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Iran Update Special Report, May 25, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
The United States and Iran continue to hold fundamentally different positions on most major issues within the US-Iran “agreement.” Iran has not publicly committed to removing its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpiles or to halting uranium enrichment in Iran, reinforcing broader uncertainty around the negotiations. US President Donald Trump said on May 25 that any deal with Iran must be “great and meaningful,” and explicitly rejected “anything like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).”
Iran has continued to claim that it and Oman control the Strait of Hormuz as territorial waters. Iranian officials are attempting to reframe transit tolls as “protection fees” to give Iran’s protection racket the veneer of legality. The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway under international law. Iran is claiming that the strait is territorial waters and under the administration of “coastal” states. It is notable in this context that Iran does not define the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a coastal state, even though the UAE borders the strait.
US President Donald Trump urged on May 25 the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan to join the Abraham Accords.
Hezbollah drone operators have likely developed a rudimentary tactical approach to coordinate multiple small first-person view (FPV) drone strikes in a short period of time. The “swarm” attacks appear to employ three or more drones operating in a staggered but near-simultaneous manner. This system is extremely rudimentary and would either require a single commander to coordinate the attack or a preset, prioritized list of strikes that cannot be dynamically changed. Hezbollah will likely attempt to overcome the shortcomings of this tactical approach.
Toplines
The United States and Iran continue to hold fundamentally different positions on most major issues within the US-Iran “agreement.” Iran has not publicly committed to removing its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpiles or to halting uranium enrichment in Iran, reinforcing broader uncertainty around the negotiations. Iran has so far been unwilling to transfer its HEU stockpile outside Iran, and officials and media consistently assert that any US demand for zero enrichment—or even a return to Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — level enrichment at 3.6% — is a red line for Iran.[1] US President Donald Trump said on May 25 that any deal with Iran must be “great and meaningful,“ and explicitly rejected “anything like the JCPOA.”[2]
These two positions on the nuclear issue are fundamentally at odds, even as talks continue and the United States has offered various concessions to attempt to get Iran to give up on aspects of its nuclear program. Unspecified mediators also told the Wall Street Journal on May 25 that the United States is seeking firm upfront nuclear commitments and fears that Iran may delay on these commitments.[3] US officials have reportedly offered sanctions relief in return for Iran handing over its HEU stockpile, according to a senior US official, but unspecified mediators told the Wall Street Journal that Iran still seeks ”clearer guarantees” on sanctions relief and access to frozen assets.[4] An Iranian delegation, led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, met senior Qatari officials in Doha on May 25, reportedly to discuss negotiations, including Iran’s HEU stockpile and access to frozen assets, though no concrete outcomes have been publicly confirmed.[5] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Central Bank Governor Abdol Nasser Hemmati attended the meeting too.[6]
Saudi state media has continued to portray the talks in a positive light, even while public positions have so far failed to change. Saudi media stated on May 25 that a draft US–Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) outlines a phased deal involving a renewable 60‑day ceasefire, continued nuclear talks, regional de‑escalation, restoration of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, gradual sanctions relief, and partial release of frozen Iranian assets.[7] Saudi media did not elaborate as to whether or not either side had agreed to any of the provisions in the draft. Saudi media also reported that Iran is willing to transfer its HEU stockpile to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) but is seeking guarantees from the PRC before continuing with the agreement with the United States.[8] These outlets have previously been premature when discussing Iran’s threshold for agreement when it comes to its nuclear program, however. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media swiftly denied the Saudi media report on the MOU terms.[9]
Iran has continued to claim that it and Oman control the Strait of Hormuz as territorial waters. Iranian officials are attempting to reframe transit tolls as “protection fees” to give Iran’s protection racket the veneer of legality. The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway under international law. Iran is claiming that the strait is territorial waters and under the administration of “coastal” states. It is notable in this context that Iran does not define the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a coastal state, even though the UAE borders the strait.[10] The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson has attempted to reframe transit tolls as ”protection fees” and “environmental fees,” but both of these are tolls, and neither is legal in an international waterway.[11] Iran remains the only power that has threatened civilian shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during this war, meaning that its “protection fee” is a protection racket that ships must pay to avoid Iranian attack. US officials are explicitly against any fee system in the Strait of Hormuz, and this issue remains a core disagreement in ongoing talks.[12]
US President Donald Trump urged on May 25 the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan to join the Abraham Accords.[13] Trump said that Saudi Arabia and Qatar should be the first countries to do so and added that a failure to join the Abraham Accords “shows bad intention.”[14] Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan currently recognize Israel but are not members of the Accords.[15]
Hezbollah drone operators have likely developed a rudimentary tactical approach to coordinate multiple small first-person view (FPV) drone strikes in a short period of time. Hezbollah has posted at least three separate examples of these operations, which they call “swarm” attacks. Normal Hezbollah FPV drone attacks have a simple three-step process: first, a drone conducts reconnaissance. Next, commanders evaluate the drone footage in real-time to determine and select possible targets. Finally, a second drone executes the strike. The “swarm” attacks appear to employ three or more drones operating in a staggered but near-simultaneous manner.[16] The first drone selects and strikes its target.[17] The second drone then takes footage of the first drone’s target, likely to conduct a hasty battle damage assessment (BDA) to determine whether a re-strike is necessary.[18] A Hezbollah drone in a “swarm” attack in Biyyadah on May 15 re-struck a Humvee, for example, after an earlier drone struck the same target.[19] This footage also serves a propaganda role, and Hezbollah is releasing this footage publicly.[20] The second drone then conducts its own strike.[21] The Hezbollah drone operators repeat this process for each drone thereafter.[22] This system is extremely rudimentary and would either require a single commander to coordinate the attack or a preset, prioritized list of strikes that cannot be dynamically changed.
Hezbollah will likely attempt to overcome the shortcomings of this tactical approach. The requirement for a single commander and subsequent drones to execute the BDA slows Hezbollah’s targeting cycle and will prevent it from executing simultaneous attacks with drones. Hezbollah, as a learning military organization, will not be satisfied with these constraints and will seek to improve its approach, especially as the IDF develops new countermeasures.[23]
Hezbollah has illustrated this tactical approach in its publicly released video footage on at least three occasions. Hezbollah posted footage of several drones striking an IDF border post in northern Israel on May 12, which Israeli media and Hezbollah subsequently called a “swarm attack.”[24] Israeli media expressed concern over the increasingly complex Hezbollah capabilities in this instance.[25] Hezbollah also posted footage on May 24 showing an attack using several FPV drones to target Israel Defense Forces (IDF) vehicles and positions in Rachaf, Bint Jbeil District, on May 21.[26] Rachaf is adjacent to Haddatha, where Hezbollah recently fought a protracted engagement with IDF forces on May 20 and 21.[27]
Maritime Developments
See the topline section.
US and Israeli Air Campaign
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Internal Dynamics
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian ordered the Communications Ministry on May 25 to end the internet shutdown that Iran began in response to the January 2026 protest movement.[28] Internet access is expected to return to the pre-January “status quo.”[29] ISW-CTP has continuously assessed that Iran’s prolonged internet shutdown posed severe economic damage and accelerated unemployment, which likely increased pressure on regime stability.[30] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has not yet approved Pezeshkian’s order. An IRGC-affiliated media outlet questioned Pezeshkian’s ability to rescind the shutdown order, given that the SNSC originally issued the order.[31]
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
See the topline section.
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly divided over a US proposal to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and dissolve or integrate the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[32] A framework source told Iraqi media on May 25 that some framework members with armed wings threatened to leave the framework if it supports a US proposal to dissolve the PMF, while others expressed a willingness to disarm and engage with Iraqi politics in exchange for securing “senior positions” within the Iraqi government.[33] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, and Asaib Ahl al Haq, have political wings that are part of the framework and control some PMF brigades.[34] The details of this US proposal are unclear at the time of this writing. This report comes as an Iraqi committee comprised of Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, Prime Minister-designate Ali al Zaydi, and caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani is reportedly close to finalizing an “executive plan” to disarm the Iraqi militias.[35] The plan includes the confiscation of militias’ medium and heavy weapons and the restructuring of the PMF, according to a senior Iraqi political official speaking to regional media on May 9.[36] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq, including via militia disarmament, since early 2025, but has intensified its efforts in recent months due to militia attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region during the war.[37]
Endnotes
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/supreme-leader-says-enriched-uranium-must-stay-iran-iranian-sources-say-2026-05-21/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-21-2026/; https://x.com/aishahhasnie/status/2057439519817839095; https://x.com/Alihashem/status/2057459373945856483; https://t.me/defapress_ir/59542; https://t.me/defapress_ir/59539;
[2] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116635193825443617
[3] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-talks-bog-down-over-nuclear-program-sanctions-relief-31702b6f?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
[4] https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/24/middleeast/iran-us-proposed-deal-wwk-intl https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-talks-bog-down-over-nuclear-program-sanctions-relief-31702b6f?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rubio-says-us-will-find-another-way-if-iran-talks-fail-2026-05-25/; https://t.me/Nournews_ir/358733; https://t.me/defapress_ir/59564
[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rubio-says-us-will-find-another-way-if-iran-talks-fail-2026-05-25/; https://t.me/Nournews_ir/358733; https://t.me/defapress_ir/59564
[7] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DYxQwZ1EScM/
[8] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DYxEJLxihgF/
[9] https://tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/03/04/3600565
[10] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/358706
[11] https://t.me/mehrnews/381432
[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rubio-says-hormuz-tolling-system-would-make-iran-diplomatic-deal-unfeasible-2026-05-21/
[13] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116635193825443617
[14] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116635193825443617
[15] https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-that-recognize-israel
[16] https://t.me/mmirleb/16596 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16580 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16161
[17] https://t.me/mmirleb/16596 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16580 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16161
[18] https://t.me/mmirleb/16596 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16580 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16161
[19] https://t.me/mmirleb/16596
[20] https://t.me/mmirleb/16596
[21] https://t.me/mmirleb/16596
[22] https://t.me/mmirleb/16596 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16580 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16161
[23] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2052359108938887219?s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-7-2026/
[24] https://t.me/mmirleb/16161 ; https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-hezbollah-launches-largest-drone-swarm-attack-on-israel-s-northern-border
[25] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-hezbollah-launches-largest-drone-swarm-attack-on-israel-s-northern-border
[26] https://t.me/mmirleb/16580 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16452
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-20-2026/ ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16390 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16416 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16417 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16421 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16423
[28] https://t.me/farsna/437984
[29] https://t.me/farsna/437984
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-14-2026/
[31] https://t.me/farsna/437936
[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/
[33] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/انقسام-داخل-ال-طار-التنسيقي-بش-ن-حل-الحشد-وفصا-ل-تهدد-بالمغادرة
[34] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/pro-iran-militias-are-big-winners-iraqs-election ; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Iraq20-20ISF20PMF20Orders20of20Battle_0_0.pdf
[35]
https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5271010-three-member-committee-negotiates-washington-disarming-iraqi-factions ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/مهمة-محفوفة-بالمخاطر-الزيدي-يستعد-لـ-نزع-السلاح-عبر-لجنة-تزامنا-مع-مقترح-الصدر
[36] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5271010-three-member-committee-negotiates-washington-disarming-iraqi-factions
[37] https://almadapaper dot net/410670/ ; https://www.newarab dot com/analysis/iraqs-elections-high-stakes-vote-amid-us-iran-tug-war ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/10/secretary-rubios-call-with-iraqi-prime-minister-mohammed-shiaa-al-sudani-2
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