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Iran Update Special Report, May 13, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its military capabilities during the ceasefire period are consistent with the behavior of any military organization when given time and space to reconstitute itself after combat. These tactical and operational reconstitution efforts, however, do not necessarily offset the strategic effects achieved during the war against ballistic missile production facilities.
Iran’s growing emphasis on the Strait of Hormuz reflects a broader, emerging consensus around the idea that the Strait of Hormuz must be central to Iranian strategy and deterrence in the future. Iranian strategy before October 7 and the events thereafter, including the Spring 2026 war, revolved primarily around ballistic missiles, drones, and its proxy and partner network as deterrents and force projection tools. Naval assets around the Strait of Hormuz featured only secondarily and as part of this wider three-pillar system.
Some regime officials and outlets have floated new ideas about how the regime could use the Strait of Hormuz to discourage behavior that the regime believes is contrary to its interests. Many of these proposals, if accepted and operationalized, would also provide Iran with new revenues that would enable it to reconstitute its military forces.
Some regional states appear to be complying with Iranian-imposed transit procedures in the Strait of Hormuz, which normalizes Iran’s claim that vessels need Iranian permission to transit the waterway. Five unspecified sources told Reuters on May 12 that Iraq and Pakistan reached agreements with Iran to move crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the strait.
Toplines
Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its military capabilities during the ceasefire period are consistent with the behavior of any military organization when given time and space to reconstitute itself after combat. ISW-CTP has continued to assess that Iran will exploit the ceasefire period to reorganize and regenerate its military capabilities at the tactical and operational levels, where it can recover relatively quickly.[1] Recent leaked US intelligence assessments, as reported by Western media, estimate that Iran has regained access to 90 percent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities, many of which remain at least partially operational, that were buried due to US-Israeli airstrikes.[2] Iranian forces have likely also reestablished communications between units and commanders and begun restoring force morale—both of which were disrupted during the war due to US-Israeli airstrikes and had significantly degraded Iran’s ability to conduct operations to achieve its objectives.[3] Recent US intelligence assessments also estimate that Iran still has about 70 percent of its mobile launchers and 70 percent of its prewar missile stockpile, including both ballistic and cruise missiles.[4] US forces buried some of these assets during combat operations, which rendered the buried assets combat ineffective. Any military force, including the Iranians, would use the time and space granted by the ceasefire to reconstitute itself. The restoration of underground missile storage and launch facilities means that Iran was degraded operationally and then prepared itself for a new round of fighting. US forces have surely also prepared for a new round of fighting. Russia has reportedly supported Iranian reconstitution efforts by sending drone components to Iran.[5]
These tactical and operational reconstitution efforts, however, do not necessarily offset the strategic effects achieved during the war against ballistic missile production facilities. The US-Israeli combined force aimed to disrupt the Iranian missile force at the operational level to prevent it from executing its campaign plan while degrading it at the strategic level in order to prevent it from expanding its stockpile and building more advanced systems.[6] The combined force struck virtually every element of the production and supply chain at the strategic level, from raw material facilities (preparing steel, aluminum, missile fuel, etc.) to final assembly plants, and severely degraded Iran’s defense industrial base that supports its military capabilities.[7] Iran’s long-term recovery depends on rebuilding this defense industrial base, a process likely constrained by limited access to resources due to the US naval blockade and ongoing sanctions targeting Iranian illicit oil sales and the procurement of weapons-related systems and components.[8] Iran will need significant time and resources to rebuild these capacities and will likely face challenges in reconstituting its military capabilities, given the scale of the damage to the production chain and limited resources available.
Iran’s growing emphasis on the Strait of Hormuz reflects a broader, emerging consensus around the idea that the Strait of Hormuz must be central to Iranian strategy and deterrence in the future. Iranian strategy before October 7 and the events thereafter, including the Spring 2026 war, revolved primarily around ballistic missiles, drones, and its proxy and partner network as deterrents and force projection tools. Naval assets around the Strait of Hormuz featured only secondarily and as part of this wider three-pillar system, not as the main element. The failure of Iran’s direct attacks on Israel in 2024 exposed the limits of Iran’s missile arsenal, which failed to effectively penetrate Israeli defenses or destroy critical military targets at scale.[9] Iran’s traditional deterrence architecture also failed to prevent repeated US and Israeli strikes in 2024, 2025, and 2026.[10] The series of US and Israeli attacks over the last two years demonstrates that traditional Iranian measures have failed to discourage or prevent military attack. This has led to a shift wherein Iranian officials have begun to elevate the position of the strait in Iranian strategic thinking and discourse. Iranian officials are now viewing the strait as co-equal to nuclear weapons in achieving deterrence, while also enabling Tehran to extract revenue and compel states to follow Iranian rules and regulations about behavior towards Tehran.[11]
Some regime officials and outlets have floated new ideas about how the regime could use the Strait of Hormuz to prevent actions that the regime believes are contrary to its interests. Artesh Spokesperson Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia stated on May 13 that Iran will no longer allow US weapons to pass through the strait to regional bases, which presumably includes US warships bound for Manama, Bahrain—the headquarters of the US 5th Fleet.[12] Such rules could extend to French or UK naval vessels as well, if those countries act in a manner that Tehran believes is contrary to Iranian interests. The United Kingdom (UK) has naval facilities in Bahrain, and France has naval facilities in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[13] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars and Tasnim news agencies recently published articles urging the regime to assert sovereignty over subsea fiber-optic cables running through the strait and charge foreign operators for using cables installed on seabeds under Iranian control.[14] Major subsea cables, including the Asia-Africa-Europe 1 (AAE-1), FALCON, and the Gulf Bridge International Cable System, run through the Strait of Hormuz and support digital connectivity between Asia, the Gulf, and Europe.[15] Three of seven cables–FALCON, GBICS, OMRAN/EPEG cables–connect to Iran and run through the strait.[16] Fars argued that “cables have the same status as ships” in the strait and that Iran can apply the same transit rules to fiber-optic cables that it applies to vessels.[17] Tasnim proposed requiring annual licenses from foreign cable operators and forcing major technology companies such as Google, Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon to operate under Iranian law.[18] Tasnim also proposed giving Iranian companies exclusive authority to repair and maintain the cables.[19] Such a system would undermine sanctions against Iran while also ensuring that Iran controls the economic lifeline—the internet—that many businesses in the Gulf rely upon. Iran could decide to throttle these cables if it felt doing so was desirable.
Many of these proposals, if accepted and operationalized, would also provide Iran with new revenues that would enable it to reconstitute its military forces. Iran’s military has suffered significant degradation to its industrial base. Rebuilding this industrial base under sanctions and with limited revenue would be extremely difficult and require challenging prioritization compromises between the missile program, for example, and internal security or infrastructure. Akraminia added that “strategic control” of the strait would provide Iran with new revenues and strengthen its power.[20]
Other regime outlets have floated military ideas to disrupt commerce further during the war. IRGC-affiliated Javan News previously implicitly threatened regional digital infrastructure on May 3 by warning that simultaneous damage to several major subsea cables, including through “deliberate actions,” could cause widespread disruptions to communications and digital infrastructure across the Persian Gulf.[21]
Some regional states appear to be complying with Iranian-imposed transit procedures in the Strait of Hormuz, which normalizes Iran’s claim that vessels need Iranian permission to transit the waterway. Five unspecified sources told Reuters on May 12 that Iraq and Pakistan reached agreements with Iran to move crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the strait.[22] Iraq reportedly secured safe passage for two large crude carriers, each carrying about two million barrels of crude oil, and is trying to secure Iranian permission for additional transits.[23] Two Qatari LNG tankers are also reportedly heading to Pakistan after Iran and Pakistan reached an agreement.[24] These arrangements would reinforce Iran’s effort to force regional states to treat Iranian approval as a prerequisite for safe passage through the Strait.
Regional and international efforts to bypass Iranian control of the strait indicate that Iran’s maritime coercion is imposing economic and security costs on the Gulf states and energy exports. The Wall Street Journal reported on May 12 that Gulf states have expanded overland trade and logistics routes across the Arabian Peninsula to reduce reliance on the strait, including routes through Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman.[25] Truck traffic at a Gulf of Oman port reportedly surged from 100 trucks per day before the conflict to 7,000 trucks per day.[26] Saudi Aramco is leaning on its East-West pipeline to Yanbu, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE is pushing more crude through Fujairah.[27] The Wall Street Journal added that these routes can help absorb market shocks but cannot replace maritime shipping capacity, however.[28]
Western countries have continued to make efforts to secure commercial shipping in the strait. This effort will reportedly not occur until after hostilities, however. Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles stated on May 13 that Australia will support a UK- and French-led multinational mission to secure shipping through the strait and will contribute an E-7A Wedgetail surveillance aircraft.[29] Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto stated on May 13 that Italy is repositioning two minesweepers closer to the Persian Gulf as a precautionary measure.[30]
Maritime Development
See the topline section.
US and Israeli Air Campaign
See the topline section.
Iranian Internal Dynamics
Nothing significant to report.
Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response
Hezbollah is demonstrating the ability to coordinate more complex attacks on Israeli military targets using first-person view (FPV) drones. Israeli media reported that Hezbollah conducted a two-wave attack targeting an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) site in northern Israel on May 12, using a “swarm” of several FPV drones.[31] Israeli media claimed that two drone impacts in the attack’s first wave caused a fire at the site, and that several drones in the larger second wave circled the site for several minutes before striking targets.[32] The IDF and Israeli media did not report any specific battle damage or casualties from the attack. Israeli reporting corresponds to Hezbollah’s claims that it launched at least five FPV drones targeting an IDF border post near Margaliot, northern Israel, on May 12.[33] Hezbollah claimed that it struck several military targets, including counter-drone electronic warfare equipment, at the site.[34]
The attack indicates that Hezbollah can conduct complex FPV drone attacks requiring coordination between several FPV drone operators, even if Hezbollah cannot yet deploy FPV drones at scale. Israeli media claimed the attack was the first instance of a coordinated, multiple-drone attack targeting a single site in Israel and Hezbollah’s most complex FPV drone attack yet.[35] Hezbollah has previously claimed to have conducted attacks using two FPV drones simultaneously.[36] The attack also indicates that Hezbollah’s decentralized command-and-control (C2) network for FPV drone operators, which has dispersed operators across various units in southern Lebanon, has not inhibited the group’s ability to conduct coordinated attacks.[37] Israeli reporting that several FPV drones circled the site for several minutes indicates that Israeli countermeasures largely failed to intercept the drones or prevent them from surveying targets.[38] ISW-CTP cannot confirm whether Hezbollah used fiber-optic FPV drones, which are impervious to Israeli jamming, in its attack on May 12.[39] A swarming attack using fiber-optic FPV drones would likely require more skilled operators and coordination to prevent drones from tangling their cables while surveying and striking targets in a single area of operations.
The IDF has further expanded the geographic scope of its airstrikes in Lebanon, amid continued Hezbollah attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. The IDF conducted three drone strikes targeting vehicles along Lebanon’s coastal highway in the Chouf District, which is located roughly 20 kilometers south of Beirut.[40] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported that the Israeli strikes on May 13 killed 12 people.[41] The IDF initially restricted its air and drone strikes to areas south of or in the vicinity of the IDF’s “Yellow Line” in southern Lebanon at the start of the temporary ceasefire, which began on April 16.[42] The IDF has expanded the scope of its airstrikes in Lebanon over the past week, including by conducting strikes in the Bekaa Valley and a strike in Beirut’s southern suburbs on May 6 that killed Hezbollah Radwan Force Commander Ahmad Ghaleb “Malik” Balout.[43] The Israeli Air Force and Israeli officials have recently called for the IDF to expand its operations in southern Lebanon to combat the threat of Hezbollah FPV drones.[44] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir previously instructed the IDF to target Hezbollah’s FPV drone production and supply chain infrastructure “beyond southern Lebanon.”[45] Israeli media reported on May 10 that the IDF has adopted a new offensive policy in which the IDF will conduct more strikes to disrupt Hezbollah’s drone activity and kill Hezbollah drone operators.[46] Hezbollah continues to conduct attacks against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and northern Israel with a variety of weapons systems, including FPV drones (see above).[47]
Other Axis of Resistance Response
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait struck multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militia positions in Iraq in early April, according to informed sources speaking to Western media on May 13.[48] One Western official and another person briefed on the matter told Reuters on May 13 that Saudi Arabia conducted airstrikes on sites near the Saudi-Iraq border from which Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched drone and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.[49] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have claimed multiple drone attacks targeting US bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain during the war.[50] Three Iraqi officials also told Reuters that unspecified actors launched at least two rocket attacks targeting during the war, including one that struck an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah facility in southern Iraq in early April, killing several fighters.[51] Iraqi media previously reported on April 7 that unspecified actors launched an attack from Kuwait targeting a Kataib Hezbollah-owned house in Basra Province.[52] ISW-CTP attributed this strike to the US-Israeli combined force at the time.[53] Protesters carrying Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) flags attempted to storm the Kuwaiti Consulate in Basra City on April 7 in response to the attack.[54] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service, but many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[55] Neither Saudi Arabia nor Kuwait has publicly acknowledged striking Iraqi territory at the time of this writing.
Endnotes
[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/applying-us-air-warfare-theory-and-doctrine-to-evaluate-the-campaign-against-iran-part-ii-iranian-missile-forces/ [2] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/12/us/politics/iran-missiles-us-intelligence.html [3] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/30/us/politics/iran-leaders-trump-war.html?unlocked_article_code=1.XFA.Q5G5.S1zgO9RY3XV1&smid=nytcore-ios-share ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hegseth-says-he-visited-us-troops-middle-east-2026-03-31/ ; https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2036908415956521033?s=20 [4] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/12/us/politics/iran-missiles-us-intelligence.html [5] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/09/world/middleeast/caspian-sea-iran-russia.html [6] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/applying-us-air-warfare-theory-and-doctrine-to-evaluate-the-campaign-against-iran-part-ii-iranian-missile-forces/ [7] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/applying-us-air-warfare-theory-and-doctrine-to-evaluate-the-campaign-against-iran-part-ii-iranian-missile-forces/ [8] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0465 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-12-2026/ ; https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2054175561036042261 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/applying-us-air-warfare-theory-and-doctrine-to-evaluate-the-campaign-against-iran-part-ii-iranian-missile-forces/ [9] https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/24/iran-israel-us-war-missile-nuclear-weapons-deterrence/ [10] https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-s300-radar-hit-isfahan-attack-ce6719d3df8ebf5af08b035427ee215c ; https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2025-12-18/iran-crisis-landscape-after-twelve-day-war ;
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-12-2026/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/12/world/middleeast/strait-of-hormuz-conrol.html ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-10-2026/ ; https://t.me/mehrnews/377775 ; https://yjcnews dot ir/fa/amp/news/9083761 [12] https://t.me/mehrnews/378911 [13] https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/proche-moyen-orient/forces-presence-au-proche-moyen-orient/forces-francaises-aux-emirats-arabes-unis ; https://www.navylookout.com/the-royal-navys-fading-presence-in-the-middle-east/ [14] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/414162 ; https://t.me/farsna/435121 [15] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/hormuz-digital-chokepoint-how-does-iran-war-threaten-subsea-cables-2026-04-28/ [16] https://www.submarinecablemap.com/ [17] https://t.me/farsna/435121 [18] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/414162 [19] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/414162 [20] https://t.me/defapress_ir/58686 ; https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/197500 [21] https://www.javanonline dot ir/fa/news/1355990 [22] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iraq-pakistan-strike-energy-deals-with-iran-tehran-flexes-hormuz-control-2026-05-12/ [23] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iraq-pakistan-strike-energy-deals-with-iran-tehran-flexes-hormuz-control-2026-05-12/ [24] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iraq-pakistan-strike-energy-deals-with-iran-tehran-flexes-hormuz-control-2026-05-12/ [25] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-new-route-around-hormuz-involves-a-massive-convoy-of-trucks-fdc306c3?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 [26] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-new-route-around-hormuz-involves-a-massive-convoy-of-trucks-fdc306c3?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 [27] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-new-route-around-hormuz-involves-a-massive-convoy-of-trucks-fdc306c3?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 [28] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-new-route-around-hormuz-involves-a-massive-convoy-of-trucks-fdc306c3?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 [29] https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-us-trump-china-xi-summit-ceasefire-peace-talks-stalled/#post-update-4dc42816 [30] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/italy-pre-positioning-2-minesweepers-closer-to-gulf-but-will-only-deploy-amid-stable-truce/ [31] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-hezbollah-launches-largest-drone-swarm-attack-on-israel-s-northern-border [32] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-hezbollah-launches-largest-drone-swarm-attack-on-israel-s-northern-border [33] https://t.me/mmirleb/16084 ; 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