Iran Update Special Report, May 11, 2026

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Iran Update Special Report, May 11, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

Key Takeaways

Iranian leaders are trying to dictate the terms for ending the war, which illustrates that the Iranian regime perceives that it has the upper hand in the conflict at this time. Iran’s proposed terms would require the United States to give up its leverage over Iran before any negotiations could take place, which would likely make it more challenging to extract nuclear concessions from Iran. Iran has not provided any guarantees that it would engage in nuclear negotiations, let alone make nuclear concessions, even if the United States accepted its terms.

Commercially available maritime data appears to indicate that some vessels may be complying with Iran’s new transit regulations in the Strait of Hormuz. Recognition of Iran’s “sovereignty” over the strait would fundamentally remake regional and global maritime norms in a manner extremely detrimental to US interests.

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-run media claimed that the Iranian regime has deployed 10,000 first-person view (FPV) drones to the Artesh Ground Forces since the 12-Day War in June 2025. Iranian forces would likely use these drones to try to defend against potential ground operations in Iranian territory.       

Iran is likely providing Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with FPV drone technology. Hezbollah and Iraqi militias have consistently conducted attacks targeting Israeli and US forces and assets using FPV drones during the current conflict.

Toplines

Iranian leaders are trying to dictate the terms for ending the war, which illustrates that the Iranian regime perceives that it has the upper hand in the conflict at this time. Iran’s proposed terms would require the United States to give up its leverage over Iran before any negotiations could take place, which would likely make it more challenging to extract nuclear concessions from Iran. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Baghiyatollah Sociocultural Headquarters Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari stated on May 11 that Iran will not enter negotiations with the United States until the United States accepts Iran’s terms.[1] Jafari stated that Iran’s terms include an end to the war on “all fronts,” the lifting of sanctions, the release of frozen Iranian assets, compensation for war-related damages, and recognition of Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.[2] Jafari is a long-time member of the IRGC and previously served as the IRGC commander between 2007 and 2019.[3] Jafari, along with other IRGC officials such as IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, pushed for Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment after the death of Ali Khamenei.[4] Jafari has ties to Vahidi dating back to the Iran-Iraq War, and the terms he outlined likely reflect Vahidi’s negotiating position.[5] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency echoed Jafari’s remarks and emphasized that Iranian demands include an end to the US naval blockade and Iranian “management” of the Strait of Hormuz.[6] These terms would fulfill Iran’s war aims while stripping the United States of its leverage in future negotiations.

Iran has not provided any guarantees that it would engage in nuclear negotiations, let alone make nuclear concessions, even if the United States accepted its terms. The Wall Street Journal reported on May 10 that Iran offered to halt enrichment for a period of less than 20 years and dilute or transfer its highly enriched uranium in its recent counterproposal to the United States.[7] Tasnim News Agency rejected the Wall Street Journal report and claimed that the report was “not based on reality,” especially its content related to Iran’s nuclear materials.[8] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami told Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission members on May 11 that nuclear technology and enrichment are not negotiable.[9] Commission members emphasized the need to protect Iran’s nuclear facilities, preserve Iran’s nuclear achievements, and defend Iran’s nuclear rights.[10]

Commercially available maritime data appears to indicate that some vessels may be complying with Iran’s new transit regulations in the Strait of Hormuz.[11] Recognition of Iran’s “sovereignty” over the strait would fundamentally remake regional and global maritime norms in a manner extremely detrimental to US interests. Commercially available maritime data shows that 21 vessels have transited through the Strait of Hormuz since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff, including nine vessels that entered the strait and 12 that exited it.[12] Eight of the 21 vessels used the Iranian-approved transit route.[13] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency also claimed that several vessels used the Iranian-approved route on May 11.[14] Some of the vessels that transited through the strait self-reported their destination as the nationalities of their owners and crews, likely to avoid being attacked by Iranian forces. Some vessels similarly declared the nationalities of their owners and crews while passing through the Red Sea to avoid Houthi attacks during the Houthis’ attack campaign against international shipping between October 2023 and November 2024.[15] The high number of vessels that used the Iranian-approved transit route suggests that these vessels may have complied with Iranian transit regulations. Iran’s “Persian Gulf Strait Authority” recently outlined on May 6 a series of stringent conditions that vessels must meet if they wish to safely pass through the strait.[16] These conditions include paying Iran a fee and providing extensive information about the vessel’s owner and crew. Iran has also continued to selectively allow only certain ships to transit through the Strait. Bloomberg reported on May 11 that a tanker carrying liquified natural gas (LNG) from Qatar turned away from the strait after approaching an area that Iran claims to control, while IRGC-affiliated media claimed that Iran prevented the vessel from passing through the strait.[17]

US President Donald Trump told Fox News on May 11 that he is considering renewing “Project Freedom” as part of a larger military operation against Iran.[18] Trump previously launched Project Freedom on May 3 to guide commercial vessels through the strait and undermine Iran’s effort to control shipping through the strait.[19]

Reuters reported on May 7 that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has taken steps to continue exporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz despite Iranian efforts to “control” the strait.[20] Iran’s recent attacks against the UAE may have been intended, in part, to impose a cost on the UAE for violating Iran’s regulations in the strait and to demonstrate Iran’s “control” over the waterway. Reuters, citing industry sources and shipping data firms, reported that the UAE has taken steps, such as turning off its ships’ automatic identification systems (AIS) and using ship-to-ship transfers, to evade Iranian detection.[21] The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) used these methods in April 2026 to export at least 6 million barrels of crude oil on four tankers from the UAE, including from Fujairah Port. Iran conducted a drone attack against an unspecified target in the Fujairah Petroleum Industrial Zone on May 4.[22] Iran also attacked an ADNOC tanker with drones as it attempted to pass through the strait on May 4.[23] Iran may have conducted these attacks in response to the UAE ignoring Iranian transit regulations in the strait and to demonstrate Iran’s “control” over traffic in the strait.

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-run media claimed that the Iranian regime has deployed 10,000 first-person view (FPV) drones to the Artesh Ground Forces since the 12-Day War in June 2025.[24] Iranian forces would likely use these drones to try to defend against potential ground operations in Iranian territory. Defa Press claimed on May 10 that the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry and Artesh Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization have supplied the Artesh Ground Forces with 10,000 FPV drones and “related ammunition” in recent months.[25] The outlet added that the Artesh Ground Forces began integrating FPV drones at the brigade level following the 12-Day War in June 2025.[26] The integration of FPV drones at the brigade level suggests that the drones are likely intended to confront potential ground operations.[27] Iran could also use FPV drones in operations against Kurdish and Baloch militants in northwestern and southeastern Iran, respectively.[28]

Iran is likely providing Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with FPV drone technology. Hezbollah and Iraqi militias have consistently conducted attacks targeting Israeli and US forces and assets using FPV drones during the current conflict.[29] FPV drones, particularly fiber-optic FPV drones, have enabled Hezbollah to conduct successful high-precision attacks on Israeli military targets at a relatively low cost.[30] An Israeli research organization reported on May 11 that most fiber-optic FPV drones cost Hezbollah between $300 and $400 USD per unit, whereas radio-controlled FPV drones cost over $1,000 USD per unit.[31] Fiber-optic FPV drones are also resistant to jamming because they do not emit a transmission signal that electronic warfare systems can disrupt.[32] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has also struggled to disrupt Hezbollah’s FPV drone capabilities because Hezbollah has decentralized its command-and-control (C2) network for FPV drone operators and dispersed them across various units in southern Lebanon.[33] An Israeli military correspondent reported on May 11 that the IDF has killed less than 10 of Hezbollah’s roughly 100 FPV drone operators during the current conflict due to Hezbollah’s decentralized C2 network.[34] Hezbollah has demonstrated the capability to use FPV drones in cross-border attacks on sensitive military equipment. The group recently posted video footage of two FPV drone attacks damaging an Israeli Iron Dome missile defense battery near the Israel-Lebanon border on May 7 and 8, for example.[35] IDF sources confirmed on May 11 that a Hezbollah drone struck an Iron Dome battery and announced that the IDF is investigating the incident.[36]

The Defa Press report comes after The Economist reported on May 8 that Russia offered to provide Iran with 5,000 short-range fiber-optic drones, citing Russian intelligence documents likely from the first six weeks of the US-Israel-Iran War.[37] Russia reportedly also offered Iran an unspecified number of longer-range satellite-guided drones equipped with Starlink terminals as well as training for Iranian personnel to operate both systems.[38] One of the diagrams in the Russian intelligence documents depicted Russian-trained Iranian drone operators attacking an amphibious landing force through coordinated drone swarms launched from concealed positions in response to a US operation to reopen the Strait of Hormuz or seize Kharg Island.[39]

Maritime Development

See topline text.

US and Israeli Air Campaign

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Internal Dynamics

Iran is attempting to rebuild its internal security apparatus, likely in part due to concerns about renewed public unrest. The combined force struck multiple Iranian internal security institutions during its six-week campaign in February and March.[40] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated during a meeting with Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan and other LEC commanders on May 11 that his administration will “seriously pursue and provide” the LEC with equipment and resources to rebuild damaged LEC facilities.[41] This meeting comes after anti-regime media reported on April 28 that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) convened a meeting chaired by SNSC Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr—a close ally of IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi — to discuss the possible resumption of protests due to worsening economic conditions.[42] It is notable that Pezeshkian met with Radan because Pezeshkian is one of Iran’s officials who is most concerned about Iran’s struggling economy. Pezeshkian has previously emphasized the importance of financial gains from negotiations, such as sanctions relief and the release of frozen Iranian assets, as necessary for Iran to pay for the estimated $300 billion USD in losses from the war with the United States and Israel.[43]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response 

The IDF is reportedly preparing to expand its ground operations in Lebanon due to Hezbollah’s ongoing attacks, specifically FPV drone attacks, against Israeli targets. An IDF source told Israeli media on May 11 that IDF ground forces are preparing for an expanded ground operation in the event that Israel’s political echelon approves such an operation.[44] The Israeli Air Force and Israeli officials have recently called for the IDF to expand its operations in southern Lebanon to combat the threat of Hezbollah FPV drones.[45] The IDF has expanded the scope of its airstrikes in Lebanon over the past week, including conducting strikes in the Bekaa Valley and north of the Litani River.[46] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir previously instructed the IDF to target Hezbollah’s FPV drone production and supply chain infrastructure “beyond southern Lebanon.”[47] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reiterated on May 11 that Hezbollah’s FPV drone operators are mostly in parts of southern Lebanon beyond the IDF’s “yellow line.”[48] The IDF also struck a Hezbollah drone launch site in southern Lebanon on May 9.[49] This strike is notable because the IDF has rarely targeted Hezbollah drone launch sites or operators in the current conflict, as noted above.[50] An unspecified IDF source noted that the strike marked the beginning of a new “offensive policy” in which the IDF will conduct more strikes to disrupt Hezbollah’s drone activity and kill Hezbollah drone operators.[51]

The IDF’s preparations come amid US and Lebanese efforts to secure a lasting ceasefire and ahead of direct negotiations between Lebanese and Israeli officials. A Lebanese source recently told Saudi media on May 8 that the United States is engaged in serious efforts to secure a ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel before the start of direct negotiations.[52] Lebanese and Israeli officials are scheduled to meet for direct negotiations in Washington, DC, on May 14 and 15.[53] Israeli and Lebanese military officials, including the IDF Strategic Division head and the Lebanese Armed Forces attaché in Washington, General Oliver Hakme, will attend the meeting, unlike previous talks that solely included ambassadors.[54] Unspecified sources confirmed to Lebanese media on May 11 that the upcoming talks ”will not be like its predecessors” and will have a greater focus on disarming Hezbollah.[55] Israeli media confirmed that the talks will focus on Hezbollah disarmament, border issues, and Lebanon’s demand for an Israeli withdrawal, but reiterated that Israel will not withdraw from Lebanese territory until Hezbollah is disarmed.[56] The Lebanese government is focused on securing a lasting ceasefire in Lebanon before addressing other issues, however.[57] A Lebanese source confirmed to Saudi media that Lebanon will not discuss key issues until a ceasefire is secured.[58]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Nothing significant to report.

Endnotes

[1] https://t.me/farsna/434872 [2] https://t.me/farsna/434872 [3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-doesnt-expect-major-israeli-retaliation-revolutionary-guards-ex-chief-says-2024-10-22/ [4] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/16/world/middleeast/iran-mojtaba-khamenei-election-supreme-leader.html [5] https://iranwire.com/en/features/65973/ [6] https://t.me/TasnimNewsEN/59605 [7] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-trump-news/card/iran-s-lengthy-response-to-the-u-s-leaves-some-gaps-jVJkux8wKbRUWK9EOOp9 [8] https://t.me/TasnimNewsEN/59605 [9] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/833451 [10] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/833451 [11] Starboard Maritime Data, available by subscription [12] Starboard Maritime Data, available by subscription [13] Starboard Maritime Data, available by subscription [14] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/414599 [15] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/maritime-sources-expect-houthis-halt-red-sea-attacks-after-gaza-deal-2025-01-16/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthi-attacks-merchant-ships-red-sea-2025-01-16/ [16] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-must-not-rule-the-strait-of-hormuz/ [17] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-11/another-qatar-lng-shipment-approaches-hormuz-bound-for-pakistan ; https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/197326 [18] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/2053853026708811953?s=20 [19] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4476318/us-military-supports-launch-of-project-freedom-in-strait-of-hormuz/ [20] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/hungry-sell-uae-slips-hidden-oil-tankers-through-strait-hormuz-2026-05-07/ [21] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/hungry-sell-uae-slips-hidden-oil-tankers-through-strait-hormuz-2026-05-07/ [22] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uaes-fujairah-says-fire-breaks-out-petroleum-complex-after-iranian-drone-attack-2026-05-04/ ; https://x.com/mofauae/status/2051340515694751923?s=20 [23] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/tanker-hit-by-unknown-projectiles-off-uaes-fujairah-ukmto-says-2026-05-04/ [24] https://t.me/defapress_ir/58509 [25] https://t.me/defapress_ir/58509 [26] https://t.me/defapress_ir/58509 [27] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2026/ [28] https://t.me/defapress_ir/57198; https://t.me/presstv/187564; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-29-2026/ [29] https://t.me/mmirleb/15878 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15959 ; https://t.me/Jaysh_AlGhadab/223 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1605 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-31-2026/ [30] https://t.me/mmirleb/15959 ; https://israel-alma dot org/special-report-hezbollahs-fpv-explosive-drone-threat/ [31] https://israel-alma dot org/special-report-hezbollahs-fpv-explosive-drone-threat/ [32] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/2026_q2/Article-b5d78530be51e91026.htm ; https://israel-alma dot org/special-report-hezbollahs-fpv-explosive-drone-threat/ [33] https://t.me/moriahdoron/30732 [34] https://t.me/moriahdoron/30732 [35] https://t.me/mmirleb/15959 [36] https://t.me/moriahdoron/30732 [37] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-8-2026/; https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/05/07/secret-document-reveals-russias-plans-to-aid-iran [38] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-8-2026/; https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/05/07/secret-document-reveals-russias-plans-to-aid-iran [39] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-8-2026/; https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/05/07/secret-document-reveals-russias-plans-to-aid-iran [40] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-19-2026 [41] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2053752158315594063?s=20 [42] https://www.iranintl.com/202604277990?source=share-link [43] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/23/world/middleeast/iran-new-leadership-generals.html [44] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/2026_q2/Article-b5d78530be51e91026.htm [45] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-894837 [46] https://www.newarab.com/news/lebanon-israeli-strikes-kill-four-bekaa-despite-ceasefire ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1505960/another-deadly-day-in-lebanon-as-israeli-army-intensifies-strikes-in-the-bekaa-valley.html [47] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/byujmvmabg#google_vignette [48] https://t.me/moriahdoron/30732 [49] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2053155171333517676 [50] https://www.mako.co dot il/pzm-soldiers/Article-9f12b7eedc01e91026.htm ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/30732 [51] https://www.mako.co dot il/pzm-soldiers/Article-9f12b7eedc01e91026.htm [52] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5271102-us-aims-consolidate-lebanon-israel-ceasefire-negotiations [53] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/article-895587 [54] https://www.nidaalwatan dot com/article/380804-حزب-الله-يشن-هجوم-الذعروخطة-ضرب-الدولة-الموازية-تنطلق-الخميس ; https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/international/artc-in-3rd-round-of-israel-lebanon-talks-israel-says-idf-withdrawal-not-under-discussion-before-hezbollah-disarmament ; https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5271102-us-aims-consolidate-lebanon-israel-ceasefire-negotiations [55] https://www.nidaalwatan dot com/article/380804-حزب-الله-يشن-هجوم-الذعروخطة-ضرب-الدولة-الموازية-تنطلق-الخميس [56] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/international/artc-in-3rd-round-of-israel-lebanon-talks-israel-says-idf-withdrawal-not-under-discussion-before-hezbollah-disarmament [57] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5271102-us-aims-consolidate-lebanon-israel-ceasefire-negotiations ; https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/2053760973027074557?s=20 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/lebanon-urges-us-put-pressure-israel-stop-attacks-demolitions-2026-05-11/ [58] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5271102-us-aims-consolidate-lebanon-israel-ceasefire-negotiations

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