Iran's Drone Power; Stealth Drones and Communication Challenges

In the first section, the enhancement of drone capabilities, questionable achievements, and the Islamic Republic's need for external sources to secure some components and devices for drone production were discussed. Here, we continue the discussion on the capabilities of combat drones, stealth technology, and the infrastructures and communication challenges. Despite the shortcomings that Iran has in acquiring or manufacturing drone engines, the unveiling of the Karrar drone with offensive missions and long range and altitude in Mordad 1389 (August 2010) marks a turning point in the Islamic Republic's activities in drone production. Until that time, the Islamic Republic's focus was primarily on small drones with short range and flight endurance. According to officials of the Islamic Republic, besides Karrar, the drones Sair, Hamaaseh, Shahed 129, and Fotros also have combat capabilities. According to Iranian media, the Karrar drone has a turbojet engine, a speed of 900 kilometers per hour, and a range of 1000 kilometers. Its flight ceiling is 25,000 feet, and in terms of armament, it can carry four cruise missiles or two 100-kilogram bombs. In mid-Ordibehesht 1392 (May 2013), the Islamic Republic introduced the Hamaaseh drone. According to Ahmad Vahidi, the then Minister of Defense, this multi-purpose drone has a flight endurance of 24 hours and can perform combat missions in addition to reconnaissance missions, equipped with various rockets and missiles. About five months later, in Mehr 1392 (October 2013), Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, unveiled the Shahed 129 drone, which bears a strong resemblance to Israel's Hermes 450 drone with a few minor differences. According to Fars News Agency, the flight endurance of this drone is 24 hours, its operational radius reaches 1700 kilometers, and its flight ceiling is 24,000 feet. At the unveiling ceremony of the Shahed 129 drone, Islamic Republic officials stated that each drone would be equipped with eight air-to-ground 'Sadid' missiles. The footage of this drone's flight, shown by some Iranian television channels, begins with the firing of a weapon from a flying Shahed 129, immediately followed by a camera showing a missile hitting a target. The latest combat-capable drone unveiled by the Islamic Republic in late Aban 1393 (November 2014) is named Fotros, and it is one of the largest models produced in Iran. According to Iranian media, this drone has an operational radius of up to 2000 kilometers, a flight ceiling of 25,000 feet, and a flight duration of 16 to 30 hours, and in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance missions, it can also perform combat missions when armed with air-to-surface missiles and various rockets. According to the project manager of Fotros, the engine of this drone is made in Iran, and its propeller is of the variable pitch type. Despite these reports and the Islamic Republic's claim of being the third-largest manufacturer of armed drones in the world, producing drones capable of firing guided missiles poses a significant challenge for Iran's aerospace industry. Before this claim, Iran's advancements in armed drones were mostly limited to suicide drones, which are drones carrying large amounts of explosives that crash into intended targets and explode upon the operator's decision. In 2006, during the 33-day war between Hezbollah and Israel, Israeli forces shot down an Iranian-made Ababil drone, and subsequent investigations revealed that this suicide drone carried 30 kilograms of explosives. Theoretically, given the reported specifications and capabilities of the Fotros drone, it should be comparable to the military drones of the United States, which have been used against Taliban and Al-Qaeda positions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia in recent years. However, whether the Fotros drone can actually demonstrate such capabilities remains doubtful. More importantly, there is no evidence or indication of the Fotros drone or other Iranian drones being equipped with missiles. The Islamic Republic has deployed many drones in Syria to support the Assad regime, but so far, no reports of missile attacks by Iranian drones in Syria have been published, and there are no images of missile-carrying drones. The situation in Iraq is similar, where the Islamic Republic uses its drones solely for reconnaissance of Islamic State forces and intelligence gathering. Nevertheless, the Revolutionary Guards and their proxy groups try to convey that some of Iran's drones are offensive and that their effectiveness is on par with American drones. Earlier this year, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, one of the Islamic Republic's proxy groups in Iraq, released a video showing its militants striking some ISIS positions with missiles using the Shahed 129 drone. However, investigations revealed that the video was entirely fabricated. It seems unlikely that this proxy group would have released such a video without the permission of the Revolutionary Guards or the Quds Force. Communication Challenges Iran has made advancements in drone technology, and undoubtedly its effectiveness in reconnaissance and surveillance has increased. However, its capabilities regarding the communication infrastructures that enable operators to control drones from very long distances are questionable. Any advancements in this area would require the country to progress in its space programs and have the necessary satellites to control and guide drones from very long distances. In other words, satellite communication with drones. There is no evidence of Iran's progress in this area, and furthermore, Iran's space program is at a basic level compared to the United States or Israel. This is while some Western experts say that the U.S., with dozens of satellites in space, still faces challenges in controlling its drones from very long distances. Stealth Technology Achieving radar-evading technology is one of the Islamic Republic's long-standing claims. In 1362 (1983), a year after the unveiling of the U.S. F-117, the world's first stealth aircraft, the newspaper 'Jomhouri Eslami' claimed that the Revolutionary Guards had built a radar-evading two-seater fighter jet. In this context, in 1380 (2001), the Islamic Republic announced the project to produce a domestically-made radar-evading aircraft called Shafaq, stating that this fighter jet would join the country's air force fleet in 1386 (2007) after its first test flight in 1381 (2002). This project has yet to yield results, and Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, the then Minister of Defense, told reporters in Ordibehesht 1392 (May 2013) that the production of this fighter jet is still on the agenda. In some cases, commanders of the Revolutionary Guards or military industry officials introduce aircraft or drones displayed without regard to their appearance, which show no signs of radar-evading capabilities, as being stealthy. A notable example is the tactical drone Hamaaseh, whose numerous angles in its appearance could leave a very clear echo on radar screens. Despite this, Ahmad Vahidi, the then Minister of Defense, told the media that this drone 'with radar-evading capability can remain undetected by the enemy.' The commander of the Aerospace Force of the Revolutionary Guards, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, announced the flight of the final model of the Iranian 'RQ-170' drone, which is identical to its American counterpart in every respect. Thus, one of its characteristics, like its American model, should be its radar-evading and stealth capabilities. The reality is that copying this drone and accessing stealth technology is closely related to Iran's actual capabilities in defense and its budget and activities to obtain confidential information from the military industries of advanced countries. Many Western experts believe that despite its claims in various areas, the Islamic Republic does not have access to stealth technology and is bluffing. This does not mean that Iran lacks expertise in reverse engineering or is devoid of capabilities in military industries. Iran has managed to optimize or repair several aircraft and helicopters remaining from the Shah's era. However, this limited capability cannot enable Iran to reproduce a radar-evading advanced drone or aircraft in a relatively short time that performs on par with the original model. Given these limitations and Iran's history in military industries, it is unlikely that Iran has produced a drone with the full capabilities and specifications of the RQ-170. The Islamic Republic has not yet demonstrated any skill that would confirm its access to stealth technology. This technology and its application are very costly, and currently, three countries— the U.S., China, and Russia— which allocate the highest military budgets in the world, possess this technology. China flew its first radar-evading drone in mid-1392 (2013) and has recently added several radar-evading fighters to its arsenal with significant investments in their production. Russia, which has the lowest defense budget among the three mentioned countries, spends eight times more on this technology than the Islamic Republic spends on weapons and equipment. Over the past three decades, the Islamic Republic has attempted to secure some of its military needs through intermediaries, shell companies, and overall illegal means, and so far, there has been no indication of Iran's efforts to acquire or copy stealth technology from countries that possess it. In these years, due to international sanctions, Iran's activities have focused on securing urgent needs such as aircraft parts and navigation devices for its space and missile programs.