipping since September 2025.[7] The Houthis’ decision, as of now, to participate in the war by conducting drone and missile attacks against Israel instead of attacking international shipping suggests that the Houthis may be pursuing a relatively cautious approach designed to avoid an immediate escalation with the United States and Israel.

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s Telegram channel published an infographic about the regime’s long‑standing concept of a “resistance economy” on March 28.[8] The publication of this type of infographic is disconnected from the present economic and social realities, particularly amid the ongoing military conflict. The infographic explained the “path to defeating the enemy in the economic war,” and emphasized the themes of national unity and sanctions evasion.[9] Mojtaba recently declared ”resistance economy in the shadow of national unity and national security” as Iran’s Nowruz slogan.[10] Mojtaba’s predecessor and father, Ali Khamenei, had for years called for the development of a “resistance economy” to resist Western economic pressure, particularly international sanctions.[11] The publication of this infographic may reflect an effort to project normalcy and portray Mojtaba as a conventional Supreme Leader, particularly around Nowruz, when it is customary for the Supreme Leader to highlight his chosen Nowruz slogan. The publication of this infographic may also reflect an effort to portray Mojtaba as an active leader amid reports that he is seriously wounded.[12]

Iran and Russia have held “very active” discussions in March about transferring a limited shipment of “upgraded” Russian drones to Iran, according to US and European officials speaking to the Associated Press.[13] An unspecified US defense official stated that the scale, frequency, and transport method of the potential shipment remain unclear.[14] The United Kingdom’s latest intelligence assessment indicates that Russia has already provided Iran with drone‑related training, intelligence, and electronic warfare support.[15] This report follows a March 25Financial Times report, citing Western intelligence, that Russia is close to completing a phased delivery to Iran of unspecified drones alongside food and medicine.[16] The Financial Times reported that officials said that Russia is likely only able to supply Iran with systems such as Geran‑2 drones and denied Iran’s request for S‑400 air defense systems.[17] Israeli media separately reported on March 19 that Russia had begun providing Iran with modified Shahed drone components and satellite imagery to support Iranian strikes in the region.[18] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told CNN on March 15 that Russia had been providing Iran with drones with ”Russian details.“[19]  Russia began domestically producing Shahed drones in 2023 and has adapted them to increase their firepower and defensive capabilities.[20] These adaptations include equipping Shaheds with Verba shoulder‑fired man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to increase their capacity to target enemy aircraft.[21] Iran recently purchased 500 Verbas and 2,500 9M336 infrared homing missiles from Russia in December 2025, according to the Financial Times in February 2026.[22]

NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW’s March 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment:

Ukraine continues to conclude bilateral defense cooperation agreements with Gulf states. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on March 28 that Ukraine and Qatar signed a 10-year defense agreement that includes developing technologies, air defenses, counter-drone measures, military training, experience sharing, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence (AI), and control systems.[23] Zelensky stated that the agreement includes building joint production factories in both Ukraine and Qatar.[24] Zelensky stated that Ukraine will soon conclude a similar agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) but noted that these agreements do not mean that Ukraine is obligated to help defend these states.[25] Ukraine and Saudi Arabia concluded a defense cooperation agreement on March 27.[26] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine can offer the United States and US allies in the Middle East unique insights into how to counter Iranian strikes, as the Ukrainian military has institutionalized and operationalized the fighting experience that Ukraine has learned throughout the past four years of war.[27]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has continued to degrade Iran’s ability to launch missile attacks by targeting Iranian missile bases and production facilities. The combined force struck the Yazd Missile Base in Yazd Province on March 28.[28] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account published a video on March 28 that shows two missiles being launched from the Yazd Missile Base.[29] It is unclear whether Iranian forces launched the two missiles before or after the combined force strikes. The combined force has struck the Yazd Missile Base at least six times since the beginning of the war.[30] The combined force last struck the base on March 27 after Iranian forces launched a missile from the base. The Yazd Missile Base is a deeply buried underground missile complex with extensive tunnel networks.[31]  The IDF separately targeted a site used to produce a variety of munitions and a Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)-affiliated site used for developing advanced explosive charges in Yazd Province on March 28.[32]

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian defense industrial targets across Iran to degrade Iran’s ability to produce military systems. The IDF struck Iran’s Marine Industries Organization (MIO) in Tehran on March 28.[33] MIO is a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and oversees the production of naval systems and vessels for the Iranian armed forces.[34] The combined force separately struck the Parchin Military Complex in eastern Tehran on March 28.[35] The complex is controlled by the DIO and is used to produce advanced munitions, including drones and missiles.[36] Western officials have long suspected that Iranian activities at the site could be relevant to nuclear weapons development.[37] The combined force additionally struck the Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA) in Bushehr Province on March 28, which supports Iran’s maritime industrial base.[38] The United States sanctioned SADRA in 2012 for being a subsidiary of the Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters.[39] The Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters is an IRGC-controlled civil engineering and construction firm that dominates broad swaths of the Iranian economy.[40]

The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities in order to maintain air dominance over parts of Iran. The IDF struck a site involved in producing air defense system components in Arak, Markazi Province, on March 28.[41] The combined force also struck the Bushehr Airport and the adjacent Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Airbase in Bushehr Province on March 28.[42]

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian steel factories that likely support Iran’s defense industrial base. The combined force struck the Kavir Steel Company in Kashan, Esfahan Province, on March 28.[43] Steel is used to produce a variety of weapons, and the United States has previously sanctioned Iranian steel companies for generating revenue that the Iranian regime uses to support its nuclear program and Axis of Resistance.[44] The IDF struck two major Iranian steel plants on March 27, including the Mobarakeh Steel Company in Esfahan Province and the Khuzestan Steel Company near Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[45]

US Central Command stated on March 27 that US forces struck a border guard outpost in Siranband, Kurdistan Province, along Iran’s western border with Iraqi Kurdistan.[46] The Siranband border crossing connects Sulaymanieh Province in Iraqi Kurdistan to Kurdistan Province in Iran.[47]

Anti-regime media reported on March 28 that the combined force struck the Artesh 44th Artillery Group in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.[48] It is unclear what the combined force specifically targeted at this site. The 44th Artillery Group is located near the Artesh 55th Artillery Group and the IRGC Ground Forces Saheb ol Zaman Unit.[49]

OSINT accounts reported on March 28 that the combined force struck the Physics Department at Iran’s University of Science and Technology (IUST) in Tehran.[50] IUST is designated by the US Department of Defense as an entity “engaged in problematic activity.”[51] IUST has been involved in research related to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[52] The IDF killed an Iranian nuclear scientist who was a graduate of IUST during the 12-Day War.[53] The IDF also killed Saeed Shamghadari in a strike in Tehran Province on March 23.[54] Anti-regime media described Shamghadari as an IUST professor who was involved in efforts to localize Iran’s missile industry.[55]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that US Sailors and Marines aboard the USS Tripoli arrived in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility on March 27.[56] The USS Tripoli is an America-class amphibious assault ship and is the flagship of the Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group.[57]

Iranian Response

Iran has launched six missile barrages at Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.[58] An Iranian cluster munition impacted in Ramat Gan on March 27, killing one man.[59] An Israeli military correspondent reported on March 28 that an Iranian missile hit Moshav Eshtaol, damaging homes and injuring 11 people.[60] ISW-CTP assessed on March 27 that Iran may be trying to maximize the effects of its limited capacity to launch large missile salvos at Israel by launching small missile salvos throughout the day to impose psychological costs on Israeli civilians.[61]

Iran continued to attack the Gulf states on March 28. Iran launched five drones and one missile at Saudi Arabia between 2:00 PM ET on March 27 and 2:00 PM ET on March 28.[62] The Bahrain Defense Force said on March 28 that it intercepted 23 Iranian drones and 20 missiles.[63] Several Iranian drones struck Kuwait International Airport on March 28, damaging a radar system and setting some fuel tanks on fire.[64] Omani authorities stated on March 28 that two Iranian drones struck the Salalah Port, causing some damage and injuring a worker.[65] Danish container shipping company Maersk said it temporarily halted its loading operations at the port due to the attack.[66]  The Abu Dhabi Media Office separately reported on March 28 that debris from a ballistic missile interception injured six people and ignited three fires in the Khalifa Economic Zone.[67]

The Qatari Defense Ministry said on March 28 that it intercepted several Iranian drones.[68] This marks the first Iranian attack targeting Qatari territory since US President Donald Trump warned on Truth Social on March 18 that the United States would “massively blow up the entirety” of the South Pars Gas Field if Iran attacked Qatar again.[69] Trump’s warning came after Iran struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City and damaged Qatari liquefied natural gas facilities on March 18.[70]     

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response 

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 53 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli communities, between 2:00 PM ET on March 27 and 2:00 PM ET on March 28.[71] The IDF said on March 28 that Hezbollah had launched about 250 rockets from southern Lebanon within a 24-hour period.[72] Hezbollah claimed seven drone attacks targeting IDF positions and sites in northern Israel. An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF intercepted five Hezbollah drones in northern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on March 27 and 2:00 PM ET on March 28, while one Hezbollah drone impacted in an unspecified open area in northern Israel.[73] Hezbollah has also continued to attempt to defend against Israeli ground activity in Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed on March 27 that it fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), mortars, and drones targeting IDF forces attempting to advance in Taybeh, Marjaayoun District.[74] Hezbollah also said that it conducted 13 attacks on IDF forces in al Biyyadah, Marjaayoun District, including a combined rocket, drone, and mortar attack.[75]

The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah positions throughout Lebanon.[76] The IDF said on March 28 that it has struck more than 170 Hezbollah targets in Lebanon in recent days and killed more than 800 Hezbollah fighters since the start of the war.[77] Two sources familiar with Hezbollah’s casualty count told Reuters on March 27 that Israel has killed more than 400 Hezbollah fighters since March 2.[78] The IDF struck dozens of Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon on March 27 and 28, including weapons storage facilities, launchers, and buildings.[79] The IDF killed two news correspondents who worked for Hezbollah-controlled and -affiliated news outlets on March 28.[80] The IDF said that one of the correspondents was a member of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force.[81] The IDF also announced on March 28 that it killed senior Hezbollah commanders Ayyoub Hussein Yaacoub and Yasser Mohammad Mubarak, who were members of Hezbollah’s communications unit.[82] Both individuals had previously held positions in Hezbollah’s rocket unit.[83]

The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on March 24. The Brigade Combat Team of the 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division) has destroyed more than 100 Hezbollah sites in recent days.[84] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade was operating in Taybeh, southeastern Lebanon.[85] Geolocated footage posted on March 28 shows Israeli forces conducting a controlled demolition of a building in Taybeh.[86] The Brigade Combat Team of the 7th Brigade, which also operates under the 36th Division, located a weapons cache that included RPGs, mines, and small arms.[87] It is unclear where this brigade is operating. The IDF said on March 28 that IDF 91st Division forces shelled and killed an armed Hezbollah fighter operating in the same area as Israeli forces.[88] The IDF said on March 28 that IDF 162nd Division forces killed multiple Hezbollah fighters, including a fighter who shot at Israeli forces.[89] The IDF also said that IDF 146th Division forces killed four Hezbollah fighters who fired rockets at Israeli forces.[90]

The IDF announced on March 28 that nine Israeli soldiers were wounded in southern Lebanon on March 27.[91] Hezbollah anti-tank fire seriously injured one soldier and moderately injured another soldier.[92] Hezbollah rocket fire targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon seriously wounded one soldier and moderately injured six other soldiers.[93]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against US interests and Israel. The combined force struck an  Asaib Ahl al Haq headquarters in Wasit Province on March 27.[94] An OSINT account reported on March 27 that aircraft struck unspecified Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) sites in Jurf al Sakhr, which is a Kataib Hezbollah stronghold south of Baghdad.[95] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[96] The combined force has repeatedly struck militia positions in Jurf al Sakhr since the start of the war.[97] The combined force also conducted airstrikes targeting the PMF Northern and East Tigris Operations Command headquarters in Kirkuk Province on March 28, killing three PMF fighters and wounding six others.[98]  

Unspecified actors conducted a drone attack targeting Iraqi Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani’s home in Dohuk Province on March 28.[99] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing. Iraqi security sources stated that one drone crashed near Barzani’s house, which was empty at the time, and caused a fire.[100] Air defenses shot down a second drone.[101] Multiple Iraqi political figures, including Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, and the IRGC condemned the attack.[102] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously threatened to attack Kurdish interests due to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s perceived cooperation with Israel, the United States, and Kurdish opposition groups.[103]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah announced on March 27 that it will extend its temporary and conditional suspension of attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad for an additional five days.[104] This marks the second time that Kataib Hezbollah has extended its pause on attacks on the embassy.[105] An Iraq analyst previously assessed that Kataib Hezbollah may have paused its attacks on the embassy due to mounting political and military pressure on the group.[106]

Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted separate one-way drone attacks targeting the Majnoon oil field in Basra Province and the Iraqi Balad Airbase in Salah al Din Province on March 28.[107] No group has claimed responsibility for either attack at the time of this writing. Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted several drone attacks targeting the Majnoon oil field and Balad Airbase since the start of the war.[108] Hundreds of US contractors who are employed at Balad Airbase to support the Iraqi government’s F-16 fighter jet program are “stranded” at the base, according to three sources speaking to The Guardian on March 18.[109]

Iranian Internal Security

Iranian security forces arrested individuals in Khuzestan, Ardabil, Kerman, Esfahan, Tehran, and Sistan and Baluchistan provinces on March 28.[110] The Iranian Intelligence Ministry reported that security forces arrested 19 individuals allegedly linked to US-Israeli networks in Khuzestan, Ardabil, and Kerman provinces.[111] The ministry announced that security forces also killed five “separatist militants” who had “bombed” civilian sites in an unspecified location.[112]

Other Activity

Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul announced on March 28 that Thailand reached an agreement with Iran to allow Thai oil tankers to pass through the Strait of Hormuz safely but did not provide further details about the agreement.[113]

Thailand is the first country that has publicly announced an “agreement” with Iran about passage through the strait. UK-based shipping intelligence firm Lloyd’s List reported on March 18 that India, Pakistan, Iraq, Malaysia, and China are negotiating with Iran to allow their vessels to transit through an IRGC-managed “safe corridor” in the strait.[114] Lloyd’s List reported on March 23 that over 20 vessels had taken the Iranian-approved route through the strait, passing by Larak Island for the IRGC to verify their vessel details.[115] Lloyd’s List reported that at least two vessels paid Iran a fee in exchange for safe passage through the strait.[116]

Endnotes

[1] https://x.com/Yahya_Saree/status/2037988448695730298?s=20; https://x.com/Yahya_Saree/status/2037793153122697591?s=20 [2] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037791120571187659?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037941188292952443?s=20 [3] https://x.com/Yahya_Saree/status/2037988448695730298?s=20; https://x.com/Yahya_Saree/status/2037793153122697591?s=20

[4] https://x.com/Yahya_Saree/status/2037988448695730298?s=20 [5] Data upon request [6] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1933709446544285753 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934510400092987747 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934513005573669159 ; https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1937860615508472295 [7] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1971226159108194784 [8] https://t.me/rahbar_enghelab_ir/134 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-20-2026/ [9] https://t.me/rahbar_enghelab_ir/134 [10] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-20-2026/ [11] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/imce-imagesToumajA_Irans-Resistance-Economy-Implications_november2014-1.pdf [12] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/11/world/middleeast/khamenei-iran-leader-injured.html [13] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-drones-shahed-war-israel-ukraine-840b4f885d99714bdb7813c0d56213cf [14] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-drones-shahed-war-israel-ukraine-840b4f885d99714bdb7813c0d56213cf [15] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-drones-shahed-war-israel-ukraine-840b4f885d99714bdb7813c0d56213cf [16] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-26-2026/ ; https://www.ft.com/content/d5d7291b-8a53-42cd-b10a-4e02fbcf9047?syn-25a6b1a6=1

[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-26-2026/ ; https://www.ft.com/content/d5d7291b-8a53-42cd-b10a-4e02fbcf9047?syn-25a6b1a6=1 [18] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-19-2026/ ; https://www.mako dot co.il/pzm-soldiers/Article-2eae2aaae860d91026.htm; https://x.com/shailevy6/status/2034682284175942071?s=20

[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-15-2026/ ; https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/15/world/video/gps-0315-zelensky-on-iran-drones [20] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/09/world/europe/iran-russia-drone-factory.html?smid=nytcore-android-share ; https://www.ft.com/content/3135edf7-2b80-4df4-9923-b96382d2fee5 ; https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/08/europe/russia-drone-factory-iran-intl ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-27-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2026/ [21] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/ [22] https://www.ft.com/content/d034cc1a-f5fb-494e-a3c1-466e8e80ed82?syn-25a6b1a6=1 [23] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18461; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18460; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2037855177428844601; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-ta-emir-derzhavi-katar-domovilisya-pro-pa-103585 https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2037881168251527552 [24] https://suspilne dot media/1275694-nam-vistacae-svoei-vijni-zelenskij-pro-ucast-ukrainskih-vijskovih-u-blizkomu-shodi/

[25] https://suspilne dot media/1275694-nam-vistacae-svoei-vijni-zelenskij-pro-ucast-ukrainskih-vijskovih-u-blizkomu-shodi/

[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/

[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/

[28] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2037905185352081731 ; https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2037801145008026078 [29] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2037911318959636700 [30] https://t.me/BenTzionM/6917 ; https://t.me/BenTzionM/7036 ; https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2033882701330035096 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2035821960685306085 ; https://twitter.com/Osint613/status/2037541130380710284 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2037905185352081731

[31] https://www.independentpersian.com/node/419777 [32] https://x.com/IDF/status/2037806218438230051 [33] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2037929539796394227 [34] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/marine-industries-group [35] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2037917170223485391

[36] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/factbox-irans-parchin-military-site-idUSBRE84U0D1/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-says-it-targeted-site-used-irans-nuclear-programme-2026-03-12/ [37] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/factbox-irans-parchin-military-site-idUSBRE84U0D1/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-says-it-targeted-site-used-irans-nuclear-programme-2026-03-12/

[38] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2037872508209086854 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2037895013103792597 [39] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1509 [40] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg539 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-27-2023 [41] https://x.com/IDF/status/2037806218438230051

[42] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2037895013103792597 https://www.globalsecurity dot org/military/world/iran/bushehr-afb.htm [43] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2037710612168314981 ; https://x.com/IranIntlbrk/status/2037881664471171078 [44] https://2017-2021.state.gov/state-department-advisory-on-the-export-of-metals-products-to-iran/?safe=1 ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1044 ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm524

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[58] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037622903416528964?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037628582705471965?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037656774677840226?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037851666913833426?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037921076869517634?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037952542290702500?s=20 [59] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2037645498438345033 ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hyy11e00vowx [60] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2037861078487474310 ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/r1tzcnbowg

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[95] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2037667929068560840 ; https://alhurra dot com/en/14420 [96] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/ [97] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-12-2026/ [98] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/ثلاثة-قتلى-من-الحشد-الشعبي-بقصف-كركوك ; https://al-hashed.gov dot iq/2026/03/28/اعتداءات-غادرة-تستهدف-مقر-قيادة-عمليا/

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[103] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-5-2026/ ; https://t.me/Al_Nojaba/1322 ; https://t.me/AbumujahidAlasaf/6 [104] https://t.me/AbumujahidAlasaf/6 [105] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-23-2026/ ; https://t.me/AbumujahidAlasaf/5 [106] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-19-2026/ ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5595 ; https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2034419663858278888 ; https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2032773359159714237 ; https://x.com/Mustafa_salimb/status/2033192823416148438 [107] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سقاط-مسيرة-حاولت-استهداف-قاعدة-بلد-الجوية-في-صلاح-الدين ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سقوط-طا-رة-مسيرة-على-حقل-مجنون-النفطي-جنوبي-العراق

[108] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-13-2026/ ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-12-2026/ [109] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/18/us-contractors-stranded-iraq-iran [110] https://t.me/defapress_ir/53949; https://t.me/mehrnews/365278; https://t.me/mehrnews/365276 ; https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/189684

[111] https://t.me/defapress_ir/53949 [112] https://t.me/defapress_ir/53949 [113] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2037766146745565537?s=20 [114] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156656/Iran-establishes-safe-shipping-corridor-for-approved-and-paid-for-transits [115] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156694/Zombie-tankers-take-Tehran-Toll-Booth-route-as-more-vessels-make-detour [116] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156694/Zombie-tankers-take-Tehran-Toll-Booth-route-as-more-vessels-make-detour

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