Iran's Foreign Policy: In Theory and Practice

In the first two sections of this article, titled "The Two-Year Record of Rouhani's Foreign Policy," we examined aspects of Rouhani's two-year foreign policy performance in relation to internal and structural obstacles, as well as its operational problems at the regional level. In this section, we address the factors contributing to the inefficacy of presidents in Iran in general, and specifically the inefficacy of Hassan Rouhani. A charismatic leader and a coup. In a general view, it can be said that Iran's foreign policy is determined by the Supreme Leader. The possibility that the Revolutionary Guard or other military power centers also play a minor role in this policymaking or merely confirm the leader's decisions is quite evident. But is there a dichotomy between the military and Rouhani's government? If this assumption is correct or close to correct, and the majority of military personnel loyal to the leader are on one side while the government is on the other, it is probable that the military may find itself in a position where it feels threatened regarding the principles and foundations of the regime to which it is loyal. The extent of this feeling of threat is unclear and may even reject the government's willingness or public support for opening the political and social space as a result of changes in foreign policy, thus easily resorting to military dominance and preventing any changes. Such tendencies are not unprecedented among military personnel in Middle Eastern countries and have been observed and executed multiple times. Over the past half-century, Egypt, Turkey, and Iraq have witnessed numerous instances of military coups. In Iran, the system of Velayat-e Faqih has attempted to contain parallel powers by establishing relationships based on the charisma of leadership and non-material dominance, or in other words, "charismatic" leadership, to create a balance between itself and mutual containment so that neither can act unilaterally. An example of this can be seen in the formation of parallel but similar forces within the Revolutionary Guard and the army. However, it should not be forgotten that the relationship based on the charisma of leadership always suffers from the internal contradiction that it is difficult to convince people to maintain the same level of obedience to the next leader after the death of a charismatic leader. As Max Weber put it, when the second leader is younger and lacks the same personality traits as the first leader, naturally, acceptance and replacement as a new "charisma" will be more challenging. For this reason, Mr. Khamenei's leadership, despite its longer duration, has never been able to generate the same level of unquestionable acceptance as his predecessor and has constantly faced questions regarding its jurisprudential legitimacy. Some individuals, by raising questions and inquiries, have put themselves at risk of long imprisonment and social deprivation. Among the prominent figures in society are individuals like Dr. Shoaleh Saadi, a lawyer, university professor, and several-time representative in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. In most cases, ordinary people are astonished at how a person has assumed leadership without their vote and why they should submit to such a matter. Military commanders, whether they follow the charismatic leader or not, at least consider themselves to be at a higher level in military sciences and understanding of tactical and strategic issues. However, some military personnel play roles at higher levels and do not accept the accepted principle that political decision-making is done by politicians, and military personnel have a consultative role at that stage. They want to play the roles of diagnosis, prescription, treatment, surgery, and even shrouding and burying the dead all at once. This is why, in times of crisis, all decisions are made at once, leading to military coups. The government and national interests can differ among political managers, state leaders, and presidents (current or former), and practically, conflicts and contradictions can arise between aspects such as national interests and security on one hand and their compatibility with the three principles emphasized by the leader: "dignity, wisdom, and expediency" on the other. There are substantial differences between the ideals of individuals motivated to gain political power and the daily realities, as well as the theories and strategies to achieve those ideals on one side and the principles emphasized by the leader on the other. Another possibility is that the president may not necessarily align all three principles desired by the leader with national interests at all times and places. Therefore, due to serious differences in viewpoints, balance and coordination between the government and the leadership do not persist, and disagreements become public. Additionally, since the constitution has given almost all decision-making powers to the leader, it is natural that he uses a group of obedient and compliant advisors and perceives his ideals in contrast to the president's diagnosis, hiding behind the protective shield of "dignity, wisdom, and expediency," which is often non-negotiable, and vetoing any opposing opinions. However, the veto of opposing opinions does not occur explicitly, and unlike the past, no president is sidelined overnight to claim eternal legitimacy like Banisadr. Groups that would be harmed by changes in policies usually support the leader's decisions and refer to them as legally principled and even superior, calling them "the final word" so that there is no need to traverse the corridors of the legislative and judicial branches and without delay, they become the necessary executive order of the leader. To end Khatami's "reforms," a plan was patiently laid out over eight consecutive years. Even in the face of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his associates, patience and restraint were exercised, and ultimately, by the second term of his presidency, it reached a point where the reform line was suppressed, and the representative of reforms was deemed discredited. Ahmadinejad, who lacked the courage and standing among the people that Khatami had, resorted to prophecy and theorizing about the Imam of the Time as a last resort. The issue of the Imam of the Time does not fall within the domain of the government or the leadership but questions the essence of the Velayat-e Faqih and subsequently draws a wide range of clerics and scholars into the fray, which is ultimately not desirable for the leadership. The confrontation with the clergy. The strategy of negotiating with the West was formulated based on the idea of "de-escalation" and certainly not as a "passive policy" or "submissiveness," but to "prevent the use of the tools of domination to sustain its existence." (Quotes from Mr. Ambassador's book, a dialogue between Mohammad Mahdi Raji and Mohammad Javad Zarif, p. 144). Rouhani's government and the foreign ministry team were very happy and excited to take initial steps towards "de-escalation" at the beginning of their term. Rouhani, who did not rule out a meeting with Obama, refrained from that due to the opposition of a few members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, but eventually had a pre-arranged phone conversation with the U.S. president, the content of which was never disclosed. However, when Rouhani and his companions returned to Tehran, instead of the multitude of Iranians who usually read the introduction and conclusion before the content, they faced a small group of protesters who had reached a conclusion against it before reading the introduction and content of the book and thus responded to his rapprochement with the West by holding prayers in the path of the president's entrance and throwing a shoe at Rouhani. From that time on, against every step the government took to achieve desirable results in negotiations, a deterrent statement from the leadership and affiliated groups or groups such as the "concerned ones" who enjoy the implicit support of the leader was raised. Nevertheless, until the last days, it could not be decisively judged whether the leadership was absolutely opposed or supportive of Rouhani's policy of rapprochement with the West, despite the fact that there was no major opposition to the essence of the negotiations. In a situation where only a few days remained until the repeatedly extended deadline of the 1+5 negotiations, and it was unclear whether the victory or failure of this strategy would be attributed to which of the power elements in Iran, suddenly the leadership officially supports the government and the foreign minister (who had just a week earlier been labeled a traitor and a sellout by the concerned members of the parliament) and introduces them as trustworthy individuals without mentioning the president's constructive interaction policy. These statements once again clarify that Mr. Khamenei is not opposed to the essence of the negotiations, and if an agreement is reached, it should be attributed to the victory of the leadership rather than the government. Of course, the public reactions, although short-lived, quickly moved from the streets into homes and virtual spaces, but even in that limited time, it became clear that the people had not backed down from their demand for social freedoms. Generalities or details? According to the constitution, the role of the leader is to determine the general lines of foreign policy. In the absence of free political parties, the process of shaping Iran's foreign policy is not entirely visible and is not carried out in a logical and rational manner but is the result of the influence of advisors close to the leader. If the president is in a position to influence the decision-making process, one can hope that the government has also played a role in this process; otherwise, the government becomes an executive tool, and its understanding of foreign policy is not taken into account. Since the beginning of Mr. Rouhani's presidency two years ago, it seemed that an agreement had been reached for a transformation in foreign policy between the government and the leadership, but the dimensions of this understanding have not been visible and still are not. The religious-based government structure of Iran has consistently had vital conflicts with past and present governments. While the government uses all means to maintain the regime, some governments have fluctuated between reform from within and engagement with the West or proximity to the East instead of the West or focusing on neighbors instead of major powers. This very conflict has been clearly observed in Mr. Rouhani's government and has led to its inefficacy over the past two years. Even if the nuclear negotiations yield the desired result, it should not be seen as a sign of the government's victory. The nuclear negotiations over the two years of Rouhani's government have best illustrated the conflict between the perspectives of the charismatic leadership circle and other influential factors in shaping a long-term foreign policy strategy. Various factors influence the foreign policy decision-making process. At the same time, it is unclear which of the factors ultimately influences the final decision and its implementation: - The charismatic leadership (with all the problems it faces in establishing itself as the charisma after Ayatollah Khomeini) is on one side of this equation. - The executive and political management of Mr. Rouhani as the head of the government, who seeks a special approach amidst the restrictive and binding webs, is another important factor. At the same time, Rouhani, who has a desire for reform in its most limited form, must come to terms with the leadership to implement his minimal policies. - Despite the theoretical separation of powers, the judiciary and legislative branches currently have special conditions and interests in the country. The judiciary is elected by the leader, while it can also play a role in the selection of the leader, but the lifelong nature of the leadership makes such a role completely impossible. This branch, of course, has a role in the composition of the Guardian Council and the Council for Reviewing the Leader's Performance. These roles create mutual interests and allow the leadership circle to manipulate the judiciary's performance. Legislators have interests beyond being able to take a direct stance against or even mildly criticize the policies supported by groups under the command, control, and close to the leader. The interests of parliament representatives are not limited to large salaries and budgets at their disposal for spending in their electoral districts. Some representatives are owners of investment firms and construction projects, land and housing distribution networks, and other economic interactions. Naturally, moving against the wave created by the leader and any change in the political atmosphere poses a major financial and economic threat to their interests, and thus they prefer to move with the wave, prioritizing satisfying the leader over their electoral district. - On the other hand, military commanders and the Revolutionary Guard are positioned, who naturally claim to have complete oversight and control over very complex regional issues. Some of these commanders, like Qassem Soleimani, resort to charismatic methods in line with or following the leader's style, while others do not recognize rivals in their understanding of strategic and regional security issues, but all of them, beyond their roles and capabilities, serve as a support for the leader's theories, which, according to the constitution, should only outline "the country's major policies." The economic enterprises that came under the supervision of the Revolutionary Guard after the end of the war with Iraq have themselves become a very solid protective bastion in the political relations between them and the government on one side and the Guard and the leadership on the other. In various cases, from the language of the commanders and the rhetoric they use, it can be observed that the direction of the Guard generally aligns with reiterating the leader's words in different language and rhetoric, but rarely finds angles that diverge from the leader's discourse, indicating conflicting interests. Of course, this conflict has not yet moved beyond the realm of words and rhetoric, indicating that a military chain has been woven around the central power circle and often acts pragmatically under special conditions, understanding the acute circumstances of the country. Many Iranian intellectuals believe that if such pragmatism did not exist, neither Mr. Hassan Rouhani would have been elected nor would his government have been tasked with resolving the nuclear dispute. Pragmatism should not be thought of as a sufficient and necessary condition for achieving desirable results. It seems that Mr. Khamenei's statements a week after the announcement of the Vienna agreement precisely define the limits of this pragmatism and outline new red lines. The agreement with 1+5 should not lead to the establishment of bilateral or multilateral relations with the United States; this is the new Achilles' heel of Iran's foreign policy philosophy at the end of the first two years of the presidency.