Iran's Foreign Policy in 1395

An examination of theoretical structures - The year 1395 was undoubtedly one of the most dynamic years in Iran's foreign policy, during which Iran faced unique opportunities and challenges. To evaluate how Iran dealt with these challenges and utilized opportunities, it is necessary to examine the influencing factors on its foreign policy. Last year, two main factors had a continuous impact on Iran's foreign policy: first, the necessity of preserving the achievements of the nuclear agreement with the West, which was the sole product of about three years of the Rouhani administration's work, in order to present it as a successful policy both domestically and internationally and to base future relations on it; second, efforts to open new relations with other countries, including Arab neighbors, as a supportive move to continue the moderate trend in Iran's foreign policy. The extent to which Iran succeeded in achieving its foreign policy goals is another discussion that this article attempts to address, but such a judgment requires a deeper understanding of the drivers and characteristics influencing the two aforementioned main factors. For this purpose, a brief look at the structure of Rouhani's foreign policy can clarify the reasons and causes of its orientations. The structure of Iran's foreign policy - Iran's foreign policy is the product of cooperation and competition among multiple factors that operate simultaneously and sometimes interfere with each other. These factors and infrastructures include: the Islamic-revolutionary ideology of the Islamic Republic; the Supreme Leader's perception of threats and enemies; the long-term interests of the country and the Iranian nation; and the relationships and interactions among predominantly hostile groups within the governance. The commonality of all these underlying factors is the interference and creation of pressure levers from various directions on Iran's foreign policy decisions. These pressures affect Iran's foreign policy in such a way that often distinguishing the requirements of national interests from commands arising from revolutionary and ideological beliefs becomes impossible. For this reason, the Iranian foreign policy apparatus is practically unable to analyze foreign policy objectives based on the expertise of its specialists and provide solutions to achieve them, and in the vast majority of sensitive cases, the foreign policy apparatus becomes an agent and executor of commands issued from 'above.' While most theorists consider the best way to secure national interests and security to be bottom-up expert work and entrusting the results to the top, so that government and foreign ministry experts can become familiar with the details of the decision-making process and outcomes in advance and discover ways to control tensions or avoid them. When the results of research are transferred up through the scientific and administrative hierarchy and then those findings are turned into actionable policy in the foreign policy decision-making council, it not only benefits from a practically strategic and calculated approach to preserving national interests and security but also timely utilizes crisis control mechanisms. Meanwhile, when the foreign policy apparatus is merely tasked with executing orders issued from 'above,' it has no discretion or initiative in any case, and thus it does not matter who is at the head of the foreign policy apparatus. After the very successful start of negotiations with the P5+1 and approaching what is known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the initiative was taken away from the direct actors of Iran's foreign policy and fell into the hands of occasionally unknown layers of power-seeking factions within the system, each pursuing its own goals within individual and group frameworks. Last year, we witnessed the most friction between these factions and the agents of Iran's foreign policy. For example, the controversy that was stirred up in the months of Azar and Dey 1395 by a member of the National Security Commission of the Parliament, during which it was stated that Zarif mistakenly 'confessed' and should not trust the 'talks and promises' of then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. Regardless of how authentic this statement was and in what context it was made, the fact that a foreign minister was subjected to such scrutiny that he 'erred' on the greatest achievement of the foreign policy of the Rouhani administration indicates how much internal power factions interfere and overlap in political and national security decision-making. On the other hand, if we look at the JCPOA from another angle, we see its importance and prominent role in international politics and trade. For example, it is clear that the new U.S. president was willing and had promised during the election campaign to annul the JCPOA (which, of course, pleased the Iranian hardliners), but in practice, under pressure from the European Union and other countries that were reluctant to disrupt this multilateral agreement, he has been forced to accommodate it. In this context, an important question arises: Has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted any studies to neutralize this trend and attempted to find a diplomatic solution for it? Is there anything that Iran's foreign policy has invested diplomatically in? For instance, after signing the multilateral JCPOA, has there been any precise calculations regarding long-term investments by Europeans, and based on that, has the foreign ministry been tasked with creating strong communication bridges to leverage European pressure against the U.S.? The answer to this question is likely negative, and it was the calculations of national interests on the part of Europeans that unilaterally compelled them to support the nuclear deal and, in that context, European diplomacy cautiously pressured the U.S. to prioritize European interests in any actions against Iran. Therefore, there was no specific diplomatic maneuver from Iran. Even in the deal with Boeing, the Americans were proactive, while in Iran, only slogans were raised against American institutions, politicians, and the government. For this reason, the Boeing deal was delayed, and in practice, this influential industrial-economic institution was able to act against Donald Trump's pressures at the last possible moments and maintain the balance in favor of Boeing. The British company BP stands in contrast to Boeing, as it had not made a significant agreement with Iran before the U.S. elections and was practically reluctant to enter the Iranian market due to fears of pressure from the U.S. and even refrained from participating in oil tenders. Here, it is also necessary to mention British diplomacy, which, in the absence of a specific and calculated policy from Iran, has not yet succeeded in fully normalizing its relations with Iran. In other words, the power groups and factions within the governance have been able to prevent the expansion of relations with Britain and obstruct it because there has been no evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of relations with Britain or any other country. In contrast to Britain, we should mention the relations between Germany and Iran, which, despite the obstructions, Iran eventually succumbed to German national interest calculations and opened its doors to Germany. If the Germans now intend to negotiate with Donald Trump and pressure him regarding some issues that are directly and indirectly related to Iran, it is not due to Iran's calculations, but rather coincidentally and because of German interests. At the same time, this issue indicates that if Iran were a skilled player in its foreign policy, it could easily count on the support of European friends today and reduce pressure from Saudi Arabia or, for instance, seek help from European friends in response to Donald Trump's government order to ban the entry of Iranians and halt visa issuance for them. Of course, it can be said that Iran's perspective on the issue of banning Iranian travel to the U.S. is a separate matter, but it is evident that this issue, regardless of what it is, has not been planned for or studied in advance by Iran's foreign policy regarding it. Some other diplomatic events in the past couple of years have drawn observers' attention. Although it is unclear whether they were intentional or unintentional, they nonetheless show that Iran's foreign policy apparatus at least does not have a correct and specific assessment regarding such events in advance, or perhaps due to nearly four decades of distance from private and international diplomatic circles and meetings, it has lost its grip on matters. For example, we can refer to the following cases: - In negotiations with David Cameron, the politician and Prime Minister of Britain, the way of sitting (crossing the right leg over the left while the President of Iran was sitting to his left) was criticized. - President Rouhani's press conference in Italy under the statue of the Iranian conqueror from the Parthian Empire in the municipality of Rome and other similar cases. - The visit of Swedish diplomats wearing hijabs to Iran and a completely female delegation sitting in front of a completely male group of male officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran drew a flood of criticism towards the foreign policy apparatus of both countries. Sweden (for wearing hijabs) and Iran (for the all-male delegation) were criticized. While this combination more indicates a lack of planning and perhaps the surprise of Iran's foreign policy officials. For meetings, the composition of delegations is clear in advance, and both sides are aware of the members of the delegations. However, regarding the hijab of Swedish women, it is likely that the Swedes calculated that to succeed and make an impact in negotiations, they needed to create an appearance, and so it happened. When we compare the attire of the hijab-wearing Swedish women with the completely free and unconventional attire of Italian diplomats in meetings with President (Rouhani) or Speaker (Larijani) and then compare it with the meeting of Rouhani and Zarif with Mrs. Theresa May, the Prime Minister of Britain, which took place on the sidelines of the 71st annual session of the United Nations General Assembly, we can easily conclude that the issue of adhering to diplomatic protocols was not considered, and European diplomats did what they thought would be more impactful. The published photo of the meeting between Rouhani and Zarif with Mrs. May was criticized by Iranian religious extremists because Mrs. May's skirt did not cover below the knee. This criticism itself shows how instead of focusing on the content of the negotiations, the appearance and attire of the parties are the concern of those who influence Iran's foreign policy. A successful foreign policy program should be able to create aligned international currents and leverage them towards long-term goals and national interests; and at the same time, utilize the same positive conditions to reduce tensions and the heavy burden of disputes. Iran's aligned currents are predominantly groups that themselves are engaged in conflict with the international system and therefore do not count as credibility for Iran. In other words, supporting groups that have been labeled as terrorist cannot enhance Iran's legitimacy in the world. In this regard, Iran, as in the past, ended the year 1395 in a situation where it could not make any positive change towards correcting global perceptions regarding its regional objectives. Iran's foreign policy objectives - It is not possible to speak definitively about Iran's foreign policy objectives because not all objectives are approved by all foreign policy agents or the government. Nevertheless, some groups within the governance support regional Shiites, and this support is believed by many analysts to be targeted. Furthermore, Iran's support is directed towards groups rather than necessarily countries. For example, Iran supports the presidency of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the premiership of Haider al-Abadi in Iraq. It is unclear whether these supports and interactions will remain with internal political changes in these countries. Iran also supports the Houthis in Yemen (the Ansar Allah movement composed of Zaydi Shiites of Yemen) and some underground groups in Bahrain, but Iran does not support radical Islamic groups like al-Qaeda or the group known as the Islamic State. Iran's support for Sunnis is specifically limited to Palestinians and only due to their conflict with Israel. The year 1395 witnessed a noticeable shift in Iran's foreign policy towards its powerful northern neighbor, the Russian Federation. Political, military, and diplomatic cooperation with Russia regarding the Russian military operations in Syria, on one hand, the purchase of sensitive weapons such as the S-300 system, and the controversial granting of a military base within Iranian territory for attacks on points in Syria were among the sensitive issues that characterized this relationship. In return, especially after the liberation of Aleppo, Russia also acknowledged Iran's role in Syrian matters. Since early Bahman, Russia and Iran, along with Turkey, Syria, and Kazakhstan, have actively participated in the Astana conference in Kazakhstan's capital to find a political solution in Syria; however, following the Astana conference, Syrian opponents who participated in the Geneva meeting under the auspices of the United Nations demanded an end to Iran's role in Syria. In contrast, Iran and its western neighbor Turkey experienced friction several times to the point of severing relations. This friction occurred while Iran was continuously increasing its support for Syria by forming and training groups that were recruited from other countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan and sending them to Syria in the form of the Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun brigades. Although Iran has consistently claimed its presence in an advisory capacity in Syria, the number of casualties among members of the Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun brigades, who are also known as defenders of the shrine, particularly after the death of Hossein Hamadani, the commander of the 'Imam Hussein' headquarters in Syria, has seen an upward trend. Some sources report a high number of casualties.