Iran's Exit from the JCPOA Announced After Simorgh Missile Launch?

Javad Zarif's critical statements in India against the European Union, referring to their "unfulfilled verbal promises regarding JCPOA commitments," indicate severe dissatisfaction with the failure to establish a special financial mechanism by the EU to circumvent U.S. sanctions. This continues a path that, despite denials, could lead to Iran's retaliatory announcement of withdrawal from the July 2015 nuclear agreement with the so-called 1+5 group. The special financial mechanism, an initiative pursued by EU's chief diplomat Federica Mogherini since last September, was supposed to be established by the end of December to facilitate trade between Iran and Europe through an independent financial channel. The U.S. government's opposition to the establishment of an independent European financial channel, which it views as contrary to the policy of "increasing pressure until the collapse of the Iranian religious regime's resistance," previously led to Austria, Luxembourg, Belgium, and ultimately the UK withdrawing from hosting the administrative structure of the proposed institution. The half-hearted last-minute efforts of Germany and France also failed to achieve Tehran's desired outcome. The importance of countering the proposed European financial mechanism for Washington was such that a significant part of Brian Hook's diplomatic activities as head of the "Iran Action Group" at the U.S. State Department has been dedicated to it in recent months. Brian Hook's specific responsibility is to advance the Trump administration's foreign policy objectives regarding Iran through "cooperation with the international community to change the behavior of the Islamic Republic," in addition to creating coordination with government agencies within the U.S. The halt of the European plan to create a special financial mechanism can be considered one of the first major successes of the "Iran Action Group" at the U.S. State Department, which has pursued the goal of political coordination with European countries regarding Iran through numerous trips to European countries and meetings with political representatives of the three major European countries in Washington. The responsibility assigned to the Iran Action Group at the U.S. State Department targets the "Achilles' heel" by applying maximum economic pressure against the Islamic Republic to dry up the financial resources that fund Tehran's military presence in the region and its missile program. The previous U.S. administration, after several rounds of confidential political negotiations with representatives of the Islamic Republic, took on the responsibility of designing, drafting, and achieving the nuclear agreement with Tehran, seemingly hoping that strengthening the economic foundation and financial capacity of the Iranian religious regime would bolster the moderate faction and lead to gradual changes in regional behavior and its "normalization." The Obama administration viewed the strengthening of the Islamic triangle of Iran, Turkey, and Egypt as a factor in restoring a kind of stability to the region and a means to soften America's image among Middle Eastern Muslims. The gradual increase in the Islamic tone of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's actions in Turkey, the rise of Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood's power in Egypt, and the groundwork for reaching an agreement with Tehran through conducting secret political negotiations with the Islamic Republic, prior to Hassan Rouhani being introduced as the winner of the presidential elections in Iran, aligned with the theory of "supporting Islamic governments emerging from the ballot box in the Middle East" that Barack Obama introduced in Cairo in 2009 and shortly thereafter pursued in Istanbul. Ten years later, in the same place (Cairo), current U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, while outlining the new foreign policy lines of his administration, declared Obama's foreign policy a failure and emphasized that instead of strengthening the hand of the Iranian religious regime, he would pursue a policy of maximum pressure against it. In the current situation in the Middle East, there are no signs of cooperation among the three major countries, as the political relations between Tehran and Cairo, which were on the verge of normalization ten years ago, have not resumed, Erdoğan's government relations with Sisi's government in Egypt are critical, and Tehran-Ankara relations can best be described as challenging and cold. The new U.S. administration is seeking a new plan in the Middle East, starting with an all-out confrontation with the Iranian religious regime, and it seems determined to continue the current path (continuing pressure) until it brings it to the brink of collapse, despite the proposed "media invitation to dialogue." If it is possible for the body to sweat after a high fever, and for the fountain to fall after rising, opening the way to solutions for political crises and security challenges, especially in the Middle East, is only possible after they become acute. The current hostile relations between the Trump administration and Tehran, which entered a new phase after the announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and the renewal of "unilateral sanctions," is now on the verge of a new peak. The current trip of the U.S. Secretary of State to the region and shortly before him, National Security Advisor John Bolton's visit to three Middle Eastern countries, as well as Donald Trump's unexpected presence at the U.S. military base (Al-Asad) in western Baghdad, Iraq's capital, on the occasion of Christmas, are related to the current sensitive and important situation and the necessary preparations for confronting a crisis in the region, should it escalate. Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, who is close to the Supreme Leader and military circles, stated on January 7 during a multilateral conference in Tehran regarding Iran's view on the current crisis in relations with Washington, "Europe has missed the opportunity to preserve the nuclear agreement (JCPOA)." Two days after Shamkhani's statements and simultaneously with Javad Zarif's trip to India, not only was the possibility of Zarif's resignation from the post of Foreign Minister raised, but the issue of announcing Iran's withdrawal from the "JCPOA" was discussed on social media - a topic that on January 21, Mahmoud Vaezi, Head of Hassan Rouhani's Office, denied in a tweet, calling it "suspicious" and attributing it to "playing into Trump's hands." On January 20, during a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's death, Hassan Rouhani reminded that in the next two to three weeks, two satellites would be launched into space by the two-stage Simorgh missile from a newly established missile base on the outskirts of the Semnan desert. Rouhani's emphasis on developing missile capacity and satellite launches in the current crisis is a simple and conventional disregard for U.S. pressures and the objections of the three major European countries (Germany, Britain, and France), which have officially described it as contrary to the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, and is a calculated move to increase tensions in the region before creating emergency conditions for entering a new round of negotiations! Javad Zarif, in an immediate reaction to Pompeo's speech on January 20 at the American University in Cairo, during which the Islamic Republic was heavily attacked, emphasized: "The day Iran would want to become a 'normal' country by imitating the U.S. puppet governments and Pompeo's 'human rights models' - whether it be the Shah or the current executioners - will never come." The indirect debate between Iranian political and military officials and U.S. officials, which has recently reached a new peak, is purposeful and aims to announce readiness for retaliation against U.S. "hostile" actions and express disappointment at Europe's failure to withstand U.S. pressures. Announcing withdrawal from the JCPOA, which has practically lost its effectiveness for the Islamic Republic in the current situation and at the same time imposes specific commitments on it, is the only relatively low-risk option (compared to blocking the Strait of Hormuz) to increase tensions in the region before a reconciliation situation arises, in an action similar to the situation leading to the "drinking of the poison chalice" and acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 598 - a thought that could occur either after launching the Simorgh missile and in response to subsequent European and U.S. objections, or could be temporarily suspended in continuation of the "heroic flexibility" and in hopes of finding "new channels of communication." The opinions expressed in this note do not necessarily reflect the views of Radio Farda.