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Iran's Economy, the Great Victim of Politics

Feb 1, 2026 February 1, 2026 10 min read 📰 Radio Farda
📋 Key Takeaway

The article discusses the long-term economic decline in Iran since the 1979 revolution, highlighting the failures of various economic policies and the persistent dominance of government and oil dependency. It questions whether the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic is compatible with economic development and welfare for the Iranian people.

🔍 Quick Context Guide
💡 Bottom Line: Iran's economic struggles since the revolution highlight the incompatibility of its political system with effective economic development.

👥 Key Players

Hassan Rouhani MENTIONED
Former President of Iran
"Rouhani's administration faced significant economic challenges and his critiques of previous administrations highlight the ongoing economic crisis in Iran."
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad MENTIONED
Former President of Iran
"His presidency is often blamed for exacerbating economic mismanagement and failures in Iran's economy."
Islamic Republic of Iran MENTIONED
Current governing system
"The ideological framework of the Islamic Republic is central to understanding the political and economic challenges facing Iran."

📰 What Happened

The article analyzes the long-term economic decline in Iran since the 1979 revolution, emphasizing the failures of various economic policies and the persistent dominance of government and oil dependency.

  • Iran's GDP ranking fell from 17th in 1980 to 32nd by 2013.
  • The Iranian economy remains heavily reliant on oil, which accounts for about 70% of budget revenues.

💡 Why It Matters

🇮🇷 For Iran: The economic decline affects the welfare of the Iranian population and raises questions about the sustainability of the current political system.
🌍 Regional: Economic instability in Iran can lead to increased tensions and affect regional security dynamics, particularly in the Middle East.
🌐 International: The situation in Iran has implications for global oil markets and international relations, especially with Western countries concerned about Iran's nuclear program.

📚 Background

Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has faced significant economic challenges, with a heavy reliance on oil and government control stifling growth.

Iran's oil dependency Impact of sanctions on Iran's economy
📡 Source: NEUTRAL
📊 Confidence: 70%
The article provides a critical analysis of Iran's economic history without overt political bias, making it a valuable resource for understanding the complexities of Iran's economic situation.

All revolutions that have led to political system changes over the past few centuries have caused short-term upheavals that naturally faced investment in infrastructure, continuity of production activities, and improvement or even maintenance of people's welfare at previous levels with various problems. However, in the medium and long term, the systems that emerged from revolutions did not provide a uniform record in terms of their compatibility with economic goals, especially the improvement of people's living standards. The system born from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia never reconciled with the economy. Neither the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP) implemented during Lenin's time nor the various reforms carried out by Stalin's successors (from Khrushchev to Gorbachev) ended the economic disaster that was intertwined with the Soviet regime. In contrast, the communist system of China managed to pave the way for economic prosperity about thirty years after the revolution, albeit at the cost of fundamentally revising the Maoist dogmas that had led the Yellow Empire to deadly experiences, including during the 'Great Leap Forward' (1958 to 1962), which sent around thirty to forty million people to their demise. Iran's economic life in the thirty-six years following the revolution has been spared from the deadly catastrophes that the former Soviet Union faced in its first three decades or China during Mao's era for various reasons. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic system has a poor economic record overall, especially when assessed against Iran's achievements before the revolution, the slogans and claims of the 1979 revolution, or the experiences of similar countries that have become 'emerging powers' over these thirty-six years. On the occasion of the thirty-sixth anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, the question arises once again: is the ideological core of the ruling system in Iran, its political and legal structures, and its domestic and international behaviors compatible with economic development and the increase of material and spiritual welfare of Iranians or not? This article does not claim to provide a comprehensive and definitive answer to such a broad and fundamental question. Here, a brief look at the past thirty-six years is sufficient, as well as the reasons for the failures of economic efforts made during this time. The thirty-six-year decline: One hundred days after taking office, Hassan Rouhani described his country's economic situation as 'terrifying' and even worse than during the war with Iraq, emphasizing that the country's treasury is empty, the government's budget deficit this year, in the best-case scenario, reaches about ninety trillion tomans, and the government's debt fluctuates around five hundred trillion tomans. The three and a half million unemployed could soon double with the influx of university graduates into the job market, most factories are closed or semi-closed, and agriculture is in such a state that Iran must import seven million tons of wheat. Mr. Rouhani made these statements in criticism of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's eight-year presidency. It is true that Iran's economic collapse during the ninth and tenth governments was exacerbated by incompetence and destructive mistakes in domestic and foreign policies. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the country's economic decline did not begin with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency, and there is no indication that it has ended with his departure. Since thirty-six years ago, alongside the establishment and consolidation of the Islamic Republic's foundations in Iran, the global economic geography has undergone a fundamental transformation. During this period, market economies expanded from their old bases in North America, Western Europe, and Japan to a vast number of countries in Latin America, Asia, and several African countries. Many emerging economic powers, especially in Asia, transformed international economic relations. Central and Eastern Europe, after several decades of socialist experience, accepted the fundamental principles governing Western European systems. The centralized and quasi-feudal economies of Central and South America, which were mainly under military regimes, turned towards economic liberalism. In Iran's neighborhood, Turkey abandoned the bureaucratic economy of Atatürk at the beginning of the 1980s and began fundamental reforms, renewing its production and commercial structures. This major transformation, which shattered the traditional boundaries between the 'third world' and the 'industrial world,' created a new structure in international economic relations, occurring in an environment characterized by the rapid pace of economic globalization. The convergence of national economies under the influence of expanding international trade and capital movement created a new world that was astronomically distant from the old division of the world into 'North' and 'South.' Only in comparison to this global transformation can one understand the lost opportunities for Iran's economy over the past thirty-six years. The World Bank's calculations regarding the classification of countries based on their gross domestic product (GDP) showcase one manifestation of Iran's economic decline. In 1980, in terms of GDP value, Iran was the seventeenth and Turkey the twenty-seventh economy in the world. By 2013, Turkey had jumped ten places to rank seventeenth, while Iran had fallen fifteen places to thirty-second. In the same period, from 1980 to 2013, South Korea's GDP ranking rose from twenty-third (six ranks lower than Iran) to fourteenth (eighteen ranks higher than Iran). Finally, Iranian readers of the October 2014 International Monetary Fund report sadly found that their per capita GDP is currently eight hundred dollars less than that of an Algerian and one thousand eight hundred dollars less than that of an Iraqi. Another manifestation of stagnation: Another major manifestation of the Islamic Republic's economic failure is the lack of change in the structural characteristics of Iran's economy over the past four decades. The most important manifestations of this stagnation can be observed in the continued role of the government in the economy and the severe dependence of the economy on oil. During these thirty-six years, the government's dominance over the economy has significantly retreated in many developing countries, and these countries' roles in international division of labor, which were mainly reliant on the production and export of raw materials, have transformed in favor of the production and export of semi-industrial and industrial goods. In Iran, however, the government's role in the economy and its volume have significantly increased during the same period, and oil still directly accounts for seventy percent of budget revenues and about eighty percent of the country's export revenues, although its role has somewhat diminished in the last two years under the pressure of sanctions. The volume of government bureaucracy in Iran is rapidly increasing. According to Mahmoud Asgari Azad, deputy of management development and human resources of the president, 'About 50 percent of the workforce in government organizations has increased over the past eight years, while managerial positions have also increased by 50 percent, to the point that there is now one manager or director for every five employees.' Mr. Asgari Azad adds: 'Structures that were managed by 40 people twenty years ago are now managed by 1,200 people, which also creates interference in operations and adds to the workflow.' The government, with this heavy volume, consumes a large portion of the country's resources and simultaneously creates numerous obstacles to economic activity. According to the 2015 report from the Heritage Foundation, Iran ranks one hundred seventy-first out of 178 countries surveyed in terms of economic freedom. Among the fifteen countries studied by the same foundation in the Middle East and North Africa, Iran has the most closed economy. The economic freedom index in the Heritage Foundation's report is determined based on ten criteria, from trade freedom to tax pressure, property rights, corruption levels, and government spending levels. In addition to the government, a powerful 'quasi-government' network composed of foundations and institutions, free from any oversight, dominates a large part of the country's economy, does not pay taxes, does not account to any official authority, and benefits from numerous rents, including priority access to foreign currency resources and banking facilities. In such a bureaucratic and monopolistic environment, those who have the enthusiasm and creativity either lose heart or turn to emigration. The inability to create a favorable business environment is one of the major failures of the Islamic Republic. In the latest World Bank report on the business environment (composed of ten components, including the cost and time required to start a business, obtain construction permits, obtain credit, etc.), Iran ranks one hundred thirtieth among 189 countries surveyed. In contrast, this non-competitive bureaucratic environment provides a suitable ground for the expansion of corruption. The organization 'Transparency International' in its latest report ranks Iran, in terms of financial corruption (meaning the abuse of political and governmental positions to gain material advantages and personal benefits), one hundred thirty-sixth among 175 countries surveyed, on par with Cameroon, Lebanon, Russia, and Nigeria. The fact that Iran is rated fifty-one places more corrupt than Burkina Faso or eighty-one places more corrupt than Saudi Arabia is painful for Iranians. In this report, we see that Iran ranks thirteenth among nineteen countries surveyed in the Middle East and North Africa in terms of financial corruption. The major barrier to change: Emphasizing the continuity of structural anomalies and economic constraints over the past thirty-six years does not mean that the policymaking apparatus of the Islamic Republic has ignored these anomalies and constraints or made no efforts to confront them. There have been numerous efforts and initiatives to revitalize Iran's economy within the framework of the Islamic Republic. The policy known as 'economic adjustment,' implemented during the first term of President Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997), aimed to reconstruct Iran's economy based on a series of fundamental reforms: from shrinking the government to privatization, liberalizing the capital market, reforming the tax system, and so on. Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) proposed the 'economic organization' plan, which was a diluted version of 'economic adjustment' accompanied by a touch of social justice. Even Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proposed the 'economic transformation' plan during his eight-year presidency, which included the famous law known as 'targeted subsidies.' Hassan Rouhani's government also proposed a 'policy package' last July and August to be implemented to exit the inflationary recession in 2014 and 2015. And since it was said that implementing some of the policies outlined in this 'package' required parliamentary approval, the government prepared a bill that was submitted to the parliament on August 10. All these initiatives either failed or, in the case of 'targeted subsidies,' produced outcomes completely contrary to the wishes of a large part of Iranian economists and added new misfortunes to the previous woes of Iran's economy. Mr. Rouhani's 'policy package,' which has been the subject of articles and radio and television interviews, got lost in the conflicts between the government and parliament, and not much news has emerged about it. In this situation, it would not be an exaggeration to describe the thirty-six-year history of the Islamic Republic as a graveyard of economic reform plans. The important question, given this experience, is why the Islamic Republic system blocks the path to economic reforms or turns these reforms, as seen in the case of the law known as 'targeted subsidies,' against themselves? Thirty-six years of experience in the Islamic Republic shows that economic reform plans collapse in the face of non-economic barriers, particularly political factors, or change their nature. Any initiative to escape economic constraints, from privatization to what is referred to in the Islamic Republic's literature as 'interaction with the outside,' falters in a long and trench warfare battle with influential circles close to the core of power in the Islamic Republic. Last December, at the opening of the 'Iranian Economy Conference,' Hassan Rouhani diplomatically summarized the lessons of this experience: 'In our country, for years and decades, the economy has subsidized foreign and domestic policy. How long must our economy subsidize politics? We must try for a decade and subsidize the economy from foreign and domestic policy to see how life, livelihood, and employment for our youth will be.' Perhaps these words of the president of the Islamic Republic can be summarized as follows: For years and decades, in this country, politics has blocked the path to economic prosperity.

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Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →

Translation confidence: 85%

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