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Iran Update Special Report, May 5, 2026
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
NOTE: ISW-CTP will continue posting morning social media threads on an as-needed basis starting April 28, 2026, for the duration of the ceasefire. We will continue providing long-form analysis on the state of the Iran War in our daily Iran Update Special Reports.
Key Takeaways
Iran has conducted a series of attacks against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the past 48 hours that are likely intended, in part, to isolate the UAE from other Gulf states. Iran’s decision to solely attack the UAE, as opposed to multiple Gulf states, indicates that Iran is likely trying to isolate the UAE and exploit fractures between the Gulf states to sow further divisions between the UAE and other countries in the Gulf.
Iran’s attacks against the UAE also likely seek to drive a wedge between the UAE and the United States and Israel in response to the UAE taking steps to strengthen its partnership with the United States and Israel. Iranian state-controlled media has suggested that Iran’s attacks against the UAE were driven by the UAE’s increasing alignment with the United States and Israel.
Iran’s recent attacks against the UAE are also a response to US efforts to restore freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran attacked an Emirati-linked vessel and UAE territory after US President Donald Trump announced Project Freedom on May 3.
Iran’s escalation against the UAE also likely reflects internal Iranian regime dynamics and IRGC Commander Ahmad Vahidi’s efforts to constrain diplomacy. Vahidi continues to dictate the regime’s approach toward the Strait of Hormuz, which has reportedly angered Iranian “pragmatist” actors.
Iran is expanding its efforts to establish bureaucratic frameworks to assert its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian regime’s English-language media outlet, Press TV, reported on May 5 that Iran has designed and implemented “a new mechanism for exercising sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.”
US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine stated that Iranian attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and against the UAE on May 4 were not violations of the US-Iran ceasefire in a Pentagon press briefing on May 5. US officials have not commented on Iran’s May 5 attack on the UAE at the time of this writing.
Toplines
Iran has conducted a series of attacks against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the past 48 hours that are likely intended, in part, to isolate the UAE from other Gulf states.[1] The UAE Defense Ministry reported on May 5 that Emirati air defense systems engaged Iranian missiles and drones.[2] ISW-CTP has not observed any reports of missile or drone impacts in the UAE at the time of this writing. Iran previously launched four waves of attacks against the UAE on May 4, including a drone attack against an unspecified target in the Fujairah Petroleum Industrial Zone.[3] Iran’s decision to solely attack the UAE, as opposed to multiple Gulf states, indicates that Iran likely seeks to isolate the UAE and exploit fractures between the Gulf states to sow further divisions between the UAE and other countries in the Gulf. Iranian attacks on multiple Gulf countries would presumably unite these countries against Iran, in contrast.
Iran’s attacks against the UAE also likely seek to drive a wedge between the UAE and the United States and Israel in response to the UAE taking steps to strengthen its partnership with the United States and Israel. Iranian state-controlled media has suggested that Iran’s attacks against the UAE were driven by the UAE’s increasing alignment with the United States and Israel.[4] An analyst close to the Iranian regime stated on May 4 that Iran targeted the UAE in response to the UAE’s “unprecedented hostile approach” toward Iran, including UAE cooperation with the United States and Israel on security and military matters.[5] An Iranian media outlet affiliated with former Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani separately cited Israel’s reported provision of air defense systems to the UAE as further evidence of the UAE’s alignment with the United States and Israel.[6] IRGC-affiliated media similarly claimed on May 4 that the UAE has become an Israeli “pawn.”[7] Iran also likely seeks to send a message to other Gulf countries that they could become targets if they similarly increase cooperation with the United States and Israel.
Iran’s recent attacks against the UAE are also a response to US efforts to restore freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. US President Donald Trump announced on May 3 the launch of Project Freedom to guide commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz and undermine Iranian efforts to “control” shipping through the strait.[8] Iran attacked an Emirati-linked vessel and UAE territory following the announcement, likely to demonstrate Iranian “control” over the strait and deter vessels from attempting to transit through the waterway.[9] The UAE has a direct interest in reopening maritime traffic through the strait. Iran’s attacks on the UAE therefore likely seek to impose costs on a key US regional partner that benefits from Project Freedom and demonstrate that Iran can contest US efforts to reopen the strait.
Iran’s escalation against the UAE also likely reflects internal Iranian regime dynamics and IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi’s efforts to constrain diplomacy. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Vahidi may seek to derail negotiations and may have accepted the risk of potential renewed conflict with the United States and Israel.[10] Vahidi and his inner circle have blocked “pragmatist” officials’ efforts to push Iran toward a more flexible negotiating position.[11] Iran’s recent attacks against the UAE and commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz highlight how Vahidi has prevailed in the regime’s internal power struggle and marginalized “pragmatist” actors, particularly Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.[12]
Vahidi continues to dictate the regime’s approach toward the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s broader conflict with the United States and Israel. Anti-regime media reported on May 5 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is “angry” with Vahidi’s decision to attack the UAE and called the attack an “irresponsible step” that was taken without Pezeshkian’s knowledge.[13] Pezeshkian is part of a group of pro-negotiations regime officials who view negotiations with the United States as preferable to renewed military conflict and better for the Iranian economy.[14] Pezeshkian reportedly sought an emergency meeting with Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to ask him to stop the IRGC’s attacks on the UAE and to prevent their reoccurrence.[15] Israeli media reported on April 19 that Vahidi is the only Iranian official with direct access to Mojtaba and is serving as a conduit for relaying key decisions to other regime officials, however.[16] Anti-regime media also reported on April 1 that Pezeshkian tried repeatedly to contact Mojtaba, but that a “military council” formed by Vahidi prevented Pezeshkian from contacting Mojtaba.[17]
Iranian officials have confirmed that Iran conducted the recent attacks against the UAE. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters spokesperson denied that Iranian armed forces conducted “any missile or drone operations” against the UAE and claimed that the UAE Defense Ministry’s recent announcements about Emirati air defenses intercepting Iranian missiles and drones are false.[18] Senior Iranian officials, including Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei, have acknowledged that Iran conducted the attacks, however.[19] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters spokesperson also warned that the UAE must not become a “den” for US and Israeli forces, which echoes threats from other Iranian officials that Iran can target states that host US forces or bases.[20] The spokesperson threatened a “crushing and regret-inducing response” if the UAE targets Iranian islands, ports, or coasts in response to Iran’s attacks.[21]
Iran is expanding its efforts to establish bureaucratic frameworks to assert its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian regime’s English-language media outlet, Press TV, reported on May 5 that Iran has designed and implemented “a new mechanism for exercising sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.”[22] The mechanism stipulates that ships that wish to transit through the strait will receive an email outlining “transit regulations” and that vessels must abide by these “regulations” to receive a “transit permit” to transit through the strait.[23] Iranian officials have previously stated that Iran will impose a “new management” in the Strait of Hormuz that will reap “economic benefits” for Iran.[24] Iran has proposed various toll schemes that would enable Iran to charge vessels of its choosing to pass through the strait.[25] This report comes amid other Iranian efforts to formalize Iranian “control” over the strait. Iranian media reported on April 19 that Iran’s parliament is drafting a bill that would ban Israeli-linked vessels from transiting the Strait of Hormuz, require vessels from “hostile countries” to obtain approval from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council to transit the strait, and bar states that have “caused damage” to Iran from transiting the strait until they pay reparations to Iran.[26]
Iranian officials have continued to emphasize the regime’s intention to exert control over the Strait of Hormuz in the long term. ISW-CTP continues to assess that it is against the United States’ interests to allow Iran to exert control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on May 5 that “the new equation of the Strait of Hormuz is in the process of being solidified.”[27] IRGC Political Deputy Brigadier General Yadoleh Javani similarly stated that Iran’s “new management” of the Strait of Hormuz will be the “foundation of the global and international order.”[28] Allowing Iran to assert “sovereignty” over the strait would enable Iran to impose economic costs on the United States and the international economy while simultaneously giving it leverage in negotiations over other important issues, such as Iran’s nuclear program.[29] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-run Defa Press argued on May 2 that the US-Iran conflict is one of attrition, in which each side is trying to impose economic costs on the other in a bid to extract concessions.[30]
US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine stated that Iranian attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and against the UAE on May 4 were not violations of the US-Iran ceasefire in a Pentagon press briefing on May 5.[31] Hegseth stated that “right now the ceasefire with Iran holds.”[32] Hegseth added that Project Freedom is “separate and distinct” from the ceasefire with Iran.[33] Caine stated that nine recent Iranian attacks on vessels and two Iranian vessel seizures in the Strait of Hormuz are “below the threshold of restarting major combat operations at this point.”[34] Caine acknowledged that Iran attacked Oman once and the UAE three times on May 4. US officials have not commented on Iran’s May 5 attack on the UAE at the time of this writing.[35]
Maritime Development
US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on May 5 that US forces have directed 51 vessels to turn around or return to port since the start of the US blockade on Iranian ports.[36]
US and Israeli Air Campaign
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Response
See topline section.
Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response
Hezbollah has continued to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on May 4. Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 20 attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on May 4 and 2:00 PM ET on May 5.[37] This is the highest number of attacks that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period since the ceasefire went into effect on April 16 (see below). Hezbollah used a variety of weapons in its attacks, including mortars, rockets, first-person view (FPV) drones, fixed-wing drones, and anti-tank guided missiles.[38] Hezbollah claimed six FPV drone attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon on May 5.[39]
Other Axis of Resistance Response
Iran has reportedly pressured its Iraqi partners to end Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ kinetic operations, while strengthening Iranian-backed Iraqi political influence, likely to try to avoid US financial pressure against Iraq that negatively impacts Iran.[40] Unspecified informed sources told Iraqi media on May 5 that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani warned about “real dangers” that could result in a loss of unspecified military privileges and discussed the need for an “alternative plan” regarding militia disarmament during meetings with unspecified militias and Shia Coordination Framework leaders in Baghdad on April 18.[41] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government since early 2025 to disarm Iraqi militias and dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[42] The PMF is an Iraqi state security institution that includes many Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[43] US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq has increased during the war due to attacks by the militias, including those within the PMF, against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region.[44] US and Iraqi officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 22 that the US Treasury Department has temporarily halted shipments of Iraq’s oil export revenue via the US Federal Reserve due to concerns about militia behavior.[45] The officials said that the United States first blocked a shipment of oil export revenue to the Central Bank of Iraq when the war began in late February 2026 and recently blocked a cargo plane delivery of nearly $500 million USD.[46] The Central Bank of Iraq has managed an account at the New York Federal Reserve on behalf of the Iraqi Finance Ministry since 2003 that holds the Iraqi federal government’s revenue from oil exports in US dollars.[47] Oil revenue accounts for about 90 percent of the Iraqi state’s budget.[48] Iran uses the Iraqi economy for sanctions evasion and to help fund the Axis of Resistance. The US Treasury Department’s actions therefore heavily impact Iran as the regime already faces immense economic pressure from the United States.[49]
Ghaani proposed a so-called “Grand Settlement” plan regarding militia disarmament, according to the informed sources speaking to Iraqi media.[50] Iraqi media reported that unspecified actors first proposed a similar version of this plan in early 2025.[51] The first part of Ghaani’s plan reportedly calls on multiple Iraqi militias, specifically Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, to end their kinetic activity in exchange for maintaining the PMF’s role within the Iraqi state.[52] These militias have, both historically and during the war, been the most kinetically active and are more subordinate to Iran than other militias.[53] Ghaani reportedly outlined a second phase that would seemingly only occur if the first phase failed to reduce tensions with the United States. The second phase would integrate the PMF into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).[54] The PMF currently operates separately from the ISF and reports, at least on paper, to the Iraqi Prime Minister instead of the Iraqi Defense Minister.[55] The informed sources implied that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders would be offered senior PMF positions in exchange for their suspension of kinetic operations.[56] Ghaani’s plan reportedly seeks to avoid provoking the United States, while simultaneously consolidating Iranian influence in Iraq via the further infiltration of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors into Iraqi government, diplomatic, and security institutions.[57]
ISW-CTP continues to assess that Iran could decide to build a new, loyal cadre of ideological militias, over which Iran has strong control, that would supplement the political activity of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors. An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia source told UK-based Amwaj Media in November 2025 that Iran would consider funding and politically supporting smaller Iraqi militias that are not affiliated with the PMF, which would place these militias fully outside state structures and control.[58] Iran has previously established splinter groups or front groups to ensure militia loyalty to Iran or to obfuscate the involvement of larger militias in military activity against the United States.[59]
Endnotes
[1] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2051666783627555127?s=20 ; https://x.com/modgovae/status/2051377907034157477?s=20 ; https://x.com/modgovae/status/2051377052998332472?s=20
[2] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2051666783627555127?s=20 [3] https://x.com/MarioNawfal/status/2051322765677109305?s=20 ; https://x.com/mofauae/status/2051340515694751923?s=20 [4] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/315150 [5] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/2051365853635944735?s=20 ; https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/2051381600101810484?s=20 [6] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/315150 [7] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/412971 [8] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116512555123589170 ; https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/04/middleeast/project-freedom-hormuz-guide-ships-intl-hnk-ml [9] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/tanker-hit-by-unknown-projectiles-off-uaes-fujairah-ukmto-says-2026-05-04/ [10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-24-2026 [11] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-24-2026 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-28-2026 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-april-29-2026 [12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-24-2026 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-28-2026 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-april-29-2026 [13] https://www.iranintl.com/202605049579?source=share-link [14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-20-2026 [15] https://www.iranintl.com/202605049579?source=share-link [16] https://x.com/DBalazada/status/2045935588839129399?s=20 [17] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604015321 [18] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/353892 [19] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2026/05/04/768057/Iran-urges-Persian-Gulf-states-to-reject-foreign-security-dependence,-calls-US-military-presence-a-liability [20] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/353892 [21] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/353892 [22] https://t.me/presstv/188544 [23] https://t.me/presstv/188544 [24] https://t.me/rahbar_enghelab_ir/313 [25] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/27/world/middleeast/iran-trump-talks-strait-of-hormuz-nuclear.html ; https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/935556/download?inline [26] https://x.com/FarsNews_Agency/status/2045935263319302651 ; https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2046050956865945627 [27] https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2051542580597338168?s=20 [28] https://t.me/defapress_ir/58052 [29] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-may-4-2026 [30] https://t.me/defapress_ir/57831 [31] https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4478065/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-dan/ [32] https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4478065/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-dan/ [33] https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4478065/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-dan/ [34] https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4478065/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-dan/ [35] https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4478065/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-dan/ [36] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2051654719920050452 [37] https://t.me/mmirleb/15777 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15776 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15771 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15769 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15768 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15764 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15763 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15762 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15761 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15756 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15755 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15754 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15753 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15752 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15751 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15748 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15747 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15746 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15745 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15744 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15740 [38] https://t.me/mmirleb/15740 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15744 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15745 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15751 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15754 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15761 [39] https://t.me/mmirleb/15753 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15754 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15755 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15756 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15763 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/15769 [40] https://almadapaper dot net/434016/ [41] https://almadapaper dot net/434016/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-18-2026/ [42] https://almadapaper dot net/410670/ ; https://www.newarab dot com/analysis/iraqs-elections-high-stakes-vote-amid-us-iran-tug-war ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/10/secretary-rubios-call-with-iraqi-prime-minister-mohammed-shiaa-al-sudani-2 [43] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/ [44] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-13-2026/ ; https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2026/03/29/two-drones-targeting-us-embassy-in-baghdad-intercepted-security-officials ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2032257902489075975 [45] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-blocks-iraqs-dollar-shipments-to-squeeze-its-iran-backed-militias-3270d5af [46] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-blocks-iraqs-dollar-shipments-to-squeeze-its-iran-backed-militias-3270d5af [47] https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/122652/1/MEC_a_fistful_of_dinars_paper_85.pdf [48] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/how-us-controls-iraqs-oil-revenues-2026-01-23/ ; https://www.imf.org/en/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1irqea2025001-source-pdf.pdf [49] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0233 ; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/04/11/iraqi-fundraising-drives-linked-to-militias-channel-support-to-iran-and-hezbollah/ [50] https://almadapaper dot net/434016/ [51] https://almadapaper dot net/434016/ [52] https://almadapaper dot net/434016/ [53] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-10-2026/ ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1625 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1612 [54] https://almadapaper dot net/434016/ [55] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/ [56] https://almadapaper dot net/434016/ [57] https://almadapaper dot net/434016/ [58] https://amwaj.media/en/article/what-s-left-unsaid-about-iran-s-influence-in-iraq [59] https://acleddata.com/report/muqawama-and-its-enemies-shifting-patterns-iran-backed-shiite-militia-activity-iraq ; https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Assaib.pdf ; https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/kata%E2%80%99ib-hezbollah
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