Previous
Iran Update Special Report, May 17, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
The United States and Iran continue to pursue fundamentally incompatible negotiating positions. Unspecified sources familiar with the US response to the latest Iranian counterproposal told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News Agency on May 17 that the United States laid out its five main conditions in response to the latest Iranian proposal.
Likely Iranian or Iranian-backed forces launched three drones targeting the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on May 17. Radiation levels at the plant remain normal. The drones approached the target from the west. Iran has previously used drones to approach a target from an unexpected direction to obscure its responsibility and create challenges for air defenses. IRGC-affiliated media used the attack to attempt to drive a wedge between the UAE and other Gulf States by blaming Saudi Arabia for the attack.
Toplines
The United States and Iran continue to pursue fundamentally incompatible negotiating positions. Unspecified sources familiar with the US response to the latest Iranian counterproposal told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News Agency on May 17 that the United States laid out its five main conditions in response to the latest Iranian proposal.[1] The reported US response rejected war reparations, required Iran to transfer 400 kilograms of uranium to the United States, limited Iran to one operational nuclear facility, and refused to release more than 25 percent of frozen Iranian assets. The war would only end if negotiations were successful, and there would be no guarantees that the United States or Israel would not attack Iran in the future.[2]
Iran sent its most recent counterproposal to the United States on May 10, which US President Donald Trump later called “totally unacceptable.”[3] IRGC Baghiyatollah Sociocultural Headquarters Commander and former IRGC commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari stated on May 11 that Iran will not enter negotiations with the United States until the United States accepts Iran’s terms.[4] Jafari stated that Iran’s terms include an end to the war on “all fronts,” the lifting of sanctions, the release of frozen Iranian assets, compensation for war-related damages, and recognition of Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.[5]
The reported US conditions directly conflict with the demands that Iranian officials and senior IRGC officials publicly outlined on May 11.[6] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iranian officials sought terms that would result in the loss of US leverage before meaningful negotiations could begin, which would likely make it more difficult for the United States to secure major nuclear concessions from Iran.[7]
Likely Iranian or Iranian-backed forces launched three drones targeting the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on May 17.[8] Regime media attempted to drive a wedge between the UAE and Saudi Arabia by blaming Saudi Arabia for the attack.[9] Radiation levels at the plant remain normal. The Emirati Defense Ministry announced that its air defenses intercepted two drones while the other struck an electrical generator at the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in Abu Dhabi, causing a fire.[10] The Ministry noted that the attacks came from the direction of “the western border.”[11] The International Atomic Energy Agency stated that the radiation levels at Barakah remained normal and that no casualties were reported.[12]
Iran has previously used drones to approach a target from an unexpected direction to obscure its responsibility and create challenges for air defenses. Iranian forces attacked Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq in 2019 using several drones that Iranian forces fired from Iranian territory, but approached the target from the west, not the east.[13] The Houthi movement claimed the 2019 attack, even though there was little evidence of Houthi culpability.[14]
IRGC-affiliated media used the attack to attempt to drive a wedge between the UAE and other Gulf States by blaming Saudi Arabia for the attack. IRGC-affiliated media suggested on May 17 that Saudi Arabia launched the drones because it is the country to the west of the UAE.[15] Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated Defa Press Agency claimed on May 17 that the United States and Israel launched attacks against ”regional countries” and then attributed the attacks to Iran.[16] Iran has previously launched attacks against the UAE in an attempt to drive a wedge between the UAE and other Gulf states, likely in response to growing cooperation between the United States, Israel, and the UAE.[17]
Maritime Development
US Central Command (CENTCOM) said on May 17 that US forces have redirected 81 commercial vessels and disabled four since the blockade on Iranian ports began on April 13.[18]
US and Israeli Air Campaign
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Internal Dynamics
IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported on May 17 that Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf became Iran’s special representative for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) affairs.[19] Tasnim reported that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian proposed appointing Ghalibaf to the position, and Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei approved the appointment.[20] Tasnim highlighted that Ghalibaf’s appointment differs from previous PRC-related representative roles in terms of “level of authority.”[21] Iranian Ambassador to the PRC Abdolreza Fazli Rahmani previously served only as the president’s representative for PRC affairs, while former Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani served as the Supreme Leader’s special representative for PRC affairs.[22]
Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response
Nothing significant to report.
Other Axis of Resistance Response
Iraqi officials told the New York Times on May 17 that Israel built two clandestine outposts in the Iraqi desert in late 2024.[23] Western media previously reported on May 9 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) built one outpost near al Nukhayb, Anbar Province.[24] The IDF used this outpost for air support, refueling, and “medical treatment” during the 12-day war in June 2025, according to two regional officials speaking to the New York Times on May 17.[25] Israeli and Western media also reported in May 2026 that the IDF deployed commando units and search-and-rescue teams to this outpost before the start of the recent US-Israeli campaign in Iran to recover Israeli pilots if Iranian forces shot down Israeli fighter jets.[26] The New York Times reported that the outpost near al Nukhayb is no longer operational.[27] Two Iraqi officials, including senior Wisdom Movement official Hassan Fadaam, told the New York Times on May 17 that there is a second undisclosed Israeli outpost in the Iraqi desert.[28] The status and location of this second outpost were not specified, however.[29]
Two Iraqi security officials also told the New York Times on May 17 that the United States “compelled” Iraq to shut down its radars to protect US aircraft during the 12-day war in June 2025 and the recent conflict.[30] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors will likely use this report, in conjunction with the reports of Israeli bases in Iraq, to pressure the Iraqi government to pursue the purchase of advanced air defense systems. Several Iranian-backed Iraqi parliamentarians previously called on the Iraqi government to modernize its air defenses and diversify its arms supplies in June 2025.[31]
Endnotes
[1] https://t.me/farsna/436095 [2] https://t.me/farsna/436095 [3] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/833203/ ; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116552102914488206 [4] https://t.me/farsna/434872 [5] https://t.me/farsna/434872 [6] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-12-2026/ [7] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-11-2026/ [8] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2056014348993360147?s=20 [9] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/416030 [10] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2056014348993360147?s=20 ; https://x.com/ADMediaOffice/status/2055953520302682178?s=20 [11] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2056014348993360147?s=20 [12] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2055974241313361927?s=20 [13] https://www.npr.org/2019/09/19/762065119/what-we-know-about-the-attack-on-saudi-oil-facilities [14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/RPT-Kagan_Attribution-Intent-and-Response-3.pdf [15] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/416030 [16] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/834848/ [17] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2051666783627555127 ; https://x.com/modgovae/status/2051377907034157477 ; https://x.com/modgovae/status/2051377052998332472 ; https://x.com/modgovae/status/2052710247979250031; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-envoy-says-israel-sent-iron-dome-battery-personnel-uae-2026-05-12/ [18] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2056014991078158472 [19] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/415917 [20] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/415917 [21] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/415917 [22] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/415917 [23] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/17/world/europe/israel-iraq-iran-bases.html [24] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-built-and-defended-a-secret-iran-war-base-in-iraq-3590851a?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-built-and-defended-a-secret-iran-war-base-in-iraq-3590851a?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2 [25] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/17/world/europe/israel-iraq-iran-bases.html [26] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-10-2026/ https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-built-and-defended-a-secret-iran-war-base-in-iraq-3590851a?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2 ; https://www.maariv dot co.il/news/military/article-1319336 [27] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/17/world/europe/israel-iraq-iran-bases.html [28] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/17/world/europe/israel-iraq-iran-bases.html ; https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraq-s-al-Hikma-bloc-New-US-Envoy-a-Standard-Practice [29] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/17/world/europe/israel-iraq-iran-bases.html [30] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/17/world/europe/israel-iraq-iran-bases.html [31] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-iraq-after-the-israel-iran-war-june-13-july-3-2025/
Previous