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Iran Update Special Report, May 29, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Key Takeaways
US President Donald Trump called for the Strait of Hormuz to “immediately open” without tolls and with the removal of mines. Iran has, in recent days, used force to try to create the reality that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s demands for “control” of the Strait of Hormuz directly contradict Trump’s position. These Iranian demands would be a fundamental change to long-held international maritime law and are at odds with the free flow of commerce.
US Central Command has continued to respond to Iranian efforts to use force to create the reality that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, most recently by issuing a notice to mariners and airmen on May 29 that the US Navy will conduct military operations north of the Musandam Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian officials continue to indicate that Iran will not accept or make concessions on US President Donald Trump’s most recent demands regarding Iran’s nuclear program, which include not producing a nuclear weapon and agreeing to “destroy” or move its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile.
The US Treasury Department has sanctioned five front companies supporting the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company on May 28, for facilitating Iranian oil shipments, including exports to the People’s Republic of China.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) denied Iranian claims that Iranian air defense systems downed US aircraft near Bushehr Province in southern Iran on May 28.
Saudi officials complained to the United States in early April that the UAE’s involvement in US-Israeli airstrikes on Iran increased the risk that Iran would target regional energy facilities, according to the Wall Street Journal. It is unclear on which day the UAE strikes began, based on this reporting, but Iran first struck Gulf energy infrastructure on March 1, when it hit a structure at Jabel Ali Port’s oil terminal in Dubai, UAE, and Ras Tanura Refinery in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.
Hezbollah has adapted to increasing IDF night operations by fielding thermal camera-equipped first-person view (FPV) drones that enable nighttime attacks, after the IDF began nighttime operations to make it harder for Hezbollah to launch FPV drone attacks on them. Hezbollah, subsequently, appears to be dictating the pace of adaptation to the IDF at this time by quickly overcoming relatively rudimentary Israeli countermeasures.
Toplines
US President Donald Trump called for the Strait of Hormuz to “immediately open” without tolls and with the removal of mines. Iran’s demands for “control” of the Strait of Hormuz directly contradict Trump’s position. These Iranian demands would be a fundamental change to long-held international maritime law and are at odds with the free flow of commerce. Trump stated on Truth Social that Iran must “immediately open” the strait with no tolls and remove remaining mines.[1] Trump’s definition of an “open” strait is different from Iranian officials’, however. Trump’s statement refers to the pre-war version of the strait – one in which international shipping was unencumbered by Iranian threats to fire at ships or mine waterways and Iranian efforts to disrupt shipping by moving traffic separation schemes and charging tolls on transiting vessels. Iranian officials and media continue to state that an “open” strait is one in which the IRGC Navy escorts vessels through an unrecognized traffic separation scheme in Iranian territorial waters, whether vessels pay a toll or not. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on May 29 that the strait has been and will continue to be under Iran’s “special measures,” including the blockage of commercial vessels that Iran deems “hostile” through coordination with Iranian authorities.[2] Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Ebrahim Azizi also stated on May 29 that Iran will pursue “management of the Strait of Hormuz” permanently.[3] IRGC-affiliated outlet Fars News Agency reported on May 29that Iran is preparing for arrangements to monitor ships, provide services, and ensure security in the strait.[4] All of these positions are at odds with the free flow of commerce on the ocean. The regime’s English-media outlet Press TV argued on May 29 that the Iran’s sovereignty over the strait is “non-negotiable” and represents a vital strategic tool for Iran to deter future US military action against Iran.[5]
Iran can try to establish its unrecognized traffic separation scheme for the Strait of Hormuz either by obtaining US and then International Maritime Organization (IMO) recognition of its traffic separation scheme or, failing that, by force. The IMO recognizes traffic separation schemes, which are governed by the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).[6] President Trump’s statement opposes the recognition of Iran’s traffic separation scheme.[7] This means that Iran would need to fire at or otherwise threaten ships in the strait in order to enforce its rules if Iran agreed to Trump‘s demands. Iran has repeatedly used force, including attacks on commercial vessels and naval mines, to force vessels to transit through its illegal traffic separation scheme and comply with Iranian transit regulations since March 4.[8] US efforts to blockade Iranian ships and ports and US strikes against Iran are part of an effort to prevent Iran from enforcing the coercive actions.
The IRGC is using force to try to create the reality that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) has continued to respond to Iranian efforts, most recently by issuing a notice to mariners and airmen on May 29 that the US Navy will conduct military operations north of the Musandam Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz.[9] The US Navy will target any vessels “engaged in, or supporting, mine-laying activities.”[10] The notice added that Iran continues to attempt to impede safe navigation and mine clearance in the strait.[11]
Iranian officials continue to indicate that Iran will not accept US President Donald Trump’s most recent demands regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Trump stated on Truth Social on May 29 that Iran must commit to not producing a nuclear weapon and agree to “destroy” or move its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile.[12] Iranian officials have indicated that Iran will not agree to these demands and therefore have refused to make concessions, however.[13] Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Ebrahim Azizi stated on May 29 that Iran does not intend to transfer its enriched uranium stockpile to a third country.[14] The committee’s spokesperson Ebrahim Rezaei also stated that Iran opposes suspending uranium enrichment or moving its HEU from Iranian territory because Iran is “victorious” and should make “maximum demands” of the United States.[15] Hardliner Parliamentarian and member of the Iranian negotiating team Mahmoud Nabavian stated on May 29 that Iran has the right to conduct nuclear research, development, and production without the interference of the United States, because it is a member of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreement.[16] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency also denied Western media reports on May 29 that Iran and the United States had agreed to a 60-day memorandum of understanding (MoU), adding that the sides did not reach a final agreement and that there was no discussion of Iran’s nuclear program. Tasnim added that Iran has ”repeatedly emphasized” that Iran will not accept any agreement until the United States has ”clarified” the status of Iranian frozen assets.[17]
The United States is continuing to apply economic pressure on Iran by targeting the networks that facilitate its illicit oil trade. The Iranian regime heavily relies on the oil trade to generate revenue.[18] The US Treasury Department sanctioned five front companies supporting the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company on May 28, for facilitating Iranian oil shipments, including exports to the People’s Republic of China.[19] The US State Department also sanctioned three entities and an individual linked to Iran’s petrochemical products trade and designated eight entities and eight vessels as blocked property for transporting Iranian petroleum or petrochemical products on May 28.[20]
CENTCOM denied Iranian claims that Iranian air defense systems downed US aircraft near Bushehr Province in southern Iran on May 28.[21] CENTCOM confirmed that all US air assets are accounted for. IRGC-affiliated media claimed that it intercepted a “hostile aircraft” over the Persian Gulf near Jam City, Bushehr Province, on May 28.[22]
The Wall Street Journal reported on May 29 that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) conducted dozens of airstrikes targeting Iran in coordination with the United States and Israel during the US-Israeli air campaign.[23] The Wall Street Journal added that Saudi officials complained to the United States in early April that UAE strikes increased the risk that Iran would target regional energy facilities.[24] Unspecified people familiar with the matter told the Wall Street Journal that the UAE began strikes in the “early days” of the war and continued them through the day after the April ceasefire announcement.[25] It is unclear on which day the UAE strikes began based on this reporting, but Iran first struck Gulf energy infrastructure on March 1, when it hit a structure at Jabel Ali Port‘s oil terminal in Dubai, UAE, and Ras Tanura Refinery in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.[26] This means that for Iran’s first attacks on energy to have been in retaliation for UAE strikes, the UAE would have had to take part in the air campaign beginning on February 28 or early on March 1. Iran also targeted the UAE with 346 projectiles on February 28, which was the first day of the war.[27]
Hezbollah has adapted to increasing IDF night operations by fielding thermal camera-equipped first-person view (FPV) drones that enable nighttime attacks. The IDF initially began conducting more operations at night due to the risks of FPV attacks during the day. Hezbollah published a video of a thermal camera-equipped FPV drone that struck and wounded two IDF soldiers near Iskandarounah in southern Lebanon at night on May 23.[28] Hezbollah has increased nighttime drone attacks, according to an IDF soldier speaking to the Wall Street Journal. Hezbollah’s thus far limited deployment of thermal camera-equipped FPV drones is likely an adaptation to IDF night operations, as many Israeli units in Lebanon have begun to operate at night to avoid the daytime threat posed by FPVs.[29] This new capability will force the IDF to further adapt to Hezbollah’s nascent nighttime FPV drone capabilities as well as to continue to combat daytime FPV drone attacks. The soldier who spoke to the Wall Street Journal warned that the IDF currently does not have a solution to Hezbollah’s adaptation “beyond covering weapons and equipment with [anti-drone] nets.”[30]
Hezbollah appears to be dictating the pace of adaptation to the IDF at this time by quickly overcoming relatively rudimentary Israeli countermeasures. Israeli media observed in early April 2026 that Hezbollah was “increasingly” deploying fiber-optic drones, which suggests that Hezbollah began the war relatively more reliant on radio-controlled drones.[31] The increasing Hezbollah reliance on fiber optic drones also indicates that Israeli electronic countermeasures may have pressured Hezbollah to begin using fiber-optic drones. Hezbollah, without the Israeli employment of electronic warfare, would have no reason to shift to fiber-optic drones. The IDF has adapted to fiber optic drones through a series of rudimentary passive defenses, none of which are particularly effective as presently implemented by tactical units.[32] Hezbollah published FPV footage from May 15, for example, that shows an IDF position where IDF soldiers deployed nets over top but not around their vehicles, making it easy for the drones to fly under the nets and detonate.[33] The drones also forced the IDF to operate increasingly at night, but the emergence of drones equipped with thermal cameras will also negate that IDF countermeasure.[34]
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf
Nothing significant to report.
US and Israeli Air Campaign
Iran has continued to use the ceasefire to reconstitute its ballistic missile force by restoring access to missiles and launchers buried in underground missile bases. The US-Israeli air campaign blocked the entrances to many underground bases to prevent missile crews from firing, but CNN reported on May 27 that satellite imagery shows that Iran has excavated at least 50 of 69 tunnel accesses at 18 underground missile bases.[35] Iran has used construction equipment to reopen the entrances and restore access roads.[36] Excavating these bases is part of a wider effort to reconstitute tactical units in the ballistic missile force and make them combat effective again. Other reconstitution activities—like reorganization of operational-level commands and regeneration of logistics networks, for example—need to take place for the units to be capable of executing their mission of massing and sustaining fire against US and Israeli targets.[37]
ISW-CTP continues to assess that Iran’s ability to regain access to missiles and launchers stored in underground bases and restore some capacity to fire missiles does not mean that Iran has reconstituted its broader ballistic missile program, however. US-Israeli airstrike campaign aimed to generate qualitative effects across Iran’s entire missile program (not just the operational force), including the assets that sustain it.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Likely anti-regime militant fighters killed one Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) member in an armed attack in southeastern Iran on May 28. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim reported on May 28 that unspecified armed individuals shot and killed an LEC officer in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[38] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing. The attack is consistent with long-running anti-regime militant activity targeting security forces and institutions in southeastern Iran.[39]
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
Israeli and Lebanese military officials discussed Lebanon’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah in a round of security talks at the Pentagon on May 29.[40] These talks are the first direct military talks between Lebanon and Israel since 1993.[41] Israeli and Lebanese diplomatic officials have met at least three times in Washington, DC, over the past two months to discuss an end to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[42] Diplomatic officials are set to meet at the US State Department on June 2 and 3 to continue talks.[43]
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
Nothing significant to report.
Endnotes
[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116658423998920803
[2] https://t.me/presstv/191896
[3] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2060248796848644099?s=20 ; https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/29/world/live-news/iran-trump-war-news?post-id=cmpqptjfn00003b6o5ou927o7
[4] https://t.me/farsna/438636
[5] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2026/05/27/769383/lessons-war-strait-hormuz-nuclear-sovereignty-define-iran-redlines-today
[6] https://www.imo.org/en/about/conventions/pages/colreg.aspx ; https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/safety/pages/shipsrouteing.aspx
[7] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116658423998920803
[8] https://t.me/iribnews/341788 ; https://www.npr.org/2026/05/07/g-s1-120978/u-s-military-intercepted-iran-attacks-navy-ships-hormuz ; https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45281
[9] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/jmic-advisory-note-005-26.pdf?rev=e49d2f2e4ad843e79672212bbe14e428
[10] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/jmic-advisory-note-005-26.pdf?rev=e49d2f2e4ad843e79672212bbe14e428
[11] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/jmic-advisory-note-005-26.pdf?rev=e49d2f2e4ad843e79672212bbe14e428
[12] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116658423998920803
[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-may-23-2026
[14] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2060248796848644099?s=20
[15] https://x.com/IranIntlbrk/status/2060384346691736024?s=20 ; https://x.com/EbrahimRezaei14/status/2059929003700416521?s=20
[16] https://x.com/nabaviantwt/status/2060410811483382209?s=20
[17] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/418749
[18] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0510
[19] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0510
[20]https://ir.usembassy.gov/u-s-continues-maximum-pressure-with-sanctions-targeting-irans-shadow-oil-economy/
[21] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2060131345263890854?s=20
[22] https://t.me/farsna/438518
[23] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-u-a-e-s-secret-role-in-the-war-involved-dozens-of-strikes-on-iran-7fd28c40
[24] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-u-a-e-s-secret-role-in-the-war-involved-dozens-of-strikes-on-iran-7fd28c40
[25] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-u-a-e-s-secret-role-in-the-war-involved-dozens-of-strikes-on-iran-7fd28c40
[26] https://t.me/BenTzionM/6909 ;
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-5-2026/
[28] https://t.me/mmirleb/16608 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16536 ; https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/1045237/
[29] https://www.kan.org dot il/content/kan-news/defense/1042606
[30] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-drones-israel-threat-f79a0457?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
[31] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/hezbollah-increasingly-relying-on-drone-technology-used-by-russia-in-ukraine-to-attack-idf/
[32] https://www.jpost dot com/defense-and-tech/article-897569
[33] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-drones-israel-threat-f79a0457?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
[34] https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/1042606
[35] https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/27/world/video/investigates-iran-unearths-missile-arsenal-digvid
[36] https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/27/world/video/investigates-iran-unearths-missile-arsenal-digvid
[38] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/418576
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-9-2026/ ;
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-13-2026/ ;
[40] https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/71762; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-forces-cross-key-lebanon-river-expanded-ground-offensive-2026-05-29
[41] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/05/29/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-airstrikes-talks-pentagon-military/3a70cd62-5b77-11f1-8a9d-afb1148204e1_story.html; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp8ddydl18vo
[42] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/05/next-meeting-between-the-governments-of-the-united-states-lebanon-and-israel; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/new-round-of-israel-lebanon-talks-set-for-thursday-as-us-said-trying-to-extend-truce/
[43] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-forces-cross-key-lebanon-river-expanded-ground-offensive-2026-05-29; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/05/second-meeting-between-the-governments-of-the-united-states-lebanon-and-israel/
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